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Abstract
Thirty years after the return to democracy, Argentina and Brazil are still facing challenges to de-
mocratize communications. In both countries, a commercial approach to culture and communications
prevails, with high rates of ownership concentration in few private ﬁrms, irrespective of the negative
consequences this has for the existence of a diversity of media voices, particularly from underrepre-
sented groups. Nevertheless, since the arrival to power of left wing governments in 2003, both coun-
tries have been experiencing changes that question this situation; for example, Argentina introduced
a new audiovisual communication services law in 2009 regulating the radio spectrum and stimulat-
ing NGO media; whereas Brazil has been funding different cultural and free media networks through
cultural policies. Yet, research has paid little attention to the processes of emergence of these media
projects that try to depart from the for-proﬁt culture and communication model of non-Western coun-
tries. In this context, this work offers a conceptual framework to understand the key dimensions that
shape how nongovernmental audiovisual media projects striving for social transformation challenge a
predominant commercial approach to culture and communication.
The conceptual framework divides the analysis into three levels: media system, policy discourses
and the speciﬁc media cases under analysis. The ﬁrst one considers the historical changes in the struc-
ture and actors of the media system in both countries, which help to comprehend the contemporary
problems of ownership concentration and the most important actors. The second level examines the
main and counter policy discourses in competition to change the existing media system, while the third
level focuses on key dimensions that have been shaping (both enabling and restricting) the projects of
new media experiences in both countries. In particular, it takes into account the important role of the
speciﬁc discourses that these experiences create to challenge a for-proﬁt communication model, which
introduces context speciﬁc interpretation schemes and visions on how communications, culture, and
more generally society, ought to be. Apart from the discursive dimension, the third level considers the
potentials and limits that technologies put on new projects, together with the ‘soft’ constraints that
quality patterns have in new media cases. Furthermore, the framework considers different types of
violence from incumbents that the cases have to withstand, which is a relevant dimension to under-
stand why these cases do not spur as fast as expected. Additionally, the conceptual framework proposes
ways to study participation and the reception of content by audiences. Finally yet importantly, the con-
ceptual framework incorporates a resource view of power to research about the different strategies for
acquiring and mobilizing resources that media projects employ to keep in operation.
This conceptual framework builds on empirical data gathered in Argentina and Brazil covering both
levels of interest. On the one hand, interviews with former and current policy makers span the pol-
icy discourse level, plus the analysis of policy documents and other sources. On the other hand, the
empirical data of the four selected case studies was collected mixing both participant observation and
xii
the material generated by and about each experience. In particular, in Argentina the thesis considers
the ﬁrst co-operative channel and the ﬁrst Mapuche indigenous community channel under the new au-
diovisual communication services law. Moreover, the research covers a preexisting ‘alternative media’
channel operating in a factory recovered by its workers, which was legalized after the law had been
passed. As regards Brazil, the thesis builds the argument on the experience of a media collective, Mí-
dia NINJA, which represents practices of the ‘collaborative economy’ advanced by a network of cultural
agents operating across the country.
In sum, this work makes empirical and theoretical contributions, stressing the importance of com-
munication to the aims of the international ‘development’ agenda, and its importance to open up spaces
for different visions and perspectives. This is not only academically relevant, but also practically for
Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries that are experiencing similar media change
processes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During the past 15 years, it is safe to say that the mainstream approach to culture and media policies
for development has been shaped by the idea of the ‘creative industries’ emanating from the United
Kingdom (UK), and later comprehended by the term creative economy, proposed by international orga-
nizations like UNCTAD as a ‘feasible development option’ (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). In synthesis,
this perspective advances a commercial approach to culture, stressing the importance of the contribu-
tion of such industries for exports, employment and economic growth, above any other type of alter-
native (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Hartley 2005). Accordingly, this strategy has been attractive to
several governments around the world that need to boost their economic growth rates as part of an
increasingly global and interconnected capitalist economy. For example, Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Singapore and Tanzania, among others (Hornidge 2011; Prince 2010; Wang 2004).
However, critiques stress that the original version of the creative industries emanating from the UK
is a vague concept that represents particular interests oriented speciﬁcally to extend intellectual prop-
erty rights that undermine the objective of ‘access’ to culture (Garnham 2005; Schlesinger 2007). These
statements are important, because if the creative economy approach suffers such shortcomings in the
industrialized nation where it was more strongly advocated, then the claims for a global development
option based on such an approach needs to be even more seriously scrutinized.
In the context of these discussions on cultural politics, among all the sectors considered by the
creative industries, in this thesis I put the focus on the tensions in the media sector. I made this
selection because of two main reasons. First, they are essential in the creation, reproduction and
distribution of knowledge, and consequently in shaping how humans view the world (McQuail 1983).
In effect, research about human-media interactions indicates the existence of a ‘media equation’, which
states that people treat and interact with media such as computers and TVs as if they were dealing with
humans (Reeves and Nass 1996). This implies that there is more than just a utilitarian relation with
media: “media can evoke emotional responses, demand attention, threaten us, inﬂuence memories, and
change ideas on what is natural” (p. 251). This suggests that people can get used to media and forget all
the mediations present in their production processes due to the emotional connections that they might
establish among them. Consequently, how we choose and what we receive from media might inﬂuence,
but not determine the way we perceive the world. Third, the importance of media has been continuously
increasing in the last century and even more so with the expansion of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT), which has been identiﬁed as a meta-process called ‘mediatization’, indicating how
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changes in media are offering new possibilities of human communication and interaction (Krotz 2007;
Hjarvard 2008). In sum, media play an important role in changing people’s perceptions given their
‘natural’ daily interaction with them. However, these inﬂuences are manifold and not linear, depending
on the kind of content these media produce and how they produce it.
The second reason for studying media relates to its historical relevance within the ‘development’
project. Indeed, since its beginnings, communication and media have been considered as central to dis-
seminate modernization models emanating from Western nations, but during the 1980s this Western-
centric approach faced the challenge of a new perspective advocating for the right to communicate. This
perspective was best illustrated by UNESCO and its MacBride report (UNESCO 1980). It advocated
for the right to communicate, aiming to surpass the previous struggle for freedom of information by
acknowledging the inequalities in the international ﬂow of information between the industrialized and
the rest of countries, and stressing the importance of NGO media compared to private and state owned
media. Nonetheless, the commercial perspective defended by the USA and the UK prevailed, establish-
ing the mainstream approach that considers information, and more generally culture, as just another
economic activity, a source of proﬁts or a mere commodity, which contributes to the economic growth of
nations to achieve ‘development’. From a political economy point of view, this can be understood as a
consequence of the end of the Cold War, giving rise to the unquestionable leadership of the USA and its
strong allies, such as the UK, which in the ﬁeld of culture and media globally disseminated commercial
models convenient to their interests. Indeed, Enghel (2015) understands this as part of the more gen-
eral process of ‘neoliberal’ globalization expanded by Western countries, which reinforces inequalities
in media and culture. If this perspective is true, it might explain why the approach advanced by the
MacBride report has lost prominence at the international level, but it does not say anything about the
diverse social movements and civil society organizations around the world still striving for the ideals
of participation in information production, distribution and access, and for communication as a hu-
man right (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). Accordingly, there is a gap between the mainstream and
the global commercial approach to culture and media for development, with grassroots practices still
opposing the former.
These international discussions set the stage for this thesis, which inquires about how media or-
ganizations that claim to oppose a commercial approach to communication can advance their projects,
despite the predominance of policies and material structures not favoring such initiatives. Different
scholars and activists have recognized that these organizations are under-researched, and stressed
the need to advance a theorization of these different types of media (Thomas 2015; Lennie and Tac-
chi 2015; Enghel 2015; Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio Dagron 2009). Indeed, these authors focused on
and suggested different dimensions to take into account in such endeavors. For example, the most
evident one is to address the ﬁnancial limits of these media (Carpentier, Lie, and Servaes 2008; Saeed
2009). Nonetheless, researchers have pointed out other dimensions as equally important, such as au-
diences and content consumption (Sandoval and Fuchs 2010; Fuchs 2010), the limits created by the
existing media structure (Thomas 2015), power issues and the role of participation (Pettit, Salazar,
and Gumucio Dagron 2009; Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011). The more contemporary theoriza-
tions emanate from critical theory (Fuchs 2010), which departing from Marxist concepts aim to offer
a universal approach to research what Fuchs calls ‘alternative media’. This strand of research is un-
doubtedly relevant given the focus on noncommercial and in many cases anti-capitalists experiences.
Although I am sympathetic to such an approach, which is in the tradition of critical research trying
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to eliminate the social obstacles that hamper the ﬂourishing of humans (Schuurman 2009); I will not
follow that path in this thesis for two reasons. First, such frameworks are not based on empiricism,
but on seminal literature of the European Marxist tradition. Second, even though such theoretical
constructions might be academically important, from my point of view they overlook the diversity of
ways that media experiences can generate patterns of interpretation of their context and schemes of
action to create noncommercial projects, different from those found in Western contexts. Contrarily,
in this research I shall take an empirical approach mostly based on the sociology of knowledge, which
from my point of view is more suitable to understand the diversity of human constructions of knowl-
edge. Although it can also be criticized, because its creators were Western authors, I shall show that
its concepts are less dogmatic, and thus, easier to adapt for the interpretivist perspective that I adopt
in this research. Therefore, I depart with the hypothesis that there might be many interpretations
on how culture and media ought to be put into practice, beyond commercial approaches. From this
point of view, the critical frameworks inspired in the Marxist tradition might capture some aspects of
the practice of these media, but from my point of view they do not match the practices of all, such as
those advanced by indigenous community organizations or new social movements that mix collective
and online practices in new ways.
Taking into account these research gaps, in this thesis I propose a conceptual framework based
on empirical research to interpret how media projects striving for social transformation can challenge
a commercial approach to communications. In particular, this research studies the global disputes on
culture, communication and social transformation in Argentina and Brazil, focusing on non private and
non state media because of two main reasons. First, both countries are good examples of what analysts
call a ‘post-neoliberal’ period in Latin America (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012), which refers to left-wing
political parties questioning the so-called neoliberal policies in the 1990s that prioritized privatizations,
reduced the role of the state and displayed a lack of concern for the poorest sectors of society (Grimson
2007). Additionally, the post-neoliberal period alludes to a challenge of the inﬂuence of international
models to shape the ‘development’ of the region, in particular the USA and international development
organizations. Although the extent up to which the neoliberal policies have been surpassed is not a
closed debate, I assume that at least the rhetorical breakup indicates tensions worth researching. Par-
ticularly in Argentina, these tendencies initiated with the arrival to power of Néstor Kirchner in 2003;
whereas in Brazil they began when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva representing the Workers’ Party assumed
the presidency in the same year. These political changes have opened up new spaces for grassroots de-
mands; for instance, from indigenous communities and similarly from different ways of organizing the
economy, such as the social and solidarity movement that operates in various countries of the region.
Second, Argentina and Brazil are good examples to consider change processes in the ﬁeld of culture in
general, and the media in particular. On the one hand, the commercial approach to culture and commu-
nication policies is still present and mainstream in both countries to varying degrees and, at different
governmental levels. This is a clear contradiction to the description of a ‘post-neoliberal’ period, be-
cause it implies the continuity of the adoption of foreign concepts to justify a commercial approach to
culture and communication, overlooking speciﬁc local issues. On the other hand, Argentina and Brazil
have implemented culture and media policies that depart from this perspective, which generates spaces
for innovation. For instance, in 2009 Argentina introduced a new audiovisual communication services
law that allows co-operatives, trade unions, indigenous communities and other organizations to apply
for television or radio licenses, something that was previously forbidden. As regards Brazil, it did not
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break with old media policies, it rather introduced quite ‘revolutionary’ changes to its cultural policies
that promoted networks of collectives, access to the internet and digital culture in general, which have
spurred the establishment of several cultural and media collectives across the country operating as
nonproﬁt organizations. Therefore, new actors emerged that are challenging previous private media
elites. I do, however, not intend to stress that they are doing so in a substantial way to replace them,
but rather showing incumbents that they are no longer going to lead the show alone. These points are
particularly relevant in the context of Latin America, where despite the transitions to democratic polit-
ical systems during the 1980s, in many countries the inﬂuence of structures established during military
dictatorships still remained, with varied direct and subtle inﬂuences from state or media elites (Lugo-
Ocando 2008). Argentina and Brazil are good examples of these changes and tensions taking place in
the region, with different struggles among actors striving to change the inherited structures toward
the so far bounded ideal of ‘freedom of speech’.
In the rest of the chapter, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy review the main conceptual changes in development,
in order to understand the corresponding connections with culture and media in the next subsection.
These links trace the historical political discussions at the international level, which have inﬂuenced
policies and practices in Argentina and Brazil. In Section 1.4, I will state the main research question
of the thesis, followed in the next section by the methods employed. Finally, I will delineate the content
of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Modernity and Development
Development can be understood as a product of modernization (Quijano 2000), which was a term in-
troduced in the 1950s that re elaborated the concerns of social sciences about modernity (Habermas
1990); where the latter can be understood as the “amalgam of new practices and institutional forms
(science, technology, industrial production, urbanization), of new ways of living (individualism, secular-
ization, instrumental rationality) and of new forms of malaise (alienation, meaninglessness, a sense of
impending social dissolution)” (Taylor 2002, p. 91). However, such deﬁnitions of modernity and mod-
ernization tend to forget that such projects were inseparable from the expansion of European powers
to ‘civilize’ the rest of the world, leading to colonialism all around the world, with the terrible conse-
quences for those who suffered the conquest. As it is known, this situation changed after World War II
with the emergence and competition of the USA and the USSR as global superpowers, displacing the
former European powers. In that context, President Truman’s address in 1949 initiated development
as a discourse, when he uttered the need to help the economically less advanced nations in the world
to catch up with the most advanced (Escobar 1995), which Escobar interprets as a USA strategy to
reduce the inﬂuence of the USSR and advance capitalism in the ideological struggle with communism.
This development project assumed that economic growth would catalyze modernization in ‘underde-
veloped’ countries, thus stopping them from becoming communist. The central idea was to ‘catch up’
with ‘developed nations’, an idea clearly stated by Rostow (1960), who subtitled his work ‘a non commu-
nist manifesto’ that organized societies in ﬁve stages of ‘development’: traditional society; pre take-off;
take-off; the drive to maturity; and ﬁnally the age of high-consumption, which reﬂected the USA model
of the time. This style of thought assumes that modernization and development are linear and uni-
versal processes, composed of a set of stages where the top ones are based on the examples of pioneer
countries. Their followers then have to reluctantly accept to ‘catch up’ with them; something that still
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prevails in much of contemporary literature.
This simplistic and naive image of modernization and development has been challenged from dif-
ferent perspectives. First, post-colonial authors stress that the association of modernity with ‘The
Enlightenment’, is just one side of the coin, which hides the other one: coloniality. This encompasses
oppression, colonialism, racism, environmental destruction, and the general cruelty of European mod-
ernization projects that began with the conquest of the Americas (Mignolo 2002; Dussel 1993). The
expansion of these ‘universal’ ideas was not by chance, but a deliberative effort of Europe and later the
USA through their military and economic strength. For these reasons, authors criticize the colonial
inheritance of development, though less explicit, because it still considers the West as the yardstick
against which to compare the ‘rest’ (Hall 1996). Second, empirical evidence casts doubt on the success
of the lineal development project, because a simple count of the number of wars, refugees, different
sorts of inequalities and crises still tormenting the contemporary world, shows that the results of the
project at a global scale have been futile so far. In many cases, military and economic interventions
to stimulate ‘development’ have only worsened the problems they intended to solve, which led to “the
loss of an illusion, in which many naively believed” (Escobar 1995, p. 4). Third, development practice
and research has not been exempt of critics that point to their failure to break with dependence chains.
For example, the high dependence on ‘experts’ who tell the ‘underdeveloped’ nations how to develop
(Edwards 1989), which is based on a strong concentration of technical knowledge production in the few
countries of the ‘North’ as against those of the ‘South’, ignores local, context speciﬁc knowledge of the
people on the ground where the problems occur (Edwards 1989). These imbalances lead to a top-down
approach to interventions, deﬁned by experts in the ‘North’ to be applied in the ‘South’; therefore, pre-
serving the idea of civilizing the ‘uncivilized’ central to the notion of modernity (Dussel 1993), though
in a more subtle way.
Dependency theory is another development paradigm that was relevant between the 1960s and
early 1980s (Servaes and Malikhao 2008). In synthesis, the authors from this tradition advanced a
critical perspective of the development project, stressing that the processes of development and under-
development are linked. In other words, this tradition postulates that the ‘backwardness’ of nation-
states is not a product of inner causes, but rather of their position in the international system, where
there are actors that generate divisions between the center and the periphery. Several Latin Ameri-
can authors advanced such an approach, such as Prebisch (1981), Cardoso & Faletto (2002) in Brazil,
Sunkel et al. (1973), and also others from outside the region, such as Gunder Frank (1966) and Waller-
stein (1974), among others. The consequence of this perspective is that the solution to ‘development’
issues is not just a matter of nation-states taking the right national policies, but rather a change in the
global unequal structure favoring some nation-states over others. Despite the success in challenging
the initial conception of ‘development’, Servaes (2008) highlights that this strand of research could not
offer practical ways to tackle existing problems. However, the importance of this research strand is
that it inspired the Non-Aligned Movement of nation-states within the context of the Cold War, which
initiated the struggles for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) that I shall
detail in Section 1.3.
These criticisms have led to different re conceptualizations of development and modernity, among
them post-modernity, which has been inﬂuential in arguing the end of grand narratives and stressing
the importance of the subjective over the objective; thus, the impossibility of the existence of any sort
of linear objective road to ‘progress’ or ‘development’ (Lewellen 2003). Within this paradigm, ‘post-
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development’ emerged as a critic to development and an inquiry into new alternatives (Sidaway 2007;
Lewellen 2003). From this perspective, development has been deﬁned as a buzzword, usually under-
stood as a better future compared to the current situation, and more generally as an empty signiﬁer
ﬁlled with varying signiﬁeds (Ziai 2009). In other words, development is not something ﬁxed, but a
shibboleth that has to be dismantled in its speciﬁc context of use to understand what actors inter-
vene, what purposes they pursue and how they are planning to put forward their visions (Cornwall
2007). This might not necessarily lead to the so claimed desired and heralded better futures. This
plastic nature of the concept has paved the way for interventions claiming to be apolitical and having
good intentions to shape ‘underdeveloped’ countries according to the image of ‘developed’ ones, despite
the real political consequences that such actions might have in shaping the subjects of their interven-
tions through the power-knowledge connections they make (Ziai 2009; Lewellen 2003). Although this
post-development approach contributed to understand biases and historical change in development
discourse, it has been criticized for not acknowledging the ‘cultural turn’ in development, overstating
the inﬂuence of a unique Western model silencing local cultures, and ignoring the role of national and
grassroots projects in adopting, adapting or opposing global development discussions (Radcliffe and
Laurie 2006; Lewellen 2003). Furthermore, the lack of ‘grand narratives’ might be central to a few in-
dustrialized nations, but for many middle and low income countries it is hard to accept that the concept
of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ no longer is of political relevance. Indeed, ‘catching up’ with ‘devel-
oped’ nations is still one of the main concerns of politicians of non-Western countries. Nonetheless, in
this thesis I take the post-development approach to the subject, which implies that there is not just
one type of ‘development’, but various possible projects. Additionally, to address the mentioned short-
comings, the focus of this thesis is on how ‘development’ projects at the national and grassroots level
interact in the area of culture, regardless of the inﬂuence of international organizations in the area.
This last perspective requires to answer how culture has been related to the ‘development’ project.
1.2 Culture and Development
Although culture is a polysemic word that has varied interpretations (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952),
what matters for this research are those inﬂuential concepts applied in cultural policies in relation to
development. In particular, this section discusses a set of concepts employed by academics and interna-
tional organizations, such as the culture industry, the cultural industries, the creative industries and,
more recently, the creative economy.
1.2.1 The Culture Industry and the Cultural Industries
Horkheimer and Adorno (1947) introduced the concept of ‘culture industry’ as part of a cultural cri-
tique of capitalism, precisely against ‘high-consumption societies’ that Rostow considered as the most
‘developed’. The concept captured the tensions between the mass production of culture at the end of
WWII with the previous more artisanal ways of cultural production. A decade before, Benjamin (1935)
had already described the problem of the mechanical reproduction of works of art as an elimination of
their uniqueness and speciﬁc history (what Benjamin called ‘aura’), or more generally, how the techni-
cal reproduction detached objects from tradition. Adorno and Horkheimer went further and described
the culture industry as a mechanism of social control that introduces the for proﬁt principle above ev-
erything else in the sphere of culture, limiting its previous autonomy from a pure economic rationality
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and leading to a standardization of contents (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 14). In this scheme,
the culture industry and its technical process of reproduction deﬁne what is ‘culture’ and what should
be expressed (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, p. 103), prioritizing the diffusion of the ideology of the
status quo and conformity (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 17). Therefore, the authors understood
that the culture industry immediately created barriers between those who follow such a system and
comply with its rules, and those who do not. Within this critique, Adorno and Horkheimer identiﬁed
advertising as a central mechanism of the culture industry, which guides consumers to obtain some
products over others. However, the authors pointed out that in a capitalist economy those who have
more economic resources are the ones that have more advantages of using advertising at a large scale;
therefore, if used repetitively, it ends up working as a propaganda machine to manipulate the masses
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, p. 131). In sum, the central argument of the authors is that the cul-
ture industry produces an “anti-enlightenment effect” (Adorno and Rabinbach 1975, p. 18), by creating
dependent individuals, chained to follow the ‘examples’ that the ‘stars’ of the culture industry offer to
them. In this way, the critical attitude of ‘individuals’ to think differently in democracies is trimmed,
and also the notion of individuality, if after all it is guided by the prototype the culture industry of-
fers. Consequently, the authors’ perspective rejects the gloriﬁcation of mass consumption present in
‘developed’ societies.
The closed picture of the ‘culture industry’ controlling human consciousness does not leave any space
for optimism, and for this reasons the perspective was soon challenged by Miège and other authors of
the French school of cultural sociology, who introduced the term cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh
2013). The plural in the term points to the main difference between concepts; the cultural industries
approach remarks that these industries have diverse types of logics of operation1. For instance, the
publishing industry works with an editorial model aimed to produce cultural commodities, in contrast
to the television sector that operates under a continuous ﬂow model; thus, requiring programming
and a quasi-industrial organization (Miege 1987). Consequently, this research tradition stressed that
each industry needs to be analyzed in more detail to consider the ambivalences and complexities of
their production processes, before uttering categorical assertions claiming that the capitalist logic has
already colonized everything in the cultural sphere without leaving any space for alternative ways
of organization (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Beyond this difference, the cultural industries concept shares
the critical political economy approach of the culture industry, that is to say, it analyzes the tensions
between production and consumption, patterns of ownership concentration, and the role of different
types of workers in the production process, among others.
Exorcised from its initial negative connotations, the United Nations Educational, Scientiﬁc and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the term cultural industries. It is important to underscore
that, since the Second World War, this organization has been one of the most relevant in articulating
international cultural policies (Canelas Rubim 2011, p. 81), which is evident in the number of ini-
tiatives since the 1950s, such as the Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Co-Operation
(1966), and the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity (2005), among oth-
ers (p. 81). Speciﬁcally with respect to the cultural industries, between 1979-1980 UNESCO ﬁnanced
a project that elaborated a report for cultural industries policies (UNESCO 1982a), which was an input
for the Mexico Declaration of 1979, that globalized the concept of cultural industries and expressed
the need to introduce policies to support them around the world in order to avoid “cultural dependence
1. For example see Garnham 1979; Miège 2006; Miège and Garnham 1979; Miege 1987.
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and alienation” (UNESCO 1982b, p. 4). At the same time, the report advocated a broader deﬁnition
of culture that included a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and affective features that
characterize a society or social group (UNESCO 1982b). Such policies were mostly associated with the
promotion of national culture and nation-states (Canelas Rubim 2011). During the last decade, UN-
ESCO passed the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO 2002) and the Convention on
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005), which intro-
duced relevant ideas for this research mixing culture and development. First, the adoption of cultural
diversity as a concept that considers development to go beyond economic growth, including “a more
satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence” (p. 13). Second, the need to respect
human rights, cultural rights and minority rights to defend cultural traditions and diversity. Third,
the need for media pluralism and free speech. Fourth, the relevance of including civil society actors
besides ﬁrms and states to support cultural diversity. Fifth, to ensure the protection of copyrights and
related rights, and at the same time to facilitate the right of public access to culture. Last but not
least, both the convention and the declaration understand cultural industries as those sectors that pro-
duce and distribute cultural goods or services “considered as a speciﬁc attribute, use or purpose, [and
that] embody or convey cultural expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may have” (p. 5).
Therefore, their deﬁnition does not stress the commercial side of culture, although it acknowledges it.
Despite the importance of these declarations for resource-scarce groups around the world, it is also
true that since the 1980s UNESCO has lost prominence and support in the area of cultural and media
policies at the international level. This can be explained by an increasing commercialization of culture
and media policies, associated with the expansion of neoliberal thought (Kozul-Wright and Rayment
2007), which was contrary to UNESCO’s position, together with a conﬂict related to media policies that
I shall explain in Section 1.3, but ﬁrst I will continue to detail more recent concepts linking culture and
development at the international level.
1.2.2 The Knowledge Economy, Creative Industries and the Creative Econ-
omy
During the 1990s, policy discourses adopted academic concepts such as the information society (F. Web-
ster 2002; Castells 2010), the knowledge based economy (Drucker 1994) or the knowledge society (Stehr
1994; Hornidge 2007). Although their deﬁnition has not been consistent, these concepts point to soci-
etal changes related to the expansion of ICT, the increase of new types of jobs beyond industrial ones
(often, but incorrectly labeled as ‘service sector’), and the general relevance of knowledge in products
and services. The herald of new economies and societies that these concepts referred to, had an inﬂu-
ence on the emergence of new terms in cultural policies; speciﬁcally the ‘creative industries’ that have
been described as a new policy discourse attuned to such presupposed social changes.
In 1994, Australia was the ﬁrst country to introduce the term ‘creative industries’ into its public
policies, but it was the UK experience under the New Labour government that globally expanded the
concept (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008). In a post-industrial context, the Department for Culture, Media
& Sport (DCMS) introduced the creative industries as a concept for cultural policy and deﬁned the term
as “[...] those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have
a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property”
(DCMS 1998). This deﬁnition covered the following arbitrary and disparate sectors: “advertising, archi-
tecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, ﬁlm and video, interactive leisure
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software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer services, television and radio”.
Their selection can be understood in relation to the areas of inﬂuence of the department; while others
that would satisfy the condition of being ‘creative’ were left aside. This original deﬁnition became the
cornerstone of further conceptualizations during the global expansion of the ‘creative industries’, which
has features in common with another popular idea of the time, the ‘creative class’. This concept, intro-
duced by USA economist Florida, refers to ‘creative people’, such as engineers, artists, cultural ﬁgures,
opinion makers, among others (Florida 2005), whose attraction and retention is central for regions to
achieve economic growth. According to Florida, this ‘class’ chooses cities or regions where there is re-
spect and openness to difference in terms of race, sex, religion, etc.; talent (measured in terms of people
with at least a bachelor’s degree); and a concentration of innovation and technological change (Florida
2005). This concept remarks the importance of formal training of the ‘creative class’ and the individual
effort in achieving proﬁciency in their respective ﬁelds of expertise (Florida 2005). There are parallels
between the creative industries and the creative class, because both terms stress the commercial im-
portance of culture and the importance of ‘talent’ and ‘individual effort’, which already shows tensions
with the position that UNESCO defends in terms of cultural policies.
The term ‘creative economy’ generalized the ideas of the creative industries, stressing the impor-
tance of creativity and the creative sectors for overall economic growth; for example, by stating that
it would surpass all other non-creative sectors in terms of growth rates (Howkings 2007). This seduc-
tive hypothesis was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
which altered and globalized the concept by publishing two inﬂuential ﬂagship reports on the creative
economy, portraying it as “a feasible development option” (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, 2010). Speciﬁ-
cally, it deﬁned the creative economy as:
“[. . . ] an evolving concept based on creative assets potentially generating economic growth
and development; it can foster income-generation, job creation and export earnings while
promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development.; [...] at the heart of
the creative economy are the creative industries” (UNCTAD and UNDP 2008, p. 15).
The report deﬁned the creative industries as:
“[...] the cycles of creation, production and distribution of goods and services that use creativ-
ity and intellectual capital as primary inputs; constitute a set of knowledge-based activities,
focused on but not limited to arts, potentially generating revenues from trade and intellectual
property rights; comprise tangible products and intangible intellectual or artistic services
with creative content, economic value and market objectives; are at the cross-road among the
artisan, services and industrial sectors; and constitute a new dynamic sector in world trade”
(p. 13).
Similarly to the UK deﬁnition, this concept ﬁctitiously grouped a variety of quite different sectors
under the same tag in the following four categories: Heritage, Arts, Media and Functional creations
(UNCTAD and UNDP 2010, p. 8). For example, Media includes audiovisuals (ﬁlm, television, radio
and other broadcasting), new media (software, video games), design, publishing and printing media;
whereas Heritage encompasses cultural sites (archeological sites, museums, libraries, etc.) and tradi-
tional cultural expressions (art crafts, festivals and celebrations). Despite the different names and the
variance in terms of sectors, the concepts of creative class, creative economy and creative industries
share a common denominator, the importance of something called ‘creativity’, although never deﬁned,
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which is present in speciﬁc groups of people or sectors to contribute to economic growth in the midst
of changes toward a knowledge society (and similar concepts) (Flew and Cunningham 2010; Hartley
2005).
The main difference of UNCTAD’s approach is its claim that the creative economy is a ‘feasible
development option’ for ‘developing’ countries, by associating it with words such as ‘social inclusion’,
‘cultural diversity’ or ‘human development’. Nevertheless, most of the language and recommended
instruments are focused on economic growth and ‘development’; but never touch on the delicate and
debated questions of what kind of development is meant, whom it will serve and how it shall be im-
plemented (Ziai 2009; Escobar 1995). UNCTAD’s economic focus is evident in a similar defense of
intellectual property rights, although in their deﬁnition with the adverb ‘potentially’ they use an am-
biguous term to be open to alternatives too, yet it undermines the heated discussions around whether
intellectual property rights contribute to middle and low income countries or not. This economic ori-
entation is not a surprise, given that UNCTAD understands international trade as “the main driver of
development” (UNCTAD 2013). Besides, the report was written in collaboration with the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO), which strives for a global intellectual property rights system,
including copyrights. In the end, I understand that UNCTAD became one of the central actors to im-
plement a top-down global diffusion strategy of the creative economy and creative industries policy
discourse through the organization of workshops, content diffusion through the internet and confer-
ences, etc., which stimulated countries or cities, such as Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Korea,
Mozambique, Singapore, among others, to follow such strategy (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). What is
important to remark is that the creative economy policy discourse follows the typical strategy in the
development project: It deﬁnes an object, the ‘creative economy’; sets up an assumed globally valid
and apolitical ideal based on the experience of ‘developed’ Western countries (in this case the UK and
the USA); then, it tries to measure how the objects or units of analysis depart from that ideal, so as
to ﬁnally suggest measures to catch up with it. This is evident in the conclusions of both ﬂagship
reports, in which the organization suggests actions to stimulate a creative economy, clearly subordinat-
ing cultural practices to economic objectives; for example, by recommending to support the training of
creative entrepreneurs who need to acquire skills for business, knowledge about intellectual property
rights mechanisms, funding, etc., to develop small and medium sized enterprises (UNCTAD and UNDP
2008), implying that culture has to be seen as just another commodity.
Despite pompous claims of the contribution of the ‘creative economy’ to ‘development’, these asser-
tions do not withstand a serious analysis, because even research from within the UK has already shown
the shortcomings of the concept and the practices of the creative industries and the political projects it
represents. For example, authors cast doubt on the creative industries policy discourse and even argue
it is a doctrine, because it ﬁctitiously connects culture with the ‘knowledge economy’, to justify a shift
toward commercially-oriented cultural policies and the protection of few ﬁrms’ copyrights (Garnham
2005; Schlesinger 2007). This trend is problematic, because it undermines the argument of public sup-
port of culture to guarantee access, at the cost of increasing inequality (Galloway and Dunlop 2007;
Booyens 2012), which according to analysts in Britain took place in a period of deregulation and pri-
vatizations inherited from the Thatcher government of the 1980s (Garnham 2005). Empirical evidence
sides with this perspective; for instance, an analysis of English regional audio-visual policy showed how
the replacement of the term cultural industries with creative industries, went hand in hand with a pro-
gressive commercialization of private assets and the emergence of neo-liberalism (Newsinger 2012).
10
With respect to the insistence on intellectual property rights, and in particular copyrights, this claim is
also dubious given the lack of conclusive evidence showing its positive effect on creativity (Towse 2010),
besides ignoring other mechanisms for cultural distribution, such as creative commons. Indeed, there
are examples that ﬂourished without it, such as the case of Nollywood, the Nigerian ﬁlm industry (Lo-
bato 2010). Furthermore, Oakley (2006) observes that the creative industries policy discourse makes
optimistic connections between economic and social development, arguing that an increase of GDP does
not necessarily lead to more jobs and better social conditions. Conversely, evidence shows a concentra-
tion of ﬁrms in London and South East England, the growth of informal employment, together with
an evident disadvantage of ethnic minorities in these jobs due to scarce social networks and a lower
representation of women (Oakley 2006). Similarly, Vötsch and Weiskopf (2009) understand the cre-
ative industries as a discourse that shapes a speciﬁc type of worker: self-sufﬁcient, oriented to projects,
innovative, ﬂexible and mobile, among other adjectives. This suggests a top-down approach to pattern
workers toward an ideal that resembles the ‘free’ and nomad artist, but hide the precarious conditions
of these types of ‘creative work’: long working hours and a lack of union representation that may lead to
strained emotional states (Vötsch and Weiskopf 2009; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2008; Gill and Pratt
2008). In sum, it might be true that the creative industries and the creative economy foster economic
growth, but the literature casts doubt on the utopian claims of the creative industries to be a ‘feasible
development option’ that contributes to ‘social inclusion’ and ‘human development’.
Apart from this criticism, it is worth to point out that the creative industries and creative economy
concepts have lost the critical perspective of mass culture that Adorno & Horkheimer introduced. Be-
sides, the concepts overstate the importance of individual creativity, which might be the case in the
context of the UK and other Western countries where individuality, for several socioeconomic and his-
torical processes is highly developed. Given the inﬂuence of Thatcher on UK policies, it is worth to
remark her view on this issue: “[...] who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men
and women [...]” (Keay 1987). Nonetheless, this approach does not at all match other contexts where
collective practices and values are equally or more important than individual ones. In addition, the
focus on talent associated with high education or formal training makes sense in industrialized regions
of the world, but becomes difﬁcult to transfer to other contexts where there are fewer opportunities to
access higher education. Therefore, this and the notion of a ‘creative class’ suggest an artiﬁcial and
quite discriminatory divide between people who are ‘creative’ and those who are not. These issues are
present, to varying degrees, in the so-called creative sectors, but I shall further argue that the creative
economy policy discourse is particularly problematic in the media sector, because its economic orienta-
tion directly sides with the position that information is understood as just another commodity. In the
process, issues such as the problems of media concentration and the struggles for freedom of speech
for resource scarce and minority groups, among other points that require to follow the historical links
between media and development, are being undermined.
1.3 Media for Development
The creative industries and the creative economy cultural policy discourse consider media as just an-
other extra industrial sector subject to its economic program. However, this approach overlooks the
speciﬁcities and the distinctive role that media has historically occupied in relation to development
and modernization.
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In effect, one of the seminal works connecting both was published by Daniel Lerner in 1958: “The
Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East”, which based on surveys claiming that
every society could be ‘modern’ if Western ideas and values ﬂowed through mass media. According to
Lerner: “‘What the West is, the Middle East seeks to become’, ‘Islam is absolutely defenseless’ against ‘a
rationalist and positivist spirit’ embodied in Western-style democratic institutions” (Lerner 1958, quoted
in Shah, 2011, p. 2). This book initiated a research tradition that believed media could have a direct and
lineal inﬂuence on development and modernization. It expanded globally and in a top-down approach,
what the ‘Western’ experts had to offer and classiﬁed societies with respect to how far away they were
from the Western (more precisely USA) experience (Lerner and Schramm 1973; Rogers 1976). At that
time, the concept of media alluded to the press, radio and cinemas, because they could concentrate the
attention of large audiences and disseminate new practices for imitation (Lerner and Schramm 1973).
As Lerner and Schramm 1973 acknowledged, the aim of diffusing images through media was to change
‘behaviors’ in a way that they contribute to modernization. They understood this process as a struggle
in ‘developing countries’ between the ‘traditional elites’ trying to keep their privileges, and other elites
siding with modernization.
These pioneering works of the 1950s and 1960s deﬁned the initial orientation of communication for
development as a research ﬁeld monopolized mostly by USA scholars, who adopted a universalistic and
instrumental model of communication that claimed to be objective, rational, scientiﬁc and apolitical.
However, from the 1970s onward, this lineal model of communication for development was heavily ques-
tioned theoretically and empirically in several ways. First, critics highlighted that the theories relied
on the modernization experience in the USA and the need of its industrial sector to export products
worldwide, but hiding such particular political interest (Barranquero 2011; Gumucio-Dagron 2011).
For example, the survey that Lerner used in his pioneering work to gather empirical material was rec-
ollected thanks to the support of Voice of America, the international broadcasting organization of the
USA State Department, which was interested to know more about Middle Eastern audiences (Shah
2011). This elucidated the clear connection between geopolitical interests and the ‘objective’ research
exalting the USA modernization model. By the way, this shows a resemblance between Lerner’s ideas
of communication for development and Rostow’s linear development model, because both stressed the
need for ‘developing’ countries to ‘catch up’ with ‘developed’ ones (Lerner and Schramm 1973). Second,
critics opposed the presumed direct lineal inﬂuence of mass media on behaviors, inspiring their argu-
ments by Freire’s dialogic approach to teaching and communication, questioning the aseptic, apolitical
and uncritical perspective used by Western communication scholars in Latin America (Beltrán 1975;
Díaz Bordenave 1976). Third, even USA researchers in the ﬁeld of communication for development
acknowledged mistakes in the original paradigm, particularly that the role of mass media was less
relevant than originally thought in innovations diffusion, because people also use other information
sources, such as peer networks (Rogers 1976). Additionally, Rogers stressed the importance of struc-
tural change over mere content in mass media to stimulate broader changes. These societal critiques
led to participatory and horizontal communications experiences and approaches (Barranquero 2011),
and most importantly, they inspired new international discussions about the role of communication for
development.
At the end of the 1970s, in the midst of critiques of the ‘development’ project in general and of
its approach to communications in particular, UNESCO assumed the leadership to advance toward a
NWICO, whose vision was expressed in the report Many Voices, One World (1980), also known as the
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MacBride report. This document questioned the prevailing commercial approach to communications in
view of the imbalances it had generated both within nations and between “developed and developing
nations” (UNESCO 1980, p. 260). Its aim was to reduce the high concentration patterns in mass media
that gave excessive inﬂuence to media ﬁrms and journalists from ‘developed countries’, leading to what
analysts called ‘cultural imperialism’ (Roach 1997; Mattelart 2006). Conversely, the MacBride Report
falls into line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by stating that “freedom of information
- and, more speciﬁcally the right to seek, receive and impart information - is a fundamental human
right; indeed, a prerequisite for many others” (UNESCO 1980, p. 253). Indeed, in its recommendations
the MacBride Report advocated a new right, the right to communicate (UNESCO 1980). This aimed at
surpassing the right of freedom of information by acknowledging the inequalities in the international
ﬂow of information between the industrialized and the rest of countries. Therefore, in the MacBride
Report UNESCO strived for a more participatory and egalitarian global communication system, where
communications were considered as an essential part of ‘development’ policies, respecting cultural di-
versity and human rights, promoting audience participation and popular access to media, and stressing
the importance of media for democratization processes (Carpentier 2011; UNESCO 1980).
From a (geo)political point of view, UNESCO’s position in the MacBride Report sided with the Non-
Aligned Movement (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008) by giving human rights, cultural diversity and
democratization priority over proﬁts and a commercial view of culture and communications, challeng-
ing the stance of Western powers. Indeed, the USA and the UK opposed the report, arguing it did
not respect the ‘freedom of press’, and even left UNESCO in retaliation (Canelas Rubim 2011), only
to return in 2003 and 1997 respectively. Regardless of the interpretation of these events, analysts say
the result was that the right to communicate and the NWICO disappeared from the agenda of inter-
national organizations (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008; Mansell and Nordenstreng 2006). Since then,
it can be argued that the role of communications in international development policies has remained
off the radar, which is evident in their lack of inclusion in the Millenium Development Goals (MDG)
and the discussions of the next Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Despite this failure at the in-
ternational level, UNESCO’s initiative stimulated projects and social movements to strive for a human
rights approach to media in different countries (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). This has been the case
in Latin American countries that were in transition to democratic political systems during the 1980s.
In those years, new projects started to emerged that departed from the lineal view of the previous
decades, giving a voice to previously ignored sectors of the population by means of horizontal and par-
ticipative organizational designs (Gumucio-Dagron 2011), but still in a context where the inheritance
of dictatorships and the commercial approach to communications prevailed.
During the 1990s and in the beginning of the 21st century, the concepts of information society,
knowledge society, knowledge economy, and similar ones, once again pointed to the importance of in-
formation and communication technologies in changing social practices and economies. The diffusion
of technological innovations like the so-called new media based on the internet and cell phones, are a
promising opportunity to ﬁnally democratize communications. These tendencies prompted the United
Nations to revisit concerns about information and communication during the World Summit on the
Information Society (WSIS), which stated in its Declaration of Principles: “[...] Our common desire
and commitment [is] to build a people-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Information Society,
where everyone can create, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals,
communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their sustainable development and
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improving their quality of life” (WSIS 2003b). As Mansell and Nordenstreng remark, despite these
good intentions, the geopolitical situation in which this initiative was written was completely different
from the one of the MacBride Report. In the latter, there was at least some opposition and a struggle
between the USA and other Western allies versus the Non-Aligned Movement of countries, whereas
at the beginning of the 21st century USA unilateralism was uncontested. Therefore, as Mansell and
Nordenstreng (2006) remark, “this brought with it an overriding concern for U.S. interests in the media
and communication ﬁeld, rather than a desire to support development initiatives aimed at the disad-
vantaged”. Consequently, despite the hopes of some civil society actors to resume the struggle for the
right to communicate, there was no space for such claims (Hamelink and Hoffmann 2008). Indeed,
in the ﬁnal texts of the WSIS principles such as participation - a key word for less advantaged actors
have a stance in the access, production and distribution of information - “only played a minor role”
(Carpentier 2011, p. 93). Similarly, Costanza-Chock (2003) concludes that WSIS defends the interest of
private corporations striving to privatize common resources and ignore communication rights, under-
mining the position of civil society actors. Given such a global political context, it is not a surprise that
the creative industries and the creative economy became the strategy for ‘development’, considering
culture and communications as a mainly commercial enterprise.
In short, contemporary development policies in the ﬁeld of culture and communication at the inter-
national level retain a bias toward a commercial approach, opposing and overlooking previous discus-
sions during the 1980s. The prevailing ‘one size ﬁts all’ model maintains a thread with the development
project described at the beginning, in the sense that is a top-down, apolitical intervention with global
claims to shape policies mirroring the experience of a few Western industrialized nations. An assump-
tion in this work is that this does not happen by chance, but rather in agreement with the hypothesis
that culture and media do in some way inﬂuence people’s ‘behaviors’, although not in a lineal way as
originally thought. Therefore, a commercial approach is functional for corporations and industrialized
nations in disseminating their visions of ‘development’ worldwide, and to similarly commercial ﬁrms in
other countries. Conversely, a challenge to such a perspective questions the economic and geopolitical
interests of states and ﬁrms, as the MacBride Report did in that time, and points to the inherent polit-
ical nature of culture and media in ‘development’. This type of contestation is becoming more relevant
in the 21st century due to the increasing interactions humans have with media, thanks to the expansion
of ICT. In this context, the interest of this research is to inquire about the tensions between a commer-
cial and a human rights approach to culture and communication in two Latin American countries, by
focusing speciﬁcally on the latter, something that has been undermined in international discussions
since the 1980s.
1.4 Research Question
The previous concerns about the role of culture and media in ‘development’, together with the speciﬁc
trends in Argentina and Brazil that have stimulated the emergence of civil society actors striving to-
wards varied objectives of social transformation, set the stage for the main research question of this
dissertation:
How do new nonproﬁt and nongovernmental audiovisual media organizations striving
for social transformation in Argentina and Brazil challenge a commercial approach to cul-
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ture and communication?
The aim of this research is to give insights on how new media experiences that are neither commer-
cial nor directly state-dependent emerge and challenge the predominant culture and media discourses
in Argentina and Brazil. This implies the study of how these experiences operating under different log-
ics create discourses and practices to achieve a social transformation process, despite the constraining
and adverse contexts they have to face, inherited from previous decades. It is worth to point out that
I do not take a normative approach to deﬁne ‘social transformation’, but rather employ it as a term to
embrace the diverse - and sometimes divergent - proposals and projects of disparate groups that aim
to change the context they live in. In order to answer the research question, I elaborated a conceptual
framework that I will detail in chapter 2, which introduces both structural dimensions (media system
and policies) and a set of extra concepts to analyze the operations of the cases. The latter allow for an
examination of the ways the selected cases operate, revealing their successful strategies and also ob-
stacles to an implementation of their projects, such as those related to the access to technologies, power
issues, the acquisition of resources and participation, among others; whereas the former highlight the
structures that affect the emergence and existence of such cases. It is relevant to point out that I do
not aim to establish a general causal model, but rather to interpret how cases that are supposed to
be nonviable under a commercial approach to culture and communication, still operate, albeit with
challenges. Accordingly, I shall shed light on the inconsistencies of a commercial approach to commu-
nications in particular, and to culture in general. It is also worth pointing out that by ‘new media’ I do
not mean that this research is restricted to the experiences that emerge on the internet and because of
the expansion of social networks, but more generally, to new projects created or inspired by a change
in institutional conditions in the studied countries; for instance, the introduction of a new audiovisual
communication services law in Argentina. Besides, audiovisual media refers to experiences that diffuse
audiovisual material, either in a ‘traditional’ way by broadcasting the signal or in a ‘new’ way by using
the internet as the means of content distribution. Although this excludes the press or radio from the
analysis, this selection is based on the highest consumption rates television has among cultural sectors.
For example, reports estimated that on average viewers in Argentina and Brazil spent 2h and 45 min-
utes (Infobae 2013) and 5h and 45 minutes respectively in front of the TV set every day (Ibope 2014). At
the same time, with the expansion of ICT there is an increasing process of media convergence, which
is blurring the differences between media platforms and generating new consumption patterns. For
instance, in Brazil 43% of those who use the internet watch television at the same time (Ibope 2012).
Taking these tendencies into account, this research analyzes the case studies of three television cases
in Argentina and one online television experience in Brazil by employing diverse methods outlined in
the next subsection.
1.5 Methodologies Applied
In order to answer the main research question the research works on two levels. One the one hand,
it considers the role of discourses that have been shaping ideas about culture and communication at
the policy level in both countries (from now onward ‘policy discourses’). I thus gathered empirical data
that consists of primary sources such as policy documents, reports from different organizations, and
interviews with key current and former policy makers, academics and practitioners in Argentina and
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Brazil related to the policy discourses (see Apendix B and C). It is worth to point out that I did not
aim to cover all policies, but only those strictly related to the selected media cases. I analyzed the data
employing a discourse analysis perspective (more details in chapter 2 and 4) to examine the different
schemes for organizing culture policies in general and communication policies in particular that the
policy discourses offer. Some of them are in tune with international discussions, but others are quite
autochthonous and in opposition to the global ones.
On the other hand, the research focuses on speciﬁc case studies of nonproﬁt and nongovernmen-
tal audiovisual media projects that illustrate counter policy discourses, departing from a commercial
approach to culture and communication. In both countries, many experiences are spurring that meet
these conditions; thus, I selected the case studies based on the information I expected to obtain from
each of them (Flyvbjerg 2006), following the next criteria. First, I chose cases that communicate dis-
courses of underrepresented groups in each country, striving for objectives of social transformation,
such as indigenous communities and co-operatives. Thus, I selected small media projects in compari-
son to the size of mass media ﬁrms. Second, I selected cases that had received negative coverage from
commercial mass media ﬁrms, assuming that this was an indicator of a latent or overt conﬂict of inter-
ests among incumbents and new experiences that represent alternative and non-commercial - at least
according to their intentions - media practices. Third, as one of my initial interests was the kind of
technologies used, I picked cases that employed diverse conﬁgurations of technologies for content dis-
tribution. For instance, cases that follow the typical TV air or cable broadcasting model and others that
are in transition or completely working online. Taking into account such criteria within the scope of
this research, the following four cases were studied: CPEtv, the ﬁrst co-operative channel in Argentina
under the new audiovisual communication services law; Wall Kintún TV the ﬁrst Mapuche indigenous
community channel in Argentina after the new law was passed; Barricada TV, an alternative channel
in Argentina that has been ﬁghting to be recognized after the new law was enacted; and Mídia NINJA,
an online media experience in Brazil that has drawn national and international mass media attention
during the riots of June 2013, not without causing controversies in the process. This group is broad
enough to answer the research question, making evident the existence of niche practices. Nonetheless,
I am aware that I could not cover other types of channels equally striving for social transformation that
could offer extra dimensions for analysis; for instance, religious organizations, trade unions or extreme
political organizations, such as terrorist groups.
In order to investigate about how the four cases challenge a commercial approach to communica-
tion, I had to understand the perspectives of the actors within these experiences. In each of the cases
I thus employed participant observation to varying degrees to collect data on the emic perspective of
practitioners and to ﬁnd out how they cope with challenges they encounter in their daily practice. In
this way, my aim has been to contribute with research that corrects what authors have identiﬁed as
the bias in mainstream media research, described as a positivist, disciplinary and mostly theoretical
approach, that ignores the discrepancies with media use in practice and the ongoing effects of new
technologies (Martín-Barbero 1984; Horst, Hjorth, and Tacchi 2012). The only difference of this thesis
and the previous claim is that I focused on the context of media production, rather than media use,
because my research interest is to inquire cases that produce media content in ways that challenge
the ones accepted by mainstream media literature. Accordingly, one evident limitation of this work
is the scant research into the connection between the studied media cases and their audiences. Simi-
larly, in this work I do not consider it enough to analyze the mere output of media projects, but rather
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and most importantly their material conditions of production, such as their technologies, the resources
employed, and the history of the organizations, among others. Thus, participant observation was the
most adequate method for data collection, with varying duration and intensity of ﬁeldwork depending
on the cases. CPEtv and Mídia NINJA involved ﬁeldwork of three and ﬁve months in Argentina and
Brazil respectively. The remaining two cases in Argentina were studied with a focused ethnography
approach that lasted two weeks on site in each case. This last type of method comprehends the gath-
ering of multimodal data; that is to say, not only ﬁeld notes as in the traditional ethnographic method,
but also videos, images and reports from and about these experiences that complement the constrained
personal observations of the previous two cases. The reason for this difference is that these cases were
less complex in terms of structure than the ﬁrst two, yet still offered important dimensions of contrast
to shed light on the challenges that this type of media experience faces in practice.
The selection of participant observation led me to different types of data collection and analysis
about the four studied media. First, I gathered my on site observations on how the different projects
operate, which I systematically recorded in written ﬁeld diaries and in a digitized blog; this was useful
to better manage the data. Second, the personal observations and impressions were not only based on
the different practices I saw, but rather relied strongly on in-depth personal and some group interviews
with members of the experiences (see Appendix C for examples of the interview guides employed),
and also with related ones I had access to through snowball sampling. Third, I collected not only
documents related to the cases (from organizations ofﬁcials or from newspapers), but also articles,
images and videos that the studied media elaborated and disseminated through different channels
(TV, online, newspapers, books, etc.). Fourth, I employed innovative methods to gather data about video
statistics available online, such as scraping techniques that use algorithms to acquire large amounts
of data from online sites (see Apendix D). In my case, I collected information about thousands of videos
elaborated by the cases from online portals, which is a method scarcely explored in communication
for development, but it is not risky to say that its use and complexity will increase given the ongoing
expansion of ICT, new media and ‘big data’ techniques. With respect to data analysis, I kept all the
gathered information digitized in Atlas.Ti and mostly analyzed it following a coding procedure based on
grounded theory, but adapted to the needs of the discourse analysis approach that I shall introduce in
the next chapter (Keller 2013). In chapter 8, I furthermore employed case-ordered displays to compare
variables of interest among the case studies (Miles and Huberman 1994), which I will detail in the
speciﬁc chapters. Moreover, to analyze audiovisual data, I experimented with videohermeneutics (Raab
and Tänzler 2012), the coding and analysis of videos, which has been useful to compare the quality
schemes of a selection of content produced by the studied media (for the examples see Appendix E-H).
Further methods are explicated where necessary in the next chapters. All in all, the mixture of on
site observations, video analyses and the digital collection of data, offered an empirical richness that is
unusual in media research in Latin America.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
Figure 1.1 shows that the rest of the thesis is organized in nine chapters. The next chapter introduces
the conceptual framework employed to interpret the strategies of nonproﬁt and nongovernmental me-
dia to challenge or depart from commercial practices. The third chapter synthesizes relevant contex-
tual events and factors (economic, historical, political, etc.) that have inﬂuenced the countries under
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study. This covers a description of the culture and media systems in each country, detailing patterns
of unequal access to culture and high levels of ownership concentration of media. In chapter 4, I will
examine different policy discourses on culture and media that are present in Argentina and Brazil
and that are relevant to understand the analyzed four media cases. On the one hand, I shall argue
that there are mainstream discourses that I call the ‘creative economy’ policy discourses, which are
widely disseminated in both countries. Their features vary and have recently been strengthened by
foreign discourses and by previous local policies that side with a commercial approach to culture; for
example, the private organization of television based on advertising. On the other hand, the chapter
describes counter policy discourses that oppose and contest - to varying degrees - the main features of
the creative economy policy discourses. In general, these are neither diffused nor supported as much
as the former in both countries, and consequently, there is an imbalance in terms of resources and
inﬂuence. Nevertheless, they are different constructions that offer alternative ways of thinking about
culture, and communications in particular, and how to put these concepts into practice, which include
alternative, indigenous and radical media, among others. Chapter 5 analyzes the ‘imaginaries’ of the
four case studies that refer to their speciﬁc discourses. This is a necessary distinction to separate these
examples from the general features of discourses described in chapter 4. In contrast, in this section the
emphasis is on the interrelations between historical and contextual factors and the symbolic-material
construction of shared knowledge in each media experience, which shape the interpretations these
cases make to put forward their alternative practices for mainstream policy discourses. The remaining
empirical chapters shed light on the limits the four case studies face to advance their noncommercial
projects. For instance, chapter 6 inspects how technologies can both advance and hamper the imple-
mentation of the imaginaries of each case, making evident the way in which other types of discourses
permeate counter-discursive practices. In chapter 7, I shall discuss issues related to content production
and reception of the four case studies. This also covers up to which extent the cases have been able to
generate content that matches their imaginary and stresses their contribution to social change issues.
Additionally, this chapter considers the role given to ‘quality’ patterns, which similarly to technologies
might either constrain or enable the imaginaries of the media projects. Furthermore, it discusses the
role of participation in content production, and ﬁnally, it compares the reception of these materials
among some of the cases in online media. Chapter 8 illuminates the role that different types of violence
have in limiting the analyzed case studies. Moreover, I will examine the role of power by comparing
the different types of resources that different media have been able to acquire and mobilize in order to
advance their projects. Finally, the last chapter covers the conclusions of the research, delineates policy
recommendations for media and culture in Argentina and Brazil, and outlines future research options.
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Figure 1.1: Thesis structure.
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Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework
In this chapter, I introduce the conceptual framework employed in this research to study media for
social transformation. Figure 2.1 shows the main dimensions of interest of the framework to inquire
about how media for social transformation advance their alternative practices in the context of Latin
America. It essentially covers three levels of analysis: the media system, policy discourses, and speciﬁc
dimensions about media for social transformation. In Section 2.1, I present the ﬁrst level that gives
an interpretation from the political economy approach to media research, explaining how a media sys-
tem works in a capitalist economy, focusing on the production of audiovisual content. This allows to
understand the mainstream commercial approach to media and to comprehend the usually neglected
role of media for social transformation. Additionally, it takes into account the historical and policy
changes that gave the media system in each country speciﬁc features of interest, which I will detail in
chapter 3. The second level inquires about the cultural and media policy discourses that inﬂuence and
strive for change in the media system. In Section 2.2, I introduce the approach to analyze discourses
employed in chapter 4 to analyze those that reinforce the structure of commercial media in opposi-
tion to others that stimulate different types of media organizations and practices. Thus, I assume a
competition among different policy discourses. In Section 2.3, I describe the last level that focuses on
speciﬁc dimensions relevant to understand how media for social transformation are able to challenge
the dominant commercial approach to culture and media or not. I selected the dimensions based on
the suggestions in the literature synthesized in the introduction about the key dimensions that need
theorization in these type of media (audiences, participation, resources, technologies), together with
others that I included based on the results from my empirical data (quality and violence). The analysis
of the three levels required the employment of key concepts and approaches from discourse analysis,
media & culture research, peace research, philosophy of technology and science & technology studies,
which I will thoroughly present in the rest of the chapter.
2.1 Media System and Media for Social Transformation
In this subsection, I describe a political economy perspective to understand the media system in a cap-
italist economy, which allows to comprehend the central role that the commercialization of information
plays, in tension with the logic of public access to information. This explanation of the main logics of
the media system also suggest why those media organizations that differ in their logics of operation
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework to analyze media for social transformation.
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tend to be neglected in international and national culture and media policies. I conclude the section by
reviewing the different concepts that have been used in the literature to deﬁne these different group of
media, and I explain why in this research I name them media for ‘social transformation’.
The political economy of communication gives a critical perspective on the role of media, economics
and power (Mosco 2009). On the one hand, the research strand characterized by authors as Schiller,
Chomsky or McChesney, focuses on analyzing the increasing concentration in media, the interrela-
tions among business and politics and the negative effects derived from this (Hesmondhalgh 2013).
For example, the simplistic view that through media the state ‘manufactures consent’ among the USA
population to go to war or to blindly follow any other policy (Herman and Chomsky 2008). On the
other hand, the ‘cultural industries’ research strand (Hesmondhalgh 2013), cultivated by European
scholars such as Miège and Garnham (Miège 2006; Miège and Garnham 1979; Garnham 1979), and
non-Europeans like Bolaño (Bolaño 2000). According to Hesmondahalgh, this school of thought offers
better analytical insights to comprehend the complexities, contradictions and tensions in media produc-
tion and consumption. I share this position and adopt a model proposed by Bolaño to understand how
audiovisual production works in the context of a capitalist economy, which despite its simpliﬁcations
offers insights for media dynamics and for contextualizing the research.
Figure 2.2 is an adaptation of Bolaño’s model, which explains how in a capitalist economy the audio-
visual industry is guided by three functions: publicity or advertising, propaganda and programming.
The ﬁrst two emanate from the tensions existing in such systems between private ﬁrms and the state
(Bolaño 2000), which in ideal terms diffuse content either to promote consumption or to attract audi-
ences to particular political positions; whereas the third function refers to the process of content pro-
duction to attract audiences. By reading the graphic from the bottom to the top, the diagram sketches
the dynamics of the audiovisual industry system. The graphic shows that audiences offer their atten-
tion to speciﬁc contents that come together either with publicity or propaganda. The former shapes the
preferences of the audiences to buy speciﬁc products, which can be consumer goods, electronics, ﬁnan-
cial services, among others; whereas the latter tries to persuade the receivers toward speciﬁc political
views, which can be produced by the state, political parties or other organizations with political inter-
ests (this includes business ﬁrms, churches, etc.). But, how do publicity and propaganda arrive at their
audiences? In the case of television, it is disseminated with the content that attracts the audience’s
attention in the ﬁrst place. This can be produced by different TV stations or acquired from others, such
as private or public producers that elaborate ﬁction, news, soap operas, magazines and other genres,
together with the transmission of entertainment events, like concerts, sport competitions, etc. Thus,
those who transmit audiovisual content can generate and/or buy content, which requires ﬁnancial re-
sources to cover the operational costs and content production and/or acquisition. Such income can be
obtained from the charges to transmit publicity or advertising and propaganda. Agents from varied
economic sectors, such as consumer ﬁrms, electronic ﬁrms, banks, etc., pay for publicity to inﬂuence
the audience toward their products or services, and trying to maximize their beneﬁts, they invest in
publicity that will reach the largest audiences. The same argument holds to me for organizations
transmitting political propaganda.
Despite its simplicity, the model grasps the two predominant logics of operation in media: commer-
cial versus public media. The former distributes content plus advertising, whereas the latter content
with political propaganda. These are ideals, whereas in practice one ﬁnds a gradient between these
two poles, because private ﬁrms distribute advertising and propaganda at the same time, furthering
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their business interests1. The same can be argued for the state, which can promote consumption in
national industries or internationally advance its business and political interests. If we add to this
picture the fact that audiovisual production is one of the most technologically complex sectors of the
cultural industries, because setting up a TV channel is an intricate task that requires technological in-
vestment, qualiﬁed human resources, content sufﬁciently attractive to retain audiences, among others
(Millerson and Owens 2009). Then, these barriers favor concentration in mass media due to economies
of scale (Hesmondhalgh 2013). In other words, the ﬁrms that attract greater audiences will generate
more proﬁt with a similar cost of production, which generates a surplus that can be invested to expand
their operations to other cultural industries. On the private side, this is one of the reasons why in
general the level of concentration in terms of ownership in cultural industries tends to be high, with
large transnational corporations such as Walt Disney, Comcast, Sony or Time Warner with revenues
higher than US$ 20 billion in 2011 (Hesmondhalgh 2013). Beside these transnational patterns, there
are also high concentration ones in terms of regional or national corporations, which do not have such
a big revenue as the latter, but still yield a strong inﬂuence in their speciﬁc regions of operation, like
the case of Clarín in Argentina that in 2010 had a revenue of US$ 1.8 billion (Hesmondhalgh 2013).
On the public side, this might lead to state monopolies in media and limits concerning the distribution
of critical content (Djankov et al. 2001). Therefore, the industrial organization of content production
and its business model based on the competition for audiences puts constraints on what sort of media
organizations can survive these selection mechanisms, which in part favors content that is attractive
to masses.
It is worth to point out two important aspects in Figure 2.2 that are of central concern in this
research. First, the role of the state that is in charge of distributing the concessions or licenses to
broadcast on TV channels and telecommunication networks, and more broadly, on deﬁning the cultural
and media policies that regulate the media system, altering the balance between the commercial and
the public actors. I shall argue that different policy discourses affect the media system, either by
reinforcing the growth of commercial media or by opening spaces for other types of organizations to
ﬂourish that challenge a mostly for-proﬁt perspective. Second, Figure 2.2 ignores the emergence of new
media and the existence of a diversity of other types of media organizations that try to depart from the
effects of advertising or publicity, and that neither classify themselves as commercially oriented nor as
state funded. This neglect is understandable given the relatively recent introduction of new media, and
also to the low number of resources and audiences that non-proﬁt private media have in comparison to
the others. For these reasons, in the next paragraphs I will review the deﬁnitions of what sort of media
organizations these categories include to arrive at a new concept to group the type of media projects I
studied in this research.
As regards new media, the tag refers to the expansion of the internet that introduced a new model
of communication that challenges the previous top-down and linear ones prevailing in mass media.
The growth of the internet’s infrastructure offers the possibility of multiple ways of interaction and of
information ﬂows to take place. This, together with new practices, attitudes and values, deﬁnes the so
called ‘cyberculture’ (Lévy 1999; Lemos 2002). Such a neologism refers to how ICT contribute to the
emergence of new social practices, which are characterized by the blossoming of virtual communities of
the most diverse topics (Rheingold 2000) or a diversiﬁcation of ‘life-worlds’ (Lievrouw 2001), the emer-
gence of collaboration practices and the appropriation of technologies for diverse means (Lemos 2002).
1. For example, the ‘neoliberal newspeak’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001).
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For instance, new sub-cultures challenging the digital infrastructure such as hackers, crackers and
cypherpunks; new relations between bodies, desires and technologies like on online dating platforms,
the expansion of erotism or wearable gadgets; new types of online-ofﬂine activism or cyberactivism
(Illia 2002); sub-cultures mixing music, hedonism and technology such as ravers, among others (Lemos
2002). In the ﬁeld of communication for social change, these changes allow a fast ﬂow of information
between those with access to ICT, and bloggers and journalists spurring all around the world, chal-
lenging the monopoly to knowledge that professional journalists and researchers once enjoyed (Harvey,
Lewin, and Fisher 2012).
Besides new media, in the English speaking literature authors have used different names to catego-
rize media experiences that depart from the logic of operation of mass media (aimed at mass audiences,
for-proﬁt or state funded, professional, etc.). However, these deﬁnitions are not coherent and vary even
more in terms of how media experiences name themselves (Carpentier 2011). In the next paragraphs,
I will brieﬂy synthesize the following six terms as a sample of the different names that refer to these
organizations: alternative media, community media, radical media, citizens’ media, indigenous media
and communications for social change. Finally, I will introduce the term media for social transforma-
tion, which is the one employed in the thesis.
This ﬁrst category, alternative media, at ﬁrst sight seems unproblematic, suggesting these orga-
nizations offer something that differs from those of mass media. But, going into the details, wide
variations emerge due to the ambiguity of what ‘alternative’ means and of the binary opposition be-
tween mainstream versus alternative. This can refer to the dissemination of different contents, which
not necessarily imply an opposition to mass media or an advocacy for social change, but just the pro-
motion of different lifestyles (Atton 2002) or even extreme right ideologies. Thus, the term is vague
enough not to focus only on social change issues. Besides content, the adjective ‘alternative’ might re-
fer to the different organizational structures that these media use, which go beyond for-proﬁt oriented
models (Waltz 2005). In addition, the alternative might refer to dissimilar content aesthetics and also
to experiments on how to organize content production that do not strictly follow the professional and
commercial patterns of mass media (Atton 2002). Yet, these divisions are problematic. For example, in
terms of content The Guardian or Le Monde Diplomatique are widely read newspapers, thus mass me-
dia, but they distribute ‘alternative content’ written by professionals, and also use tools of the market
economy such as publicity. In fact, Waltz mentions that the Guardian may publish articles criticizing
air travel, while in another supplement they may just promote it (Waltz 2005). In sum, it is hard to
ﬁnd clear criteria to deﬁne what falls within this category.
The same can be argued with the next concept, community media, which presupposes an active
participation of its members, co-operation, a sense of belonging (Krohling Peruzzo 2007). However,
it is problematic given the ambiguities in the term ‘community’. What does it refer to? The general
shortcoming with this concept is that it is not explicit who belongs to the community, where and for
what motives. Thus, it might hide more than it reveals, even obscuring undemocratic ways of operation
(Downing 2001).
In contrast to alternative media, radical media refers to those initiatives speciﬁcally concerned with
social change issues and the participation of social movements (Downing 2001). According to Downing,
the concept includes the group of media that is “relatively free from the agenda of the powers that be and
sometimes in opposition to one or more elements in that agenda” (p. 8). However, he remarks this does
not imply a clear-cut deﬁnition, because audiences might be radical in some aspects but not in others.
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For example, he mentions the failure of organized labor to deal with the issues that female workers face
(Downing 2001). Sandoval and Fuchs (2010) also consider alternative media as radical media if their
content offers anticapitalist worldviews, independent of whether or not they have commercial strategies
for their economic sustainability, professional practices or participatory production processes. In both
cases, the approach is inspired by a counter information model and Gramsci’s work, which consider
radical media as tools through which the cultural ‘hegemony’ of the capitalist class can be unveiled
by subverting how and what information mass media journalists present (Downing 2001). But this
approach suffers from the inaccuracies of the concept of ‘class’, its lack of applicability in communist
states, and its lack of application to analyze radical right wing or religious media.
Citizens’ media is another variant that wants to depart from the binary thinking involved in mass
or mainstream media versus alternative media. Instead, this concept refers to media that strives
for social change, and keeps an organizational structure not based on proﬁts and open to access and
volunteerism of citizens (Rodriguez 2001), rejecting those media that are not ‘progressive’ or that do
not include diversity within their aims (Waltz 2005), such as far right extremist groups. Once again,
this is problematic for excluding ‘non-progressive’ groups, which just means those that are not close
to the political stance of the author, implying that the authors do not consider them citizens! Thus, I
could not disagree more with such division.
Indigenous media is another category that is not present in any of the lists made by the most cited
works in the English speaking literature of alternative media, such as the contributions of Downing,
Atton or Waltz. This term refers to all those experiences by indigenous communities around the world
that try to resist foreign cultural inﬂuences (Alia 2012), challenging the concepts and structures em-
anating from Western experiences. In general, they are small-scaled, geographically constrained and
have few ﬁnancial resources (Ginsburg 1991).
Finally, Gumucio-Dagrón (2011) accepts the difﬁculty of capturing the diversity of these different
media practices in a deﬁnition, and proposes his own tag of ‘communication for social change’. This
concept covers media that satisﬁes the following ﬁve conditions or processes: First, there is community
participation and appropriation of the project. Second, these media use local languages and transmit
messages pertinent to the place of operation; in other words, not elaborated in the West just to be
adapted in the South. Third, the content these media elaborate reﬂects local life. Fourth, these media
use appropriate technologies favoring the process of putting forward the experience rather than the
use of advanced technology that does not contribute much to it. Fifth, they construct networks and
processes of debate with other experiences of communication for social change. This list is interesting,
because it gathers many points that I shall later analyze in the cases. However, it is too normative and
might leave aside other types of media interested in social change that do not satisfy these conditions.
This list could go on, for example by including the term ‘activist media’, which includes those that
stimulate the action of their audience toward a speciﬁc goal or aim (Waltz 2005). Thus, this includes
any sort of media that advocates a political program or a philosophical or religious system, but once
again irrespective of their position or of the size of their audience. Furthermore, other media projects
classify themselves as ‘free media’ or ‘independent media’, remarking that they are not dependent on
corporate support (state and large ﬁrms) or that they can cover whatever they want without fearing
editorial cuts. For example, Democracy Now from the USA. These and other concepts such as ‘rhi-
zomatic media’ (Carpentier 2011), ‘popular media’, among others, show the diversity of categorizations
and the difﬁculties in establishing a uniﬁed ordering scheme for all of them, which in part derives from
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the particular perspective and the always bounded variety of experiences that each researcher knows
about. Besides, each media in practice might use the previous tags in combination or just new ones
that better reﬂect their experience. Given these differences between the local naming, and the ones that
researchers apply in their academic work, in the next chapters I will adopt the local categories used
in the four cases (co-operative media, alternative and popular media, indigenous media, independent
media). Only when I speak of them as a group, I shall call them ‘media for social transformation’ to
distinguish them from the previous concepts. However, I have no intention of deﬁning a set of features
that through induction would allow to decide which types of cases belong to such a group or not. I just
employ the term to remark how these media want to challenge mass media, although in practice this
intention will vary considerably from case to case.
2.2 Policy Discourses and Imaginaries
The media system described in Figure 2.2 is not static, but a dynamic structure that varies according
to the ideas and concepts that key actors related or in the system have on how media ought to be or-
ganized and on the feasibility of implementing such changes. In this research, I shall understand such
a set of ideas and their practical implications as policy discourses on culture in general and media in
particular. For example, in the ﬁrst chapter I already introduced the creative industries as one popular
approach in international discussions on how to organize cultural industries, reinforcing a commer-
cialization of culture and linking it to ‘development’. Taking into account the interpretation of the
media system offered in the previous subsection, it is not difﬁcult to comprehend that this discourse
has been attractive to reinforce the practices of for-proﬁt cultural and media organizations in capitalist
economies, such as those in Argentina and Brazil. However, I shall show in chapter 4 that there are
other discourses challenging this perspective and paving the way for different types of practices. To
achieve this objective, in this section I will describe a discourse analysis approach, which suggests a
method to study ideas, what they produce in practice and their relation to their particular context of
emergence. Nonetheless, the term discourse has been used diversely by different disciplines during
the last century, such as linguistics, anthropology, sociology, etc., which paved the way for different
approaches. Some study the structure of grammar and its function in meaning in particular contexts2,
whereas other approaches are concerned with utterances and their relation to social and political is-
sues3. This research focuses on the last strand, due to the interest on how knowledge about culture
and communication connects with political and social issues. In particular, I employ the Sociology of
Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD) (Keller 2011a, 2011c, 2008a), which synthesizes ideas from
post-structuralism and the sociology of knowledge.
Foucault pioneered discourse analysis to study how concepts, ideas and practices vary in time and
affect practices, making the key connection of these changes with speciﬁc power relations and challeng-
ing the tenets of structuralism. For instance, his research on Discipline and Punish (1977) argued that
with the emergence of the bourgeoisie and the industrial revolution in the 18th century, a discourse of
discipline appeared in prisons, but also in schools, the military and other institutions to shape docile
bodies, though in a violent way and marked by power relations. Another example is The Birth of the
2. For example see (Gee 2011).
3. For instance, critical discourse analysis advanced by van Dijk (1993) and Fairclough (1989), post Marxist discourse analysis
initiated by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Foucaultian discourse analysis as synthesized by Diaz Bone et al (2008), among others.
For a complete reviews see (Keller 2011c).
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Clinic (1963), where Foucault explains that an epistemic change took place toward a new ‘objective
medical gaze’, which in contrast to the prevailing perspective in the 18th century separated the sub-
jective experience of the person from the diseases to analyze in his body. Thus, Foucault showed the
instability of meanings and of structures associated with them. He introduced his approach to study
discourses in The Archeology of Knowledge (1972), where he sketches his analysis of statements. Ac-
cording to Smith (2009, p. 117), this was an important approach for cultural research, because it
disposed of the concept of ideology that was overcharged with Marxist associations and with the need
of truth assessment. Instead, Foucault’s approach stressed the importance of describing what a given
discourse implies in terms of knowledge, power relations and subjects created through discourse. In-
deed, Foucault expressed that “to speak is to do something – something other than to express what one
thinks” (Foucault 1972, p. 230), which suggests discourses shape subjects by introducing a mesh that
enables and constrains practices. These ideas were incorporated into SKAD.
Apart from post-structuralsim, SKAD employs insights from social constructivism, in particular
from the sociology of knowledge of Berger & Luckmann (1966). In contrast to previous research, the
authors focused not just on intellectual theoretical knowledge, instead they enlarged the object of anal-
ysis to include all knowledge employed by humans in what they called “the reality of everyday life”
(Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 35). Berger & Luckmann claimed that the personal construction of
meaning is done through three processes: externalization, objectivation and internalization. The ﬁrst
concept describes how subjective experiences are shared and communicated through language crossing
the barrier of just individual experience. The second refers to the materialization of the subjective
meanings that now are part of the common inter-subjective world. For example, Berger & Luckmann
(1966, p. 49) mention the case of a weapon, which could represent the exteriorization as violence of a
subjective feeling of anger far beyond the face-to-face expression. Finally, the concept of internalization
refers to the process through which new generations retroject in their consciousness the available objec-
tiﬁed meaning patterns as ‘given’ without questioning them. In parallel, Berger & Luckmann describe
that the previous three processes take place through processes of: typiﬁcation, institutionalization,
reiﬁcation and legitimation. First, typiﬁcation is the process of creating schemes used in everyday life
to deal with particular situations or interactions; for example, schemes that codify how to deal with
a man in contrast to those to interact with a baby or a dog. Second, the process of institutionaliza-
tion is composed of three subprocesses: habitualization, objectivation and sedimentation (Berger and
Luckmann 1966; Tolbert and Zucker 1996), and produce institutions. The ﬁrst one refers to the “[...]
reciprocal typiﬁcation of habitualized actions by types of actors” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 72). In
other words, when those intervening in the interaction routinize their actions, establishing “patterned
problem-solving behaviors” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996, p. 181); for instance, someone who goes to a bar-
ber will expect to have his hair cut, whereas the barber will expect to get paid in return, or also the legal
routinization of actions, between citizens and police enforcement. The second comprehends the process
I described before, but now in terms of how the habitualized actions are repeated in time, that is to
say, they acquire historicity; thus, for those not being part of their original creation, they appear as ‘ob-
jective’ or as a “social coercive fact” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 76). Finally, sedimentation refers
to the transmission of the objectiﬁed stocks of knowledge to new generations through a sign language
(Berger and Luckmann 1966); thus, replicating the institutional structure. The third process is called
reiﬁcation, which was deﬁned as “the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is,
in non-human or possibly supra-human terms” (p. 106). Namely, the steps that led to the objectivation
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of human action are lost and institutions are taken as something ‘natural’, or in other words, not built
by humans! Finally, the process of legitimation tries to ‘explain’ and justify the established particular
institutionalization of typiﬁcations to new generations. According to Berger & Luckmann “legitimation
not only tells the individual why he should perform one action and not another; it also tells him why
things are what they are” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 111).
Taking into account these two perspectives, SKAD considers a dialectic interaction between an ob-
jective and subjective ‘reality’ that is mediated by different types of knowledge (Keller 2011b). As
Keller explains, “SKAD is not a method but rather a research programme embedded in the sociology
of knowledge tradition in order to examine the discursive construction of symbolic orders which occurs
in the form of conﬂicting social knowledge relationships and competing politics of knowledge” (p. 48).
Thus, in the vein of Berger & Luckmann, it is based on a social constructivist perspective that states
our understanding of the world is not completely objective, but instead mediated by systems of cat-
egories that are the product of social construction processes (Keller 2013). According to Keller “[...]
everything we perceive, experience, sense is mediated through socially constructed and typiﬁed knowl-
edge (e.g. schemata of meanings, interpretations and actions) - a knowledge, that is, to varying degrees,
recognized as legitimate and ‘objective’” (p. 61). The central point for this perspective is that humans
are not born with an innate set of concepts, but that these are instead acquired and changed through
“socially created symbolic systems that are produced in and through discourse” (p. 61). In contrast to
Berger & Luckmann’s approach that focused on everyday knowledge, SKAD “[...] is concerned as well
with processes and practices of the production and circulation of knowledge at the level of institutional
ﬁelds” (p. 63). Therefore, SKAD mixes the Foucaldian approach to study social and historical power
effects of discourses with the insights of how this knowledge is created, distributed and internalized in
different areas of contemporary societies.
SKAD is a research program mostly employed in the German speaking community of discourse
analysis and has been applied in diverse research areas; for example, to analyze environmental issues,
the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, religion, among others (Keller 2013; Stuckrad 2013). These broad areas
of application are in part a result of the clear suggestion of tools and procedures that SKAD gives to
analyze knowledge production and circulation in different institutional spheres of contemporary so-
cieties (Keller 2013). Speciﬁcally, SKAD offers guidelines for an interpretative discourse analysis of
statements, practices and dispositives. The ﬁrst concept refers to the typiﬁable features of a set of
utterances (Keller 2013), whereas SKAD divides the second concept in discursive and nondiscursive
practices (Keller 2013). The former includes all forms of statement production that get materialized in
texts, which are not only written, but also audiovisual, whereas the latter refers to actions that are not
discursive, but inﬂuenced by a discourse; for instance, how a particular way of dressing is associated
with a religious discourse. Finally, ‘dispositive’ is a concept that SKAD borrows from Foucault’s work,
which comprehends the ways in which a discourse is (re)produced and the power-effects it can have.
For example, formal rules for action, such as laws or a book of precepts, but also technologies, objects,
educational procedures, among others, that lead to some sort of action related to the discourse (Keller
2013). It is worth to point out that the concept of dispositive has a rich variety of meanings (Meunier
1999), but the one employed here refers to a link between the structural features of a discourse with
a speciﬁc set of practices (Peeters and Charlier 1999). This link does not imply a determinant rela-
tionship, but the creation of conditions that reinforce some practices over others, and I shall employ
this concept in the next chapters to show how the commercial policy discourses prevalent in the me-
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dia system under analysis inﬂuence and limit the expansion of alternative ones; for instance, through
technology, quality classiﬁcation schemes and different types of violence that form obstacles for media
for social transformation.
In sum, SKAD is an approach suitable for studying different discourses that shape culture and
media policies and structures in Argentina and Brazil, allowing to shed light on how knowledge is
constructed in this area. However, the method has at least three shortcomings for tackling the re-
search question of this thesis, which will require the employment of further theoretical approaches and
concepts.
First, although SKAD employs the concept of dispositive to tackle the general shortcoming of dis-
course analysis that focuses more on the symbolic and texts as determinant factors, the procedures pro-
posed by SKAD to analyze dispositives, such as meaning patterns, classiﬁcation schemes, phenomenal
structures and narrative structures (Keller 2008b), are still limited to the symbolic aspect of disposi-
tives. Additionally, the concept of dispositive might be too broad to analyze speciﬁc material artifacts
and their networks, which enhance or limit the media organizations under analysis and their practices.
Therefore, a discourse analysis approach is not enough to unveil the role of artifacts and the material
conditions of productions of the media cases under analysis, a shortcoming which I shall address in the
following section.
Second, although discourse analysis has left aside the concept of ‘ideology’, given its previous nega-
tive connotations with particular research traditions, this more objective stance also lost the previous
focus on the imaginary futures that challenge prevailing discourses. In particular, I refer to the concept
of utopia4, which appears in tandem with the concept of ideology in the works of both Mannheim and
Ricoeur. The former takes the view that utopias are those states of mind that when put into practice,
would either completely or partially destroy the prevalent social orders (Mannheim 1979), and are the
product of ideologists, belonging to speciﬁc social groups in reply to a particular context (Mannheim
1979). Ricoeur (1984) agreed with Mannheim that utopias aim to challenge preexisting power rela-
tions, but also added that they propose an ‘alternative society’ to transform ‘reality’, aiming to unleash
a process of transformation, which might lead to schemes of action that are in the extremes unattain-
able, but still lead their followers to an all-or-nothing stance. To avoid loosing the dimension of building
‘alternative futures’ or ‘other futures’, in the analysis of discourses I employ the term utopian in the
sense of offering guidelines for transforming the contexts in which the groups under analysis operate,
and not with the negative connotation of unattainable.
Third, Keller (2005, p. 6) remarks about discourses that “we can’t enter the world and see ‘discourses’
in the way we see, for example, a piece of cake, a building, or even a concrete set of social interaction.
[...] Discourse so far is nothing but a theoretical device for ordering and analyzing data”. Therefore,
discourse research implies interpretative research, which means there are no clear-cut boundaries to
decide whether something is a discourse or not, much less at which level. If a group of ﬁve friends has
a crazy meaning pattern for understanding reality it has shared for 20 years and that is repeated in a
set of statements and practices, in theory that would be a discourse. The same can be said of the global
climate crisis presumably produced by human industrial activity. If such two different things, with
diverse power-effects and reach can be explained with the same terminology, there clearly is a poor
distinction between levels. Thus, in this research I shall refer to ‘policy discourses’ as those discourses
that had repercussion at the national policy level, whereas I shall use the concept of ‘imaginary’ for
4. A word introduced by Thomas More to describe a fantasy place, but in fact it means no place.
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those discourses that are part of the meaning patterns of speciﬁc projects or networks. This concept is
not connected to the idea of social imaginary by Castoriadis (1975), who just spoke of a unique and dy-
namic social imaginary for each society, and mystiﬁed where the imaginary lies or who imagines, giving
the impression that ‘society institutes itself ’, forgetting the role of human agency (Strauss 2006). The
perspective I adopt is closer to the idea of social imaginaries used in the ﬁeld of multiple modernities as
“the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they ﬁt together with others, how things go
on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative no-
tions and images that underlie these expectations” (Taylor 2002). Similarly, the concept resembles the
idea of cultural models used in cognitive anthropologists, deﬁned as “presupposed, taken-for-granted
models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alterna-
tive models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that
world and their behavior in it.” ((Quinn & Holland, p.4) quoted in Strauss 2006, p. 331). Thus, my
concept of imaginary is not an imagined, nonexistent mental object, but the discourse and the associ-
ated speciﬁc practices of networks of people, which includes their vision of a future, as in the concept of
utopia.
For these reasons, the employment of SKAD was bounded to: the analysis of policy discourses in
chapter 4, the imaginaries of the cases in chapter 5 and the description of dispositives that reinforce
commercial practices that I will refer to throughout the remaining chapters, limiting media for social
transformation. Some of these discourses have been disseminated as national policies, others as city
policies only and some are just part of the imaginary of a network of actors. In the next subsection I
will detail the remaining key approaches and concepts selected to thoroughly study media for social
transformation cases.
2.3 Media for Social Transformation
Besides analyzing the speciﬁc imaginaries that each case adopts, my analysis focuses on a group of di-
mensions that introduces key concepts to understand how the media cases are restricted by commercial
practices to culture and communication, and also how in some cases they have been able to challenge
such boundaries. Therefore, in this section I will thoroughly discuss concepts from speciﬁc research
strands that offer ways to analyze the six dimensions (audiences, quality, participation, technology,
violence, and resources) that I proposed in Figure 2.1 to study media for social transformation. I shall
ﬁrst discuss concepts to analyze the role of technologies, which I will later employ in chapter 6 to show
how they enable or limit the cases. Then, I will consider concepts to discuss the relativity of ‘qual-
ity’, and how the predominant classiﬁcation schemes create barriers to new media experiences, which
I shall later analyze in chapter 7. In the following subsection, I will discuss two further dimensions,
where I discuss perspectives to examine the role of audiences and participation in media for social
transformation. This is important, because it allows to contrast the claims that these media differ with
their practice from those elaborating massive and standardized content in an nonparticipatory way.
The remaining subsections propose concepts about violence, resources and power that I will analyze in
chapter 8. As regards violence, I draw inspiration from peace research on the different types that these
media cases have to struggle with. With respect to power, I will discuss research strands in media
theory, to ﬁnally introduce an interdisciplinary approach employed to generate a typology of resources
that media cases have acquired, to different degrees, to keep their projects operational. In sum, these
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dimensions together with the previous two sections offer the key analytical concepts applied in the next
chapters for the analysis of the empirical data.
Technology
Discourse analysis methods, and more broadly philosophy and the founders of social science, have
generally not given a central role to technology, constituting a sort of ‘technological somnambulism’
(Shields 1997). However, since WWII it has become evident that Science and Technology (S&T) were
essential for the elaboration of new weapons to win the war and, at the same time, to foster economic
change by introducing new technologies and expanding the technological frontier of ﬁrms. This advance
of S&T is evident in the growing rate of scientiﬁc publications and of patents (Larsen and Ins 2010;
WIPO 2014), or by the increasing number of inventions that were nonexistent 20, 50 or 100 years ago,
and that are now taken for granted, such as the internet, airplane travel or pharmaceuticals. Media
have not been an exception to the pervasiveness of technological change. Pioneers in the ﬁeld have re-
marked its importance, like McLuhan (1964), who stated that technologies act like extensions of man,
allowing to see, hear and perceive things far beyond what the natural senses allow, but also causing new
numbness. This relentless process of technological change in media has been altering their modes of
content production and how they are consumed by users, with most of the technological advances based
on decades of progress in S&T. For example, electromagnetism and quantum mechanics that paved the
way for radio wave transmissions and electronics or advances in computer science and algorithms that
are the backbone of the participatory web. Thus, technological change has been an inﬂuential factor
in media change (Harvey, Lewin, and Fisher 2012; Lemos 2002; Thornburn and Jenkins 2003), and
in this research I follow the position of Carpentier (2011, p. 273) that states “media technologies are
the objects of hegemonic projects that (aim to) ﬁxate their meanings, and aim to normalize these always
particular meanings. [...] Media technologies are rigidly embedded in societal contexts, and in this sense
they are never neutral”. This quote suggests that by just analyzing the content or discourses that ﬂow
through media, the important technological dimension is overlooked. If the focus on text analysis is not
a useful tool to grasp technological complexities in general, nor in particular in media, how should such
a shortcoming be addressed? A ﬁrst solution would be to employ the concept of dispositive suggested
by Keller in SKAD, following Foucault’s pioneering works. The general justiﬁcation for this election
is that the concept helps to mediate between the structural symbolic dimension of a discourse and the
respective practices that it encourages. Indeed, in the French literature the concept has been used to
highlight the technical aspects of social phenomena (Peeters and Charlier 1999). In this sense, the
concept is useful to point to the existence of some sort of network of interrelated elements producing
power-effects. However, the broadness of the concept might hide the speciﬁcities of the elements and
actors present in those networks, and thus I shall use a more precise approach to analyze the role
of technologies in media for social transformation experiences. Speciﬁcally, I adopt perspectives from
science and technology studies and from the philosophy of technology, because the former allows to
understand how technologies mediate actions, whereas the latter how they mediate perceptions (Ver-
beek 2006); and in this way, they offer a depth for inquiry that is lacking in the analysis of dispositives
suggested by SKAD.
The ﬁrst research tradition from which I shall borrow approaches to interpret and gather data
about technologies and concepts is Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which emanates from the broader
ﬁeld of Science & Technology Studies (STS). The latter ﬂourished during the 1980s, when researchers
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started to expose the dynamic interaction between humans and nonhuman actors and the construction
of ‘scientiﬁc facts’, far from the previously held belief that facts and theories are objective (Latour
1988, 1993; Latour and Woolgar 1986). Similar ideas were applied to study technology, pointing to the
instabilities in the process of design and use of artifacts (Bijker 1995; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 2012).
In both cases, these strands can be understood as extensions of the ideas of Berger & Luckmann to
objects, showing how the apparent ‘naturality’ is nothing more than a speciﬁc stabilization of a set of
arrangements, which depends on their context of origin, the actors that intervened in the process and
the speciﬁc practices they had. Besides, this research tradition discarded clear-cut distinctions between
human and nonhuman objects, such as the concept of the cyborg (Haraway 1990), which tries to capture
the increasing symbiosis between the two and the uncertainty in deﬁning who affects whom and how
they interrelate. Speciﬁcally, ANT challenges what its proponents call ‘sociology of the social’ (Latour
2005), which is a name that comprehends sociological research that uses casual explanation factors
created by analysts, employing accepted concepts and types irrespective of what the actors under study
use; thus, respecting little what new associations detected in ﬁeldwork might reveal. For example,
something will be caused by ‘forces of society’, or the invisible hand of the market, or lobbies, etc.
(Latour 2005). Although Latour acknowledges that ﬁxed categories usually assumed in social science
research, such as ‘actors’, ‘power’, ‘institutions’, etc, might be useful in many situations, he stresses
that they become problematic in others where actors innovate in their collective associations (Latour
2005). For this reason, ANT proposes a method to conduct research that would ‘free’ the researchers
from these preassumed concepts by advancing a similar approach to those employed by anthropologists
during participant observation, focusing on tracing controversies and acknowledging different types of
uncertainties. Among them, I mention those about the types of actors to consider and the source of
action (Latour 2005). As regards actors, ANT made a radical departure from previous theories by
putting human and nonhuman as actors on an equal stance, which is based on the fact that social
interactions tend to be short-lived, but might have long-lasting effects (Latour 2005). Consequently,
ANT states that material elements must be present to extend agency in time and space (Latour 2005),
and thus ANT considers nonhumans as potential actors to accurately portrait the associations in any
ﬁeld research. The technical term used in ANT is actant, which is deﬁned as “any thing that does modify
a state of affairs by making a difference” (p. 71). Given this symmetry between human and nonhuman
actants, ANT suggests to study or to trace the speciﬁc associations or ties among them to understand
the sources of action (Latour 2005), which clearly broadens the scope of the ‘sociologies of the social’
restricted just to humans. This stance assumes that an actant is inﬂuenced by many others to act,
and ANT differences between intermediaries and mediators, where the former just transport meaning
without producing changes in the process, whereas the latter “transform, translate, distort, and modify
the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” (p. 39). In particular, in this research I shall
employ the concept of ‘script’, which refers to the ways in which technologies can guide human action in
some particular ways, and not in others. According to Akrich (1992), the script deﬁnes the “framework
of action together with the actors and the space in which they are supposed to act”. For example, a speed
bump in the middle of a road is a technological object, designed to be in a given road to reduce the
speed of drivers. For these reasons, Akrich argues that scripts invite some types of actions and not
others. This understanding of technologies is useful and is complementary to the idea of dispositif used
in SKAD, because it suggests that the use of a technology depends on its ‘script’ that was embedded in
a particular context, inﬂuenced by a particular group of discourses guiding action. Therefore, the use
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of the resulting technological artifact in another context might lead to the enactment of the original
script, reinforcing the discourses present in the context of creation but absent in the new one.
Despite the theoretical and empirical innovations that ANT introduced, the approach has received
severe criticism when employed for media research; for instance, Couldry (2008, p. 96) remarks that
ANT is useful to leave aside a functionalist perspective in media research that “speak as if media were
the social, as if media were the natural channels of social life and social engagement, rather than highly
speciﬁc and institutionally focused means for representing social life and channeling social participa-
tion” (Couldry 2008, p. 96). Particularly, ANT offers insights to open up the technological mediation
in media, by following different associations among humans and nonhumans. However, Couldry ar-
gues that ANT has three shortcomings in dealing with media. First, in ANT time appears during the
process of naturalization of an actor-network, but once established, Couldry (2008) remarks that the
theory ignores potential future dynamics. Second, ANT has little interest in power issues and how
long-term distribution of resources affects inequalities (Couldry 2008). In general, this is a central
issue for research interested in social transformation and thus a considerable deﬁciency of ANT. In
particular, in this thesis I shall show in chapter 3 that the historical and political changes in Argentina
and Brazil indeed did create a considerable imbalance in the media system. Third, although ANT offers
insights into how a network becomes structured and naturalized, it does not offer much insights on the
potential subsequent processes of (re)interpretation by those in association with such actor-networks
(Couldry 2008). Despite its shortcomings, I shall employ part of the methodological recommendations
and concepts from ANT, such as the ethnographic study of the role that technologies have in the cases
under analysis, and the concept of ‘script’.
Even though the concept of ‘script’ gives more precision to the idea of ‘dispositive’ by describing the
precise supposed range of effects that a technology was thought to have; this perspective still assumes a
determinate, linear inﬂuence of these designs over users, ignoring their potential for reinterpreting the
technologies and altering their original designs. To discuss such processes of reappropriation, I shall
employ a perspective from the philosophy of technology introduced by Ihde (2012), which is based on an
extension of phenomenology’s concepts created by Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, among others.
Speciﬁcally, Ihde describes two types of possible interactions between humans and technologies that he
names the embodiment and the hermeneutic relation respectively. On the one hand, the embodiment
relation points to the fact that once an artifact is taken for granted, it becomes a sort of extension of
humans. For example, if I use a walking stick, the sensations I feel when I press on the ground with
it are of a new nature that I do not experience without it. Therefore, there is a union between human
and artifact, the embodiment relation, which leads to a new experience of the environment. On the
other hand, the hermeneutic relation highlights that from technologies we get readings of something
else happening in the world, which is not necessarily ‘objective’ but just one speciﬁc interpretation.
For instance, a thermometer might give us the temperature of the external environment and make us
adapt our clothes accordingly, but it might also fail and give us a wrong reading leading to inappro-
priate clothing. For these reasons, Ihde (2012) accepts that technologies might have an implicit design
as ANT as the script concept describes. However, he adds that the establishment of the embodiment
and the hermeneutic relation also imply a particular interpretation and appropriation of technologies
by humans, which is not unique but multiple. For this reason, Ihde gives examples on how technolo-
gies have ‘multistability’, such as the different uses of cyberspace or the different ways in which bow
technologies have been adapted according to their “speciﬁc cultural contexts” of use (Ihde 2012, p. 180).
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Indeed, Akrich (1992) agrees that the concept of script is challenged when the context of use is quite
different from that imagined by the designers of the artifact. I shall adopt this insight and discuss how
the studied media for social transformation have been able to reinterpret or not media technologies
under their speciﬁc contexts of production, which do not necessarily coincide with the ones they were
designed for.
In sum, the perspectives of philosophy of technology and of ANT offer concepts to open up the role
of technologies in the speciﬁc case studies under consideration, perfecting the broad focus on ‘dispos-
itives’ that SKAD suggests. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that I do not accept the whole
baggage of ANT, because in the ﬁeld of development research, where many times the mediators and the
networks are stopped from acting due to diverse types of violence and historical unequal distribution
of resources, issues of power and context cannot be neglected as easily as ANT implies. Consequently,
these dimensions cannot be dismissed easily, and I shall argue that the interpretationalist approach,
together with power and violence concepts, is more suited to grasp the processes that media for social
transformation experience.
Quality
Technology can be understood as a dispositive of discourses, but it is not the only one. This section
raises awareness of another of the dimensions in Figure 2.1: the importance of the ‘quality’ schemes of
news production as a dispositive, because it acts as a system of classiﬁcation that elaborates a hierarchy
of the type of content that is ‘good’ and ‘worthwhile to watch’ and the one that is not. It reinforces the
practices of private, for-proﬁt audiovisual ﬁrms, and neglects those of media for social transformation
that want to depart from the established ‘quality’ patterns. To discuss these issues in the empirical
chapters, in this section I will stress the social construction process behind ‘quality’ patterns, inspired
by concepts from Bourdieu, in connection with discussions of journalism as a profession.
The online Cambridge Dictionary deﬁnes quality as something of ‘high standard’ or ‘how good or
bad something is’, which are deﬁnitions that assume speciﬁc cultural products or expressions having
essential features that can be compared based on a predeﬁned standard. But the arbitrary deﬁnition of
the standard of comparison makes evident that the classiﬁcation scheme is not objective. Indeed, it can
lead to and justify quite harmful systems of classiﬁcation. For example, the outrageous patterns that
emanated from the history of the conquest of the Americas and colonialism in the 19th century, which
established chains of equivalence among quality, culture and civilization (Carpentier 2011), putting the
views of the conquerors at the top of the hierarchy as if they were natural. This led to the pretext of
civilizing the uncivilized, which unleashed processes of cultural destruction of indigenous communities
and of those who survived, based on the supposed lack of ‘quality’ of their cultural expressions. This
points to the fact that ‘quality’ is not an objective concept, but dependent on the speciﬁc system of
classiﬁcation.
Bourdieu (1984) elaborated a pioneering research showing this relativity of ‘quality’ by studying the
variations of taste in terms of consumption patterns in France. From his point of view, the consump-
tion patterns in a population can be explained by the interactions between two concepts: the position
of people in ‘social space’ and their ‘habitus’. The ﬁrst concept refers to the dispositions that people
under similar conditions and conditionings share, thus leaving aside the ﬁxed concept of ‘social class’
present in Marxist analysis (Bourdieu 1989). Bourdieu deﬁned the ‘habitus’ as the relation between
“the capacity to produce classiﬁable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate
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these practices and products (taste)” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 170). From his perspective, this leads to differ-
ent ‘life-styles’, which are systems of classiﬁed and classifying practices, which emanate from speciﬁc
conditions of existence. Therefore, the concept of taste reﬂects what people consume related to their
speciﬁc position in social space, establishing particular hierarchies of values on what is interesting and
what is to be rejected, which according to Bourdieu end up contributing to processes of social reproduc-
tion and ‘distinction’. The latter is an important term that remarks that the identity a group of people
with similar habitus has is not only deﬁned in terms of the general elements that the members of this
group share, but also by the strong rejection of the taste of others. This perspective brings to the fore
that the notion of taste, or what I shall call quality in this research, is the result of a social construction
process that establishes hierarchies of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
The previous tensions between the objectivity of quality and its relativity are present in discussions
about journalism. Ideally, the profession in the West has been characterized by ﬁve shared values and
aims (Deuze 2005). First, it aims to offer a public service to citizens, to inform them and act as ‘watch-
dogs’. Second, journalism wants to distribute information in an ‘objective’ and reliable way. Third,
journalists want to report with autonomy. Fourth, journalists cultivate the sense of immediacy, which
alludes to what ‘news’ is. Fifth, journalists aim to perform the previous points ‘ethically’. Empirical
research conﬁrms that there are shared values across different ‘journalism cultures’ beyond Western
deﬁnitions, such as the aim to become a watchdog mainly of government, but also of business elites; or
to report in an impartial way; or to avoid obtaining information through questionable methods (Han-
itzsch, Thomas et al. 2011). However, there are also differences, like non-Western journalists being
more prone to actively engaging in social change issues, and varied understandings on what to be ‘ob-
jective’ means (Hanitzsch, Thomas et al. 2011). This last ideal, in essence, assumes that there is an
objective reality that can be observed and described without bias independent of the observer, which
has its background in positivism (Giménez Armentia 2005). Contrary to this philosophical school,
subjectivism claims that truth depends on the subject (Giménez Armentia 2005), but in its extreme
position, it would defend truths irrespective of ‘hard facts’. A middle way is to accept a connected re-
lation between subject and object, where the perceptions of the former about the latter are inﬂuenced
by a particularly limited point of view (Giménez Armentia 2005). In this third case, the objective ideal
would be impossible to fulﬁll. Nonetheless, many non-Western mass media tend to keep, at least dis-
cursively, the ‘objective’ claim as a pattern of news making. For example, Boyd-Barret and Xie (2008, p.
206) take the view that new regional networks, such as Al-Jazeera based in Qatar and Phoenix Satel-
lite Television based in Hong Kong, do not depart much from a “Western-style formatting and greater
commercial orientation”.
The important point of the previous concepts and discussions for this research is that there is a
struggle over the deﬁnition of what deﬁnes the ‘quality’ of an audiovisual production. For instance,
mass media tend to associate quality with professionalization, involving a particular and specialized
training, which is useful for media professionals to generate entry barriers against others (Carpentier
2011). In contrast, Carpentier mentions that alternative media have challenged this with the produc-
tion of content by amateurs. Following Bourdieu, I accept that there is a relativity in terms of the
classiﬁcation schemes that deﬁne what a quality audiovisual production is, and I additionally under-
stand that the hierarchy of existing ones act as a dispositive that negatively classiﬁes content that
departs from what is considered ‘good’. Although in this research I did not aim to systematically study
consumption patterns, Bourdieu’s insights inspired my discussion to show the hurdles that media for
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social transformation face in elaborating content that differs from and challenges mainstream ways of
news production. Thus, I focus on the production side, on the one hand, describing how some cases have
followed the mainstream media quality schemes, and on the other hand, on cases that have challenged
them. In both cases, I weigh the pros and cons of each strategy.
Audiences and Participation
In this subsection, I will discuss two more dimensions of the conceptual framework: audience and
participation. These cover the reception of content by viewers, and the process in which they ‘par-
ticipate’ in content production or in giving feedback, which are important points to touch on given
the centrality of participation in discussions of communications for development (Pettit, Salazar, and
Gumucio Dagron 2009; Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011).
As regards ‘audiences’, there are varied ways of understanding the concept, which in general try
to explain the interactions between what media organizations produce and the receivers of such infor-
mation. Webster (1998) identiﬁed three types of speaking about audiences: as masses; as outcomes
and as agents. The ﬁrst type considers audiences as masses of people that follow a pattern in terms
of what sort of media content they consume, whereas the second type thinks of audiences as outcomes
of the contents that media organizations disseminate, that is to say, it focuses on the effects that me-
dia have, studying the reactions of viewers to the stimuli they receive. Finally, the third type argues
that audiences are composed of active actors that decide what to do, depending on their speciﬁc social
and cultural context. Although the third type of thinking would be more suited to the ethnographic
approach I applied to study the context of media production, within the scope of this research I take
the ﬁrst perspective, because my interest is to estimate how many people have been watching the con-
tents elaborated by media for social transformation I analyzed. This question is important to consider
somehow, given that the argument of private or state ﬁrms against media for social transformation is
precisely that they are not relevant given their reduced number of viewers. Therefore, in chapter 7 I
will consider statistics about the access to content by viewers, and contrast it, whenever possible, with
similar numbers that estimate the audiences of mass media ﬁrms in Argentina and Brazil.
As regards ‘participation’, the concept has varied connotations within and among different disci-
plinary ﬁelds. Within this section, I shall discuss its relation with democracy, media studies and in
particular, the concept of public sphere. Finally, I consider the relation of new media based on ICT
with participation, in order to delineate contrasting perspectives on whether these new technologies
contribute to such an ideal or not.
Participation is a concept usually associated with democracy, and for this reason it is important to
review for the research, given that I am considering media for social transformation in countries where
the democratization of the media system has lagged behind similar such process as in their political
systems. Nonetheless, democracy is a polysemic world that can refer to different democratic models
with varied levels of participation (Held 2006). Following Carpentier (2011), the levels of democratic
participation in a political system can be classiﬁed as a gradient between two poles of minimalist and
maximalist models. On the one hand, the minimalist pole covers those models where participation is re-
stricted to elites, who take decisions after power has been relegated to them, limiting the political5 and
participation just to institutional politics, and with an homogeneity of actors involved in the decision
5. Carpentier cites Mouffe’s distinction between the political and politics. The former refers to the inherent antagonist features
that any social relation might have, whereas the latter just to those that appear in the ﬁeld of institutional politics (Carpentier
2011).
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process (Carpentier 2011). On the other hand, the maximalist pole includes models that try to balance
representation and participation, not just delegating power to an elite. Besides macro-participation
like in elections, they include micro-participation such as in participatory budgets. Another difference
is that these models understand the political beyond just institutionalized politics and thus require
an heterogeneity of actors involved in decision processes in diverse sites (Carpentier 2011). In sum,
minimalist participation models seem democratic, but in fact tend to be quite tyrannical with reduced
spaces of participation for the population, with many examples around the world. The maximalist pole
can be represented by varied models, such as deliberative democracy, which, according to Carpentier
(2011) (citing Elster, 1998), is characterized by decision processes in which all actors affected by the de-
cision participate, and all can exchange arguments in a rational and impartial way. Another example is
anarchism and its vision of participation, because authors defend anti-authoritarianism, decentraliza-
tion, maximum participation and solidarity against the hierarchies established by governments, and
against privileges maintained through individual property6. A ﬁnal example is the model of radical
democracy advanced by Laclau and Mouffe, who consider the inclusion of a diversity of actors and
struggles, such as anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-capitalism as equally relevant (Laclau and Mouffe
2001; Carpentier 2011, p. 37).
These discussions have inﬂuenced media research, which also offers different models of participa-
tion in media that can be divided into a gradient between minimalist and maximalist poles. On the
minimalist side, Carpentier (2011) describes an ideal type where media is controlled mostly by profes-
sionals and participation from the audience is restricted just to interactions with the content the media
produce. For example, the comments that viewers can post on a news website or through any other
of the new social media ‘participatory’ technologies. According to Carpentier, this perspective homog-
enizes audiences, favoring media organizations interests, with a prevailing unidirectional perspective
of information ﬂow that tries to reduce political expressions. This matches mass media approaches in-
troduced in Section 2.1, which have scarce spaces of participation for audiences, and even less in terms
of management and content selection. Therefore, in this case the introduction of new media technolo-
gies only enlarges the participatory process in mass media in terms of how members of audiences can
comment and interact with media content, but makes almost no advancements in other dimensions.
On the maximalist side, Carpentier (2011) lists the opposite qualities of the minimalist ideal type. In
this case, participation in content production is not only limited to media professionals, but it rather
includes citizens and amateurs who start their own media. Additionally, audiences can participate
not only by interacting with content elaborated by media, but also in content production and in the
management decisions of media, by suggesting or selecting what topics to include and exclude through
some sort of decision process. Moreover, this ideal pole tends toward audience diversity and makes
explicit the political aspects of participation in media. In sum, mass media models would fall on the
minimalist side of the poles, disregarding the more radical democratic perspectives. Conversely, expe-
riences of media for social transformation tend to claim that, contrary to mass media, they fall into the
maximalist participation side, an assertion that I shall assess in chapter 7.2.
Apart from the previous division into two ideal poles, the ‘public sphere’ has been a central concept
in media research to inspire research related to audiences, democracy and participation. Habermas
deﬁned the concept as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be
formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every con-
6. Foundational texts of this perspectives were written by authors such as Bakunin, Kropotkin and Proudhon.
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versation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas, Lennox, and Lennox
1974), and employed it to analyze the emergence and decay of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas
1962–1991). Speciﬁcally, Habermas highlighted the role of the public sphere as a way to control and
counter-arrest the power of the state in the 19th century, or more generally, as a warning system in a
maximalist model of deliberative democracy (Carpentier 2011). However, Habermas stressed how dur-
ing the 20th century the bourgeois public sphere decayed with the expansion of mass media and growing
economic inequalities, which allowed private ﬁrms to encourage through it media consumerism to ben-
eﬁt capital accumulation processes, neglecting the role of the political that the public sphere used to
have before (Habermas 1962–1991). This pessimistic perspective on mass media was criticized for ig-
noring the capabilities of citizens to organize the distribution of alternative media content within the
structures of mass media (Downey and Fenton 2003). In like manner, critics remarked that Habermas
idealized the 19th century bourgeois public sphere, which in fact ignored the oppression of women and
resource scarce sectors of the population (Carpentier 2011). This criticism led to improvements of the
initial theory, such as the acknowledgment of subordinated social groups conforming counter publics
that contest the public sphere (Fraser 1990). This new perspective inspired a diversity of conceptu-
alizations around the term counter-public sphere, which refers to spaces where these counter publics
communicate. This concept suggests a broadening of potential participation avenues and shows the
interaction between a mass media public sphere and a diversity of counter-public spheres (Downey
and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010). Indeed, Downey and Fenton (2003) hypothesize that the public-sphere
will include more content from the counter-public sphere, given the growth of the latter thanks to the
internet and new media.
Despite the claims that new media might contribute to stimulate participation by viewers and rein-
vigorate the public sphere, the role of ICT and new media in society is contested. On the one hand,
there are actors who claim that these new technologies of communication will indeed lead to participa-
tory, democratic and equal societies, opening new channels of expression by eliminating intermediaries,
which Morozov (2011) pejoratively named ‘cyberutopians’. Societies where everyone would be able to
speak, comment and intervene more than before, thanks to the mediation of ICT disseminated around
the world by ﬁrms like Google, Facebook, etc. that will lead to societal changes. One of the most promi-
nent examples of such a vision is the common understanding of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a revolution ignited
by online social networks such as Twitter, which would not have taken place without them. Although
this argument is grandiloquent, because it ignores the existence of social movements and organizations
such as Takriz in Tunisia, which has been trying to stimulate change for years, it does stress the im-
portance of new technologies to coordinate action and diffuse information among citizens (Dutta 2013;
Pollock 2011). Moyo (2009) makes a similar argument with respect to the elections in Zimbabwe, which
were shaped by citizens sharing information in a horizontal way through the use of text messages and
weblogs, as an expression of citizen journalism. In general, these groups of authors remark the ‘posi-
tive’ effects of ICT in stimulating similar social transformations, such as the emergence of new spaces
for a politics of contestation by activists belonging to different subcultures (Kahn and Kellner 2004), or
the way in which new political mobilizations can start from internet groups and later turn into active
movements on the streets (Harlow 2011), among others.
On the other hand, there are skeptics to the previous grandiose advocates of technology for commu-
nication and social change, who mistrust the assumed emancipatory powers of free communications
on the internet to arrive to more participatory and democratic societies (Morozov 2011). Morozov de-
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ﬁned ‘net-delusion’ as the set of ideological-utopian beliefs about social transformation fostered in and
centered on the internet, which ignores the particular local practices and contexts in which the net-
work expands as well as its variations in use. Thus, the expansion of ICT does not necessarily lead
to more open, participatory and democratic societies. On the contrary, there are several negative as-
pects ignored or overlooked by those in the ﬁrst camp. First, the obvious contradiction of the high
concentration in very few technological ﬁrms who control these ‘democratization’ tools; for example,
Facebook, Gmail, Twitter and other large technological ﬁrms mostly in the USA, who do not only spy
on what users do, but also sell their content to third parties, as the Snowden revelations have shown
(Morozov 2011). This reduced decision space for users about their data and their privacy, could not be
further from the ideal of democracy. Second, high-tech ﬁrms from countries such as France, Germany,
Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States sell internet mass surveillance equipment to other
countries under the pretext to ﬁght ‘terrorism’, irrespective of the consequences this might have for
human rights and privacy (Morozov 2011; Hopkins and Taylor 2013). Third, the Arab Spring and other
mobilizations are not produced by technology per se, but by a longer process initiated by activists and
social movements that use the technologies as means, and consequently, these are never just techno-
logical revolutions (Pollock 2011; Morozov 2011). As Morozov (2011, p. 305) states “every new article
or book about a Twitter revolution is not a triumph of humanity; it is a triumph of Twitter’s market-
ing department”. Instead, these are the product of social organization, social movements and activists
that through their courageous action put their demands into practice, with technology being just one
type of media among the ones possible (Morozov 2011). Therefore, without the human actors, these
technologies could not have unleashed social change processes.
All in all, I shall take the dimensions suggested by Carpentier about minimalist and maximalist
models of participation and discuss them in chapter 7 if the four studied cases offer participation to
audiences in content production, selection, and access through new media technologies. Additionally, I
will examine up to what extent the new media platforms have contributed to stimulate the participation
of viewers and to strengthen the ‘public sphere’ or to conform ‘counter public spheres’, considering the
reviewed shortcomings about new media technologies.
Violence
In Figure 2.1, I include violence as one of the issues that media for social transformation have to
address. This is an important dimension that is conspicuously absent in research of Western academics.
In effect, key literature on the topic usually speaks of the power of the media over society (Curran 2002;
Castells 2009), in some cases distinguishing the competition between alternative and mass media and
their effects over society (Guedes Bailey, Cammaerts, and Carpentier 2007), but scarcely focusing on
the competition among them. This is clearly a bias of these strands of research, which might ignore
a dimension not so relevant in the context of Western countries, but deﬁnitely one that cannot be
neglected in the context of non-Western countries.
To address this research gap, I shall show how the four analyzed cases have suffered different types
of violence from incumbents and from preexisting structures. This requires a conceptualization of vi-
olence, including but also beyond purely physical aggression, which can be found in the theoretical
contributions of Galtung and Bourdieu. For instance, Galtung (1969) offered a pioneering typology
that extended the concept of violence beyond the physical, by including ‘structural violence’ as well.
This last concept refers to the existence of violence without the presence of an actor directly commit-
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ting such an act, but built into the ‘structure’; for example, the unequal distribution of resources within
a city that automatically and unfairly causes more suffering in poor neighborhoods than in rich ones.
Indeed, the concept of ‘structure’ is a black box for different types of systems, of which in this research
I am interested in those that authors named symbolic or cultural. Bourdieu (1977) deﬁned symbolic
violence based on the concept of symbolic power, which understands symbolic systems as structuring
structures, structured structures and domination instruments. The ﬁrst dimension refers to systems
such as art, religion or language that suggest a particular way for individuals to think; the second
dimension covers the inherent speciﬁc structure of symbolic systems, while the third describes how
speciﬁc groups try to legitimize and use their own symbolic structured and structuring structures as
universal. Consequently, symbolic violence is deﬁned as the exercise of symbolic power by one group
over another, to impose its own view of the world, or ‘discourse’ in the language of this work, undermin-
ing the rest. In a similar vein, Galtung (1990) introduced the concept of ‘cultural violence’ to capture
how culture or the symbolic, can be used to attack human basic needs, or more generally, to attack life
in a legitimized way. In this case, the concept is part of the broader term structural violence, and it
refers to the suffering caused by speciﬁc symbolic structures, such as religion, ideologies, languages,
art, science, etc.
Despite the fact that the extension of the concept of violence is useful to theorize about how differ-
ent structures cause social suffering, I ﬁnd the clear-cut distinction between personal and structural
violence problematic, because in many cases structural violence might be produced by high-ranking
individuals in the structures, although the link might not be easily traced empirically, thus giving the
ﬁctitious impression of being impersonal. Another shortcoming is that it employs ‘structure’ in a very
broad way, referring to the interactions between different systems (cultural, educational, military, polit-
ical, etc.), which blurs what speciﬁc system might be causing the violence (Farmer et al. 2004). Taking
into account these weak points and the empirical data in the context of new media projects in Argentina
and Brazil, in this research I shall open up the concept of violence in the following four dimensions:
physical; economic; legal; and discursive. The ﬁrst dimension refers to the use of physical force to
damage the experiences through repression by police forces. Although at the ground level this implies
direct violence against journalists, it is not easy to trace the origin of the orders, thus this dimension
matches the structural violence deﬁnition committed by the state. The second dimension considers
the economic strategies that incumbents, such as mass media ﬁrms, might use to harm the projects of
media for social transformation by distorting market prices to their favor (i.e. dumping). Therefore,
there is an intention to damage the new cases, which builds on an unequal distribution of resources
that has a historical origin, paving the way for resource asymmetries. The third dimension, on the one
hand, covers the legal structures that put constraints on, and thus exert legitimized violence against
media for social transformation projects, such as the nonexistence of regulations for media ownership
or the explicit ban of NGO media. On the other hand, it also considers the capability of actors (state
and large media ﬁrms) to ignore the demands of existing laws, in detriment of the rights assigned to
media for social transformation. The fourth dimension covers the conﬂicts among different discourses
described in chapter 4, in other words, how the different visions on how culture and communication
need to be organized lead to discursive violence against those who share a different perspective. In-
deed, investigations within the peace research tradition have already stressed that the primacy of an
economic approach to communications impairs the full democratization of media (Becker 1982). Thus,
this dimension is a speciﬁc instance of what Bourdieu called ‘symbolic violence’ or what Galtung named
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‘cultural violence’. Furthermore, I shall exemplify how this violence is put into practice through the
diffusion of stereotypes and defamatory communications. In the ﬁrst case, I shall quote cases of stereo-
typing, adopting a perspective from social psychology that highlights the link of stereotypes with power
relations, because they can reinforce “[. . . ] one group’s or individual’s power over another by limiting
the options of the stereotyped group” (Fiske 1993, p. 623). In the second case, I shall consider libel or
slander, which covers communication that “[. . . ] tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him”
(Cohen and Gunther 1987, p. 13). I extend this deﬁnition to include the negative portrayal by state or
private for-proﬁt mass media ﬁrms of the new media for social transformation cases studied in the em-
pirical chapters, and I consider these portrayals as a type of violence from mass media organizations
against media for social transformation. Although it is true that the latter might elaborate similar
portrayals of mass media, the former have far more capabilities of diffusing such defamatory commu-
nications to mass audiences, leaving few spaces of reply for the latter, who also have scarce resources
to legally challenge such practices. Therefore, there is an asymmetry in the dissemination of libels, and
I shall focus on those of mass media against media for social transformation, which the latter under-
stand as harmful. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the dissemination of defamatory communications
is not a lineal process that immediately affects the attitudes of audiences in a negative way, given the
active nature of the latter to challenge or discard the received information (Cohen and Gunther 1987).
Therefore, within the scope of this research I cannot categorically afﬁrm or deny the consequences of
this violent behavior, though this might inspire further avenues of research in media psychology.
A ﬁnal point to make is that these different types of violence overlap with the concept of dispositives
employed in SKAD. However, the different types of violence not necessarily always emanate from the
policy discourses I analyzed in chapter 4. Indeed, I shall mention in the next chapter that the restric-
tions NGO have been facing in Argentina were a product of the dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s.
Nonetheless, in other cases they do coincide; for example, when mass media employ their channels to
despise media for social transformation.
Resources
The ﬁnal dimension to explain from the conceptual framework is ‘resources’, which refers to a resource-
view of power that I applied to understand how media for social transformation acquire and mobilize
resources to deal with the challenges posed by their respective contexts of operation and incumbents.
In this section, I will review different strands of research and their conceptions of power to explain why
a resource perspective is suitable. Then, I will introduce the approach I shall apply in chapter 8.
Foucault and Weber offered two different conceptualizations on power. The latter deﬁned it as “the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber 1978, p. 53), which
is an example of a distributed theory of power, where some actors have such resources and can join
collectively to increase them in competition with others (Heiskala 2001). In contrast, Foucault viewed
power as relational and all-pervasive in society, and not as a resource that some actors have whereas
others do not. His work delineates three types of power: sovereign, disciplinary and governmental.
The former refers to the power achieved through repression and laws, which he exempliﬁed with the
monarchic authority. The second refers to the repeated training in speciﬁc practices that becomes incor-
porated in the subjects. The third and most subtle, refers to how the preferences of actors are shaped by
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discourse. Thus actors might think they are free in their decisions, when in fact their choice horizons
have been already limited by subtle power inﬂuences through discourses. These last two dimensions
show how power is not only negative as in the resource approach, but rather positive in shaping human
action (Foucault 1980). The latter option is important in research strands in media studies that want
to understand how media inﬂuence audiences by disseminating messages representing discourses that
shape subjects and particularly constrain their bodily and material practices7. In some traditions, it
has been argued that audiences are considered to be directly inﬂuenced by media, whereas in others,
it is argued that audiences can contest and react in different ways to the content they receive (audi-
ence research ﬁeld) (Curran 2002). Notwithstanding, empirically proving these positions is a thorny
issue, given the challenges regarding an isolation of all factors outside media that could intervene
with the way audiences react to the content they receive. Although I share the perspective that media
disseminate discourses that can inﬂuence audiences, this stance does not say much about how media
organizations were able to accumulate ‘power’ in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, I shall adopt a resource
view of power in synchrony with Weber’s deﬁnition, in order to comprehend how media for social trans-
formation acquire and mobilize resources for their operation, irrespective of the potential effects that
their content dissemination might cause.
The resource view of power is what really matters for this research, given its interest on how new
media experiences can emerge that challenge preexisting mass media structures. Castells (2009) pro-
posed a power typology in the context of his network society framework that tackles part of these issues,
because he tried to show the importance of networks regarding the power certain media have8. Accord-
ingly, his perspective understands media as part of networks that are materially conditioned, and that
materially condition the messages that ﬂow through them. As a shortcoming, it focuses on the broader
mass media picture and its connections with technological, ﬁnancial and political networks, which do
not match all the speciﬁcities of the speciﬁc media projects for social transformation of non-Western
countries I am interested in. Nevertheless, this approach suggests to study the variety of resources
that new media experiences are able to mobilize to construct their networks. For this reason, I em-
ploy in this research a resource-view of power, because it allows mapping the different strategies of
acquisition and mobilization of resources that media experiences have put into practice in the context
of Argentina and Brazil. In particular, the analysis was inspired by the resource-based deﬁnition of
power introduced by (Avelino and Rotmans 2009, p. 550) in the context of interdisciplinary research
projects, which deﬁned power as “[. . . ] the ability of actors to mobilize resources to achieve a certain goal
[. . . ]”. In their deﬁnition, the authors deﬁned resources broadly, covering “[...] persons, assets, materials
or capital, including human, mental, monetary, artefactual and natural resources” (p. 551). Although I
7. For example see (Carpentier 2011; Thorpe 2008).
8. Castells (2009) deﬁned four types of power emerging due to networks: a) Network power; b) Networking power; c) Networked
power; and d) Networking making power. a) Network power refers to how the medium (networks) in which messages ﬂow
conditions the type of expressions and the format of the messages, without necessarily determining them. b) Networking power is
the ability that some gatekeepers have of allowing certain messages to ﬂow within the network or not. For instance, even though
now there are more media, still most read are those in mass media and thus the diversity of what is accessed is not inﬁnite. c)
Networked power refers to the inﬂuence that certain nodes have over others, which he calls programmers, who have the capacity
to deﬁne what is relevant. Castells thinks these conform a network by themselves, that aim to produce the programmed, which
are the “subordinated subjects of the power-holders in the communication networks”. Finally, d) Network-making power refers to
the capability of those actors that can create and program a network, like Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi, Larry Page, Sergey
Brin, among others. These meta-programmers constitute a network too, aiming to maximize proﬁts and to attract audiences to
expand their symbolic capital, which can later be redirected for other ends such as political inﬂuence. An extra concept is that
of network switching that refers to the contact or interface between different networks, which is controlled by gatekeepers who
allow content to pass from one to the other. These gatekeepers exercise network switching power; for example, when a media
owner decides to favor one political line over another.
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do not apply the approach in a transitions framework, in which the authors introduced the concept, I
adopted their broad view of resources as central to understand power issues. In contrast, I introduced
some variations in the types of resources based on the empirical data collected during ﬁeldwork. In
effect, in chapter 8 I will consider the following eight types of resources: audience; ﬁnancial; human;
knowledge; legal; political; relational; technological & infrastructural.
In sum, this eclectic conceptual framework links structural dimensions of analysis with the speciﬁc
practices of media for social transformation cases, complementing different theoretical perspectives
and concepts. In this way, I shall argue that I avoid the shortcomings of pure discursive perspectives,
which simplify the central role of the material contexts of production. Likewise, I address Western
biases that overlook dimensions of key importance in order to understand the hurdles media for social
transformation face in the context of Argentina and Brazil. In effect, in the next chapter I shall begin
by examining the speciﬁc contextual factors in both countries, which shape the most relevant actors
and policies in the cultural and media sectors.
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Chapter 3
Context: Argentina and Brazil
“In common use almost every word has many shades of meaning, and therefore needs to be interpreted
by the context” (Marshall 1890, p. 37).
This chapter introduces the most relevant discussions and features of cultural policies and media
systems in Argentina and Brazil. This is important, because it sets the stage for the structural condi-
tions that the four analyzed media for social transformation are challenging. To understand these more
recent debates, in this chapter I will ﬁrst synthesize relevant demographic, geographical, political and
historical facts, which focus mostly on events that took place in the last decades of the 20th century,
although some previous inheritances relevant for the research are mentioned as well.
3.1 Demography and Geography
3.2 Argentina and Brazil
There are a number of cultural, demographic and geographic facts about Argentina and Brazil relevant
to highlight in this research. As Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show, both are large countries that occupy the 5th
and 8th position in terms of total area in km2 respectively (Wikipedia 2014c), and for this reason they
have a diversity of climates that inﬂuences their cultural diversity. For instance the cultural practices
in the humid and hot Amazon, like in the city of Manaus, contrast with those in the northeast regions
far from the coast that suffer continuous droughts. In the same way, Argentina has different cultural
practices in the northwestern cities that have high average temperatures, like Salta, which differ from
those of the south with lower average temperatures, like Comodoro Rivadavia. The important point is
that these different environmental conditions have inﬂuenced particular and varied cultural patterns
in each region.
As regards population, in 2014 Brazil approximately had 203 million inhabitants1, whereas Ar-
gentina had only 42 million inhabitants (INDEC 2013). Thus, in comparison, the national population
density is also smaller (15 for Argentina vs 24 for Brazil2). Even though both countries have a low
population density in comparison with countries of similar size such as India or China (with 421 and
1. The value is a projection of the results of the national census of 2013 obtained on 27/09/2014 from Instituto Brasileiro de
Geograﬁa e Estatística (IBGE 2014).
2. The data corresponds to the year 2013 and the source was the World Bank (World Bank 2015).
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Figure 3.1: Map of Argentina. The numbered squares indicate the cities where I conducted ﬁeldwork:
1) Buenos Aires; 2) Santa Rosa; 3) Córdoba; 4) Resistencia; 5) Bariloche.
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Figure 3.2: Map of Brazil. The numbered stars indicate the cities where I conducted ﬁeldwork: 1)
São Paulo; 2) Ubatuba; 3) Rio de Janeiro; 4) Belo Horizonte; 5) Brasília; 6) Recife; 7) João Pessoa; 8)
Fortaleza; 9) Belém.
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145 respectively), in both cases the population is very unevenly distributed with the majority of them
living in large urban cities. For instance, the metropolitan region of São Paulo is estimated to have
21 million inhabitants, whereas the metropolitan region of Buenos Aires almost 13 million (Wikipedia
2015a). More broadly, in Brazil the population is concentrated in the southeastern states (Espirito
Santo, Minas Gerais, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) that represent 42% of the population (2%, 10%,
22% and 8% respectively)3. In Argentina, however, the concentration pattern is even worse, with 46%
of the national population living in the province of Buenos Aires, which includes the capital Buenos
Aires (INDEC 2013).
3.3 History, Economy and Politics
In this subsection, I will brieﬂy introduce relevant historical, economic and political features in Ar-
gentina and Brazil, which help to explain the recent discussions in the media system of both countries,
and background factors that help to comprehend the positions of the analyzed media for social trans-
formation.
3.3.1 The 19th century
In 1816, Argentina obtained its independence from Spain through a revolution, which led into a fero-
cious internal struggle between those favoring the concentration of the country’s command in Buenos
Aires, the port, versus those who struggled for a federal country. At that time, the frontiers of the
country were still not established and there was a continuous ﬁght against indigenous communities
inhabiting the south. These tensions were narrated in a classical book by an Argentinean president,
‘Civilization or Barbarism’, referring to the clash between European versus Latin American cultures,
clearly in favor of the former and scorning the latter (Sarmiento 1896), which was a position also re-
ﬂected in national policies, such as the 1853 national constitution that in its Article 25° speciﬁcally
encouraged the immigration of Europeans only. According to Romero, these conﬂicts could only be
resolved around 1880 after a war with Paraguay and the conquest of the territories controlled by in-
digenous communities, also known as ‘the conquest of the desert’ (Romero 2002, p. 2). On the one hand,
the former established the northern geographical limits of the country and Buenos Aires as the capital
of a federal nation. This decision contributed to the concentration of productive forces and inhabitants
of the city, which at the time was a logical consequence of the country’s economic model based on agri-
cultural products exported from the harbor of Buenos Aires. However, it led to a division between the
‘developed capital’ versus the ‘backwards interior’ of the country, a separation still relevant, because it
persisted in time (Sawers 1996). On the other hand, the conquest of the desert expanded and deﬁned
the current southern Argentinean borders. But this was done through the oppression of indigenous
communities who lived there, limiting their access to politics and disseminating negative stereotypes
against their culture (lifestyles, beliefs, languages, etc.) that prevail until today. These two historical
patterns are important for this research, because they challenge new media experiences located far
from the capital or managed by indigenous communities.
As regards the nation of Brazil, it is the product of the Portuguese colonial project, which estab-
lished a latifundium economic model based on slave labor to exploit and trade raw materials produced
3. The percentages are also based on estimations of national and state populations based on the 2010 census.
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in the colony (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). The inhabitants of what we now call Brazil
did not revolt against their conquerors, as the Spanish colonies did, instead, in 1822 the threat of
Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal pushed the monarchy to transfer part of the royal court to Brazil (Pri-
ore and Venancio 2010) and to establish Rio de Janeiro as the capital of the so-called Brazilian Empire
(1822-1889). During this period, the union of diverse regions toward a national project was advanced;
European migration was fostered (mostly to southern and southeastern states) to ‘whiten’ Brazil (Skid-
more 1999); and in 1888 slavery was abolished, which unleashed disputes among different groups that
contributed to the fall of the Empire and the establishment of the First Republic the following year
(Priore and Venancio 2010). It is worth to remark that despite the abolition of slavery, “unwritten color
bars” were kept against the social mobility of non-whites (Skidmore 1999, p. 79), in addition to the
remaining huge income inequalities linked to skin color, which is another feature haunting Brazil until
modern times (Skidmore 1999). Although these ‘color bars’ are also present in Argentina (Adamovsky
2008), in Brazil they are more pronounced, because of the large proportion of Afro-descendants (Skid-
more 1999). Argentina implemented a state policy to negate their existence (Ocoró Loango 2010).
However, color bars remain against descendants of indigenous communities. Besides this skin color
discrimination, Skidmore remarks two other tensions present in Brazilian history that are relevant
for this research. First, the geographical division of those living near the modern urban cities of the
coast versus those in the small relegated rural towns in the interior of the country, with the northeast
and the southeast having been home to more than 60% of the country’s population for over 200 years
(Skidmore 1999). Second, the colliding interests between parts of the Brazilian society that strived
for the protection of the remaining indigenous population against other groups that had no remorse in
destroying them whenever they were in the middle of some resource that could be exploited (Skidmore
1999). Therefore, as in the Argentinean case, there are negative stereotypes about the lifestyles of
indigenous communities .
3.3.2 From the Beginning of the 20th Century to the End of Dictatorships
A couple of facts from the complex history of Argentina during the 20th century are of interest for this
research. First, the pendulum motion between civil and military governments, which became particu-
larly politically polarized and conﬂicting after the governments of Juan Domingo Perón from 1946 to
1955. Although himself a general, he arrived to power through democratic elections and introduced
several state centered policies to favor resource-scarce sectors of the population, for instance their in-
corporation to politics, social life and an expansion of their consumption options (Romero 2002). These
measures gave the government popular support, however, historians point out that the government
took an authoritarian bend and massively used propaganda to indoctrinate the masses in its vision
and to convince them of the leadership qualities that Perón and his wife, Eva, had (Romero 2002). A
conﬂict with the church and representatives of the military sector paved the way for a military coup
that began a process of ‘deperonization’ in 1955 (Romero 2002), which included a ban of the peronist po-
litical party (Perón went into exile) and a strong media and cultural censorship of the previous peronist
inﬂuence (Romero 2002). Over the following decades, the country experienced even more pendulum
changes between military and civil governments. During these years, there were struggles between
economic projects to advance industrialization through import substitution 4 (Romero 2002), versus
projects basing their economic model on income concentration in large ﬁrms and exports. In 1973,
4. Based on dependency theory to surpass ‘development’ problems understood from a Latin American perspective.
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Perón returned to power, but he died only one year later and left the government in the hands of his
third wife, Isabel de Perón, together with a decaying political situation that led to the most violent mil-
itary dictatorship of the country’s history (Romero 2002). In the context of the global struggle between
the USA and the USSR, this military coup occupied power from 1976 to 1983 and left several marks
on Argentina. In the economic sphere, it questioned the previous ideas of the need of a welfare state
and the development of national markets, imposing instead ideas of economic liberalism and a focus
on exports to world markets. Nonetheless, the application of these principles ended up favoring ﬁrms
close to the military, reinforcing concentration patterns and at the same time, dismantling the capacity
of the state to plan, regulate and control the economy (Romero 2002). With those measures, Argentina
made a ﬁrst experiment in ‘neoliberalism’ by liberalizing trade and ﬁnance, albeit with increased in-
come inequality (Chudnovsky and López 2007). What is particularly important for the context of this
thesis is that political participation was banned, media and civil society censorship was introduced and
complemented with the massive use of propaganda to reinforce the discourse and policies of the mili-
tary (Romero 2002). Anyone who deviated was considered ‘subversive’ and became a target of torture,
which led to the tragic death of around 30.000 political dissidents who suffered forced disappearance;
in other words, they were killed but there are no traces of their bodies left.
As regards Brazil, the First Republic was overthrown by a military coup in 1930, Getúlio Vargas
assumed power and started a process of state centralization, which challenged the previous dominance
of oligarchic rule (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). In particular, this project faced resis-
tance from the elite of the state of São Paulo in a revolt that took place in 1932. Previously irrelevant
in Brazilian history, this state increased its inﬂuence from the beginning of the 20th century onwards
thanks to income from coffee exports reinvested in acquiring manufacturing skills and the exploitation
of cheap local and foreign labor (Priore and Venancio 2010). Although Vargas controlled the rebellion,
the Paulista elite lost political support at the national level, but still achieved some of its objectives and
continued concentrating economic power (Priore and Venancio 2010; Skidmore 1999). During the next
years, the political climate became more polarized with an advancing communist threat to the govern-
ment, which was used as an excuse by Vargas to increase power centralization and his authoritarian
image (Skidmore 1999). An example of the latter was the continuous use of propaganda disseminated
through radio and cinema to promote his personality cult (Priore and Venancio 2010) and also the stim-
ulation of a national feeling of belonging through the promotion of Brazilian culture, such as samba
and carnivals (Skidmore 1999). Due to the pressure of opposing military groups, Vargas ﬁnally left
power in 1945, only to return once again in 1951, but this time through a democratic election (Priore
and Venancio 2010). After World War II, Brazil experienced rapid urbanization, which paved the way
for populist policies such as those Vargas introduced during his second term, including 100% increase
of the minimum salary (Priore and Venancio 2010). According to Priore and Venancio, from then on-
wards a schematic way to understand the history of Brazil is as a conﬂict between two ideal poles: on
the one hand, projects that defend a nationalist development with strong state intervention; on the
other hand, projects that put the center of development in the hands of Brazilian private ﬁrms in as-
sociation with foreign capital (Priore and Venancio 2010). Obviously Vargas sided with the former and
cultivated a populist image to erase the previous dictatorial one he had left (Skidmore 1999), but other
groups defended the latter strongly and entered into conﬂict with Vargas. To avoid another military
coup, this and other tensions led him to commit suicide in 1954, to safeguard democracy (Skidmore
1999). Some years later, Julescino Kubitschek assumed the presidency and put forward an economic
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development model to stimulate industrialization and set up the required infrastructure together with
the construction of Brasília, the new capital (Skidmore 1999). This model achieved economic growth
at the expense of an increasing inﬂationary spiral and international debts that opened the door for
interventions by the IMF (Skidmore 1999). During the next governments, this heavy burden only es-
calated with skyrocketing inﬂation rates that ﬁnally contributed to destabilize the political situation
and led to a new military coup in 1964 (Skidmore 1999). This dictatorship lasted 21 years and affected
several aspects of Brazilian life. In the economic sphere, similarly to the Argentinean case, the coup
opened the economy and introduced programs to control inﬂation rates, which showed some positive
results until 1973, but then, the situation deteriorated, and the government never addressed issues
of income distribution, which was highly unequal between the small proportion of well paid technical
workers and the surplus of poorly paid unskilled ones (Skidmore 1999). Therefore, economic growth
went hand in hand with wealth concentration in few sectors of the population (Priore and Venancio
2010). In the political sphere, every group and individuals opposing the military rule were persecuted,
combated and in some cases tortured, which went hand in hand with censorship in media and culture
(Priore and Venancio 2010). The growing impoverishment of the urban population, violence rates, and
the authoritarian and repressive image Brazil had abroad, were all factors that inﬂuenced the military
to begin a slow process of return to democracy during the 1970s, which was ﬁnally completed in 1985.
3.3.3 The Return of Democracies and the Neoliberal Decade
In Argentina, the transition to democracy was well-welcomed by civil society and previously banned
political parties; however, it soon became an illusion because of the still remaining inﬂuence of the
military and large ﬁrms that deﬁed the recently elected government (Romero 2002). A worsening eco-
nomic scenario led to a new government in 1989, which even had to assume power in advance, led
by the ‘peronist’ Carlos Menem. What is important for this research of the two periods in which he
occupied the administration is the economic and political ideology he subscribed to, neoliberalism or
Washington consensus. According to Romero, Menem followed the top-down approach disseminated by
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and a
network of neoliberal economists who advocated to “reduce state spending to the level of the state’s real
ﬁscal resources, eliminate state intervention in the economy, and open up the economy to foreign compe-
tition—in short, a program of austerity and capitalist restructuring” (p. 286). Evidently, he continued
the job the military had begun by force in 1976, but now under a democratically elected government.
During those years the president introduced several reforms to increase privatizations that he named
“surgery without anesthesia” (p. 288), which led to a recovery in GDP growth and GDP per capita,
but at the same time to an increase in the gap of income distribution. These tendencies are shown in
sections 3.3 and 3.4. The former illustrates the spur of economic growth during the ﬁrst years of the
decade, together with a worsening of the ﬁgure of income distribution measured by the GINI index.
Therefore, the trade and ﬁnancial liberalization measures fostered by international credit organiza-
tions contributed to economic growth, but also to an increase in social conﬂict and unemployment rates
(Chudnovsky and López 2007; Romero 2002). By the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st
century, these trends only worsened; in 2001 several internal and external factors converged and led to
the burst of one of the worst economic and political crisis in Argentinean history (Romero 2002), which
is evident in the ﬁgures by the abrupt fall of GDP per capita in 2002 and the peak in the GINI index in
2003.
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As regards Brazil, the ﬁrst democratically elected president after the dictatorship died before his
inauguration, so the presidency was left in the hands of José Sarney. His period saw a serious economic
crisis in 1989 with hyperinﬂation rates of over 1.000% per year (Priore and Venancio 2010), in addition
to other enduring problems of the decade such as the growing disparity between the rich and the poor
(Skidmore 1999). Despite these hurdles, one of the most important measures of his government was
the new constitution of 1988 that aimed to democratize some of the authoritarian institutions inher-
ited from the dictatorship (Skidmore 1999). The next election was won by Fernando Collor de Mello, an
unknown candidate who skyrocketed in popularity thanks to a sly use of the increasing inﬂuence that
television had in politics (Priore and Venancio 2010), and also thanks to a strong support from the USA
because of his promise to implement neoliberal policies (Skidmore 1999). In spite of the good reputa-
tion and fame his government enjoyed, it had a short duration because of a worsening economic crisis
and an impeachment against him due to corruption scandals (Skidmore 1999). The next two demo-
cratic elections were won by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), who remained in power from 1994
to 2003. This period continued with generically called neoliberal policies, which included: measures
to internationalize the economy, privatization of public ﬁrms, deregulation of markets, introduction of
incentives to attract foreign capital, among others (Priore and Venancio 2010). In terms of GDP growth
per capita, there was a considerable increase from 1993 to 1997, but as Figure 3.3 shows, in 1998 GDP
per capita experienced a decrease until 2002 due to the impacts of the Asian and Russian ﬁnancial
crisis of previous years. All in all, the main success of the government was to ﬁnally control inﬂation
rates, which improved the buying power of the poor, but this did not imply an improvement in terms
of income distribution (Skidmore 1999). For instance, the GINI index in Figure 3.4 did not vary much
for Brazil during the 1990s, although it shows a slight tendency to decrease. Thus, inequality issues,
chronic unemployment rates and increasing debts with the IMF remained unaddressed challenges dur-
ing Cardoso´s presidencies (Priore and Venancio 2010).
3.3.4 The Post-Neoliberal Decade?
An important point to stress is the political change that has taken place in several countries of Latin
America in the beginning of the 21st century. Analysts have hypothesized this period to be a post-
neoliberal one (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012), because there have been efforts to turn away from policies
imposed by the USA and the so called Washington consensus. Argentina and Brazil are examples of
this, because they have recovered national development projects distancing themselves from foreign
dependance and took advantage of windows of opportunity in the region to challenge USA hegemony;
for instance, the rejection of the initiative to create a free trade area of the Americas (Whitney JR.
2005), and instead founding the “Unión de Naciones Suramericanas” (Union of South American Nations
- UNASUR) to defend the political interest of the region and move toward the so desired “patria grande”
and Latin American unity (Zibechi 2012, p. 80).
These changes cannot be understood without mentioning the political parties in power. From 2003
until 2015, both countries have been under the command of the same party at the national level, the
“Partido dos Trabalhadores” (Worker’s Party) in Brazil led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma
Rousseff (from now onward I shall refer to them as Lula and Dilma respectively) that has a social
democratic ideology, and the “Frente para la Victoria” (Front for Victory) or informally Kirchnerism led
by Néstor and Cristina Kirchner with a center-left ideology.
As regards Argentina, from 2003 to 2007 Néstor Kirchner was president of the nation, succeeded by
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Figure 3.3: GDP per capita in Argentina, Brazil, Latin America and World averages from 1975 to 2013.
Source: World Bank Data.
Figure 3.4: GINI index for Argentina and Brazil from 1985 to 2010. Source: World Bank Data.
53
his wife, Cristina Kirchner, from 2008 to 2015. In these years, several changes took place that are worth
remarking. In the economic sphere, the country focused on industrialization policies and at the same
time restructured and canceled part of its international debt (Galand 2013). These measures went
hand in hand with policies to redistribute income (Galand 2013); for example, the “Asignación Univer-
sal por Hijo” (universal child allowance) that has been giving a minimum salary to jobless Argentineans
or those in the informal economy, who have a kid under 18 (ANSES 2014). The improvement in the
economic and social conditions during 2003-2010 can be appreciated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, where the
GINI achieved its minimum of the series since the beginning of the 21st century, and GDP per capita
its peak, with an annual growth rate of 13,57% during the period 2003-2013, higher than the Latin
American and world growth rates that were 10,28% and 5,78% respectively. In the political sphere,
participation was strengthened, in particular by the youth reversing the apolitization processes of the
1990s (Galand 2013), human rights became a national policy reversing the sad inheritance from the
dictatorship, policies were introduced to address disadvantaged positions of indigenous communities
and the power of traditional sectors of Argentina was challenged, for instance that of the agroindustrial
producers and mass media (Natanson 2014). However, critics of the economic model that allowed gov-
ernment success point out that it has been heavily dependent on exports of raw materials to China, in
particular soybean, which are in the control of few ﬁrms (82,4% in the hands of seven) (Natanson 2014).
At the same time, since 2013 the economic situation in the country has worsened, with increasing in-
ﬂation rates and issues with foreign credit organizations that endanger the recent income distribution
and growth patterns (Natanson 2014). In brief, some issues inherited from previous decades have been
addressed, but the increasing economic instability of the last years has also boosted social conﬂicts
around the distribution of resources.
As regards Brazil, in 2003 Lula and a whole generation that had participated against the military
coup during the 1960s came to power. His candidature was resisted by businessmen and oligarchs who
feared a return to populist measures similar to those of Vargas. In part, this fear emanated from Lula’s
ﬁgure, who was born in a poor family in the northeast of Brazil that later emigrated to São Paulo. He
had a worker’s background and did not obtain a university degree (Love and Baer 2009). This proﬁle
connected with the experiences of the majority of the Brazilian population, but of course diverged from
the one of previous presidents who were more related to the elitist lifestyle. Still, to defuse the attacks
he was receiving, before his election Lula wrote a public letter to the Brazilian people in which he
explained his political project, which included exports and the development of national mass markets
as one of its main points (Lula da Silva 2010). Thus, despite Lula’s criticism of Cardoso’s government,
analysts say he kept the orientation towards international markets that was inherited, but added mea-
sures to address income inequality and poverty issues that remained unaddressed (Priore and Venancio
2010). For example, according to the Financial Times “whereas in the past it was said that Brazil must
grow in order to distribute wealth, his view was that Brazil must ﬁrst distribute wealth in order to grow”
(Love and Baer 2009, p. 312). In this way, Brazil under Lula did not follow a revolutionary approach
as some critics feared, but instead applied reformist measures to reduce the negative effects of glob-
alization (Priore and Venancio 2010), like the so discussed program Bolsa Familia. Figure 3.3 shows
that from 2003 to 2011, GDP per capita grew each year except for one, with an annual growth rate
of 13,94%. Therefore, economic growth was successful during his two periods in government. At the
same time, Figure 3.4 illustrates that during the period under consideration 2003-2009 the GINI index
had a continuous downward trend. Hence, Lula was able to put forward a project stimulating economic
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growth and social inclusion at the same time. According to the BBC (Cabral 2010), in 2011 he left
power as the most popular president in Brazil. He was succeeded by Dilma, who belongs to the same
political party, and even though this was supposed to be a government of continuity, the economic situ-
ation was not so spectacular as before and several social issues came to the fore. For instance, in 2013
a series of protests that began after an increase in transport fares led to massive riots all across the
country claiming for unattended issues related to health, education, corruption, among others (Watts
2013). This context will be relevant for the description of the Brazilian case study.
3.4 Culture and Media
This section introduces two important descriptions for the research. First, it describes the cultural
diversity existing in both countries, and at the same time, the large inequalities in terms of consump-
tion, distribution and production of culture. Second, the section details the main transformations in
the media system in Argentina and Brazil, focusing on how policies for audiovisual media changed in
comparison to the main political events taking place from the mid-20th century onwards. Speciﬁcally,
it focuses on the last decades that explain the context in which the analyzed case studies have been
operating.
3.4.1 Culture
The ofﬁcial national language in each country was an inheritance of the colonial powers that ruled
these lands, Spanish in Argentina and Portuguese in Brazil. However, according to the Atlas of the
World’s Languages in Danger (UNESCO 2014) there are 190 and 18 endangered languages in Brazil
and Argentina respectively, spoken by indigenous communities that inhabited the territories before the
conquest. Besides, both countries have different sectors of their population that speak the languages
of the immigrant settlers, mostly European ones (Italian, French, German, but also Japanese, Arabic,
among others). These Spanish and Portuguese colonizers also introduced the catholic religion, but the
cultural background of each country is far more diverse than the mere Iberian inﬂuence, because it is
a product of the mixture and amalgamation, though at different rates, of varied cultures. In Brazil, the
three main sources came from: European immigrants, indigenous communities inhabiting the territory
and Afro-descendant communities brought by the Portuguese as slaves (Ribeiro 1995). The latter have
been the stronger non-European inﬂuence that left marks on music, food, religion, among other cultural
practices (Skidmore 1999). Comparatively, the African inﬂuence was much weaker in Argentina, where
the major source of cultural diversity derives from the clash between the European inheritance and the
indigenous communities inhabiting the soil. In sum, these different immigration waves contributed to
the cultural diversity that both countries have, which is far broader than the Spanish or Portuguese
inﬂuence alone.
The cultural diversity that characterizes Argentina and Brazil is an important fact for this research,
because it is not equally represented in cultural productions or activities distributed through markets
in both countries. For instance, despite the large presence of Afro-descendant features in the Brazilian
population, black skinned actors are underrepresented in the most nationally viewed cultural product,
soap operas (Araújo 2004). Therefore, the ‘whitenization’ policies still continue in a subtle way. The
same can be said of indigenous communities, both in Brazil and Argentina, which rarely appear in mass
media. Instead, the products of the so-called ‘creative class’ ﬁnd more acceptance and distribution,
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which are aimed toward consumers in larger urban centers. These issues are connected with one of
the most drastic characteristics of the creative or cultural (depending on the country) industries in
most of Latin American countries, the high level of concentration in few ﬁrms, which of course limits
the amount of what sort of cultural products or activities are widely diffused. For example, in 2006
a group of researchers arrived at the conclusion that more than 50% of TV, Radio and press markets
in several Latin American countries (including Argentina and Brazil) were concentrated in just four
ﬁrms (Mastrini and Becerra 2006), which of course decide what sort of content to distribute. Besides,
there is not only concentration in terms of ﬁrm ownership, but also in their geographical location. For
instance, in the case of Argentina, Buenos Aires clusters most cultural production and has a higher
budget assigned to culture (Villarino and Bercovich 2014). Similarly, most of the cultural production
in Brazil comes from the South East region, particularly São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais
(MinC 2010). The previously mentioned historical and population facts explain such concentration
levels, which are not reversed by free market forces that do not have much incentive to expand their
products to regions with fewer inhabitants and lower consumption capacity.
Inequalities are also present in the access or consumption of cultural products and activities. For
example, in 2010 the Brazilian Minister of Culture stated that “only 13% of Brazilians go at least once
per year to cinema; 92% of Brazilians never entered a museum; 93,4% never went to an art exposition
(...)” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 484) and gave further examples that illustrate how the access to cultural
products and services is heavily restricted to classes with higher incomes. Similar statistics for cultural
consumption show that those families receiving a minimum salary of 830 Reais spent 35 times less on
culture than those families with a salary bigger than 6.335 Reais (IBGE 2013c). Besides, cultural re-
sources are concentrated in the richest region of Brazil, the southeast, which in the period 1996-2006
received 80% from the incentive laws to cultural projects operating in the country (IBGE 2013c). In
like manner, Argentina shares the same inequalities in terms of cultural production and access, with
the former concentrated in the province of Buenos Aires, far from the regions where most of the pop-
ulation with unsatisﬁed basic needs lives (mostly the north) (Villarino and Bercovich 2014). At the
same time, the northwestern and southern regions where indigenous communities live suffer a lack
of media and other cultural infrastructure (Villarino and Bercovich 2014), which reinforces the lack
of consideration of their particular cultural features. For these reasons, the differences mentioned be-
tween Buenos Aires and the ‘interior’ are still maintained and recreated in terms of cultural production
and consumption barriers.
3.4.2 Media in Argentina
In 1953, Perón passed the ﬁrst broadcasting law of the country that declared media to be of ‘public
interest’ and not a public service. At that time, the latter would have implied the nationalization of
media, something not wanted by the government because of the need to have private investors in the
sector. Still, according to Arribá (2009), the law reﬂected the authoritarian side of the democratically
elected government of Perón, which wanted to represent and have direct links with the ‘people’ through
media, considered as the central mechanism of interaction and diffusion of ideology. This model also
included the restriction of freedom of speech and of the press for the aim of limiting what Perón called
the “liberal concept of absolute liberty” (Arribá 2009, p. 75). Besides the ideological regulation, this
authoritarian approach to communications unleashed a process of geographic, political and economic
concentration in the city of Buenos Aires, where most of the ﬁrms related to the sector were established
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with close links to the government (Arribá 2009). Therefore, Arribá deﬁnes it as a ‘parastatal’ system,
because all ﬁrms and their content were strictly linked to governmental objectives, in addition to being
regulated (Arribá 2009).
Given this context, the military coup that expelled Perón from power had as one of its main objec-
tives to ban Peronism and to reduce its ideological inﬂuence; but in order to achieve this the previous
media structure had to be dismantled. To fulﬁll this objective, a decree was passed in 1958 that was
capable of constraining Perón’s political party, but, according to Mastrini (2009) simultaneously it had
several other negative consequences for the media system that persisted over time. First, the military
government created a broadcasting model characterized by private initiative. Second, it set up a com-
munication model totally dependent on advertising, which would turn out to be quite problematic in
the provinces of the interior of Argentina because of the incapacity to achieve proﬁt margins to foster
local productions. Third, they lifted the restrictions on foreign capital to enter the communication in-
dustries, which allowed US ﬁrms associated with local groups to sell content, equipment, and as Bulla
(2009) remarks, the myth of the consumer society.
These tendencies were deepened during the dictatorship that began in 1976, which in the global
context of the struggle between the USA and the USSR, considered media and culture as strategic are-
nas against the so called subversive enemy. Under this pretext, the dictatorship advanced measures
to censor media; for example, by requiring all ﬁrms to send their content to the state to be checked
before being published (Postolski and Marino 2009), and also to control media directly by intervening
in their management or indirectly through regulation organisms. Given the fact that state advertising
was an important source of income for media ﬁrms, the military used its redistribution as a strategy to
inﬂuence what content media could disseminate. In addition, they gave differentiated access to foreign
equipment and capital to ﬁrms obeying their orders. These measures contributed to generate an hege-
monic media discourse, based on disinformation to produce consent in the population for the project
the dictatorship was willing to establish (Postolski and Marino 2009). As I remarked in Section 3.3.2,
this included dismantling the previous distributionist and import substitution economic model toward
a concentrated liberal model based on ﬁnance that transferred resources from the popular sectors of
the country to national and international concentrated capital (Postolski and Marino 2009). However,
this was done under systematic violation of human rights, torture, repression of the alternative press,
trade unions and social movements in order to eliminate any sort of opposition to the imposition of its
economic and social project (Postolski and Marino 2009). These control measures introduced by force
were reiﬁed in 1981 through a new broadcasting law, which was oriented toward the aim of ‘national
security’ and declared communications to be of public interest, but at the same time, it excluded civil
society media (trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, etc.), and only allowed private ﬁrms close to
the regime to proﬁt from communications (Postolski and Marino 2009). Of course, this discrimination
was based on the fear of opening spaces for critical voices to emerge that the government had, which
would have challenged their repressive and authoritarian media model, something totally contrary to
their supposed liberalism in economic policies (Postolski and Marino 2009). During this whole process,
those ﬁrms that had close ties with the government clearly obtained economic beneﬁts and advantages
in acquiring licenses, as was the case with Clarín, which would become the most important multime-
dia ﬁrm in the country in the following decades (Postolski and Marino 2009). Before the dictatorship
collapsed, it also made sure media was passed to the hands of ﬁrms with ideological positions still close
to them (Postolski and Marino 2009). In sum, the inheritance of the period was a discriminatory law
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and eight years during which freedom of speech, freedom of expression and the right to communicate
were all repressed, elucidating what the dangerous links between media and military might lead to
(Postolski and Marino 2009).
In 1983, the ﬁrst government after the return of democracy was in a very fragile political and
economic situation to advance any change in the media system (Com 2009). However, in 1989 the next
government led by Menem did introduce changes, but not toward democratization. On the contrary,
he accepted and deepened the inheritance of the centralist, authoritarian and discriminatory media
system the military had left behind (Rossi 2009). As was highlighted in the historical review, this was
related to the embracement of Menem’s government of the neoliberal discourse, as his following words
illustrate: “[. . . ] the Argentinean state, will feel very happy the day that it does not have not even one
commercial, industrial or productive ﬁrm under its control [. . . ]” (Carlos Menem quoted in Baranchuk
2009, p. 235, translated by the author). The media were not exempt of such privatization processes,
which created a mass media system that interpellated the population as mere consumers or spectators,
limiting political action and participation (Rossi 2009). During his second government, the entrance of
foreign capital to media enterprises increased along with the concentration patterns in terms of media
ownership (Albornoz, Hernández, and Mastrini 2009). At the same time, media networks obtained
legal permission to produce the same content across the country, irrespective of regional differences,
thus affecting the expression and diffusion of the country’s cultural diversity. In sum, it was a period
in which the private interest was always valued above the public interest (Albornoz, Hernández, and
Mastrini 2009).
These structural features of the Argentinean media system and the concentration patterns in few
ﬁrms were not altered during the following government, and even less by the one that followed the se-
rious economic, social and political crisis that the country experienced in 2001 (Baladrón 2009; García
Leiva 2009, p. 310). In 2003, Néstor Kirchner assumed power and promised to introduce transparent
rules in the sector, however, not much changed. Instead, the interests of concentrated media networks,
such as Clarín, were protected and even promoted by allowing a merger of the two larger networks in
the cable TV sector (Cablevision and Multicanal), which allowed Clarín to control most of the market
at the national level (Califano 2009). Despite this, there were some small changes, such as the modi-
ﬁcation of article N° 45 of the law from the dictatorship in 2005, which prohibited co-operatives from
having their own media channels (Ginger 2007). Notwithstanding, mass media organizations lobbied
against such modiﬁcations, and although they could not stop them, several requisites were added that
made it quite hard for the only possible competitors, the co-operatives, to start offering their service
(Califano 2009).
In sum, from 1985 to 2007 the increasing need of the political class to legitimize their power and
projects in mass media led to relations of dependence with private mass media conglomerates (Mas-
trini 2009), damaging democratic processes in the country. In 2007 and after 22 years of democracy, an
authoritarian model still prevailed that only favored powerful and private media groups. As Mastrini
et al. (2009) indicated at that time, civil society and social movements had been silenced and excluded
from this debate; either because they did not give too much relevance to the topic or because fragmen-
tation among them did not allow them to advocate strongly for a process of media democratization.
Since 2004, several civil society organizations, such as alternative radios, trade unions, universi-
ties, social movements, famous national personalities and international organizations, united under
the “Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática” (Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting), and made
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public a list of 21 points that the state should fulﬁll to democratize communications (Coalición por
una Radiodifusión Democratica 2004). This proposal criticized media concentration as a constraint to
democracy, and strove for informational and cultural pluralism, considering communications as a fun-
damental human right (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democratica 2004). Additionally, it stressed
the need to foster community media, national and regional content, and to assure public media were
not coopted by ruling parties, among others (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democratica 2004). De-
spite their efforts, no political support was given to their claims during that or the following couple of
years, partly due to the still weak political position the government had; it had only received 22% of
the national votes in the 2003 elections. Thus, it had to keep a ‘friendly’ position toward mass media,
in particular the Clarín media group, which had considerably increased its inﬂuence. For instance, it
became vox populi that no government could resist three negative front pages of the most widely read
newspaper they controlled (Tiempo Argentino 2011), pointing to the role this ﬁrm had as a political
actor (Galand 2013).
In 2009, the scenario changed after the ruling party initiated the discussion about a new media
law. Why? The inﬂuence Clarín had and its partiality (Repoll 2010) became evident in several events
during Kirchner’s government, but in particular in a conﬂict between the national government and
agricultural producers. In synthesis, the increasing international prices of soybeans and the growing
international demand for them, mostly by China, pushed the government to argue in favor of a movable
tax to gather resources. On the contrary, the agricultural producers saw this measure as unfair and
started massive protests across the country to stop it (Wikipedia 2014a). This led to a national conﬂict
and a vote in the senate that in the end canceled the tax; however, in the process the most inﬂuential
mass media network took a biased position in favor of the agricultural sector, strongly opposing the
government and elucidating once again the excessive inﬂuence of media on politics. This was one of the
main reasons that ﬁnally convinced the ruling party to start the process for a new media law, which
was discussed in several forums across the country, taking as its base the initial 21 points presented
by civil society organizations in 2004 (Télam 2014). The Law N° 26.522 was ﬁnally passed in 2009
and much celebrated by the ruling party and the new organism that would apply it, the Autoridad
Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (AFSCA - Federal Authority of Audiovisual Commu-
nication Services). For instance, Figure 3.5 shows a poster distributed by the organization in 2013 that
transmits several symbolic messages related to the communication discussion that took place. First, it
shows the polar tension of democracia vs corporaciones (democracy vs corporations). Second, it tries to
highlight the increase of diversity that the law would bring, such as the inclusion of the multicolored
ﬂag of indigenous communities in the lower middle part of the add. Third, it suggests new employment
opportunities that would spring up by showing a lot of people how to work with diverse media (radio,
TV, satellite). Fourth, the last point is also connected to a supposed easy access to technology for new
media illustrated by the different equipment in the advertisement. Last but not least, it mentions the
slogan the ruling party employed, década ganada (won decade), which refers to the 10 years the polit-
ical organization led by the Kirchner couple (Néstor and Cristina) had been in power at that time. All
these points will be interpellated with the analyzed case studies; what is more, the enforcement of the
new law quickly encountered legal barriers and conﬂicts to be described next.
The sociology of law as discussed by Weber postulates that there are conﬂicts of interest behind
the framing of new laws among social groups who are competing to defend their own interests (Duke
1975), and this case was not an exception. Friction around the new law began before it was passed,
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with the obvious opposition of the Clarín multimedia group that would have had to reduce its size if the
project had been legalized. Despite their hostility toward the law, it was passed in 2009, considering
communication to be of public interest and having two clear aims: a) to promote new channels all over
the country managed by ﬁrms, the state and civil society organizations; b) to limit monopolistic ten-
dencies in media ownership, which is an explicit point of article 45° in the law. The conﬂicts, however,
did not stop with its sanction, conversely, they escalated. Why? Because article 45° was immediately
questioned by Clarín, who stopped the requirement of the group to reduce its size with an injunc-
tion. Second, Clarín also used injunctions to boycott the start of new entrants into the market, the
co-operatives, arguing that they would compete unfairly by taking advantage of the reduced taxes they
pay. This resistance exposed the leverage the ﬁrm had to delay a legal order from taking place through
the use of its economic resources, even though the law was widely discussed and debated across the
country with high support of civil society. This illustrates the tension between private interests and
social interests. However, this situation would not be inﬁnite, but all these legal hurdles were able to
delay the ﬁnal decision over the constitutionality of the law for four years.
The ﬁrst injunction to be revoked was the one that limited co-operatives to have their own TV
channels. Therefore, the legal road was ﬁnally open for several co-operatives to advance with the
formal process to obtain a TV signal. The ﬁrst channel under the new law was constituted in the city of
Santa Rosa, La Pampa, and shortly, the ﬁrst indigenous community TV channel was created in the city
of Bariloche by members of the Mapuche community. Both are cases analyzed in this research that shed
light on the challenges and innovations in the process of fostering new NGO media in the country under
the new law. Meanwhile, the AFSCA had among its activities the stimulation of new public and NGO
media; thus, started actions to foster their growth in the country. For example, with the coordination
of training workshops and tenders for interested organizations to apply for credits and subsidies to
set up their TV and radio channels. Nonetheless, there has been a group of so-called alternative and
popular media organizations that have not received the same support that the law claims to defend.
Most of these organizations are community based, self-managed, with scarce ﬁnancial resources as a
result of the 2001 crisis that transmit critical content, both of the government and parts of the new
law, and since then have been ignored from the support or offers the AFSCA provides. To unravel these
inconsistencies between a ‘democratic’ new law and this apparent discrimination, I have considered a
self-managed community media ﬁrm, Barricada TV, in the case studies.
The injunction to article 45° was the most critical one, because it tried to stop the control of mo-
nopolistic tendencies that the law wanted to establish. Only at the end of 2013, a ﬁnal decision was
taken by the Supreme Court of Argentina. But given the importance that the debate had in the polit-
ical agenda, before expressing its judgment, the Supreme Court organized a public audience between
the involved parts in the legal battle, the Clarín group vs the state, which clearly elucidated the two
different perspectives with several points that are worth highlighting due to their relevance in poste-
rior chapters5. On the one hand, Clarín representatives ﬁrst stated that they had ‘acquired rights’ in
terms of licenses, which the state gave to them and even prolonged in 2005. Thus, in their view the
law showed an inadmissible erratic conduct of the state. Second, they associated democracy with the
freedom to choose what to consume. This hypothesis sustains the argument that audiences prefer to
choose their media because they are better, and this does not imply that there is no plurality in terms
of offer, but just a clear preference in terms of demand and of ‘taste’. Third, Clarín representatives
5. These points were summarized from the online transmission of the debate that is still available in social networks like
YouTube.
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stressed that they are a media critical to government, which requires its current operational structure
to be economically sustainable and independent. Otherwise, with less structure their freedom of speech
would be limited. Last but not least, Clarín representatives argued that the large size of their network
is necessary to absorb expensive technological innovations that would be impossible to obtain with less
scale. On the other hand, the AFSCA’s president, Martín Sabatella, representing the state exposed
counter arguments. First, he replied that the growth of the network into a quasi-monopoly was done
in periods in which the state had scarce capacities to control concentration patterns, or even worse,
during dictatorships. Thus, from his perspective there was no contradiction for the state to introduce a
legislation to correct these distortions that damage the audiovisual market and democracy. Second, he
argued that the Clarín network has the dominant position on the TV market. This allows Clarín to set
prices and competitiveness conditions, along with predatory pricing strategies (dumping) against co-
operatives (La Arena 2010). Third, he rejected that Clarín’s ﬁnancial sustainability would be affected,
because smaller multimedia groups had already been operating sustainable for years. To prove this,
he mentioned the statistics of licenses by networks, with Clarín having 237 licenses at that time, while
the average licensee only had 1,6. The next multimedia group ‘Grupo uno’ had 49 licenses, followed by
the third with 18 and the fourth with 12. Consequently, he stated that media with 24 licenses or less
have proven to be sustainable, of course without as much proﬁtability as Clarín previously enjoyed,
but since it is an anti-monopoly law, it was still a reasonable limit from their point of view. Fourth,
the AFSCA rejected the argument that the government was advancing toward independent media. In-
stead, its president stated that they wanted to defend democracy and freedom of speech by regulating
the audiovisual market, so that no ﬁrm can obtain excessive strength. The following fragment of the
speech of AFSCA’s president during a public audience illustrates such a position, and he is implicitly
making reference to the Clarín media conglomerate:
“If someone wants to own an audiovisual communications ﬁrm in Argentina, the limits
of the law are enough. But if someone wants to own such a ﬁrm for other purposes, like to
extort democracy, to deﬁne the direction of the country, to manipulate the public opinion, or
to set and take out presidents, obviously it is not enough. But it in that case, what they need
is a completely different thing, they need to build a political party for elections and win them”
(Centro de Información Judicial 2013, translated by the author).
After these presentations, the Supreme Court voted and ﬁnally established the constitutionality of the
article N° 45, which limits media concentration. As a popular journalist in Argentina expressed, one
of the results of this conﬂict was that “the debate and the sanction of the audiovisual communication
services law has been a very transformative event for society, culture and democracy. With their interests
being affected, big businesses showed their real face, barely without the make up used hitherto. This
was one of the most important aspects for society. We discovered we were informed by media strongly
committed to their business interests” (Morales and Berlanga 2012, p. 4, translated by the author).
Nevertheless, the conﬂicting positions that the two actors in the debate exposed are far from being
reconciled. The case studies in Argentina will contribute to illuminate the difﬁculties that new media
blossoming after the law are having.
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3.4.3 Media in Brazil
In 1962, telecommunications were legally organized in Brazil through Law N° 4.117, which was ori-
ented to favor private ﬁrms (Bolaño 2007). However, the military rule altered the media system into a
more authoritarian and centralized one, excluding foreign capital and limiting the property of TVs and
radios (Bolaño 2007). These decisions led to a centralized TV model in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
from where content was diffused to the rest of the country, stimulating a nationalist media model that
limited the dissemination of local expressions, constraining content diversity (Bolaño 2007). National
capital ﬁrms were favored and the lack of regulation allowed the concentration of medias not only ge-
ographically, but also in terms of ownership in the hands of few rich Brazilian families (Bolaño 2007;
Mattos 2005).
A key media conglomerate in the history of Brazilian media favored by the military rule was the
Globo Network, which began with the foundation of the newspaper O Globo (The World) in 1925 in the
city of Rio de Janeiro (Mattos 2005). In 1965, the ﬁrm entered the TV sector with the inauguration of
TV Globo, which became one of the most powerful business television networks in the world during the
military dictatorship (Lima 2005). Several factors contributed to the rapid growth of its inﬂuence (Lima
2005). First, Globo established an implicit alliance with the army that allowed it to enjoy favorable in-
stitutional conditions, such as easy access to state funding. In return, they contributed to legitimize
governmental policies. Second, Globo achieved a high concentration in terms of audience share; for
instance, Skidmore estimates it reached around 80% during the 1970s (Skidmore 1999). Third, Globo
used its private investments in the name of public interest and nationalism, which reinforced its eco-
nomic advantages. These factors contributed to a high degree of media concentration in the hands of
the network that allowed it to have direct inﬂuence on several political issues in Brazil both during
and after the dictatorship. For example, they disseminated contents to diffuse topics of interest to the
government and behaviors through their most popular product, soap operas, which had large audience
shares (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Another example is how they intervened and took a clear position in the
elections of the mayor of Rio de Janeiro in 1982 or yet how they delayed the coverage of social move-
ments striving for democratic elections during the last years of the dictatorship (Lima 2005). Besides
their success in the TV sector, the Globo network remained highly inﬂuential in the press sector. By
the way, the O Globo newspaper is the second most sold in Brazil and preferred among Class A and B of
consumers (Mattos 2005). In addition, it produces several magazines, such as the weekly news Época,
a magazine named Pequenas Empresas & Grandes Negócios (small ﬁrms & big businesses), several for
women, among others (Mattos 2005). These printed media reinforce their inﬂuence in the dissemina-
tion of content and ideas in the country in addition to what is done through TV. According to Mattos
(2005), the ﬁrm has aimed to create good quality products, attracting ‘talents’ to produce content, but
at the same time concentrating production.
There are several negative consequences to highlight caused by the inﬂuence that the Globo network
built. For example, Ramos remarked the power of hegemony it has to diffuse and defend the ‘ideology’ of
private enterprise above any other in the sectors of radio and TV, despising the conformation of larger
alternative projects of NGO media that could challenge this supremacy (Ramos 2005). For Ramos,
this condition is essential for media democratization, but the power that such media conglomerates
gained, conspires against any initiative that tries to regulate or alter the status quo (Ramos 2005).
At the same time, the excessive inﬂuence in terms of content diffusion to audiences has allowed the
ﬁrm to reinforce negative stereotypes against: minority groups and issues related to ethnicity, gender
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differences, age groups, quality patterns, political parties, among others (Lima 2005). For instance,
it displaced the diversity of cultural community features Brazil has (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Although
Benvenuto thinks that Globo had little interest in developing community content, he suggests that this
might have also been the consequence of other factors. First, for ﬁnancial reasons the ﬁrm needs to
produce content that is proﬁtable, which constrains what can be produced and what themes can be
explored (Benevenuto Jr. 2005). Second, Globo increased its professionalization and the ‘quality’ of
its products, which created entry barriers for other producers who would have been able to elaborate
community based content, but not with enough ‘quality’ to be included in their programs (Benevenuto
Jr. 2005). The third and last factor is related to the advanced technological capabilities that the network
has developed (Benevenuto Jr. 2005), which at the same time requires for its update to be ﬁnanced by
its content, diffused to large audiences so as to cover the costs through advertising. Consequently, this
case suggests that a for-proﬁt and a high technology oriented approach to content production, without
regulation, leads toward positions contrary to the inclusion of cultural diversity, and more broadly,
against the democratic process.
As in many other countries in Latin America, Brazil had previous experiences with community
radios that diffused contents and ideas challenging the predominant ones (state and private) (Fórum
Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007a, p. 10). During the military dictatorship, several
community media initiatives operated illegally and were considered a threat to hegemonic ideology
(p. 10). These are part of what is known as the ‘popular and alternative communication’ movement
(Skidmore 1999; Benevenuto Jr. 2005). After the return of democracy, these communicators and so-
cial movements strove for the democratization of communications in Brazil, in particular during the
discussions of the 1988 constitution. Despite their efforts, strong resistance from private ﬁrms kept
the status quo and blocked democratization proposals for the new constitution (Fórum Nacional pela
Democratização da Comunicação 2006b, p. 20). This negative outcome for the organizations striving
for media democratization pushed them to unite and create the Fórum Nacional pela Democratização
da Comunicação (FNDC - National Forum for Media Democratization) in 1991, which aims to democ-
ratize communications in the country by proposing new projects, laws, mobilizations, among others
(Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006a, p. 13). During the 1990s, the move-
ment lost importance during the ﬁrst term of FHC, in which the strength of the neoliberal discourse
reduced the inﬂuence of social movements in general (p. 13). Their activities regained dynamism and
support during the discussion for a new cable law for Brazil, where they challenged commercial ﬁrms,
ﬁnally including in the law the obligation that private cable operators should include free channels,
among them a community channel open to citizens and NGOs (Peruzzo 2001). Although this was an
advancement to democratize content and local producers, for analysts like Bolaño (2007) it is far from
an industrial audiovisual policy that stimulates a diversity of actors; it even blocked the growth of
more community channels. It is worth pointing out that these channels are similar to the new ones
stimulated by the new law in Argentina; however, in the latter NGOs can be cable operators and there
is no restriction to just one community channel. Contrarily, every legalized channel recognized by the
AFSCA has to be included by cableoperators. For this reason, I did not cover these channels in Brazil in
my research, but rather focused on an example of new media that surpassed the problems of the cable
law, illustrating what is missing in Argentina. Furthermore, the FNDC advocated for a legalization of
the ﬁgure of community radios (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006a, p. 13),
and has also been active in the discussions around the introduction of digital TV in the country (Fórum
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Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2006c, p. 33). However, there was little advance during
the 1990s to introduce a new law to democratize media, regulating the power of large media groups.
Besides the inheritance of a concentrated and authoritarian media model, another endemic issue
that persisted in the Brazilian media system after the dictatorship is the so-called coronelismo elec-
trônico (electronic colonelism). This concept describes a situation in which a politician has direct or
indirect control over media; for instance, by assigning media licenses to those ﬁrms who will keep a
positive image of him or her (Santos and Caparelli 2005). This practice used by the military to main-
tain and expand its discourse, was not addressed by new laws once democracy had returned. Research
conducted in 2005 showed that 37% of broadcast television generators were controlled by political rep-
resentatives that had at least been elected in the previous 15 years (Santos and Caparelli 2005). There-
fore, the practice was not altered during democracy, since even channels with ‘educational’ aims have
been detected to be under the control of politicians of the country (Bolaño 2005). Santos & Caparelli go
further and claim that this clientelist practice did not even change with the rise of Lula and the Work-
ers’ Party to power in 2003 (Santos and Caparelli 2005). Taking into account these facts, the idea of
free markets for media in Brazil is deceiving, because these ‘electronic colonels’ have already accumu-
lated privileges obtained in previous times that violate the conditions for free competition (Santos and
Caparelli 2005). In sum, the inheritances of the dictatorship in the media sector were resilient to de-
mocratization processes, as the following assessment of the Brazilian media landscape by a researcher
illustrates:
“The end of the military censorship regime led to ultra-liberalism in terms of content, [...]
which privileges the interests of a very small group of companies, whose content production
capacity is more than enough for their private interests, but obviously limited to the country’s
needs concerning its insertion in international markets and to preserve local and national
cultures” (Bolaño 2007, p. 104).
The discussions and conﬂicts around the excessive inﬂuence of the Globo network continued and pre-
vailed after the return of democracy. Some critics accuse it of sabotaging the attempt to create a
national agency to regulate audiovisual production and cinema (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização
da Comunicação 2006d, p. 23). Besides, according to the results of a project to map media ownership in
Brazil (see Figure 3.66), Globo kept a leading position among national TV networks that diffuse content
across the country7, conﬁrming the privileged position that the Globo network has and showing the un-
equal distribution of media in the hands of few networks. But if market share percentages are taken
into account, the current situation is even worse and has not changed much since the dictatorship.
During the 2014 World Cup, even the liberal magazine The Economist published an article denouncing
the scandalous situation in Brazil, where Globo TV held approximately 50% of market audience shares,
a number that is exorbitant even for free market advocates (Economist 2014). For comparison, they
cited that in the USA the largest broadcast network, CBS, only has an audience share of 13% of the
market. Therefore, high concentration levels and the lack of regulation on what is transmitted has
still been a source of tensions, given the misrepresentations of diversity and groups that differ from
the elite controlling such media. For example, research showed that even though more than 50% of the
Brazilian population is of Afro-descendants or indigenous origin, these groups are scarcely represented
6. Elaborated by Donos da Mídia project. Data accessed 24/09/2014 (Donos da mídia 2009).
7. The project surveyed 1.511 media controlled either directly by ownership or indirectly through associations by 31 national
networks, where Globo is the largest network of this reduced group that control 23% of the surveyed media. The following 6
multimedia networks control 50% of the total, and the remaining 24 networks the remaining 27%.
65
Figure 3.6: Percentage of a total of 1.511 media owned or associated with national networks (31 in
total). Source: (Donos da mídia 2009).
in mass media (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007b, p. 13). Media also pro-
mote stereotypes of women, such as through ‘beauty patterns’ to follow or about the reduced spaces
where women could succeed in public roles (p. 13).
With the arrival of Lula to power, social movements expected changes in the media sector, but
nothing was done to advance toward a new law to democratize media (Fórum Nacional pela Democ-
ratização da Comunicação 2006d, p. 36). This was a surprise, given that most mass media had a
biased and negative image of Lula and his party, even before he came to power, which is explained by
researchers as part of a class conﬂict between the Brazilian elite that owns media networks and the
groups supporting the Worker’s Party (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação 2007b,
p. 6). Despite the several policies introduced to address inequality issues, the concentration of media
in private ﬁrms remained, but this did not keep other initiatives from dealing with some issues in a
precarious way. Indeed, during Lula’s ﬁrst government, there was a clear conﬂict of visions between
the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Culture, because the former was commanded by
an ex journalist from Globo that defended the interests of hegemonic ﬁrm networks, whereas the latter
implemented policies to democratize cultural and communicational practices (Bolaño 2007). In partic-
ular the program Cultura Viva (Living Culture), which aimed to decentralize cultural ﬁnance and to
support community based organizations, began a process of stimulating the adoption and use of digital
culture (also named cyberculture) for networking and reinforced free media initiatives in the country,
among others, which will be detailed in the next chapter. What is relevant in the scope of this research,
is that the Ministry of Culture had a different stance and position than the Ministry of Communica-
tion, contributing to discussions and the expansion of the capabilities of the Brazilian population to use
ICT for the diffusion, consumption and production of information beyond mass media. This dissem-
ination of ICT implies a new channel in which public opinion is formed, something that researchers
clearly detected during the reelection of Lula in 2007, during which he faced a strong opposition of all
mass media, but nevertheless emerged victorious (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comuni-
cação 2007b, p. 5). According to Rubim (p. 5), this might be related to how popular sectors of Brazil
have experienced social, economic, political and cultural changes that opened the door for new ways of
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establishing and inﬂuencing their worldviews besides what mass media might disseminate .
Nevertheless, the relation with media during Lula’s two terms in power has remained conﬂicting.
For example, in an interview he admitted to have told his wife that “‘If we want to rule this country, we
will not watch TV, we will not read magazines, we will not read newspapers’. From then onwards, I have
spent half an hour per day conversing with my press advisers, to know which were the news [...], but I
did not accept any more to wake up in the morning, turn on the TV and already become contaminated”
(Lula da Silva quoted in Sader 2013, p. 14, translated by the author). Such a statement still suggests
that the content diffused through mass media is not ‘objective’, which for Lula is a threat to democracy
in Brazil, because a “part of media is trying to substitute political parties. That is, the debate that should
be done in parliament between parties and society, is being monopolized by the media. It is being made
by few columnists in newsrooms, who are all partisans trying to pretend they are impartial” (Lula da
Silva quoted in p. 17, translated by the author).
In this context, and after the election of Dilma in 2011, the following year the FNDC and several
organizations launched a campaign called “para expressar a liberdade! Uma nova lei para um novo
tempo” (to express freedom! a new law for a new time) (Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comu-
nicação 2013) to put forward a new communications law in Brazil. This included diverse points quite
similar to what occurred ﬁve years before in Argentina, such as understanding communication as a so-
cial right and media democratization as an indispensable process to achieve full democracy (p. 21). The
proposal strives for: an increase of social participation in the media, the need to set up limits to con-
centration patterns, to stimulate national technology and standards, to support community media, to
promote content that reﬂects the cultural and religious diversity in Brazil, among other points (p. 20).
But even though in 2011 Dilma promised during her campaign to alter the Brazilian media system, the
issue has so far been evaded. Thus, in contrast to the Argentinean case, the sociology of law does not
offer much help in the analysis, because after all there has been no new regulatory framework despite
the more than 25 years of claims by civil society organizations, spearheaded by the FNDC. Therefore,
the current situation can clearly be seen as the superiority of those who beneﬁt from the current order,
against the protests and claims from civil society groups, with a ruling party that does not have enough
political support to advance the needed changes in the media system.
3.5 Concluding Discussion
In this chapter, I have introduced the main contextual factors to explain the state of the media sys-
tem in Argentina and Brazil. The key ones have been the political changes in both countries, which
during the 1970s suffered military dictatorships that left several marks that persisted after the return
to democracy. During the 1990s, the expansion of neoliberal policies in the region reduced windows of
opportunity to address social and inequality issues, because most decisions were oriented toward the
reduction of the state, favoring privatizations and the interests of large private ﬁrms. However, since
2003 both countries entered new political trajectories with presidents and political parties in power ad-
vocating for a break up with the previous projects, trying instead to expand democratization policies in
several areas. These political changes have produced similar vicissitudes in the media systems of both
countries. During the 1970s and -80s, they reﬂected a model based on state intervention to support
national development models favoring military dictatorships and allied private media conglomerates.
After the return of democracy, the implementation of neoliberal policies deepened the commercial ap-
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proach to communications, which led to high concentration patterns in a reduced number of private
media groups. As a result, in both countries audiovisual market shares are concentrated in few media
networks, like Globo in Brazil and Clarín in Argentina, which consequently have excessive inﬂuence in
terms of content distribution, neglecting alternative voices and thus challenging the democratic ideal.
It is important to point out that these unequal concentration patterns grew out from speciﬁc historical
processes that despised the diversity of communities and groups advocating for a non state and non
private approach to communication. These are important contextual factors, which cannot be omit-
ted, and which delineate the speciﬁcities in both of these countries, quite contrary to those in other
regions of the world, where state media prevail. Accordingly, the high concentration patterns illustrate
the limits that approaches advocating for a free market approach to media have in countries where
regulations are missing, hard to enforce or biased in favor of minority elite groups.
In this context, many citizens of Argentina and Brazil expected that the election of presidents chal-
lenging neoliberal policies would change their media system toward a more democratic model, however,
these changes have neither been so immediate nor without shortcomings. Indeed, despite the policies
for social inclusion and reduction of inequality in Brazil, the ruling party has not been able to legally
address the high concentration patterns and the lack of representation of its diverse communities.
Nonetheless, new cultural policies have strengthened social movements and other collective organi-
zations thanks to the expansion of ICT, internet access and new media, which have, to some degree,
challenged mainstream media structures. Conversely, Argentina passed a new audiovisual communi-
cation services law, but only almost at the end of the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century. This project aims to
ﬁnally democratize media to previously excluded groups, and regulate concentration patterns in terms
of media ownership, but not without hurdles. Under those circumstances, both countries have been
experiencing different degrees of change in their cultural and media system, which introduced policies
that gave windows of opportunity to stimulate and strengthen nonproﬁt experiences, challenging the
predominant commercial approach, and increasingly debating the role that culture and media should
play in their relatively young democracies. These national discussions are connected with old and cur-
rent global ones, which inﬂuenced (either in adoption or rejection) the local discourses. This will be the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Culture and Media Policy
Discourses in Argentina and Brazil
“To speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks” (Foucault 1972, p. 230)
The objective of this chapter is to describe mainstream and counter policy discourses that link cul-
ture, economy and social issues in Argentina and Brazil. I shall show that both countries have a group
of policy discourses that consider culture mostly as an economic resource, whereas a second group
opposes this bounded deﬁnition and instead considers culture as a resource for other types of objec-
tives beyond mere proﬁts. This contrast among policy discourses is relevant for the rest of the thesis,
because I shall show how the ﬁrst group, which is actively advocated by international development or-
ganizations and industrialized countries from the ‘Global North’, discriminates against resource-scarce
or minority groups, despite its claim to contribute to ‘development’. Conversely, the second group of
discourses does not have such international support as the former, but is deﬁnitely better tuned to
inclusion objectives, tackling the issues that resource scarce groups face in the area of culture and
media.
My starting point to detect the different policy discourses in the area of culture in Argentina and
Brazil was to follow the key term discussed in international discussions on culture and development,
the ‘creative industries’. I shall show that this concept and other closely associated ones, such as ‘cre-
ative economy’ and ‘cultural industries’, imply speciﬁc policy discourses encouraging the commercial-
ization of cultural sectors (including media), which neglect other types of practices. These discourses
were introduced and (re)produced in both countries by different actors, aiming at speciﬁc objectives and
intended power-effects. As explained in chapter 2, the analysis is based on the application of SKAD,
because it suggests different tools and procedures to analyze knowledge production and circulation in
different institutional spheres of contemporary societies (Keller 2013). Thus, it is based on a social
constructivist perspective that states that our understanding of the world is not completely objective,
but is instead mediated by systems of categories that are the product of social construction processes
(Keller 2013).
In particular, in this chapter I will apply the suggestions by SKAD to unveil the phenomenal struc-
ture of these discourses (Keller 2013), in other words, how they refer to a speciﬁc combination of ele-
ments to deﬁne the structure of how cultural policies (including media) ought to be organized. For in-
stance, I shall make evident the actors that (re)produce the discourses, their objectives, their addresses,
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the subject positions they offer, among other dimensions (Keller 2013). These allow to compare the im-
plicit classiﬁcation schemes that the policy discourses make to fulﬁll their aims, which together with
knowledge on the local situation in each case allows to understand the implicit power-effects of the pol-
icy discourses. For unraveling such constructions, I borrowed the coding methodology from grounded
theory and applied it to a data corpus, which was built based on information gathered during ﬁeldwork
in Argentina and Brazil. The data corpus includes, on the one hand, interviews with key actors that
(re)produce such policy discourses, like current and former policy makers, practitioners and academics.
On the other hand, it consists of varied types of documents, such as ofﬁcial reports, previous local re-
search articles, press articles, books, laws, etc., which are related to the policy discourses. The analysis
of this material consisted in coding and building key dimensions of contrast among discourses, which
where ﬁrst selected based on discussions in the literature about such commercial discourses, and then
thoroughly and opened up based on the particular experiences of Argentina and Brazil I will analyze
in the ﬁrst subsection of this chapter. In the second subsection, I will discuss the main differences
between the two groups of policy discourses, focusing on tensions between them, which sets the stage
for the analysis of other key dimensions of media for social transformation in the next chapters.
4.1 Culture and Media Policy Discourses
Table 4.1 summarizes the main dimensions of the six policy discourses that I shall describe in this
section. They are divided into two groups according to their aims. The ﬁrst four policy discourses share
the understanding that culture is predominantly an economic resource that contributes to economic
growth. Therefore, they share similar aspects, though with nuances, with the creative industries, the
creative economy and the cultural industries policy discourses at the international level that I described
in chapter 1. For this reason, I shall call them creative economy policy discourses. Conversely, the
remaining two discourses offer a different perspective on cultural policies, which think of them as
a resource to prioritize other issues, beyond purely economic objectives. For example, the access to
cultural consumption, distribution and production by stressing the contribution of culture to human
rights. In that sense, they represent an opposition to the former in many of the dimensions in the
table; thus, I shall call them counter policy discourses. By way of introduction, in the next paragraphs
I will brieﬂy sketch the main contrasting features of these two groups of policy discourses, that I will
then detail with empirical data in the following subsections.
The aim is the ﬁrst clear dimension of contrast; while the ﬁrst group puts the central focus on eco-
nomic growth, the latter stresses its contribution to address social inequality issues. Indeed, these cen-
tral differences in terms of objectives lead to further variations with respect to the actors (re)producing
the policy discourses and its addressees. As regards the former, the main difference among the two
groups is that the ﬁrst one shows different combinations of governments, ﬁrms, the ‘creative class’,
academics, consultants and international organizations. In contrast, in the second group different or-
ganizations from civil society played the prominent role to advance the policies in tandem with national
governments. As regards the latter, the ﬁrst group is mostly aimed at ﬁrms (both large and small and
medium sized enterprises), including artists and producers, which would make part of what Florida
called the ‘creative class’. In contrast, the second group addresses nongovernmental organizations
and different types of communities, previously excluded from cultural policies, such as indigenous or
Afro-descendant communities.
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These differences also explain how the two groups differ in terms of the subject positions they
offer. The ﬁrst group of discourses disseminates knowledge in such a way that those trained in any of
the selected cultural sectors can become cultural/creative entrepreneurs, which involves a diffusion of
management and commercial practices. Therefore, they assume that the unique way to organize the
production of cultural products and services does not differ much from any other type of business. In
contrast, the second group encourages different types of skills and knowledge to advance NGO projects,
where the aims are not for proﬁt. Consequently, the practices of cultural production depart from the
business oriented perspective.
With respect to dispositives, a common one in the creative economy policy discourses has been the
creation of observatories, which elaborate statistics to justify the ‘existence’ of a concept that ﬁctitiously
embraces a heterogeneity of industrial sectors. Besides, there have been others that depend on each
speciﬁc policy discourse. For instance, the most important media organization in Brazil, Globo, has
been using its channels to disseminate the commercial perspective on culture and communications.
Additionally, the construction of creative industries clusters, incubators or massive events have also
contributed to the (re)production of this policy discourse, as if it were something ‘natural’. The counter
policy discourses relied on new government agencies and speciﬁc programs to (re)produce their policy
discourses, and in the case of Argentina of a new law.
The dimension related to the protection of knowledge is another axis of variation among policy
discourses. The ﬁrst four share the need to protect knowledge through the use of intellectual property
and by standard means: copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc., which resembles the original DCMS
deﬁnition. However, there is variation among the ﬁrst four policy discourses on the strictness to include
IPR or not, and the level of enforcement of the laws protecting these rights. In contrast, the Brazilian
counter policy discourse has been supporting NGOs and communities that have advanced the use of
different mechanisms of encouraging knowledge sharing, such as Creative Commons, or free sharing
of knowledge. As regards the Argentinean counter policy discourse, it has not deﬁned a position with
respect to this point.
An important dimension of contrast among the policy discourses particularly relevant for this re-
search is the different positions that they take with respect to media. Except for the cultural industries
policy discourse, the remaining three of the ﬁrst group do not take into account any of the political
and normative discussions on freedom of speech, media democratization and media ownership concen-
tration, which, as I explained in chapter 3, are particularly problematic in the two countries under
study. In contrast, the second group directly addresses this issue by supporting the media projects
of a diversity of organizations neglected by the ﬁrst commercial discourses in order to advance media
democratization. This is notably the case of the policy discourse in Argentina, which also legislates to
regulate what it considers excessive media regulation patterns.
In brief, these two groups of discourses are a good example of the contradictions that I mentioned in
the introduction between ‘neoliberal’ policies and the new-left ‘progressive’ governments in Argentina
and Brazil. As I shall show in the next subsections, national governments have been supporting both
groups of policy discourses, with different emphasis through time. This in part is related to the con-
text in which the policy discourses emerged. In particular, the ﬁrst group beneﬁts from the capitalist
economic system that has been ordering the activities of ﬁrms in both countries, in any sector toward
71
proﬁts for its survival, which, as I explained in Section 3.3.2, has been particularly brutal during the
dictatorships of the 1970s. Thus, an extension to the cultural sector has already been in practice before
a policy was created for them; for instance, cinema, radio, TV, books, etc. Additionally, the ‘neolib-
eral’ policies of the 1990s furthered this position, by questioning any type of state or nongovernmental
organization as ‘non-efﬁcient’ in comparison to private actors based on proﬁts. Therefore, the policy
discourses justify and reinforce an already existing practice. In contrast, the second group has been a
policy innovation after the return of democracy to each country, because it challenges the bias against
NGOs, resource-scarce and different types of communities discriminated by the commercial discourse.
For these reasons, the selection of case studies that I did and the further analysis in the next chapters
focuses on the second group of policy discourses to show what has been kept off the radar.
72
4.1.1 Culture as an Economic Resource
In chapter 1, I synthesized the policy discourses advanced by the UK and UNCTAD, the creative in-
dustries and the creative economy respectively. In both cases, these policy discourses instrumentalize
cultural activities towards economic ends, and have been important experiences, directly and indi-
rectly, in shaping the policies for the cultural sectors in Argentina and Brazil. I shall show that these
policies want to basically stimulate economic growth, by arguing that the promotion of what they call
‘creative’ or ‘cultural’ sectors is an excellent strategy, because they can generate employment and in-
come through exports and national commerce of cultural goods and services. Therefore, these policies
constitute a discourse in which culture is just another economic resource in the more general equation
for stimulating economic growth. Although this contribution might be true, I shall show this position
is problematic, because it neglects resource-scarce groups from cultural policies, and in particular, it
does not tend to question the issues in the media sector existing in both countries. Additionally, I shall
remark the different actors, subject positions and other features of this group of discourses in each
country, acknowledging the variations with respect to the original one emanating from the UK and
UNCTAD.
4.1.1.1 Creative Industries and the Creative Economy in Brazil
The creative industries policy discourse emerged in the UK, considering cultural activities as just an-
other economic sector based on the skill and talent of individuals (creative entrepreneurs), aimed to
generate wealth through intellectual property. The policy makers that I interviewed in Brazil agreed
that this concept ‘arrived’ to the country in 2004, when UNCTAD organized a high-level panel on cre-
ative industries and development in the city of São Paulo (UNCTAD 2004), the Brazilian cultural hub.
After that event, UNCTAD received the mandate from representatives of countries all over the world
to work on this topic and to promote it internationally. At that time, President Lula showed interest to
host an international center in Salvador de Bahía, Brazil, to study creative industries worldwide, but
in practice this proposal did not progress and neither did the creative industries policy discourse to the
national level during his administrations (2003-2010). Since then, the term employed to name such
policy discourse varied, progressively incorporated under the umbrella concept of ‘creative economy’,
but still siding with the business orientation of the original DCMS perspective. This is clear in the
three types of actors that adopted and advocated the policy discourse, despite its lack of support at the
national level: private ﬁrms that already considered culture as a business; federations of industries;
and local governments of large urban cities.
The Globo network is the most clear example of a private ﬁrm adopting the terms ‘creative indus-
tries’ and later ‘creative economy’. This is not a surprise, because it matches the commercial model of
the organization to operate in media and in other cultural sectors. For example, during 2013 the Globo
University (Globo 2014), which is a project of Globo to diffuse knowledge through different types of
courses and workshops, organized an event to discuss how to ‘tropicalize’ the creative economy concept,
or in other words, to discuss its adaptation to the Brazilian context (Globo 2013). During the event that
I witnessed, representatives of Globo made evident their orientation: The aim of the creative economy
is to make proﬁts, although not all the invited panelists agreed with such a perspective. The publica-
tions of the organization go in the same direction; for instance, their magazine for Small and Medium
sized Enterprises (SME) published several articles on the creative economy and how to make money
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with creative sectors (Adán Gil 2012). Figure 4.1 shows the front cover of the magazine, which has the
subtitle “Creative economy: how to earn money with fashion, videogames, design, blogs, music, cinema,
gastronomy ...”, which makes evident the commercial orientation of culture they advocate, reinforced
by the content of the magazine that tells the stories of diverse ‘creative entrepreneurs’, besides citing
the creative ‘gurus’: Florida and his concept of the ‘creative class’, together with John Howkins and
his idea of the ‘creative economy’. However, the front cover also implicitly suggests what sector of the
economy it is directed to, trained and white skinned sectors of the population, leaving aside most part
of the Brazilian population. Given the importance of this media ﬁrm in terms of audience reach in
Brazil, it is worth pointing out that despite the ‘creative industries’ or ‘creative economy’ were not a
policy discourse, this ﬁrm has been contributing to the discourse (re)production, such as the diffusion
of the subject position of the ‘creative entrepreneur’, who based on his skills and talents can advance
and commercialize a product or service in a cultural sector. The way the magazine portraits the sector
also makes evident the connection with the concept of ‘creative class’, which distinguishes divides be-
tween those that are ‘creative’ and those that are not. Taking into account that this ﬁrm is the main
opponent to media democratization initiatives in Brazil, is no surprise its adoption of a commercial
approach to culture and media, such as the creative industries, because it helps to hide the issue of
media ownership concentration. After all, if the purpose of the creative industries is to obtain proﬁts
through creative products and services, without caring about the means or competition regulations,
the deﬁnition precisely matches the activities of the Globo network during decades, legitimizing its
business strategy. Indeed, this perspective is clear in the journal of the multimedia ﬁrm, O Globo,
which was one of the ﬁrst online newspapers in Brazil to introduce a paid subscription to access its
content. This practice is in synchrony with the original deﬁnition of the creative industries, because
the access to information on the internet is ﬁctitiously limited, making evident their perspective that
it is just another commodity, quite contrary to the perspective of the second group of policy discourses
that considers it a public good. For these reasons, the medias of this Brazilian conglomerate can be
understood as a dispositive to advance an approach striving for the commercialization of culture and
media, in synchrony with the international policy discourse emanating from the British experience.
Apart from Globo, the commercial use of culture represented by the creative industries has been
attractive to the most inﬂuential federations of industries in Brazil. The most clear example is the
Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP - Federation of Industries of the State of
São Paulo), which groups industrial organizations from the most economically developed state in the
country that represents 32,6% of national GDP (IBGE 2013b). The FIESP (2012) has been active
in supporting the creative economy by organizing events and conferences to inspire new business in
the area, which are discursive practices to (re)produce the creative industries discourse. Similarly, the
Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FIRJAN - Federation of Firms of the State of Rio
de Janeiro), has adopted the creative industries, and contributed to the (re)production of the discourse
with the elaboration of the ﬁrst statistical studies of the Brazilian national creative industries. In
these reports, they employed the deﬁnitions proposed by UNCTAD, and also included new sectors such
as biotechnology, and more generally, research & development (SISTEMA FIRJAN 2012). Although
the selection of sectors they made might be questionable, the results they found have been replicated
in Brazilian mass media, such as Globo (Carneiro and Cavalcanti 2014), which tend to (re)produce the
economic rhetoric of the discourse in terms of higher rates of growth of ‘creative industries’ and higher
salaries of ‘creatives’. For instance, the following fragments encourage further policies for the sector:
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Figure 4.1: Cover from the magazine “Pequenas Empresas & Grandes Negócios” dedicated to the cre-
ative economy. The translated subtitle says “Creative economy: how to earn money with fashion, video
games, design, blogs, music, cinema, gastronomy ...”. Source: (Adán Gil 2012).
76
“In 2011, 243,000 ﬁrms comprised the core of the creative industries. Based on wages gen-
erated by these companies, it is estimated that the creative core generates a gross domestic
product equal to R $ 110 billion, or 2.7% of what is produced in Brazil. These results place
Brazil among the world’s top creative producers, surpassing Spain, Italy and the Nether-
lands.
[...] The formal labor market of the creative core consists of 810,000 professionals, represent-
ing 1.7% of Brazilian workers.
[...] With regard to compensation, while the average monthly income of Brazilian workers was
R $ 1,733 in 2011, creative professionals reached R $ 4,693, almost three times the national
level” (SISTEMA FIRJAN 2012, p. 5, translated by the author).
Third, different cities in Brazil adopted at some governmental level the creative industries as a term for
cultural policies, among which I consider Rio de Janeiro and Recife. These are good examples to show
the limits of the concept, because they are cities known for their problems in terms of poverty and social
exclusion. The former is globally known due to the existence of large slums next to wealthy neighbor-
hoods, whereas the latter is one of the most unequal cities of Brazil with a GINI of 0,68 (PNUD 2005).
In both cases, the situation is evident for any foreigner, who realizes in the former the atrocious inequal-
ities between the poorer northern part of the city, and the wealthier south, or in the latter any traveler
arriving by airplane easily perceives during the landing that the coast has luxurious skyscrapers sim-
ilar to those in Miami, but most of the rest of the city is composed by poorer, slum like neighborhoods.
In this context, the magazine Época, owned by the Globo network, portrayed in an article that Rio de
Janeiro is “giving a lesson to Brazil” on how to reemerge as an economic and cultural center (Mendonça
2013), thanks to the support of the city’s creative sectors, such as architecture, cinema, fashion, music,
soap operas, sports, tourism. Nevertheless, the photos and people presented in the article are all part
of the elite ‘creative class’ of the city; such as famous actresses or singers. What is worse, it does not
make any mention of the diversity of other popular artists or initiatives that exist in the city and in
the state of Rio de Janeiro; an omission that suggests their disregard for cultural activities not directed
purely at economic proﬁts. This suggests a classiﬁcation scheme of what type of cultural creativity
is ‘relevant’ - for proﬁts - and how the rest does not require much attention. At the policy level, the
state of Rio de Janeiro adopted the concept of creative industries with the creation of the incubator
Rio Criativo, which aims to support ‘creative entrepreneurs’ by providing the needed ﬁnancial, market-
ing, among other business skills (Rio Criativo 2013). This can be understood as a material dispositive
to materialize and stimulate the business practices that the policy discourse requires for the cultural
sector.
As regards the city of Recife, the town hosts Porto Digital (Digital Harbor), a high tech cluster
dedicated to ICT, hosting at least 230 ﬁrms and 7.000 workers (British Council 2015). In 2013, Porto
Mídia was inaugurated in this cluster, which is an instrument to support the creative economy in the
sectors of multimedia, design, music, videogames, cinema and photography. In this place, inhabitants of
Recife receive technical training and workshops on these sectors and in entrepreneurship to contribute
to their respective markets, which is also a way to (re)produce the policy discourse. However, the
objectives of the program do not make any link with the obvious poverty problems in the city. My visit
to the events organized by the organization once again shows the pattern present in Rio de Janeiro,
the presence of mostly white skinned and well trained sectors of the population, and an ignorance of
other local and traditional cultural expressions. To illustrate the features of this project in Recife, I cite
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below notes from my ﬁeldwork notebook, which illustrate my perceptions of the fourth “seminar on the
creative economy”, organized by Porto Mídia in 2014:
“The event took place in a house that from the outside seemed old, but from the inside
was quite modern, with security guards and air conditioning. I paid 40R (approx.. 13 US$)
for the event. Around 30 persons were there, just covering half of the available spaces in the
room. Those presenting were professionals (designers, architects) and academics studying
creative sectors. Additionally, those from the audience who asked questions were students or
professionals, well dressed, suggesting that they belonged to the educated class of the city.
The content of the discussions was not new to me, much had to do with the UK experience
in the ﬁeld, and also to the ideal of creating an entrepreneurial hub in the city in creative
sectors. The image I received was of a sort of Silicon Valley like zone, but dedicated to cre-
ative industries. Therefore, the main concerns were how to create products or services with
added value that would be sold in national and international markets, and discussions on the
management of these processes and the speciﬁcities of creative processes that business models
need to deal with, because they are not so easily planned in advance. Although a member of
the audience questioned the creative industries concept as putting the economy over art (or
more generally culture as I refer to in the research), the consensus of the presenters was on the
importance of the economic aspect. The discussions made me realize that here the policy is
just a strategy to encourage qualiﬁed inhabitants to get an opportunity to work on what they
have been trained for, and stop them from migrating to other urban cities in Brazil or abroad.
Thus, the dilemma expressed by the ‘creatives’ in the audience was that they either become cre-
ative entrepreneurs or otherwise, they would be jobless” (Fieldwork notes, 26/02/2014, Recife,
Brazil).
These observations make evident that the promotion of creative industries and creative entrepreneurs
can contribute to employment generation, but mostly restricted to the skilled, well-trained sectors of
the population. The case of the city of Recife, with its high social contrasts, makes evident that adopting
the international version of the creative industries policy discourse gives a very limited version of how
they could contribute to a broader understanding of ‘development’. As I stated in chapter 1, the problem
is that by design, the policy discourse is aimed to well-trained inhabitants in one of the creative sectors,
but neglects all those who do not belong to such ‘elite’ groups, which in the context of Recife, Rio de
Janeiro and many other Brazilian cities, covers a large section of the population. Therefore, it is no
exaggeration to say that a strict application of the creative industries policy discourse as emanating
from foreign organizations only creates an island of excellence within a sea of poverty, not enlarging
access to opportunities, reinforcing social exclusion processes, and making evident the inadequacy of
this market only approach to culture to achieve broader ‘development’ goals. However, it is true that
the industrial actors that have been willing to adopt the original version of the DCMS of the creative
industries were not successful in establishing a national law to easily advance a copy & paste version
to defend their interests in the commercialization of culture. As I shall show in the next subsection,
there were attempts to adapt it to the local context, which paved the way for the Brazilian creative
economy national plan.
Creative Economy Plan in Brazil
After Dilma Rousseff assumed power in 2011, the new Minister of Culture, Ana de Holanda, cre-
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ated the Secretaria de Economia Creativa (SEC - Creative Economy Secretary), which had as an aim
to “broaden participation of culture in national socioeconomic sustainable development” (Ministério da
Cultura 2012, p. 39). This government department introduced the concept of the creative economy
into national policies, by elaborating a national plan to encourage the creative economy (Ministério da
Cultura 2012), which in several sections acknowledges the inﬂuence of UNCTAD and UNESCO on the
subject. For instance, the main challenges that the plan proposes to address are similar to the recom-
mendations suggested in UNCTAD’s (2010) report gathering information and data about the creative
economy, stimulating creative entrepreneurship, offering training in ‘creative competences’, strength-
ening the infrastructure for the creation, production, distribution and consumption of creative goods
and services, and ﬁnally, creating or appropriating legal frameworks for creative sectors (Ministério
da Cultura 2012). UNESCO’s inﬂuence is evident on the stress over the importance of ‘cultural diver-
sity’, highlighting its relevance for Brazil given the wide variety of languages, indigenous communities,
environments, etc., in the country (Ministério da Cultura 2012). Additionally, the plan establishes a
selection of creative sectors of interest based on the previous categories offered by UNCTAD and UN-
ESCO1, including television (Ministério da Cultura 2012). What is important to highlight is that the
plan is a sort of dispositive, because it became the cornerstone for the expansion of the concept and
associated practices to Brazilian states and municipalities.
However, in two important aspects the plan departs from UNCTAD’s original strategy. First, as the
following quote shows, it tried to adapt the concept to the Brazilian context by stressing in its organiz-
ing principles ‘inclusion’ and ‘sustainability’, trying to connect, at least discursively, to the project of
the solidarity economy and to tackle inequality challenges (Ministério da Cultura 2012).
“The Brazilian creative economy will only develop in a consistent way with the national
reality if it incorporates in its conceptualization the importance of: the cultural diversity of
the country; the perception that sustainability is a factor of local and regional development;
innovation as a vector of cultural development of vanguard expressions; and ﬁnally, the prin-
ciple of inclusion as the base for a co-operative and solidarity economy” (p. 33).
Second, the plan has a permeable position toward intellectual property rights, as the following frag-
ment transmits: “It is very restrictive to think that ‘creative sectors’ are only those that generate economic
value through the exploitation of intellectual property rights, which is not the unique way to deﬁne the
value of creative goods and services” (p. 22). This position puts a distance between the strict one from
the DCMS on creative industries, and the favorable one, though not strict, of UNCTAD’s reports. In-
deed, the co-ordinator of the SEC conﬁrmed this during a personal interview by saying that “for us,
copyright is not a necessary condition for a creative economy” (C. Leitão, 09/03/2014, interview with &
translated by the author in Fortaleza, Brazil).
Despite the broad original deﬁnitions that suggested an interest on guiding the creative economy
beyond a pure commercial orientation, by the end of 2013 the practical implementation of the plan had
been reduced to the introduction of two policy instruments: the measurement of the creative economy
and the promotion of creative entrepreneurs (SEC/MinC 2013). As regards measuring the creative
economy, the Ministry of Culture funded eight creative economy observatories in distinct large cities,
such as Rio de Janeiro, Brasília and Manaus, among others, with the aim to collect and provide data
1. The document deﬁnes the following ﬁve categories, each with different ‘creative sectors’ within: a) heritage: material and
intangible heritage, archives and museums; b) cultural expressions: crafts, popular cultures, indigenous cultures, Afro-Brazilian
cultures, visual arts, digital art; c) Entertainment arts: dance, music, circus, theater; d) audiovisual and press: cinema, television
and radio, print media; e) cultural and functional creations: fashion, design and architecture.
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about the creative sectors in different Brazilian states (SEC/MinC 2013). From a discourse analysis
perspective, these observatories can be understood as dispositives to institutionalize the policy dis-
course, because they create buildings or departments within universities dedicated to measure the
‘creative economy’ as if it were something real. Furthermore, these observatories will contribute to the
economic rhetoric of the discourse, by highlighting their contribution to national and regional GDP and
employment.
As regards encouraging entrepreneurship, the Ministry of Culture launched public tenders to sup-
port incubators for creative entrepreneurs and free training programs in the creative sectors (SEC/MinC
2013). Furthermore, Brazil collaborated with the UK, which through the British Council created the
program Transform to “connect artists, arts organizations and governmental bodies from the UK and
Brazil with projects that support training for arts professionals and provide opportunities for new tal-
ent” (British Council 2014, translated by the author). Additionally, they explain that “[...] through our
creative economy projects, we create a network of artists and entrepreneurs capable of promoting sus-
tainable growth in the creative sector” (translated by the author). Among its activities, they coordinated
several training workshops across large cities in Brazil, such as Brasília, Porto Alegre, Salvador, São
Paulo, Recife and Rio de Janeiro, to diffuse the skills necessary to becoming a creative entrepreneur
(British Council 2013). Figure 4.2 shows the advertisements distributed for these events, where the
training offers knowledge to creative entrepreneurs for their businesses. For example, one of its aims
was to teach how to prepare a business plan by following the ‘Creative Enterprise Toolkit’ developed by
Nesta, a UK charity dedicated to stimulating innovation (Mini 2014). This shows, on the one hand, how
the Ministry of Culture implemented mechanisms to diffuse knowledge for the Brazilian population to
‘occupy’ the subject position of a ‘creative entrepreneur’, which requires knowledge on business plans,
ﬁnancial organization, marketing, etc. In other words, key knowledge to turn a cultural practice into a
business. On the other hand, it makes evident the role of the British Council in propagating the idea
of the creative industries and its business oriented version of culture, which in fact is contrary to the
‘inclusion’ and ‘sustainability’ principles declared in the national creative economy plan. Indeed, critics
have pointed out the shortcomings of this inﬂuence of the British Council, as the following quote from
a Brazilian consultant who worked for UNCTAD illustrates: “In Brazil, we started working with other
models, but the British Council would just sell theirs. They do every sort of thing here and ﬁnance ac-
tivities as long as they are using their model” (Brazilian UNCTAD´s Consultant, 07/08/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil).
It is important to emphasize what the previous two policy instruments have not taken into account.
In relation with the guiding principles of the creative economy plan, there has been no instrument
designed to directly address issues of social exclusion, or to foster cultural diversity or sustainability.
With respect to media, although the plan speaks about the need of ‘new or appropriate legal frame-
works’, it makes no reference to the serious issues of ownership concentration nor the movements of
media organizations striving for other types of policies beyond those just focused on for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
Consequently, these omissions suggest that the creative economy policy discourse in Brazil, despite the
efforts for a local adaptation, has kept the emphasis on culture just as an economic resource. Indeed,
the phenomenal structure shown in Table 4.1 coincides with the previous creative industries policy
discourse, which was heavily inﬂuenced by foreign experiences with no adaptations. Several of the
interviewees working in civil society organizations shared this interpretation, and assessed the cre-
ative economy approach negatively. One of the reasons is that even though the principles orienting
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Figure 4.2: The advertisement says: “The training that helps you to plan, develop and communicate
your business”. Translated by the author. Source: Transform program, British Council.
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the plan might differ from those of the original concepts emanating from international organizations,
the language used still acts as a barrier, it draws boundaries for action. For example, concepts such as
‘creative entrepreneur’ or ‘sustainability’ or ‘cultural products and services’ were employed, which, at
the local level, generally associated with an approach oriented to the commercialization of culture, and
thus, they were received with suspicion by civil society organizations that have been precisely trying to
invent new ways of doing things, as the next quote suggests, uttered by an interviewee who works with
social entrepreneurship projects in the city of Ubatuba, São Paulo:
“They attempted a synthesis between creative industries and a bit of cultural diversity,
but the vocabulary that was adopted always alludes to the market, the basic document says
creative economy occurs when culture turns into a product” (social entrepreneur, 29/10/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Ubatuba, Brazil).
Another point important to remark is the conﬂict that this policy discourse had with one of the pre-
existing cultural policies, the Cultura Viva, in terms of the deﬁnition of recipients. As I shall show
in the next section, the latter explicitly tackles social inclusion by prioritizing resource-scarce groups;
conversely, the creative economy plan only speaks of ‘creative entrepreneurs’ or ‘creative workers’,
making invisible the asymmetries to take that subject position. This was already delineated during
the inaugural speech of the Minister of Culture in Brazil that introduced the creative economy, Ana de
Holanda, who expressed in her inaugural address that “to create will be the center of the solar system
of our cultural policies and of our daily tasks, because of a very simple reason: there is no art without
artists” (Culture e Mercado 2011, translated by the author). Those siding with previous policies under-
stood this statement as a return of the importance of artists to cultural policies, a position they had
challenged, understanding artists as those members of the elite ‘creative class’ with more resources
(ﬁnancial, knowledge, relations, etc.) than others, and who, through these advantages, could impose
their priorities irrespective of issues of social change. Therefore, the vague language employed to de-
ﬁne the addressees, shares the same shortcomings of the original creative industries policy discourse I
described in the introduction and in the previous section.
A ﬁnal contradiction that I want to acknowledge is related to intellectual property rights. Before the
introduction of the creative economy plan, the Ministry of Culture had openly advocated for a change
in the intellectual property rights framework in Brazil and the use of alternative licenses, such as
Creative Commons, which are not opposite to copyrights, but that at least give authors alternative
ways of distributing their works. Indeed, the nonproﬁt organization offers different types of licenses
that are supposed to allow users to change the copyright terms “[...] from the default of ‘all rights
reserved’ to ‘some rights reserved”’ (Creative Commons 2015). Nonetheless, the new Minister of Culture
that introduced the creative economy plan stopped these previous policies, which were understood by
several civil society organizations as a return of the lobby of industries to support a strict protection of
IPRs. Although the latter is not mentioned in the creative economy plan, the decisions and the speeches
of the Minister of Culture created such a perception that had a negative impact on the reception of the
whole idea of the creative economy.
In sum, the adoption of the creative economy policy discourse at the national level in Brazil tried
to make a synthesis of the foreign concept with the local context. However, the policy instruments
used to implement the creative economy plan and the language employed in the creative economy
document, still put the priority on the economic use of culture. For example, the approach speaks
broadly of ‘creative entrepreneurs’ and ‘creative workers’, disregarding community culture, inequality
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and poverty challenges that Brazil faces. For these reasons, it is questionable that this approach can
become a ‘sustainable socioeconomic development’ option, but just a limited economic policy for ‘creative
sectors’.
4.1.1.2 Cultural Industries versus Creative Industries in Argentina
In Argentina, the cultural industries and the creative industries have been the names of two of the
most inﬂuential cultural policies, but used in different levels of government and introduced by opposing
political parties.
In the middle of the 1990s, Octavio Getino, a ﬁlm maker, pioneered the advocacy of the need to
study and promote the ‘cultural industries’ of Argentina at the political level. For many of the intervie-
wees, this helped to visualize the economic contribution that professionals working in cultural sectors
had, and displaced the prevailing understanding of cultural policies just directed to encourage ﬁne
arts. In one of the ﬁrst reports about Argentinean cultural industries, Getino deﬁned them as those
industries “[...] dedicated to produce and sell, with industrial criterias, goods and services speciﬁcally to
meet and/or promote cultural demands for purposes of economic, ideological and social reproduction”
(Getino 2003, p. 22). At that time, the deﬁnition covered the following sectors: publishing, audiovi-
sual (TV, cinema videogames), music, advertising, supporting industries of the previous ones (those
that build the necessary materials and equipment) and ICT related ﬁrms (Getino 2003). Therefore,
the deﬁnition follows UNESCO’s approach, leaving aside the negative connotation that the culture in-
dustry originally had in the work of Adorno & Horkheimer, and focusing on the promotion of circuits
of creation-production-distribution-consumption of culture (Getino 2008). It can also be argued that
the economic importance given to these cultural sectors shares similar aims with the deﬁnition of cre-
ative industries (Getino 2008). However, the policy discourse Getino advocated for had two important
differences. First, in his works he continuously stressed the importance of cultural industries for na-
tional and Latin American integration objectives (Getino 2008, 2003). Second, Getino (2008) recognized
the relevance of authors’ rights as a way to protect the products and services of these sectors, but he
was also aware of the power imbalances that this international system has, favoring those states and
organizations with more economic resources at the expense of poorer ones.
The ideas disseminated by Getino were adopted as policies at the national level and in the capital
city, which created governmental agencies dedicated to support the cultural industries in the areas of
cultural policies. However, after the economic crisis of 2001, the cultural industries suffered a reduction
in consumption, reduced employment, and a concentration of cultural SME mostly in transnational
enterprises (Getino 2003). At the same time, the country had a political conﬂict at the cultural policy
level, because the person in charge of the Secretary of Culture stated that culture was not a priority
in the context of the economic crisis (Cornejo 2004). Indeed, these led to a couple of years without
radical innovations in terms of cultural policies, until 2009 when a new management took charge of
the Secretary of Culture. That year, this administration launched the program Mercado de Industrias
Cultural Argentinas (Market for Argentinean Cultural Industries - MICA), which had the following
aims:
“MICA is the ﬁrst initiative in Argentina that concentrates in one place the different
activities of cultural industries in order to generate business, exchange information
and present their production to main worldwide referents. The sectors involved are:
performing arts, audiovisual, design, publishing, music and video games. Producers and
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artists will have the possibility, for four days, to meet major companies in cultural indus-
tries around the world and open new business opportunities. MICA has stands with cul-
tural productions of all provinces and the presence of the whole sector through business
chambers, national institutions and SMEs. A place where producers and artists can
meet the main referents and companies of cultural industries in the world, through business
rounds, conferences, seminars and presentations of live entertainment. The event aims to
strengthen the internal market and to position Argentine Cultural Industries in
the global market, highlighting their quality and competitive prices” (MICA 2013).
This quotation illustrates the main features of the program, which retook and reinforced the original
idea of supporting cultural industries that Getino pioneered. MICA’s aim is to encourage the commer-
cialization of cultural sectors in the country by promoting business skills and opportunities for pro-
ducers and artists. To achieve this, the Ministry of Culture organized ﬁve massive events in different
provinces of the country, which according to state publicity gathered 2.572 ﬁrms of the cultural sectors,
organizing 9.873 business rounds (MICA 2013); and the process ended with the largest event in the city
of Buenos Aires with 1.700 ﬁrms and 4.500 business rounds (MICA 2013). Although these events had
different workshops related to speciﬁc knowledge of each of the cultural sectors to increase their pro-
fessionalization and to connect different cultural producers and artists (Hamawi 2013), it is important
to remark that for the organizers the most important aspect of these events were the business rounds
(Hamawi 2013), as the previous stress on their number suggests. The main reason for this priority
is the contribution of such rounds to strengthen the economic side of the cultural sectors, which also
makes evident the synchrony between the creative industries and the cultural industries discourses in
terms of economic ends. Furthermore, the MICA has become institutionalized, in the sense of Berger &
Luckmann (1966), because the ruling party continuously arranged such meetings, and for this reason I
shall argue that it has also become a dispositive for reinforcing the cultural industries policy discourse,
at least during the administration of Cristina Kirchner. For example, by disseminating knowledge for
more artists and producers in the creative sectors to become entrepreneurs (Ministerio de Cultura de
Argentina 2015), which I call cultural entrepreneurs to differentiate them from the subject-position of
the creative industries. Although they coincide in the methods and aims, I keep this difference because
the cultural industries policy discourse aims to promote regional entrepreneurs, trying to address the
existing regional imbalances that the remaining three policy discourses neglect.
This goes hand in hand with the activities of the Argentinean National System of Cultural Infor-
mation, which similarly to the creative industries observatories in Brazil, is dedicated to elaborate
statistics about the cultural industries in the country. This helps to disseminate quantitative data that
reinforces the economic rhetoric present in most of the material produced by the government about the
cultural industries. For example, the following quote shows an extract from a magazine elaborated by
the Ministry of Culture:
“For decades, culture was just an activity merely associated to leisure and recreation. Far
from this consideration, today culture is considered as an inexhaustible source of entertain-
ment, learning, pleasure, and primarily of value, (both symbolic and economic). Cultural
industries generate wealth and employment, and public policies in the matter have managed
to strengthen the cultural rights of Argentines. Since 2003, the national cultural GDP grows
at an average annual rate of 14.4%, and in 2012 reached 3.8%. Put in relation to other sec-
tors, cultural activities contributed to GDP in 2010 more than the supply of electricity, gas
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and water (2.50%), mining (1.21%), and ﬁshing (0.11%). [...] Cultural industries also create
employment, which has grown in a sustained way during the last years. In 2009, 246.011
jobs were recorded from the cultural sectors, 35% more than in 2004 (the year in which statis-
tics recollection began), demonstrating the vitality and centrality of the area” (Secretaria de
Cultura de la Nación Argentina 2013).
Therefore, the previous statement elucidates the similarities of the cultural industries approach with
the creative industries or the creative economy, because both express that the commercialization of
products and services from cultural sectors can generate economic wealth and employment. Similarly,
the addressee of ‘producers and artists’, hides and neglects minority and resource-scarce groups that
cannot become professional cultural entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding, MICA kept the cultural indus-
tries concern to encourage Latin American integration processes through cultural exchange. Indeed, in
2014 the idea of MICA inspired the creation of the Mercado de Industrias Culturales del Sur (MICSUR
- Southern Cultural Industry Market), which is a similar program that encourages the commercializa-
tion of culture within several Latin American countries, and also with foreign ones. But by keeping the
same language and discursive structure as the MICA, it suffers the same problems of only addressing
members of the creative class, neglecting cultural expressions of resource-scarce or minority groups of
the countries of the region.
As regards authors’ rights, the following words from the coordinator of the MICA illustrate the
government’s position: “In the context of a transition from an analog to a digital way of producing and
consuming culture, we have the policy of defending authors’ rights so that they receive a payment for their
work” (R. Hamawi, 26/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
This statement shows how the strict protection of authors’ rights is an integral part of the initiative,
similar to the the DCMS version of the creative industries, leaving aside the ambiguities that Getino
had in his original positioning with respect to cultural industries. According to a representative from
the Vía Libre Foundation, which advocates for Creative Commons and open software, “[...]intellectual
property is not an issue on the public policy agenda” (member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina), in the sense that there is no
questioning of the current status quo. Conversely, well-known musicians and artists have beneﬁted
from extensions of their author rights, a reading of the national scene shared by academics such as the
following quote shows:
“The government has a rather questionable policy in terms of intellectual property rights.
It has ingratiated much with artists, both from the music sector and TV, in extending intellec-
tual property rights, which is contradictory to many of its other social policies” (Argentinean
University professor I, 08/05/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
As regards the media sector, despite its market orientation, the cultural industries policies adopted at
the national level acknowledge the problems of media ownership concentration, and also aim to “mul-
tiply voices to propitiate content diversity” (Hamawi 2013, p. 15, translated by the author). This shows
the synchrony of the cultural industries policy discourse with the national policies of the Kirchner ad-
ministration for the media sector and its conﬂict with the largest media group, Clarín. Indeed, during
MICA events, the AFSCA, the state organism in charge of applying the new law, has been present to dis-
seminate information about the regulation (AFSCA 2013a). This stance on media is a point of contrast
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with the rest of the policy discourses that speak of ‘creative industries’, neglecting the asymmetries in
this and other cultural sectors that are a product of how these have changed in history. On the one
hand, this suggests that there are spaces for adapting the cultural or creative industries discourses by
introducing further regulations limiting the negative effects of a free markets approach. On the other
hand, my data still suggests that such regulations are not enough if the historical unequal distribution
of resources is not addressed at the same time. Otherwise, a new competitions law, for example in the
media sector, might limit the excess advantages of few private ﬁrms, but might do nothing to promote
a variety of voices that cannot access the resources to compete in markets.
To conclude, it is important to highlight that despite the differences in terms of media ownership
and in the promotion of national and regional integration of cultural markets, the cultural industries
and the creative industries policy discourses are more similar than what their supporters would like
to admit. Indeed, both put the priority on the commercialization of culture, aiming the discourse to
well-trained, entrepreneurial sectors of the population, with scarce concerns for social issues. However,
Argentinean policy makers at the national level prefer to avoid the term ‘creative industries’, because
they interpret it as too broad, loosing the focus the ‘cultural industries’ give. Furthermore, they keep
it as a way to proudly reject the introduction and inﬂuence of concepts coming from Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, something also evident in the term MICSUR that highlights the word south, implicitly making
reference and distinction to the idea of the so called Global North. Nevertheless, it is also true that the
MICA events were in part sponsored by the British Council (MICA 2013), and given the other similari-
ties I mentioned in practice, their similarities outweigh their differences, justifying its inclusion in the
ﬁrst group of policy discourses.
Creative Industries in Argentina
In this section, I shall show how the government of the city of Buenos Aires adopted the creative
industries policy discourse as a purely industrial policy, undervaluing the potential contribution of cul-
tural policies for social inclusion. In part due to the political orientation of the party in power, but also
due to the concentration of cultural industries in the city that favor such an approach. Furthermore, I
will show that the city has defended the existing media structure, contrary to attempts to democratize
communications at the national level.
The city of Buenos Aires, the largest of Argentina where most cultural industries are concentrated,
had a different institutional trajectory with the use of the term ‘creative industries’ and ‘cultural in-
dustries’. Until the end of 2007, cultural industries was the term employed, following the work by
Getino, but in 2008 a new mayor was elected, Mauricio Macri, who represents a right-wing conserva-
tive political party. From then onwards, the citys’ government replaced the term ‘cultural industries’
by the new term ‘creative industries’. Additionally, the former Secretary of Cultural Industries was
reduced in rank to a National Direction of Creative Industries and Foreign Trade, and taken to depend
directly of the Ministry of Economy, instead of the Ministry of Culture. The same change in names took
place in the preexisting Observatory of Cultural Industries, which became the Observatory of Creative
Industries. These changes are not minor, because they show that cultural activities were even further
reoriented based on an economic rationality, following the terminology and the recommendations of
the creative economy reports by UNCTAD (2010). Indeed, the following ofﬁcial deﬁnition of creative
industries makes evident the orientation toward foreign exports that the city government has, making
evident their synchrony with the international policy discourse:
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“They are content industries that use creativity and intellectual capital as primary inputs.
They include economic activities that combine creation, production and marketing of goods
and services. Creative industries of the city Buenos Aires cover the following sectors: music;
publishing; audiovisual (ﬁlm, video, radio and television); visual and performing arts; de-
sign; software, video games and internet; architecture; advertising; libraries, archives and
museums” (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013c).
Although the deﬁnition bounds the policies to speciﬁc industries, given that the agency depends on the
Minister of Economic Development of the city of Buenos Aires, the policy discourse also appears con-
nected with broader innovation policies on clusters and entrepreneurship. As regards the former, the
city of Buenos Aires created four clusters related to creative sectors: a technological district dedicated
to ICT; a district of audiovisual ﬁrms; a district of design ﬁrms; and a district for visual and performing
arts, with the publicity of the city government highlighting the process of concentration of ‘talent’ à
la Florida that they have put forward (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013a). With respect to
entrepreneurship, the city’s government promotes it through workshops, funding and incubators, al-
though not strictly bounded to creative industries. For example, the following quote displays the aim
of the two incubators that the city government has implemented:
“New ﬁrms, especially those related to the areas of technology, creativity and innovation,
are generating much impact on the growth and development of the economy of the countries
across the globe. In this context, we work to support the consolidation of ideas and innova-
tive business projects, with high potential, transgressors, generating new jobs, accompanying
the economic growth of the city and enabling us to position Buenos Aires among the most
innovative and creative cities in the world” (Ministerio de Desarrollo Económico 2013b).
Once again this statement makes evident the economic rhetoric to justify the support of innovative
business projects, including those related to ‘creativity’. In both cases, the construction of districts and
incubators, as places where ‘creatives’ reside, can be considered as infrastructural dispositives that help
to reinforce the policy discourse of the creative industries and the associated idea of a separate ‘class’ of
creative people. Furthermore, it exempliﬁes the subject-position of this discourse, becoming a creative
entrepreneur, which parallels the original idea of the creative industries in the UK. Indeed, the city
government collaborates with the British Council to promote entrepreneurship; for example, Figure
4.3 shows an advertisement of an award for young creative entrepreneurs from Buenos Aires, whose
winners would travel to London to create links with “the most relevant actors of the British creative
scene”. Besides making evident the foreign inﬂuence in the inspiration of the policy, this advertisement
shows how the British Council also operates in reproducing the idea of creative industries in Argentina.
As in the case of Brazil, the UK government funds events to (re)produce the practices of the policy
discourse, by training creative entrepreneurs and positioning their country as the role model to follow.
As in the previous cases, the elaboration of statistics by the city government is a practice that con-
tributes to the dissemination of the policy discourse. Similarly, the Creative Industries Observatory
plays the role of a dispositive, through its continuous production of discursive practices, such as the
elaboration of reports and statistics about these industries, highlighting their importance to the city’s
GDP, employment and exports (Observatorio de industrias creativas 2012, 2008). For example, in 2011
the Minister of the Economy maintained that: “In terms of employment, creative industries generate
about 145,000 jobs in the private sector, representing 9.03% of total employment in the city, outperform-
ing other dynamic sectors as construction, social services, health or retail” (Observatorio de industrias
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creativas 2012; 2008, p. 7, translated by the author). Therefore, the rhetoric employed to justify the
importance of the creative industries is once again related to their contribution to economic growth,
following the same strategy initiated by the DCMS and expanded by UNCTAD.
One slight difference in comparison to the national government and the DCMS is that although
they do recognize the importance of authors’ rights by covering the topic in all their annual reports
on creative industries, the evidence shows that they are also open to other types of licenses, such as
Creative Commons. Take the case of the declaration of cultural interest for the city of Buenos Aires
of the Global Summit 2013 of Creative Commons, which suggests a departure from a close support of
copyrights and all other restricted rights. Therefore, despite the similarities with the DCMS approach,
this shows that there are nuances in its implementation, at least in this globally debated point.
Beyond the previous variation, the creative industries policy discourse in the city of Buenos Aires
maintains the scarce concern for social issues, which is one of the most serious blindspots of this global
policy discourse. This shortcoming is present in the language employed by the programs and its ad-
vertisements that always speak of ‘entrepreneurs’, ‘talent’, ‘artists’, but say nothing of the barriers to
access those subject positions, which shows a lack of concern for resource-scarce and minority groups.
For instance, Figure 4.4 is a leaﬂet of the event Buenos Aires Creativa (Creative Buenos Aires) that
says its aim is to “gather professionals in the area of culture, urbanism and technologies to exchange
practices and reﬂections about the creativity of cities”, all toward ‘inclusion’. At ﬁrst sight, the adver-
tisement suggests that creativity could contribute to inclusion challenges in the city, but this word
game hides the context of the event and who ﬁnally participated. The event took place at the Centro
Metropolitano de Diseño (CMD - Metropolitan Design Center), which is located in a resource-scarce
neighborhood of the city, nearby one of the biggest slums. This building is in fact a project inherited
from the previous management, which hosts craft training workshops aimed to resource-scarce sectors
of the population, like textile courses to train workers for local ﬁrms. However, the CMD is the only
place where such an experiment of mixing a creative industry, design, with social aims has been made,
and no expansion to other creative sectors has been done by the political party that introduced the
creative industries. From my observations at the event, it was evident that most of the speakers and
attendees where middle or high income professionals from the country and abroad, with a conspicu-
ous absence of the ‘poor’, who were supposed to be included in the city, but who where only present
in some slides. Indeed, this contradiction was already suggested by the advertisement, because it only
addressed ‘professionals’. Therefore the event organized to mix creativity and ‘inclusion’ makes evident
that the creative industries policies of the city of Buenos Aires are still focused on the ‘creative class’,
as Florida deﬁned it, with few concerns to include the resource-scarce groups from the city.
Last but not least, the commercial approach of this policy discourse once again ignores all the de-
bates of media ownership concentration in the country I described in chapter 3, because media are just
considered as another industry. Indeed, the city administration tried to introduce its own audiovisual
media law, to exempt audiovisual ﬁrms in the city from obeying the national law that bounded media
concentration patterns; however, the legislative power ﬁnally suspended this initiative, for contradict-
ing the national audiovisual media law (Perﬁl 2014). On the one hand, those defending the position of
the government interpreted this attempt by the political party in the city, which opposes the national
government, as clear support for the Clarín multimedia ﬁrm, which would not have to obey the restric-
tions imposed on ownership by the national law (Pertot 2013). On the other hand, the politicians of the
city government argued it was a law to defend ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘fair competition’, because ac-
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Figure 4.4: Leaﬂet distributed before the event ‘Buenos Aires Creativa: ideas for inclusion’, which says:
“Creative Buenos Aires arrives in August, a space that gathers professionals from the area of culture,
urbanism and technologies to exchange and reﬂect about creative practices for the development of
cities. It is an opportunity to live ideas and experiences (local, national and international) put at the
service of inclusion”, translated by the author.
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cording to the mayor of Buenos Aires: “this industry has much to contribute, it needs a clear regulatory
framework for competition between cable, telephone and satellite platforms” (Clarín 2014, , translated
by the author). Nevertheless, this statement always refers to private ﬁrms, thus to the commercial
aspect of communications, and the initiative was not discussed at all in open forums, as it happened
with the national audiovisual communication services law. In sum, these tensions with the national
law show how a political party governing the city, siding with a commercial approach to culture and
communication and with scarce concerns for social issues, appropriated the creative industries policy
discourse to sustain and legitimize its industrial policies.
To conclude, the previous data shows that these four policy discourses share the same objective; to
contribute to economic growth through the commercialization of cultural products and services. For
this reason, they use an economic rhetoric that puts at the center the creative/cultural industries and
their contribution in terms of employment and GDP. In all cases, the policy discourses offer the subject-
position of cultural or creative entrepreneurs, which is an important element, because they need to dis-
seminate knowledge about the business practices that can implement such an economic oriented vision
of culture. It is important to remember that economic growth per se is the mainstream understanding
of what ‘development’ is all about, which is linked to the capitalist economic system operating in both
countries, where the logic of proﬁt maximization – at least in principle – is the main signal that guides
the actors in the economy for planning and taking decisions in their respective areas of operation. In
this context, the orientation of the original criticism of the culture industry is valid (Horkheimer and
Adorno 1947), because these policy discourses still contribute to the primacy of economics and of the
actors with more economic resources over the cultural sector, reducing the spaces of culture as an in-
dependent ‘sphere’ from such economic logic. However, these spaces are not eliminated as Horkheimer
& Adorno claimed. Conversely, there are spaces for different types of practices to arise and challenge
these discourses, as I shall show with the case studies in the next chapters.
In connection with the national discussions about Latin America in a post-neoliberal period, the
expansion of these commercial policy discourses in the area of cultural sectors precisely goes against
the positions defended by left-wing, progressive parties that governed during the ﬁrst decade of the
21st century in Argentina and Brazil. Although it is true that in some cases these discourses have been
advocated by conservative parties, such as in the city of Buenos Aires, they have also been present
during the PT administration in Brazil and in the version of cultural industries during Kirchner’s
governments. One of the main contradictions is that the aseptic language employed neglects all the
social inequalities in the region in terms of access to culture and to becoming entrepreneurs. Although
those defending these policy discourses argue that ‘anyone’ could become a creative or cultural en-
trepreneur, in practice, this disregards the state of resource deprivation and negative stereotyping that
members of Afro-descendant, indigenous, resource-scarce communities and others suffer. The second
important contradiction for this research is that by promoting the commercialization of cultural prod-
ucts and services as their main objective, these policy discourses do not address issues of ownership
concentration patterns in the media sector and the consequences this has for the democratic processes
in both countries. Thus, they reinforce the problems several actors from civil society have been try-
ing to alter. The contradiction is more evident when considering the next two policy discourses that
have been implemented in Argentina and Brazil. These take another perspective with respect to cul-
ture and communication by altering the aims and addressees of the policies linking culture, economy
and social issues. Therefore, they oppose and challenge the commercial perspectives disseminated by
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international organizations and implemented in other governmental agencies.
4.1.2 Culture as a Social Resource
In contrast to the last four policy discourses oriented to economic growth, I shall show the next two
policies oppose the latter by considering how cultural activities contribute to other objectives, beyond
just economic ones. Particularly, I will introduce the Cultura Viva in Brazil, and in the second part
the discourse on communications as a human right in Argentina. These cover a new set of actors, ad-
dressees, objectives, among other dimensions, which have inspired organizations and networks thereof
to operate in different ways from commercial ﬁrms; thus, setting the stage for the speciﬁc case studies
of the next chapter.
4.1.2.1 Cultura Viva in Brazil
In this section, I will describe a policy discourse initiated in Brazil in 2005 with the creation of the
Cultura Viva (Living Culture) program. Although it was introduced at the national level before the
expansion of the creative economy described in section 4.1.1.1, it opposes approaches that aim to com-
mercialize culture above other ends as I shall show. Indeed, before president Lula came to power, an
analysis of previous cultural policies pointed out that Brazil had to deal with ‘three sad traditions’:
absence, authoritarianism and instability (Rubim 2007). Absence, in the sense that the state during
several periods did not care much about culture and thus did not intervene; authoritarianism, because
the state imposed just one vision at the national level ignoring others, as it happened during military
dictatorships; instability refers to the lack of continuity in terms of cultural policies (Rubim 2007),
which started to change when Lula became president, because he appointed a renowned Brazilian mu-
sician Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, who introduced path breaking policies with respect to these
three sad traditions. The ﬁrst change was the introduction of a new concept of culture that expanded
previous ones, detailed in the next quote:
“Culture not in the sense of academic or artistic rites of an intellectual class, but in its
full anthropological sense. That is to say: culture as the symbolic dimension of the Brazilian
social existence; as generator of a set of signs of each community across the nation. Culture
as an axis that builds our identities, in a continued way that results from the encounters
among multiple representations of feeling, thinking and doing of Brazilians and global cul-
tural diversity. Culture as a realization space of citizenship and as a resource to overcome
social exclusion, either by enhancing self-esteem and sense of belonging or due to the potential
inscribed in the universe of artistic and cultural expressions with its multiple possibilities of
socioeconomic inclusion. Yes, culture also as an economic fact that is able to attract foreign
currency to the country, to generate employment and income” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 239,
translated by the author).
At a global level, this was not a new cultural concept, because it was already sketched in UNESCO’s
world conference of cultural policies in 1982, but its introduction was new to Brazil’s national cultural
policy (Gil and Ferreira 2013). What is important to remark is that the Ministry of Culture recognized
the importance of culture’s contribution to ‘sustainable development’ (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p.
10) and opened up the concept in three dimensions: as the production of a variety of symbols, as a
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right and as a contribution to build citizenship, and as a way to stimulate the economy (Ministério da
Cultura 2005). Therefore, it is important to highlight the order of these three priorities, which turn
upside down the ones of previous policies during the 1990s that considered culture just as a business2,
also opposing the conceptualization of culture that the creative industries and creative economy policy
discourses would later reinforce. At the time of its initiation, the initiative tried to revert previous
policies that were mostly ﬁscal incentives allowing ﬁrms to deﬁne where cultural investments would go,
a problematic structure, because given the proﬁt oriented rationality of ﬁrms, they inevitably selected
cultural projects that would give them more visibility and larger audiences. Consequently, they had
preferences for artists acting in densely populated regions with the capacity to reach large masses,
favoring the concentration of cultural investments in the southeastern region of the country (Nunes
Saddi 2010), but ignoring the rest of the country and stopping funds from going to cultural projects
from minority groups. For these reasons, the Minister of Culture openly expressed his criticism toward
such previous mechanisms:
“It is clear that the laws and mechanisms of tax incentives are of utmost importance, but
the market is not everything, it will never be. We know very well that in terms of culture, as
well as of health and education, we must examine and correct distortions inherent in the logic
of the market, which is always, in the last analysis, governed by the law of the strongest” (Gil
and Ferreira 2013, p. 230).
This critical stance of Gilberto Gil with respect to previous market oriented cultural policies became a
central aspect in the delineation of the Cultura Viva program; for example, its ofﬁcial objective was to
“promote access to means of cultural fruition, production and diffusion, as well as to enhance social and
cultural energies, aiming at the construction of new co-operative and solidarity values” (Ministério da
Cultura 2005, p. 47, translated by the author). I want to highlight two features of this deﬁnition. First,
the terms ‘co-operative and solidarity values’ in that context implies a connection with the movement
of the solidarity economy in Brazil. Indeed, the full name of the program is “Living Culture: National
Program of Art, Education, Citizenship and Solidarity Economy” (p. 1, translated by the author). As
I will explain in more detail in section 4.1.2.2, this is a movement covering a diversity of formal and
informal NGO organizations, operating in different economic sectors and striving for ‘another econ-
omy’. However, in contrast to Argentina and its media co-operatives, the Brazilian solidarity economy
movement has not been as active in the area of communication and culture and was thus not covered
in this research. Nevertheless, the movement has been very inﬂuential to the Cultura Viva program
through its practices, such as community currencies, solidarity ﬁnance, fair trade, among others, as-
pects that did inﬂuence the Brazilian case study I will analyze in the next chapter. Second, the term
‘access’ is another keyword in the objectives of the Cultura Viva program, making evident the concern
for the inclusion of different actors in cultural processes. This establishes a distance with the previous
group of policy discourses, which do not directly address policies to encourage inclusion of excluded
actors. Speciﬁcally, the Cultura Viva program was destined for: “Low-income populations; elementary
school system students; indigenous, rural and maroon communities; cultural agents, artists, teachers
and activists who develop plans to combat social and cultural exclusion” (p. 47, translated by the au-
thor). Furthermore, tenders have been aimed at sections of the population with low incomes, living
not only in large urban centers, but also in small towns and rural areas (Ministério da Cultura 2005).
In addition, they have considered other minorities usually ignored by cultural public policies, such as
2. The main slogan of the Ministry at that time was “culture is a good business” (Porto 2009, p. 23).
93
different sexual orientations (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p.
54). Another important fact to mention is that tenders did not consider ﬁrms as destinees; conversely,
they aimed at strengthening connections between the state and nonproﬁt organizations, favoring those
groups with less resources. This undoubtedly associates cultural policies with the main discourse dur-
ing Lula’s government, the ﬁght against hunger, poverty and social inequalities in general (Lula da
Silva 2006). Therefore, in terms of addressees the program clearly opposed the policy discourses of the
creative industries and similar ones, because ﬁrms or entrepreneurs were not the central ﬁgures, but
rather resource-scarce groups that needed more support from the state to initiate and sustain their cul-
tural projects. In synthesis, the program initiated with criticism of existing market mechanisms that
had not been fair for all Brazilians and proposes an instrument precisely directed at those who had
been excluded, quite opposite to the uncritical perspective of goods and services exchange through mar-
kets that the previous policy discourses had, and the creative economy and industries policy discourse
would later reinforce.
In this context, the program Cultura Viva implemented different policy instruments to advance its
perspective on cultural policies, among which I will describe Pontos de Cultura (Points of Culture) and
Cultura Digital (Digital Culture). These have been the most inﬂuential, which I consider as dispositives
in SKAD’s terminology, for their contribution to (re)produce the policy discourse. As regards the for-
mer, it consisted in the state supporting projects run by pre-existing nonproﬁt organizations, by giving
them funds, equipment and the ofﬁcial recognition as a point of culture to help legitimize their cultural
activities. In contrast to the creative economy discourses, this support was not restricted to predeﬁned
sectors or industries selected by policymakers; instead, it was open to a variety of cultural projects per-
formed by the addressees of the policy; for example, ‘cineclubs’, theater groups, puppeteering, hip-hop,
sculpture, design and percussion, free media, amongst others (Ministério da Cultura 2005). A speciﬁc
example is the NGO “Vídeo nas Aldeias” (Videos in Villages), which trains indigenous community mem-
bers to be ﬁlm directors and ﬁlm their lifestyles, avoiding the stereotypical ﬁlms that outsiders usually
elaborate (Vídeo Nas Aldeias 2009). Another example is given by a diversity of free media projects
that the state supported, such as a peripheral cultural agenda in São Paulo, which gives visibility to
cultural activities taking place in resource scarce neighborhoods of the city (Agenda Cultural da Per-
iferia 2014). Figure 4.5 shows a leaﬂet of the agenda, which promotes hip hop, samba and Afro culture,
which is important in terms of social inclusion, because as I mentioned in chapter 3, these cultural
expressions still suffer from negative stereotypes in Brazil and have little diffusion in mass media, due
to the inheritance of negative stereotypes from the slavery period.
According to former policy makers, the Cultura Viva program funded over 2.000 points of culture
and supported a diversity of projects, clearly contrasting with the limited number of industries that the
previous policy discourses focus on, which, according to the ﬁrst coordinator of the Cultura Viva pro-
gram, Célio Turino, “are killing all the spontaneity of cultural groups. Everyone has to think the same”
(C. Turino, 05/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil). Additionally,
the state funded the creation of networks of points of culture and events gathering its members, fo-
cused on speciﬁc themes, such as those related to indigenous communities or free media (Ministério da
Cultura 2005). This support of varied types of networks is important for the research, because it in-
spired many experiences to follow similar network organizational structures, as the one I will analyze
in chapter 5. Furthermore, the funding of free media networks can be interpreted as a challenge to the
lack of policy change in the Communication Ministry of Brazil, which did not alter the media structure
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Figure 4.5: Leaﬂet from a point of culture in the city of São Paulo that diffuses the cultural agenda
of activities in peripheral communities. In this case, it highlights cultural events of Afro-Brazilian
music, hip-hop, samba, etc. At the same time, it makes evident the state support that recognized the
experience as a Ponto de Mídia Livre (free media point, a specialized point of culture).
favoring large corporations. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the promotion of networks of points
of culture also stimulated collective practices of organization and of creativity, that depart from the
individualistic perspective the original DCMS deﬁnition of creative industries advocates.
As regards the Cultura Digital instrument, it complemented Pontos de Cultura by stimulating the
use of digital technologies in the supported nonproﬁt projects. Although it started out as an experimen-
tal initiative, it soon became central to the Ministry’s new cultural policy due to its potential to give
resource-scarce actors the tools to register and diffuse their cultural output (Fernandes 2010; Costa
2011; Ministério da Cultura 2005). Speciﬁcally, this instrument delivered multimedia equipment to
each Ponto de Cultura, which included three PCs to edit videos, a camcorder, equipment to record and
edit sounds and broadband access to the internet, all running under free software (Turino 2010). For
example, several indigenous communities did online projects, such as the indigenous community Xikrin
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do Kateté located in the Brazilian state Belém do Pará (Xikrin 2012), and Afro-descendant communities
too, like the Quilombo3 da Fazenda (Quilombo da Fazenda 2013) in Ubatuba, São Paulo, among many
others. It is relevant to stress that the selection of free software was not only for ﬁnancial reasons, but
also to take a position with respect to the changes that digital technologies have introduced in knowl-
edge sharing, challenging restricted copyrights. This stance is opposite to the original DCMS deﬁnition
of the creative industries that advocated copyrights, instead, the Cultura Viva program “develops the
exercise of collaborative and more generous intellectual practices” (Ministério da Cultura 2005, p. 26).
For this reason, the distribution of such multimedia equipment can be understood as a dispositive to
further the perspective of this policy discourse in terms of IPR, and to stimulate collaboration practices
coordinated through online networks. Actually, this decision encouraged the growth of a community of
free software developers in Brazil that contributed to the needs of points of culture and also introduced
a critical view of technology that acknowledges every technology has a design, with its own risks and
potentialities. For example, the online network Metareciclagem, which was part of the program, specif-
ically advocated for understanding the working principles of technologies in order to alter them for
purposes of social transformation beyond those considered in their original designs (MetaReciclagem
2014).
The diffusion of digital culture practices together with the mainstreaming of digital technologies,
free software and other types of licenses, such as Creative Commons, illustrate the opposition of this
policy discourse with those emanating from the DCMS and UNCTAD. Most of the interviewees sympa-
thetic to this approach hypothesized that this was a result of the inﬂuence of the Minister of Culture at
that time, Gilberto Gil, who pioneered the defense of open source approaches to knowledge and culture
(LaMonica 2007), as the following quote shows:
“[...] everyone here knows that I am a defender, an advocate, a practitioner, a user, an en-
thusiast of: free software, tools for establishing virtual and remote networks, digital inclusion
programs, accelerating and multiplying exchanges, the most intense, radical and innovative
forms of exercise of freedom of thought, expression and creation” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p.
230, translated by the author).
This desire to introduce a new perspective on IPR brought to the fore old questions, such as what is
an original work of art in the digital age? Are all art works and cultural expressions copies or remixes
of previous ones? During the administration of Gilberto Gil, the Ministry of Culture took the position
that authors’ cultural productions depends on a huge social accumulation of knowledge that inﬂuenced
their work. Therefore, from this perspective it is incorrect to believe in the existence of ‘genius’ artists,
members of a ‘creative class’ à la Florida, when in fact they have been affected by a speciﬁc set of
material and social conditions. This position was understood by many of the interviewees to be related
to Gil’s personal background as a musician belonging to the Tropicalist movement in Brazil, a group of
artists that emerged during the late 1960s that based their creative process on the mixture of diverse
musical styles to elaborate new ones. Thus, the idea of ‘remix’, without being inhibited by copyrights
boundaries, was at the center of his musical career. This background helps to understand the decision
to support free software and open licenses, the free ﬂow of information and knowledge, and a project
to reform existing copyrights to update them to the digital age, opposing the perspective that culture
should be strictly protected under IPR. However, such a perspective is clearly against the interest of
ﬁrms proﬁting from the existing IPR system, and of artists that base their careers on their ‘genius’ or
3. Hinterland settlements founded by Afro-Brazilians, most of them who escaped slavery.
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‘godlike’ qualities. Therefore, this feature of the policy discourse establishes a clear opposition with
tenets of the creative industries.
A consequence of the Cultura Viva is the questioning of universities ‘universal’ knowledge, as the
following statement of the successor to Gil at the Ministry of Culture clearly illustrates:
“The university must face the challenges of informal culture, of traditional knowledge, of
the creativity that springs from the streets today and emanates centuries ago from peripheral
communities. These are ways of thinking and doing that bring new challenges, which require
the production of new concepts, and that serve as a test for the validity of the universal criteria
that are the instruments par excellence of formal culture” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 561).
This questioning is in part a product of the diversity of addressees that in many cases practice Amerindian,
Afro-descendant and other lifestyles, which have been usually discriminated in the country and absent
from the syllabus at universities (Gil and Ferreira 2013). This has posed challenges to the role of uni-
versities as the sole place where universal knowledge is generated and disseminated, and it is an issue
I will consider during the analysis of the Brazilian media case, because it keeps a similar mistrust
towards universities, given the elitist orientation they have in the country.
In sum, the Cultura Viva program initiated a new type of policy discourse in Brazil, which linked
culture with social inclusion aims and was directed toward previously excluded actors, challenging
mainstream stances of the strict defense of IPRs, and expanding the concept of culture to include other
objectives beyond economic ones. These features oppose the previous policies of the 1990s that saw
culture mere as a business and left cultural investment decisions mostly in the hands of ﬁrms, favoring
an elite group of artists. Therefore, it also opposed the creative industries approach to culture that
would later reinforce such patterns. It is important to remember that the emergence of this policy
discourse has to be understood in the context of the left-wing government in Brazil, which resisted
the commercialization policies of previous years associated with ‘neoliberalism’. Indeed, the policy dis-
course expanded to other countries of Latin America facing similar challenges, such as Argentina4 and
Bolivia. Despite its efforts to democratize cultural policies, the program has faced several challenges,
among them a small budget for the Ministry of Culture, bureaucratic issues that limited the capabil-
ity of the state to deal with nongovernmental organizations (Gil and Ferreira 2013), resistance from
groups against such cultural democratization, and the scarce expansion of the economic dimension of
culture, though it was one of the three main priorities of the new culture conceptualization. This led to
a conﬂict with the creative economy policy discourse, which took that priority in 2013 at the expense
of budget cuts to this program (Turino 2013), and paradoxically within the national administration of
the Worker’s Party. However, the inﬂuences of the policy discourse had already expanded across the
country and Latin America.
My ﬁnal observation to remark is that, although I do not directly analyze a point of culture as one of
my case studies, this policy discourse is important for this research, because it inspired the Brazilian
case I inquire about at least on ﬁve aspects. First, it put under the spotlight the cultural activities of
previously ignored minority groups, such as peripheral communities, indigenous communities, Afro-
descendant communities, among others, which have not only been ignored in mass media, but which
have also been suffering negative biases. Second, the policy stimulated the use of ICT for the creation
4. I will, however, not compare the expansion of this discourse further in Argentina, because it did not have a direct inﬂuence
on the media organizations under analysis. Instead, the key inﬂuence was the new audiovisual communication services law
detailed in the next section.
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and distribution of cultural products and expressions of these groups, stimulating as well a critical
stance on technologies. Third, the inclusion of new types of actors in the production and distribution
of knowledge, challenged the role of universities as the only places where ‘universal’ knowledge is
elaborated. Fourth, the support of networks and collective organizations inspired other projects to
follow similar strategies of association and collaboration. Fifth, the support of Creative Commons and
more ‘generous intellectual practices’, inspired organizations across Brazil to depart from the model of
closed IPRs, challenging as well the association of ‘genius’ or ‘creative’ qualities to just a reduced elite
over the majority of the population. These are all points that connect this discourse with the case I will
analyze in detail in the next chapter.
4.1.2.2 NGOs in Law 26.522 of Argentina
In chapter 3, I introduced the Law 26.522, which was passed in Argentina in 2009, also known as
the audiovisual communication services law. It is important in this section for two reasons: First, I
consider the law as a dispositive to advance the perspective of information as a human right, which
differs from the commercialization of culture and media reinforced by the creative industries, where
information is just another commodity. Second, the law has paved the way for new types of actors to
acquire their media legally, in particular, I will focus on actors of the so-called ‘social and solidarity
economy’, ‘alternative media’ and indigenous communities.
The audiovisual communication services law assumes the perspective of a transition to an informa-
tion society, and in that context aims to regulate the allocation of licenses for the provision of audiovi-
sual communication services (radio and TV). Amongst its objectives, in Article 2° the law claims “[...] to
promote diversity, universal access and participation, thus implying equal opportunities for all inhab-
itants of the nation to access the beneﬁts of audiovisual services provision” (Ley 26.522 2009). Second,
the law limits market concentration in audiovisual services, by deﬁning a boundary to the number of
licenses that a private provider can have (up to 24) and limiting its service to 35% of the total possible
number of subscribers in Article 44°. In Article 2° the law deﬁnes these objectives following a particu-
lar perspective on communications, which stresses information as a human right, and addresses three
types of actors detailed in the next fragments:
“The state considers of public interest the activities carried out by audiovisual communi-
cation services, because they are fundamental to the sociocultural development of the pop-
ulation, through which they manifest their inalienable human right to express, receive,
impart and investigate information, ideas and opinions. The exploitation of audiovisual
communication services may be made by state-run, privately owned for-proﬁt and privately
managed nonproﬁt providers, which must have the capacity to operate and have equal
access to all available transmission platforms [...] To this end, audiovisual communication
in any media is a social activity of public interest, in which the state must safeguard the
right to information, participation, preservation and development of the rule of law and
the values of freedom of expression” (Article 2°).
To argument in favor of the regulations included in the law, the text includes references to international
declarations and discussions. First, the law argues based on the declaration of human rights, which in
its article 19° expresses the right to freedom of opinion and expression, which “[...] includes freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
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media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations 1948). This is the pillar of the discourse of informa-
tion as part of the struggle for human rights, which in the case of Argentina is particularly connected
to the leading role the country has had in the last two decades defending human rights, particularly as
a reply to state terrorism during the dirty war of 1976-1983. Thus, the law links the general struggle
of democratization, with the speciﬁc need of media democratization still concentrated in few private
ﬁrms. Second, and also connected to the previous imbalances in the media system, the law sides with
the protection of freedom of expression, taking the position that the state must assure the right to
information, considering communication to be of public interest in order to give equal opportunities
to all actors. Thus, the notion of access is not overlooked, as it is the case in the international ver-
sion of the creative economy and creative industries. Finally, the previous fragment considers three
types of actors that could offer audiovisual communication services, among which this research focuses
on nonproﬁt privately managed TV providers. The law justiﬁes the inclusion of this type of actor by
citing documents of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the cultural diversity
conventions of UNESCO, which encourage media ownership diversity (WSIS 2003a). It is important
to highlight these have been prohibited and ignored actors in Argentina since the dictatorship in the
1970s, but they are also usually ignored in media analysis given their nonproﬁt orientation, which does
not have a space in a political economy understanding of the media system as the one I illustrated in
Figure 2.2. Therefore, my research covers actors that are off the radar in the existing media literature
in Argentina.
The previous deﬁnitions and the references to UNESCO, human rights and freedom of expression
discourses already put a distance between this policy discourse and the commercially oriented version
of the creative and cultural industries, simply because information is not considered to be just another
commodity. This stance is evident with further articles in the law that put quotas on what type of con-
tent the media organizations can transmit. For instance, Article 65° requires that non-governmental
media distribute at least 70% of national content, out of which 50% needs to be produced by themselves,
including a local news channel. Moreover, Article 86° establishes a minimum number of hours that me-
dia organizations legalized under the law have to transmit. For the case of TV, media in cities with a
number of inhabitants between 100.000 and 600.000 need to transmit 10 hours, whereas in larger cities
they need to transmit 14 hours. These measures are important to promote local audiovisual produc-
tions in different points of the country, contributing to decentralize the production so far concentrated
in the capital city, limiting as well the inﬂuence of foreign audiovisual content, speciﬁcally from the
USA.
Taking into account the previous points, the law can be considered as a dispositive to implement a
human rights approach to information, particularly given its aim to democratize communications and
to give legal entitlements to nongovernmental organizations previously ignored. Concretely, the mate-
rial aspect of the dispositive is deﬁned in Article 9° of the law that establishes the Autoridad Federal
de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual (AFSCA - Federal Authority of Audiovisual Communication
Services), which is the organization in charge of implementing the objectives of the law. This includes
the enforcement of the law by controlling that media ﬁrms obey the limits to licenses and by initiating
legal actions to punish those who disobey the regulations. Equally important, the AFSCA funds new
media organizations to initiate their media projects, distributes funds and organizes training work-
shops to diffuse the needed knowledge. However, one of the criticism the law received is that it does
not legislate the internet, but that it only regulates and stimulates ‘traditional’ media (Centro de Infor-
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mación Judicial 2013). This observation is important, because it explains why the cases in Argentina
put an emphasis on these sort of media that do not base their operations on the internet completely,
maybe underestimating that online technologies might be more appropriate in some cases for their
objectives, given the resource constraints that media for social transformation have. Conversely, the
lack of a new media legislation in Brazil leaves the media system that favors large commercial ﬁrms
untouched, which explains why the Cultura Viva policy discourse has stimulated free media networks
to focus on online means of information dissemination; a strategy to ﬁght against the existing asym-
metries. Another difference between the two discourses is that the Brazilian one has challenged the
preestablished IPR system, whereas the new law in Argentina does not legislate that point, which is
left open to each NGO to decide.
In Argentina, the immediate effect of the law as a dispositive has been that a diversity of non-
governmental organizations initiated the process of legally acquiring radio and TV licenses for their
media. This broad category includes channels from trade unions, religious organizations, mutual orga-
nizations, among others. But taking into account that I selected the case studies based on the existence
of conﬂicts between these actors, three types are relevant for this research: the ‘social and solidarity
economy’, ‘alternative media’ and ‘indigenous communities’, because they had pronounced confronta-
tions with private ﬁrms and the governments before and after the passing of the law. To set the stage
for the analysis of speciﬁc case studies in the next Chapter, I will brieﬂy synthesize below the features
of these movements and their relation with the new law.
Social and Solidarity Economy
In the next Chapter, I shall introduce two cases, one operating in a co-operative and another in an
alternative media channel that transmits from a recovered factory managed by workers. In both cases,
these channels operate in organizations that belong to the so called ‘social and solidarity economy’,
but they represent different poles of organizations belonging to these movements. To shed light on
their differences, it is important to answer the following question: What does the social and solidarity
economy refer to? According to academic deﬁnitions, it is the group of organizations that is not part of
the market based ordering of society nor of the public economy, which includes different sorts of actors
such as co-operatives, mutual associations, NGOs generating income through their activities, commu-
nity and self-help organizations, among others, which are not ‘capitalists’ but just workers trying to
survive (Coraggio 2013). Although this deﬁnition is problematic, given that the interactions of any of
those organizations with ﬁrms and the state are undeniable, the point Coraggio makes is that they
want to build something different from what the economy based on proﬁts offers, challenging the hier-
archic structures of organization in many private ﬁrms. Other authors have stressed the importance of
“[...] self-management practices of production, trading, consumption, exchanges and services still sparse
in the world” (Nunes 2009, p. 53, translated by the author) of the organizations of the movement,
operating in heterogeneous economic sectors, such as agriculture, banking, gastronomy, among others.
It is important to point out that the name of the movement emerged in academic discussions at the
end of 1980s, to describe and stimulate struggles of many social movements and organizations in Latin
America against neoliberal policies (Embshoff 2014). Since then, it has expanded and inspired global
networks, such as the Réseau Intercontinental de Promotion de l’Économie Sociale Solidaire (RIPESS -
International Network for the Promotion of Social Solidarity Economy) that connects social and solidar-
ity economy initiatives and research worldwide. Among the different types of organizations within the
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movement, co-operatives tend to be the largest and more resourceful, but it is also important to remark
that during the ideological wars between capitalism and communism, they became erroneously associ-
ated with the latter, and consequently have been suffering from a negative bias as alternative models
of organizing production. Indeed, 2012, the year of co-operatives, was amongst the most ignored news
by mass media, even though one billion people practice this business model (Project Censored 2013).
In Argentina the social and solidarity economy is a strong movement, which according to estimates
represents around 10% of national GDP and has 25.000 co-operatives (Sosa 2013). In particular, in the
cultural sphere there are several cases of organizations that follow a co-operative model or that promote
such form of management. For instance, the Centro Cultural de la Cooperación (CCC - Co-operation
Cultural Center) that diffuses co-operative practices and cultural performances such as dance, music,
theater, among others, together with social science research. Speciﬁcally with respect to media, af-
ter the new audiovisual communication services law was passed, several co-operatives initiated the
process to legalize or create their own TV channels and networks in order to disseminate the values
and principles of the sector to balance the lack of coverage of their activities in mass media. Indeed,
one of the case studies I analyzed is part of the more than 39 organizations that created a network
called TRAMA, which gathers mostly co-operative channels distributed across the country to produce
content collectively on a larger scale. Their aim is to elaborate audiovisual material showing stories of
the sector previously excluded in mass media, and for this to succeed, many of their members speak
of producing mass, popular, high quality content, which also coincides with some of the principles of
a ‘cultural industry’ approach. Therefore, these organizations criticize the economic order, but at the
same time, they want to employ the contemporary structures and mechanisms to gain more inﬂuence
for the sector. This paradoxical position can be explained by the organizations hosting these media
channels, which usually are locally strong co-operative ﬁrms specialized in different economic sectors,
like electricity or internet provision in several towns across Argentina. As such, they are on the ﬁnan-
cially richer side of the spectrum of social and solidarity economy organizations, and thus their way
of thinking about ﬁnancial sustainability models is not so different from that of for-proﬁt media orga-
nizations, though with nuances, because in the end co-operative members decide what to do with the
proﬁts they generate. In the words of one of TRAMA’s members:
“The end of this co-operative media network is to communicate the interests of the sector,
which does not mean it is not going to sell advertising. We will, and we also have to be
proﬁtable. But the difference between for-proﬁt ﬁrms and us is what we will do with that
income. Is it going to be accumulated by an owner or by the board of directors? No. Instead,
we are working to respect a cycle, where co-operative members decide what we will do with
proﬁts: Either we increase workers salaries or we reinvest in our tools” (TRAMA’s member,
23/05/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
Alternative Media
A second case I shall analyze in the next chapter is also part of the ‘social and solidarity’ economy,
because it transmit from a factory that was recovered by its workers, who initiated a self-management
process. This is one of the many examples that sprouted in Argentina in the context of the 2001 eco-
nomic crisis, which replicated the concept of factories recovered by workers (Restakis 2010). However,
the members of the media organization classify themselves in their texts and utterances, ﬁrst and
foremost, as part of the ‘alternative media’ movement in Argentina, and I would say only second as
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part of the ‘social and solidarity movement’. This includes small scale, and in many cases ﬁnancially
resource-scarce, community radios and TV channels that are already operating or emerging in the
country thanks to the law. In contrast to media from larger media co-operatives, they do not have the
objective to compete in markets. Instead, they aim to elaborate critical content on their localities, which
is ignored by other media who have economic or political stakes. This perspective can be understood
by considering the political economy interpretation of the media system I synthesized in Figure 2.2,
which considers that private and public media are mostly dependent on advertising by industries and
publicity by the state respectively. Contrarily, Barricada TV, and the type of media it represents, claim
to break with such chains of inﬂuence. For example, TV channels and radios articulated in the Red
Nacional de Medios Alternativos (RNMA - National Network of Alternative Media) express that their
aim is to:
“[...] generate a different agenda from the one imposed by corporate media and successive
administrations in power, thus aiming to democratize speech. Our role is to be a tool to
disseminate and nationalize conﬂicts, working with the working class and other people, with
an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-patriarchal perspective. Our practice is based on
horizontal, collective work and consensus” (RNMA 2014, translated by the author).
Therefore, in contrast to the network of co-operatives I previously mentioned, this network of media
is concerned with conﬂict and the working class, explicitly adopting and disseminating anti-capitalist
worldviews and also challenging administrations in power. As I shall show in the next chapters, despite
the fact that law entitles them to legally obtain their media, this project has not been as easy as
expected.
Indigenous Communities
The inclusion of indigenous communities in the new audiovisual communication services law has to
be understood in the context of their still remaining conﬂicts with the state. For instance, in 2014 the
Consejo Plurinacional Indigena (CPI - Indigenous Plurinational Council) of Argentina, which gathers
fourteen indigenous communities of the country (Aranda 2014), remarked in an ofﬁcial statement that
“[...] the colonial nature of the state insists on making us missing of history and the present. A story that
they draw every day as if Argentina were only a country of white Europeans” (Consejo Plurinacional In-
dígena 2014). This statement illustrates the position of indigenous communities in the country, which
argue that the state keeps opposing and repressing them. Indeed, there are many areas of conﬂict
among both type of actors. For example, a central issue in 2013 was the government’s delay in recog-
nizing territories that ancestrally belong to indigenous communities. This is conﬂictive, because ﬁrms
(both private and state-owned) are appropriating such lands for raw materials exploitation (soybean
production, oil), irrespective of their inhabitants and of the consequences that these industries have
for the environment and the Mapuche lifestyle (IWGIA 2014). What is more, several indigenous com-
munities organized demonstrations to strive for collective property rights and against state violence
(IWGIA 2014). Moreover, the oppressive conditions that these communities have tolerated during the
last century have been scarcely researched. Few books touch these topics and they have mostly been
written during the last decades (Moyano, 2007; 2013). What is even worse, there has been a lack of cov-
erage of all the conﬂictive situations they have faced against the state in mass media. Indeed, they do
appear from time to time, but are generally portrayed negatively; for example, the following quote by a
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member of the indigenous channel that I will analyze in the next chapters, Wall Kintun TV, illustrates
their perceptions about mass media:
“The government and ﬁrms never diffuse the struggles of indigenous communities; and
when they do, they take a racist position, they report with scorn, they stigmatize and crim-
inalize us. But they never give indigenous communities the opportunity to elaborate their
perspective on what is really going on” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & trans-
lated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).
It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd data that conﬁrms this statement, even from public ﬁgures; for instance, in
2014 the governor of the Argentinean province of Neuquén was heavily criticized for stating “100 men
and 100 Mapuches work there” (LPO 2014), implying that the Mapuches do not belong to the category
of humans. Another recent example was a protest by Mapuches in Bariloche, claiming ownership over
a territory where a Yacht Club operates. The conservative newspaper, La Nación, titled the event “a
Mapuche group says it owns a Yacht Club”, which is not correct at all, because they were claiming the
territory and not the organization built on it (La Nación 2014). But in the article, the journalist only
represented the position of the members of the Yacht club, and even worse, associated the Mapuches
with aggression, without mentioning anything of the historical and structural state violence these
communities have been suffering and resisting since the 19th century.
Given the historical negative bias against indigenous communities in the country, representatives
from these groups were part of the discussions for a new audiovisual communication services law, with
the hope of obtaining media to better represent their points of view, and to preserve and expand their
culture. Their claims were successful, and the new law includes indigenous communities as part of the
actors that could request media licenses for the 33% of the radioelectric spectrum assigned to NGOs.
In fact, indigenous communities receive a special treatment in the law, which explicitly incorporates
them amongst its objectives in Article 3° that expresses to “preserve and promote the identity and
values of indigenous communities” (Ley 26.522 2009). Additionally, in Article 37° they are exempt of
requirements that commercial ﬁrms have to fulﬁll to acquire the license. Moreover, in Article 9° the
law states that audiovisual services have to be expressed in Spanish or in one of the 21 indigenous
communities languages, in order to preserve them. As regards funding for their media, Article 152°
deﬁnes a list of possible sources for radio and TV channels of indigenous communities, such as: national
budget allocations, advertising, donations, sale of their content, among others. These measures show
a considerable change with respect to the situation before the law was enacted, but as I shall show in
the next chapters, in practice they have not been without contradictions nor shortcomings.
4.2 Discussion
In this section, I want to discuss a number of differences between the two groups of policy discourses in
order to illustrate tensions that I shall elaborate further with the case studies of the next chapter. First
of all, this covers the discussion on who is ‘creative’ and what sectors can be classiﬁed as such. Second,
I will analyze the implicit notion of entrepreneurship in the ﬁrst group of policy discourses, shadowing
other types of cultural organizations. Third, I will mention the tensions in the conceptualization of
sustainability between for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt projects. In relation to the latter, the fourth point I will
discuss touches on different positions with respect to intellectual property rights, which implicitly have
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different understandings of the role of culture. Finally, I will close the discussion stressing the political
side of the adoption of the different policy discourses, describing the role of international organizations.
Creativity
The selection of the addressees in the ﬁrst group of policy discourses sides with the idea that only a
subset of the population can be ‘creative’ in the creative or cultural sectors. Indeed, the DCMS deﬁni-
tion assumes creativity is an individual quality, associated with talent that ‘artists’ or ‘creative people’
have. This is similar to Florida’s deﬁnition of the creative class, where talent is correlated with profes-
sional graduate training. This hypothesis that creativity is only a quality limited to a small group of
‘geniuses’ leads to the mythical view of the ‘artist’ or the ‘creative’ as a role in society superior to others.
One of the problems of this ‘god’ like perspective is that artists might become excessively inﬂuential in
politics, advocating for the defense of their interests, speciﬁcally authors’ rights, irrespective of social
issues in terms of cultural access, such as this quote by a member of the Foundation Vía Libre5 in
Argentina suggests:
“Personalism is usual in politics, and many entertainment ﬁgures and entertainment in-
dustry representatives sitting in the front row of all presidential speeches are not free. I do not
say they are paid for it, although there are reports in some cases. But that pressure implies
a tacit, mutual support alliance between the national government and much of the artistic
community, which is not free” (member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
In contrast, the second group of policy discourses challenge this perspective with the inclusion of mi-
nority and excluded groups who would not be classiﬁed as ‘creative’ by the ﬁrst. This is best illustrated
with the case of Cultura Viva in Brazil that directly challenged the privilege of artists or creatives, as
the following quote by Juca Ferreira - the Minister who succeeded Gilberto Gil - illustrates:
“It is a change that clearly contrasts the vision of previous administrations, for which
the privileged clientele of the Ministry of Culture were artists. That stance was equivalent
to deﬁne doctors as privileged clientele of the Ministry of Health, or teachers as privileged
clientele of the Ministry of Education” (Gil and Ferreira 2013, p. 460).
Instead, Cultura Viva had as an objective to democratize not only cultural access, but also cultural pro-
duction to include those sectors of the population that have been systematically neglected in previous
cultural policies. This was a way to balance the tension between those who had the access to specialized
training in a speciﬁc creative discipline with those who did not, which in both countries is correlated to
income levels. In other words, the policy discourse tries to balance the economic inequalities that favor
those born in rich enough contexts to acquire the needed education and training to work in a creative
sector. Thus, this approach questioned the apolitical approach taken by the conceptualization of cre-
ativity just associated to talent. Although it might be true that under equal training, some people are
better than others, the point here is that the opportunities to access training are not equal at all, and
thus policies are needed to encourage disadvantaged sectors of the population. This might be related to
the obvious different contexts of Argentina and Brazil, with respect to the UK and other industrialized
5. An NGO that encourages debates, diffuses information, contributes to new laws, among other activities, all related to the
social impacts of ICT in the country. In particular, it has close relations with the free software movement.
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countries where the creative industries policies were ﬁrst accepted. Although in all these countries
there are asymmetries in access to education, in the latter the barriers are much higher, and thus a
policy that ignores these issues is scandalously out of context.
Irrespective of the previous point, the premise that ‘creativity’ is just a feature of ‘gifted’ individuals
contradicts research on creativity. Indeed, the literature shows that creativity is not a quality restricted
to few geniuses working in isolated environments; conversely, it is a set of steps or mental processes
that everyone - irrespective of one’s educational level - can learn (Carson 2012). This point is relevant
for industrializing countries, where formal education in many cases is restricted to an elite, while the
majority of the population are excluded from such training. Therefore, this structural exclusion does
not mean that those not considered in formal educational processes cannot be ‘creative’. They still
can, but as a second result from creativity research shows, they need an appropriate environment and
collective inﬂuences on their mental processes (Runco 2007).
The immediate consequence of the previous points is that it casts doubt on the classiﬁcation of the
creative or cultural sectors introduced by the DCMS and UNCTAD. The former delimited a disparate
group of sectors, which the latter generalized by deﬁning a creative sector as one that uses ‘creativity’ as
primary input. However, this last deﬁnition neither made explicit what ‘creativity’ is nor did it specify
the conditions required for such feature to be a primary input of a sector. In both cases, creativity is a
word used in a vague way to refer to a sort of quality that certain people or sectors may have, but not
others. But if one accepts the conclusions from previous research that everyone can be creative, ergo
every economic activity can be creative, too: from hairdressers, cashiers, accountants to football players.
Thus, this shows that the criteria of UNCTAD to describe creative industries as those sectors that use
creativity as a primary input is arbitrary, and deﬁnitely not a serious academic concept. Instead, just
an empty signiﬁer to be ﬁlled with a list of sectors to be adapted according to the political needs of the
policy makers employing it.
Entrepreneurship
The subject position that the policy discourses try to create offers additional differences. Those in the
ﬁrst group all try to stimulate creative or cultural entrepreneurs, understood as those who create new
for-proﬁt businesses in one of the selected ‘creative sectors’. This is in synchrony with their aims of
promoting economic growth and such a strategy can be understood from the connection of the creative
industries with the broader knowledge society or innovation discourses. Indeed, the importance of
the role of the entrepreneur emerges from Schumpeter’s theory of innovation; he remarked the role
of entrepreneurs in the capitalist process (Schumpeter 1939). This concept has been further extended
to include entrepreneurship in all economic activities, and in particular in recent years in SMEs. Al-
though this might be true in terms of its contribution to economic growth, its uncritical extension to
cultural policies is problematic, because it undermines all activities that do not aim to ‘innovate’ to
produce proﬁts. For instance, the cultural expressions of traditional communities. In this way, those
discourses that consider culture as an economic resource undermine Afro-descendant communities, in-
digenous communities and other minorities that might be interested in collective organizations for the
diffusion and preservation of their cultural practices, without aiming toward for-proﬁt and innovation
aims. At the same time, the focus on for-proﬁt entrepreneurship neglects other types of entrepreneur-
ship that might be more equally useful to alleviate social issues in countries like Brazil or Argentina.
Speciﬁcally, I will refer to projects that address social issues through culture and media, which in
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the English speaking literature tend to be called social entrepreneurship. For instance, the radio La
Colifata (Loony) in Argentina, which broadcasts from inside a mental hospital and diffuses the testi-
monies of internees; this is not only therapeutic for them, but also a useful way to reduce the negative
stereotypes that outsiders have of them and the place (Caselli 2014).
Sustainability
The different policy discourses side with dissimilar ideas of what is to be considered ‘sustainable’. The
ones that strive for a commercialization of culture, associate sustainability with ﬁnancial proﬁts as a
typical ﬁrm in any other economic activity. From this perspective, the sale of products and services is
the source of sustaining the activities of the creative ﬁrm or entrepreneur. However, this understanding
of sustainability is in conﬂict with the one of cultural organizations that are state-funded or not for-
proﬁts. For instance, the coordinator of the Cultura Viva program in Brazil expressed the following
perspective:
“What is sustainability? What sustains. From this point of view, which is what sustains a
traditional culture or popular culture? The very soul of that culture, and the process of trans-
mission of this culture itself; in a demonstration at a party, in a representation of indigenous
peoples, or in street culture and hip hop, this soul and its need for expression” (C. Turino,
05/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil)
Although the interviewee used mystical language to make his point, he remarks that cultural activ-
ities are not just sustained in time by a cost-beneﬁts analysis and the amount of proﬁts made, but
rather through diverse strategies, like activism, experiments with different exchange systems, state
support, volunteering, etc. I shall describe these in more detail in the next chapters, which show there
is more diversity of resources to sustain cultural activities than just focusing on the sale of cultural
products and services. Nevertheless, these organizations are ignored or neglected by those advocating
a for-proﬁts based perspective on sustainability, who argue these other experiences are ‘unsustainable’
(ﬁnancially) or despise many of them for depending on the state. It is important to remark that this
conﬂict of visions on sustainability is related to the national discussions of neoliberal policies, which,
as I explained in the introduction, attacked the role of the state, discriminating against any sort of
organization receiving its support.
Intellectual Property Rights
Given the ‘immaterial’ or symbolic nature of cultural products and services, a central challenge for those
who want to make proﬁts out of them, is how to protect these intellectual creations. The perspective
launched by the DCMS and followed by UNCTAD is that intellectual property rights are the best
mechanism to protect knowledge in cultural and creative sectors. As regards the UK, the position is
understandable given thee country’s strategy to increase exports of cultural goods and services. The
same can be argued about UNCTAD, whose creative economy reports were elaborated together with
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), known for its aim to “lead the development of a
balanced and effective international intellectual property system that enables innovation and creativity
for the beneﬁt of all” (WIPO 2015). But it is also true, that in contrast to with the DCMS, UNCTAD
recognized the existence of alternative types of content protection and distribution in its reports, such
as free software and copyleft licenses (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010). In both cases, the argument is that
the access to cultural expressions, goods and services has to be charged somehow, so that the author
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gets a retribution for his or her work, which is a reasonable position to defend the sources of income of
artists; however, it overlooks that in many cases the ones that proﬁt more from strong protection are
the commercial ﬁrms reproducing the cultural products and services.
As Table 4.1 shows, the policy discourses from Argentina and Brazil show varying positions with re-
spect to this issue. Some have been inﬂuenced by the perspectives advanced by the international policy
discourse of the creative industries disseminated by the UK, while others have been more ambiva-
lent in this aspect, because of a set of challenges that strict protections of intellectual property rights
are facing at the global and national level. There are four issues relevant to review for the posterior
analysis of the media cases.
First, the notion of the ‘creator’ or ‘author’ of a creative work assumes an individual is solely re-
sponsible for the elaboration of a given cultural product or service. However, there is a perspective that
casts doubt on this view, arguing it is an artiﬁcial enclosing of knowledge that hides that any cultural
product or service is never the unique result of one person, but rather one that builds on the collective
work of previous knowledge and experiences, and on all of those that contributed to the training of the
one who organized the ﬁnal product or service (Alperovitz and Daly 2008). An inheritance acknowl-
edged in the famous phrase of Isaac Newton: “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders
of giants”. Therefore, from this perspective it is seen as theft to assign an exclusive right to a person or
group in order to exploit a given cultural product or service, because it does not acknowledge the input
from others.
Second, a strong defense of intellectual property rights ignores the hurricanes that the internet and
digital culture are producing. Indeed, the internet allows content to ﬂow through the net at almost
no cost, which eliminates in many of the creative or cultural industries the need to depend on analog
platforms and intermediaries, thanks to the free reproduction of digitized content. Therefore, the high
speed ﬂow of electronic books, videos, music, news, etc. is challenging the structure of many business
models of the creative industries that used intellectual property rights to limit access when analogical
platforms reigned. This process affected and reformed the music sector at the beginning of the 21st
century, and now it seems to be changing others such as the audiovisual and media sectors.
Third, a strict respect for copyrights creates a tension with the objective of access in cultural policies.
This is quite problematic in countries with scarce economic resources, because a strict enforcement
might directly contribute to leave most of the population out of the access to culture and information
due to their elevated prices in comparison to average incomes. Indeed, according to the World Anti-
Piracy Observatory from UNESCO, the existing economic asymmetries in the world are an incentive
for the disrespect of copyrights and the growth of piracy activities (UNESCO 2007). At the same time,
through authors’ rights creators obtain the privilege to exploit and proﬁt from their work for their
whole life, and in the case of Argentina and Brazil, this right is extended 70 years after their death.
For some critics, this condition that creators or their relatives have to exploit for such a long period
of time is like a right to rent, reinforcing income inequalities, as the next quote by a representative of
the Vía Libre foundation illustrates: “In fact there are many discussions about the copyright law as the
labor of the artist, but this mixture of labor law and intellectual property law is not possible. The ﬁrst
is a labor law (working conditions, social security, etc.), whereas the second one is a rent seeking right”
(member of the Vía Libre Foundation, 05/06/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
Fourth, although the advocates of the current system of IPR argue it is in favor of the ‘creators’,
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critics point out that these arguments ignore the role of copyright collecting societies, which are not
exempt from criticism and mistrust, as the following quote from an academic in Argentina reﬂects:
“The whole issue of intellectual property rights is in crisis. With the internet, how do
you protect content? Besides, artists prefer to be known on the internet, then they organize a
concert to raise money, and it works because they are already known. Copyright collecting
societies actually detain the best part, they are not mainly collecting money for artists, but for
ﬁrms” (Argentinean University professor II, 15/05/2013, interview with & translated by the
author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
These issues evidence that a strict defense of IPRs collides with policies oriented to balance social
differences. Thus, the recommendations by UNCTAD and the DCMS on this aspect, although copied
by Argentina and Brazil, because both have systems that defend such intellectual protection, have not
always been strictly enforced. When they were, they matched the interests of groups desiring to keep a
privilege, such as large ﬁrms in Brazil like the Globo network or an elite group of artists in Argentina
trying to extend authors’ rights.
In the mean time, new experiences have diffused like the use of Creative Commons and copyleft
licenses that the points of culture and several solidarity and collaborative economy experiences are
using. Still, their reception has not been without criticism. On the one hand, those who defend a
copyrights approach think that to liberate content is a synonym of admitting that it has bad quality
and is not marketable. On the other hand, critics from social movements consider that the approach
does not depart much from copyrights, because it still encourages a parceling of knowledge, admitting
authorship without taking into account the debt the creator owes to all those who inﬂuenced him.
Instead, these last critics advocate for a perspective where culture and information are seen as public
goods, and thus ought to ﬂow freely without economic barriers limiting their access and distribution
(Belisário and Tarin 2012). However, those who oppose such a ‘free culture’ approach classify it as utter
nonsense, because it does not seem to offer solutions for the ﬁnancial sustainability of artists (Helprin
2010). How are creators going to be paid for their work? How are their works going to be ﬁnanced if
their products are immediately accessible on the internet for free?
These and other questions are part of ongoing and unresolved global debates about the digitization
of creative and cultural industries, where there is a clash between positions that cling to methods
of property protection created before the internet, and those that want to update, and in the most
extreme cases radically change the existing systems of knowledge protection. The music sector has
been an example for the collision of perspectives, because the introduction of the MP3 format and the
ease of music distribution through the internet altered old business models based on CDs. Indeed,
their sales decreased, but at the same time new business models emerged, where artists increased
their popularity thanks to the internet and their proﬁts through more live concerts. I shall show in the
next chapters, particularly in the Brazilian case, which is entirely based on ICT, how these discussions
have been transferred to journalism as a profession, challenging the accepted business models.
Politics and International Organizations
The ﬁnal point that I want to highlight is that the different policy discourses all refer to culture, but
the way they deﬁne and employ such resource differs considerably. How to explain these differences?
A possible answer was suggested by an academic and ex coordinator of Petrobrás, the Brazilian energy
corporation that is the biggest cultural sponsor in the country:
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“In Brazil, we need a public policy that takes into account small and medium sized en-
trepreneurs, not only large and already established industries. However, there are people
who think that the creative economy is composed only by large established industries, but
this is not due to ignorance. It is a choice. It is politics” (Brazilian University professor I,
25/11/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
I agree with the statement, which suggests that the creative economy deﬁnition in Brazil is a product
of different political projects, and I extend the same conclusion to the rest of the policy discourses con-
sidered in the previous section. I argue that these political projects can be divided according to how
much importance they give to the issues of social inclusion existing in Argentina and Brazil. A low
priority would focus on the policy discourses of the creative industries, creative economy and cultural
industries, which put the emphasis on industries and entrepreneurs as the key recipients of their poli-
cies. As I showed, this assumes that culture is just another economic sector, producing speciﬁc cultural
goods and services for national, and at best, international markets, with the main aim to contribute
to economic growth through exports and employment. Although it might be true that these measures
indirectly help to solve inclusion problems through the generation of employment, these policies are
problematic, because they just ignore the need to include actors that for different asymmetries in the
access to resources, have little chances of becoming cultural or creative entrepreneurs. Therefore, they
contribute to the imbalances in access to cultural production, favoring the ‘creative class’, as Florida
would say, but leaving aside all other types of actors, such as indigenous communities, Afro-descendant
communities, resource-scarce peripheral communities, among others. Additionally, they just discrim-
inate against those actors performing cultural activities, who do not have any intention of becoming
an entrepreneur, although they do want to continue elaborating cultural products, services and expres-
sions.
In contrast, a political decision to give a high priority to social inclusion issues necessarily has to
address the actors that have the worst conditions to advance their projects in cultural sectors, and such
condition is only fulﬁlled by the last two policy discourses. These speciﬁcally focus on the actors that
the former overlook under the tags of ‘entrepreneurs’ and contribute with diverse types of support to
their projects. Moreover, these two policy discourses do not consider culture just as another economic
resource, although both recognize its economic contribution, the main priority is discursively situated
elsewhere. For instance, Cultura Viva highlights the role of culture to produce national symbols and to
create a sense of citizenship, whereas the new communication law in Argentina considers information
as part of the struggle for human rights, and tries to legally democratize the access to media of minority
groups. These are central discursive changes that depart from the commercial perspective, which
considers cultural goods and services - and information in the case of the media sector - just to be
another commodity to exchange for the sake of proﬁts.
It is worth returning to the international discussions I described in the introduction, because they
closely parallel the opposition of the two groups of policy discourses and their speciﬁc political orienta-
tions. On the one hand, UNCTAD and the UK advocate strategies that side with the perspective that
culture is just another commodity, which is a position they have been actively expanding through a
diverse set of practices that include: the organization of workshops and conferences, the distribution
of reports, the funding of conferences and workshops, the backing consultants from the ‘Global North’
to diffuse the topic abroad; among others. In the end, for local observers who mistrust such positions,
like the coordinator of the Cultura Viva program, the perception of these organizations is that “[...]
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they have complete standardization, uniformity, trying to impose their models” (C. Turino, 05/07/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil). On the other hand, UNESCO ad-
vocates the importance of culture as a right and defends the idea of ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural
exception’ in terms of trade in cultural products and services, although in far less radical ways than
what the MacBride Report in the 1980s aspired to. This position has been disseminated by interna-
tional conventions, and advocated in each country by groups opposing the commercialization of culture,
which delineates the key division among two different ways to think about the link between culture
and ‘development’.
I comprehend the main differences of these discourses also in terms of how international actors
beneﬁt from each position. The extreme stance of the commercialization of cultural goods and services,
strictly protected by IPR, clearly favors those industrialized countries that have ‘attraction’ in terms
of cultural products or services or who control considerable elements of global value chains in differ-
ent cultural sectors, like the USA or the UK. Conversely, the position defended by UNESCO tries to
address the economic imbalances by considering the speciﬁcities of cultural goods and services, pro-
tecting the public dimension of culture and the diversity of expressions in the world from the economic
logic that favors most industrialized countries for the expansion of their cultural products and services.
But if this division is correct, why were the creative/cultural industries policy discourses adopted in
Argentina and Brazil? One part of the answer is that the globalized capitalist economic system shares
similarities in terms of the exchange of products and services, and the cultural sector is not an excep-
tion. Therefore, a strategy that stimulates entrepreneurial and industrial activities in cultural sectors
is a useful resource for politicians to attract votes, by favoring local cultural and creative industries
and through the promise to increase jobs and wealth through economic growth. However, it is also
important to point out that the adoption of the policy discourses of the creative and cultural industries
has been more successful in those large cities that already concentrated a developed group of indus-
tries, such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Buenos Aires. Therefore, the foreign discourse of creative
industries was just functional for the prevailing existing economic structures and interests, neglecting
local inclusion issues. But I argue that the second part of the answer to the question is deﬁnitely po-
litical, because although the reinforcement of the industrial policies in urban cities might beneﬁt some
sectors of the population of both countries, for those that have been previously excluded from these
commercial practices, these are concepts out of context, a recurrent criticism of many ideas imported
to South American countries that ignore the local issues (Schwarz 1973; Thomas and Dagnino 2005).
Still, this pattern of acritically copying foreign models is as common as soccer in Latin America. Who
is to blame? On the one hand, international organizations that disseminate these discourses, such as
UNCTAD, or transnationalized national organizations like the British Council, share part of the re-
sponsibility. They claim to offer global solutions, when in fact they are pursuing their own missions,
trying to expand their inﬂuence and interests abroad through the strategy of soft power, understood
as the skills to inﬂuence others to perform actions through attraction rather than coercion, portraying
themselves as a positive good friend, whose virtuous advice and practices ought be followed (Nye 1990).
But in practice, the strategies that they advocate in many cases are ignorant and insensible to local
conditions and social issues. On the other hand, a large part of the responsibility of the inadequate
adoption of such foreign models rests with politicians in the countries of adoption, who use these alien
models for their own political objectives and aims, irrespective of the consequences they might have for
the local population and their context, which they do know very well indeed.
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For these reasons, I argue that these policy discourses are charged with particular political prior-
ities, which cannot be put aside, as international organizations sometimes want recipients to believe
when they advocate ‘feasible development options’. Those policy discourses aiming toward industries
and entrepreneurs from the ‘creative class’, share an elitist orientation, contrary to others who prior-
itize access and social justice for marginalized groups to cultural access, production and distribution.
Similarly, in the media sector there is an opposition between a perspective defending a commercializa-
tion of information and another that considers it a human right, which has been best illustrated with
the conﬂict between the USA and the UK against UNESCO. Despite the fact that the latter position
lost support at the international level during the last decades, the two last policy discourses show this
position is quite present in Argentina and Brazil, which I shall further illustrate with four case studies
in the next chapter. Accordingly, the selection of which dimension to prioritize is in the end a political
question, and it is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when analyzing the contemporary political
situation in Argentina and Brazil, which as I mentioned in chapter 1, claims to be in a ‘post-neoliberal’
period. Nonetheless, the existence of creative economy policy discourses suggests that policies favoring
the commercialization of culture are still present and needed, but it is also true that they are in tension
with other new policy perspectives, which are more in synchrony with the ‘progressive’ governments in
power.
4.3 Concluding Discussion
In this chapter, I delineated the main policy discourses in the area of culture and media in Argentina
and Brazil. On the one hand, I deﬁned a group of ‘creative economy policy discourses’ that consider
culture mostly as an economic resource that large industrial ﬁrms or creative entrepreneurs ought to
exploit, who, based on their speciﬁc knowledge of one of the creative sectors, will generate wealth and
employment through exports and different property rights mechanisms. These have been inﬂuenced to
varying degrees by the global policy discourse on creative industries, particularly due to the activities
of international organizations, such as UNCTAD and the British Council. Nonetheless, I also stressed
that the adoption of these commercially oriented policy discourses was possible, in part due to already
present structures stimulating a similar public policy approach. This of course is connected to the
capitalist economic system in both countries, and thus, I am not arguing that these policy discourses
initiated a commercialization of culture, but I do argue they reinforce it, putting aside alternatives.
Indeed, the discourse analysis of the empirical data makes an important contribution, because it does
not only coincide with the critics of the creative industries in the UK (Booyens 2012; Galloway and
Dunlop 2007; Garnham 2005; Schlesinger 2007), but rather expands and improves the criticism in the
context of countries where social inequalities are higher, stressing the more severe gap between the
claims of these policy discourses and their implementation in quite different contexts. For example, I
showed how the four creative economy policy discourses neither in their aims nor as addressees take
resource-scarce sectors of the population or minority groups into account. This neglects the inequality
of access to resources (educational, ﬁnancial, relational, etc.) these groups have, which blocks them
from becoming creative or cultural entrepreneurs. Consequently, I interpret that these four policy
discourses implicitly support ‘elite’ sectors of the population that have enough of these resources. It
might be true that they contribute to ‘development’ in the sense of economic growth through the export
of their cultural products and services, but undoubtedly they do in terms of social inclusion and with
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respect to cultural diversity. Additionally, these policy discourses, except for the cultural industries in
Argentina, just say nothing about the imbalances in the media sector in both countries, where a purely
commercial approach to communications still favors a reduced number of media conglomerates, which
according to civil society considerably damage the democratic ideal in both countries. Accordingly,
these policy discourses might be enough for promoting economic growth, but they blatantly ignore
other central concerns of broader deﬁnitions of ‘development’ that consider access, democratization,
freedom of speech, participation, among others.
As a counterbalance, the second group of policy discourses illustrates a perspective that uses culture
to address different types of social inequality issues in both countries. Both in the case of Argentina
and Brazil, the considered policy discourses have different aims, actors and addressees than those in
the ﬁrst group. As I argued, this deﬁnes different ways of conceptualizing the role of cultural and
media policies, leading to different practices that depart from the perspective of the former, where
just for proﬁt ﬁrms matter. Conversely, Cultura Viva in Brazil and the part of the new audiovisual
communication services law in Argentina that supports NGOs have from the start addressed actors
that face the toughest conditions to (re)produce their cultural practices. Equally important, in both
cases there is a concern about media ownership concentration and thus, both policy discourses aim
to create alternative ways for NGOs and diverse types of communities to produce and disseminate
content of their perspectives. These and other differences delineate the opposition between the two
groups of policy discourses, which reject the claim of those who defend that the creative economy policy
discourses can be a fertile approach to embrace ‘just everyone’.
The political economy aspect of these tensions cannot be overlooked. The expansion of the creative
industries and the creative economy defending a commercial approach to culture and media coincide
with the positions of the UK and the USA against UNESCO and its MacBride Report, making evi-
dent the Western bias of such an approach. Indeed, Mansell & Nordenstreng (2006) highlighted that
from then onwards such commercial perspectives prevailed at the international level. Nonetheless,
the existence of counter-discourses at the national level in Argentina and Brazil prove that at such
level the discussion is not closed, and the debates in these two Latin American countries cannot be
understood without considering the political change in their governments toward left-wing oriented
administrations, which discursively put an emphasis on tackling inequality issues and challenging for-
eign ‘development’ models. Although their policies have not been without contradictions, because they
also promote creative and cultural industries, it is true that the existence of cultural and media policies
that depart from a purely commercial perspective would have been unthinkable during the 1990s. This
new political context is central to understand the mismatch between what international organizations
advocate, and what local NGOs, social movements and diverse types of communities have been striving
for in the area of culture and media.
The data also shows that the political dimension is central to understand why, even though the two
countries are in a so called ‘post-neoliberal’ period, in some cases the creative economy policy discourses
have been adapted with little adaptation, neglecting the counter policy discourses. My hypothesis is
that the adoption of a discourse depends on the changing political forces operating in a given territory
(not only national ﬁgures, but also city mayors and even ministers) and on the associated aims of their
development projects. Given that economic growth is the holy grail of mainstream economic policies,
the adoption of an approach where culture is an economic resource is reasonable and understandable.
Nevertheless, the use of vague economic terminology by fanatics of the creative economy policy dis-
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courses hides the fact that their ‘development’ projects mute and discriminate all groups that imagine
different pathways for society to unfold, conﬂicts that are particularly visible in the media sector. For
these reasons, I totally disagree with UNCTAD’s perspective on the creative economy as a ‘feasible de-
velopment option’ (UNCTAD and UNDP 2010) and even less with the more restrictive proposal of the
DCMS (1998) disseminated by the British Council, which I consider a strategy of soft power. Instead,
I argue that countries such as Argentina and Brazil need to reinforce and expand policy discourses, as
those in the second group, in addition to caring about the commercial aspects of culture. However, it
is true that the existing practices and structures favor a commercial approach to culture and commu-
nications. For this reason, the rest of the thesis focuses on analyzing cases that have been inspired by
the counter policy discourses in order to understand up to what extent they have been able to challenge
the homogenization of practices. Speciﬁcally, I will focus on experiences in the media sector, because it
is the cultural sector where the tensions between a commercially oriented approach and broader ‘de-
velopment’ objectives are becoming more evident. To accomplish this objective, the next chapter will
analyze the discourses (‘imaginaries’) of four media for social transformation that have been stimulated
and sustained, to varying degrees, by the counter policy discourses introduced in this chapter.
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Chapter 5
Imaginaries
The previous chapter showed a division among policy discourses in Argentina and Brazil. I identiﬁed
four variants that resemble the ﬁrst version of the creative industries approach introduced by the
DCMS, which are widespread at the national level and to a lesser extent in some large urban cities.
These policy discourses share the view that culture and media should operate on a for-proﬁts basis to
contribute to economic wealth, stimulating business practices of cultural and creative entrepreneurs in
one of the creative sectors with the aim to commercialize their products or services. Although it can be
argued that the material produced also carries an ideological dimension, the prevailing form of these
policy discourses is the economic one. Therefore, the organization of the production and distribution
process does not differ much from any other industry. This perspective to understand culture as an
industrial activity and as an economic resource is an experience to which the average reader is used
to; for example, while buying books, CDs/DVDs or the daily printed newspaper, etc. In all these cases,
the acquisition of the products and services follows the usual exchange process present during the
acquisition of other commodities, and thus I shall not analyze further these cases. At the same time,
in chapter 4 I described counter policy discourses that depart from this view: the new audiovisual
communication services law in Argentina and the Cultura Viva program in Brazil, which are not so
extended nationally and which oppose and challenge, to varying degrees, the structuring pattern of
the creative economy policy discourses. These discourses have inspired practices that aim to depart
from a commercial approach to culture in general, and media in particular, which in comparison with
the former are neglected by the international development agenda. For this reason, in this chapter I
will analyze four case studies of media for social transformation that have been stimulated by these
counter policy discourses, primarily to show the weaknesses of the creative economy policy discourses,
by making evident the existence of cases that oppose their supposed universal approach to culture and
media. Additionally, I introduce features of the four case studies of media for social transformation,
which are the focus of the rest of this thesis.
In this chapter I shall argue that a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for these media for
social transformation to challenge a commercial approach to communications is to have an ‘imaginary’
defending such a position. I remind the reader that according to what I deﬁned in chapter 2, the
term imaginary refers to the discourses of these speciﬁc projects or networks. Therefore, I devote the
rest of the chapter to thoroughly analyze the empirical data that illustrates media cases inspired by the
counter policy discourses that contrast, to varying degrees, with for-proﬁt private media, and therefore,
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the creative economy policy discourses. Speciﬁcally, I shall consider three cases in Argentina that shed
light on the introduction of the new audiovisual communication services law described in chapter 3.
These include diverse types of TV channels, such as a co-operative; a channel emitting from a factory
recovered by workers and a channel of an indigenous group, the Mapuches. In Brazil, I examined a
project that emerged in 2013 through online social networks, Mídia NINJA, which quickly attracted
national and international attention. In contrast to the other three, it offers a different approach in
terms of context, technology and practices. In the next section I will synthesize the main dimensions of
the imaginaries of these cases, followed by a detailed description and analysis of the speciﬁc social and
historical contexts that paved the way for their imaginaries and their particular features, ending with
a discussion of the main argument of the chapter.
5.1 Synthetic Comparison Among Cases
I employed guidelines from SKAD to compare the imaginaries of the four media for social transforma-
tion, in order to detect and contrast speciﬁc dimensions among their imaginaries and with the main-
stream group of four policy discourses of chapter 4. To achieve this aim, I built a corpus database
including of all the information gathered during ﬁeldwork and from secondary sources, which was di-
vided according to the level of analysis (policies vs cases), and coded employing Atlas.TI. This allowed
obtaining a list of codes of relevant themes in each case, to sketch the phenomenal structure, interpreta-
tion schemes and narratives of the imaginaries, in other words, the variety of elements that a discourse
designates and combines to deﬁne a particular problem, its ways to interpret how media ought to be or-
ganized, and storylines joining these elements (Keller 2013). Where appropriate, these were contrasted
with each other and with the main dimensions of the policy discourses, and such differences, together
with contextual information, led to the interpretations that I will detail in the chapter.
In Table 5.1, I offer a synthesis of the main dimensions that I shall consider in the following sec-
tions of this chapter. The ﬁrst four dimensions give important insights with respect to the historical
and social context where these imaginaries emanate from. I shall show how the speciﬁc narratives
that emanate from particular geographic places under consideration put emphasis on a variety of ac-
tors and corresponding aims, which lead to speciﬁc interpretation schemes on how media ought to be
organized, not necessarily coinciding with those advanced by the creative economy policy discourses.
This incompatibility reveals how the claim of universality of the commercial approach to culture and
communication inevitably faces the resistance of actors that have historically opposed, similar commer-
cial approaches before for diverse reasons. Furthermore, I shall describe the inspiration these cases
drew from the counter policy discourses of chapter 4 and the links with broader discourses, such as
co-operativism or indigenous movements. The next three rows of the table synthesize dimensions sug-
gested by SKAD to study the aims, actors and addressees of the discourses, explaining the opposition
to the commercial policy discourses, and also the diversity among the four cases of media for social
transformation. In effect, along the chapter, I show that these variations are related to the previous
historical and social context.
A main point to highlight from the table is that I shall understand the media projects of each case
study as a dispositive to (re)produce the practices of the imaginaries. For instance, the Mapuches un-
derstand their project as a way to preserve and expand their ancestral worldview, whereas the Brazilian
case comprehends the role of their channel in a similar way to expand the ‘collaborative economy’ that
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they defend. Accordingly, each case claims to apply different practices from those of mainstream media,
where the term ‘collaboration’ tends to be common among cases, though in practice, their connotations
differ.
With respect to the rest of the dimensions of the table, they refer to speciﬁc features of the imag-
inaries related to media. For example, I shall introduce brieﬂy the perspectives that each case has
on quality patterns and technology, which are aspects that I will analyze in detail in chapter 7 and 6
respectively. Additionally, I will contrast the perspectives adopted by each imaginary in terms of intel-
lectual property rights, which, except for one case, offers a marked contrast with the ones of the creative
economy policy discourses. Apart from this, I will explain the opposition that the four cases have to
what they frame as mass media practices (private and state), by delineating their different position on
communications and detailing what sort of news content they try to provide to their viewers.
5.2 CPEtv, Argentina
The city of La Pampa only has 100.000 inhabitants and is 600 km away from Buenos Aires, the mega-
lopolis where most culture and communication is concentrated in Argentina. In 2012, CPEtv, the ﬁrst
co-operative TV channel after the new audiovisual communication services law, was founded in this
city. How was this possible? Given all the stereotypes and structural conditions mentioned in chapter
3, answering this question would not be easy for an average Argentinean who would not expect such
experience to emerge from a small city from the ‘interior’ of the country. I shall argue that the foun-
dational historical events that led to the emergence of the co-operative is essential to understand how
they were able to establish their TV channel, questioning the limits that existed for NGO media at
the time. My point is that their successful experience in setting up the co-operative and resisting what
they classify as foreign private ﬁrms, set the example for similar future challenges, despite the negative
horizons that they would face. I will show this, ﬁrst, by describing the foundation of the co-operative
that hosts the TV channel, CPE, and the inﬂuence this event had along its history and future initia-
tives. Second, I will depict the struggle of CPE to overpass the legal limits that inhibited co-operatives
from having their own media channels in Argentina, which gives further contextual factors to ﬁnally
delineate the main features of the imaginary of CPEtv.
5.2.1 CPE’s Foundation
To comprehend CPEtv and the features of its imaginary, it is necessary to understand the foundation of
its mother institution, the Cooperativa Popular de Electricidad de Santa Rosa (CPE - Popular Electric
Co-operative of Santa Rosa)1. In 1930, the city of Santa Rosa was part of what the government used to
call ‘National Territory’, because the province of La Pampa did not yet exist as such. The territory was
scarcely populated, with around 12.000 inhabitants and electricity services were provided by a ﬁrm of
USA capitals called Compañía Sud Americana de Servicios Públicos S.A. (SUDAM - South American
Company of Public Services) (CPEtv 2013c). In the context of an international economic crisis, the
SUDAM increased their rates, attaining levels considered oppressive by locals and contrary to the
1. For the following summary of historical events I used the archive of the local newspaper, La Arena, and a book about the
history of CPE (Lluch and Sánchez 2002). The only disadvantage is the bias toward the position of the co-operative’s vision,
given that one founder of the co-operative was part of the management of the newspaper. Nevertheless, it is a good source to
reveal how members of the co-operative understand and reconstructed the foundational events of the organization later in time.
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public interest (La Arena 1933b; Lluch and Sánchez 2002, p. 35). A group of citizens considered this
an intolerable situation and as a reply organized a co-operative to compete against the private ﬁrm in
the next tender. Given the social discontent against SUDAM, in 1933 the citizens won the concession
for the service, which compromised them to start supplying energy from October 1st, 1935 onwards (La
Arena 1933a).
Despite the initial success, the remaining road of the co-operativists until they could actually start
offering the service was not easy. One of the ﬁrst hurdles to address was that the local inhabitants
knew little about co-operativism, so they had to actively disseminate co-operative principles and prac-
tices by organizing talks to explain the advantages of such a model (La Arena 1935f). This need of
disseminating their ideas and practices would later reemerge in contemporary discussions as an argu-
ment in favor of having their TV channel. Apart from this, the co-operativists had to deal with growing
suspicion of an arrangement between the local government and SUDAM to conspire against them, so
that if they failed to provide energy, the contract would once again return to the foreign ﬁrm (La Arena
1935b). In effect, the local newspapers published public letters of the actors and articles about the
situation; for example, the co-operative denounced to the state extortions of SUDAM (La Arena 1935g),
journalists expressed suspicion that SUDAM would remove the cables to distribute energy (La Arena
1935j) and there were fears of possible boycotts of the co-operative service (La Arena 1935c), among
others. Nonetheless, the most problematic issue raised by SUDAM in local newspapers was a warning
to the city’s inhabitants of the ‘perceived error’ they were about to make, given that the technology the
co-operative had was completely improvised and incapable of meeting the city’s energy needs (La Arena
1935j). From their point of view, the whole project would fail and produce negative consequences for
the population, who would have been the sole and only responsible for such chaos (La Arena 1935j).
How did the co-operative address such challenges? First, they started to raise awareness through
public assemblies and newspaper articles on how co-operatives could help to surpass the exploitation
they were suffering from a foreign ﬁrm by turning electricity into a common good (La Arena 1935e).
This conﬂict between private and social interests was also present in several cities of the country (La
Arena 1935c), and the co-operative discourse at the time advanced a nationalist position, which claimed
that key services should be in the hands of locals and not in the ones of foreign private ﬁrms (Lluch
and Sánchez 2002). Second, to address the technological issue the co-operative expected new motors
from a provider, but when they found out that these would not arrive on time for October 1st , 1935,
they had to ﬁnd a creative way to deal with this hurdle. The co-operativists decided to use the dynamos
of old threshers (La Arena 1935i), which were obtained in September of that year and adapted to
supply energy by a local technician surnamed Savioli (La Arena 1935h). The newspaper La Arena gave
a lot of importance to the arrival of this improvised technology, which occupied its frontpage stating
“Tonight three dynamos and a motor will arrive” (La Arena 1935d, translated by the author), which
shows the support of the co-operative initiative and the importance given to technology in their project
of independence from SUDAM.
The last day before the transfer of the service to CPE was not exempt of tensions, despite the co-
operative had addressed the main barriers to offer the service. According to the local newspaper, the
municipality deployed armed forces to protect its own and SUDAM’s buildings, which made them sus-
pect that there would be a last minute hidden arrangement in favor of the private ﬁrm (La Arena
1935d). These fears were not fulﬁlled, but tensions were high. Finally, when the light was cut by SU-
DAM, only minutes later it returned with the new energy offered by the co-operative (La Arena 1935a).
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Up until today, members remember this foundational event that took place on October 1st, 1935 with
the phrase ‘Firewood Savioli!’ (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in
Santa Rosa, Argentina), in allusion to the creativity of the technician who set up the improvised tem-
porary motors. Most importantly, these foundational events became part of the narrative of members
of CPE, remembering this was a success of the citizens to self-organize against what they considered
foreign forces from Buenos Aires and the USA, defending their public interest over the private inter-
ests of few. Under the light of Berger & Luckmann’s (1966) work, the process of the foundation of the
organization can be understood as institutionalizing a set of typiﬁcations that would later become part
of the repertoire of the members of the co-operative when facing similar situations in the future. For
instance, the co-operative association of citizens against what they classify as private for-proﬁt foreign
ﬁrms, or the role that technology played to ﬁnd a solution to a supposedly irresolvable problem, while
facing a more resourceful opponent. These patterns have been at the base of further actions in the 21st
century of the members of the co-operative, which I shall describe in the next section.
5.2.2 The Long Road to the Channel
Since its foundation, CPE kept on working as a service co-operative, growing and diversifying its activ-
ities, although energy distribution remains its most important activity given that it generates around
60% of their total income (CPE 2013b). It did so in the province of Santa Rosa, which gives an impor-
tance to co-operatives not found in others of the country due to its comparative recent creation. Indeed,
co-operativists highlighted that the province as such was founded in 1952 by the national administra-
tion under Perón, and as co-operatives preceded its political organization, they were recognized in the
constitution and kept the control of the energy distribution business in small towns, which allowed
them to keep a close interaction with citizens. Accordingly, co-operatives have a prominent role in the
institutional life of several cities. Such is the case of CPE, which in 1966 presented to the national
state a ﬁrst project for a TV channel to diffuse co-operative principles in the city and the province,
but were rejected by the national authority in charge of distributing licenses (CPEtv 2013b). During
the next years this type of project would become even more difﬁcult, because of the dictatorship in
Argentina that introduced a broadcasting law prohibiting NGOs from having their own media. This
situation endured during the return of democracy in the 1990s, which were particularly tough years
for co-operatives, due to the expansion of neoliberal ideas all across the country, advocating for priva-
tization that led co-operativists to conﬂictive situations with provincial governments and local ﬁrms.
Despite these constraints, the economic crisis Argentina suffered in 2001 opened new windows of op-
portunity for the mobilization of co-operatives, which started the long road to obtaining their channel.
CPE was a leading case, because as I shall describe in this section, it protested against the restrictions
imposed by the preexisting national law, contributing to a broader movement of NGOs striving for
media democratization that ﬁnally paved the way for having a chance to set up their own TV channel.
In the postcrisis scenario of 2003, inhabitants of Santa Rosa had difﬁculties to pay for private cable
services offered by two local private cableoperators, which were merged and became part of Cablevisión
and the Clarín Group, the most powerful media group in Argentina. From then onwards, interviewees
have pointed out that most of the content distributed was no longer elaborated in the province, but
in other locations of the country where the ﬁrm had studios; therefore, restricting the space for local
voices, unless they could pay the price to transmit. In this context, the co-operative announced it would
soon start to broadcast a couple of air channels for free, which was a clear challenge to the status quo
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that defended the idea of private communications. CPE’s argument was that they were contributing
to fulﬁll the human right to communication of the city’s inhabitants, which even received statements
of support from deputies of the province (La Arena 2003j), which clearly resembles the position of the
MacBride Report. Despite this idealistic position, the national organism that regulated TV licenses at
the time, the Comité Federal de Radiodifusión (COMFER - Federal Broadcasting Committee), stated
that such an initiative was illegal, because by law co-operatives could neither have a TV channel nor
emit any audiovisual signal. However, it is important to remember that the restriction in the law they
were referring to was created during a dictatorship to silence alternative voices. For this reason, the
co-operative deﬁed the legal order and set up a date to transmit by air four free TV signals in Santa
Rosa, with the intention to extend their service to around forty channels (La Arena 2003h). To gather
political support, a couple of days before the start of the transmissions they organized the ﬁrst national
co-operative congress of broadcasting, which gathered representatives of co-operatives all across the
country, with the aim to initiate a national discussion on the article N°45 of the law that prohibited
NGOs to have audiovisual media (La Arena 2003c). The underlying theme for the congress was ‘for
broadcasting without exclusions’ and took place where the ﬁrst machines that generated electricity in
1930s used to be located (La Arena 2003d), which can be understood as a way to connect this strug-
gle with the one of the foundation of the co-operative against the US ﬁrm. During the congress, the
president of the national co-operativist alliance, Juan Carlos Fissore, expressed that: “we are not only
ﬁghting for a service and economic interests, we are ﬁghting for the right to the freedom of speech, and
for the Argentinean identity and culture”, (p. 11, translated by the author), which shows how the co-
operative movement distances itself from a for-proﬁt only perspective on media and culture. Indeed,
the following quote by the president of the co-operative, Oscar Nocetti, shows their interpretation of
the previous situation, and the need to do something about it:
“In 1966, 37 years ago, this co-operative initiated the legal application to COMFER to
obtain a TV channel, but it was rejected. Over the last 20 years we have been suffering
discrimination on the hands of a law from the dictatorship. The people of Santa Rosa have
said ‘It is enough, let’s move forward!’”, (La Arena 2003h, p. 10, translated by the author).
After three days of debate, the event ended with the following statement called ‘Cry of Santa Rosa’,
which mentions key aspects of the co-operative movement and its demands for a democratization of
communications in the country:
“Under a pluralistic framework, the right to communication and freedom of speech are
essential requisites for real democracies. The strengthening of democracy in Argentina re-
quires the democratization of communications. By preventing the access of co-operatives
and other nonproﬁt organizations to provide broadcasting services, the national government
violates those human rights in ﬂagrant transgression of the Constitution and in-
ternational treaties. The cry of Santa Rosa translates the most genuine and legitimate
resistance of the people as expressed through the local co-operative, compared to the absurd
claim to subordinate the Supreme Law to the dictatorship of the market. On this his-
toric occasion, the Argentine co-operative movement reafﬁrms the demand for the immediate
repeal of article N° 45 of the dictatorship Law N° 22.285, which keeps such an aberrant
discrimination” (CPE 2003, p. 15, translated by the author).
Besides expressing the demands of NGOs to the state to uplift the legal shackles toward having their
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own media, the cry illustrates a quite different perspective on communication from the one defended
by the creative economy policy discourses. They strictly speak of a dictatorship of the market, referring
to the problems of high concentration patterns in media ownership that exist in the country, which -
as I described in chapter 3 - are a consequence of previous years and alliances between those in the
national administration and businessmen. These asymmetries silence the voices of resource-scarce
groups, which is a situation far from the ideal of a public-sphere open to everyone discussed in media
research; not even close to the ideal of free markets in the media sector as in the creative economy
policy discourses, where ﬁrms can compete in equal conditions, because since the 1970s NGOs have
been legally excluded from having their own media. Contrariwise, this statement shows similar claims
to the MacBride Report, though at the national level, illustrating a different perspective - at least
discursively - on communications.
For these reasons, and despite the ‘illegality’ of their project, CPE broadcasted free TV air channels
to antennas of local inhabitants who had received the equipment from the co-operative (La Arena
2003m). As the president of CPE explained: “We only installed parabolic antennas, took what is free
and we also distributed it without charge. We are not doing any business, instead we are only helping
many people who cannot afford to pay, because they have been socially and economically marginalized”
(La Arena 2003h, p. 10, translated by the author). As with the foundation of CPE, this event was also
a popular party, with murgas - expressions of popular culture performed in the streets of Argentina -
and neighbors on the streets celebrating their advancement toward what they considered a more just
situation. The co-operative offered the service for free and challenged a private ﬁrm that charged high
prices for the access to such signals (La Arena 2003m). The initiative was supported by the signature
of 23.000 neighbors who wanted the project to continue (La Arena 2003m). However, the joyfulness did
not last long, because that same week a private association of cable operators organized an event in
Santa Rosa, where they made explicit their opposition to the co-operative project. For instance, they
expressed that CPE was violating the national law, and claimed that if CPE entered the TV market,
they would become a monopoly, given the fact that they had captive markets due to the other services
they offered to the local inhabitants, such as electricity or the internet. Additionally, they feared that
the co-operative would later charge higher prices for the service than private ﬁrms do in other cities (La
Arena 2003i). As expected, the co-operativists maintained just the opposite position, and interpreted
this as an attack on what they called private ‘monopolies’, or more precisely private ﬁrms’ associations
that did not want the competition from co-operatives against them (La Arena 2003b). Members of the
co-operative understood the situation as a repetition of what happened during its foundation, because
once again a co-operative, caring for the city’s inhabitants, was struggling against what they understood
as the oppression of a private ﬁrm, making excessive proﬁts at the expense of the local population.
From my point of view, it is an example of the conﬂict of interests between a discourse of culture and
communications as a business versus another one that puts the priorities on social issues ﬁrst.
The following days, mutual accusations were commonplace between the co-operativists and the
private service providers and COMFER. For instance, the co-operative had to stop the transmission
fearing an imminent conﬁscation of their equipment by personnel of COMFER , which was followed
by a public denouncement of the co-operative movement against the lobby of private ﬁrms with local
and national politicians (La Arena 2003h, 2003f). Even though some days later they retransmitted
the signal once again, this time broadcasting just the national public channel (La Arena 2003h), the
battle was quickly inclined toward private interests when COMFER ﬁnally sent representatives to
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Figure 5.1: Mobilization of CPE associates and supporters in favor of their own media, repudiating the
legal intervention against their project of free TV access. Source: (La Arena 2003a, p. 10).
CPE to write an afﬁdavit about the illegal situation and to conﬁscate their TV equipment (La Arena
2003e). Although they were not able to ﬁnd them, they succeeded in stopping further transmissions.
This situation immediately pushed around 300 of CPE’s associates and supporters to mobilize by or-
ganizing a ‘symbolic hug’ around the co-operative’s building (see Figure 5.1). The supporters carried
the co-operative colored ﬂag and sent a clear political message of the importance they assigned to the
TV project and to the need to advance with media democratization (La Arena 2003e, 2003h). As one
of the members of the CPE press sector expressed: “When a major event occurs in the co-operative, it
generally becomes a topic of discussion in the city very quickly, because it is an institution with a lot
of grassroots support. [...] particularly when there is an issue against a mega private enterprise” (CPE
press sector, 09/09/2013, group interview in Santa Rosa, Argentina). Despite the fact that the battle
was lost, according to interviewees it legitimized the importance of the struggle for media democrati-
zation in the town, and inspired further actions that contributed to the national movement of media
democratization mentioned in chapter 3.
The following days, the expectations of the co-operative members were still high, hoping for an
opportunity to legally offer the service (La Arena 2003k, 2003h). However their optimism ended quickly,
because the association of private ﬁrms ﬁnally presented an injunction to stop COMFER and CPE from
starting any sort of project, unless they had legal permission (La Arena 2003g). Therefore, the private
ﬁrms took advantage of the existing legal framework, and exerted on the co-operatives what I call legal
violence in my conceptual framework, because such restrictions only left one possible road of action: to
start advocating a new law, something that the co-operativists began to do nationally (La Arena 2003l).
However, as described in chapter 3, the mobilizations were not enough to unleash immediate change.
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Instead, they would have to wait for major shifts in the national political context that took place six
years later.
In October 2009, with the sanction of a new national audiovisual communication services law, new
windows of opportunity opened for co-operatives to have their own TV channels and offer cable services
(Ley 26.522 2009). A key event at that time was the national struggle between the government and
the multimedia network Clarín, which legally challenged the new law. This multimedia group owned
the largest cableoperator in the country, Cablevisión, which controlled the private channels in Santa
Rosa and the cable service. In this new context, CPE began the administrative procedures to obtain
the license. Nevertheless, the road was bumpy because of two main hurdles. First, as they were
the ﬁrst co-operative to begin the procedure, the administrative requisites took a lot of time, because
governmental bureaucracy was also in the learning process of what to do, check and require from co-
operatives. Second, the co-operative had to reply and continuously dismantle legal hurdles created by
Cablevisión and the Clarín Group, which according to the co-operativists did not want competition in
the city and resisted the new law (Colsecor 2011a). This time, the co-operative was able to navigate
the turbulent waters and surpass the barriers. In December 2011, CPE became the ﬁrst cooperative to
obtain a license to provide cable service and have their own TV channel in Santa Rosa, CPEtv (Colsecor
2011b). Eight years after their claims began, they were ﬁnally able to solve the legal constraints to
their TV project, and ﬁnally began their transmissions on October 1st, 2012 (El diario de la Pampa
2012). This day was not selected by chance, but rather chosen because it coincides with the day the
co-operative started to offer electricity to Santa Rosa in 1935, making explicit the importance of CPE’s
history in this struggle.
For these reasons, I argue that to understand CPEtv’s imaginary and how such initiative was able
to emerge from a small city in the interior of Argentina, it is necessary to comprehend the links be-
tween the foundation of CPE and the struggle to establish their TV channel. Without the history of
oppression by private ﬁrms and citizens resistance and organization in co-operatives, the city of Santa
Rosa would have never been this successful in organizing a co-operative TV channel and ﬁghting for
years for the legal opportunities to broadcast, challenging a market oriented perspective on media and
communications. The success of the founding fathers of CPE facing a similar conﬂict has been a strong
element for convincing co-operativists to keep on ﬁghting for their channel, despite the difﬁculties they
would face. In other words, it became a narrative to stimulate action, such as the following quote by
the co-operative’s president illustrates:
“These foreign companies have a serious problem: they believe that people are stupid. They
ignore that residents have a long experience of struggle against monopolies of every stripe.
When SUDAM became convinced that the co-operative was a serious enterprise, they offered
to lower the price of energy and showed their best smiles to convince us. We, the inhabitants
of Santa Rosa, gave them the ﬁnger and they had to go. It would not be uncommon for history
to repeat itself ” (Nocetti 2012, translated by the author).
This statement alludes to the conﬂict between CPE and SUDAM in the 1930s, who tried to persuade
the citizens not to built a co-operative. At the time when the president gave this talk, the local private
cable ﬁrm was reducing their prices for cable service and improving its image quality to compete with
CPEtv. Thus, Nocetti tried to warn citizens of the private ﬁrms’ marketing techniques by reminding
them of similar ‘tricks’ played by foreign ﬁrms on the population before. This text also shows that,
despite obtaining their license, the conﬂicts between those who defend a private approach to commu-
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# Co-operative principles
1 Voluntary and open membership
2 Democratic member control
3 Member economic participation
4 Autonomy and independence
5 Education, training and information
6 Co-operation among co-operatives
7 Concern for community
Table 5.2: Principles from the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA 2014a).
nication and those who struggle for a human rights approach are far from closed. This clearly relates
to the discursive opposition in chapter 4 between creative economy policy discourses and the policy
discourse supporting NGO’s media in the new audiovisual communication services law. In the case of
Argentina, co-operatives have been one of the many types of actors of civil society initiating the debates
and mobilizations to try to alter the unjust media law (Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democratica
2004), and CPEtv is one case of this movement. In sum, the historical context is essential to understand
why the following imaginary departs from the basic tenets of the creative economy policy discourses in
some dimensions.
5.2.3 Imaginary
In this section, I will analyze the main dimensions of the imaginary of CPEtv, synthesized in Table 5.1,
which was not only inﬂuenced by the local context and the history of the co-operative, but also by the
discourse of the international and national co-operative movement. I shall ﬁrst sketch some features of
the international movement that help to understand CPEtv, because of its principles that characterize
co-operatives, and also of the national movement that has a particular view on communication.
As regards the international co-operative movement, its origins date back to the industrial revolu-
tion in England, when in 1844 a group of workers suffering from unemployment and poverty conditions
founded the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers2. These workers had scarce resources but a curi-
ous set of principles to organize their work, which quickly succeeded in growing their enterprise and
in disseminating the model all across England. In 1895 the success of this experience led to the cre-
ation of the International Co-operative Alliance, which had as an objective the global expansion of the
co-operative model (ICA 2014b). The Rochdale Pioneers and their principles became the prototype for
co-operatives worldwide. Although these have been slightly altered in vocabulary, even the following
last version in the table keeps their original orientation:
These co-operative principles put an emphasis on democratic participation, a concern for issues re-
lated to the community, co-operation among co-operatives, among others. Of course they represent goals
or ideals, which are not necessarily always met, but toward which organizations that want to call them-
selves co-operatives should be striving for, and such is the case of CPE. It is important to remember
that co-operatives in capitalist countries compete in markets and earn proﬁts through their products
or services, just as any other private ﬁrm, but the main difference lies on how participation takes place
in these organizations. In a ﬁrm, the owners, although a small subset of the total amount of work-
ers, decide what to do with proﬁts without consulting employees. Conversely, in a co-operative these
2. For more information on the story of the ﬁrst experience see (Holyoake 1922).
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decisions are collectively taken by associates in a more democratic process. This does not mean that
co-operatives are exempt from conﬂicts, either from those emanating from frictions among personal
relations or among different co-operative departments. Nonetheless, the co-operative model strives for
reducing the hierarchical asymmetries existing in private ﬁrms between the owners and workers and
extending the democratic ideals to the economic sphere. Therefore, as CPE and CPEtv follow and dif-
fuse content based on these principles, they are adopting a perspective that differs from the creative
economy policy discourses that do not take into account such principles.
In particular, the 6th principle of co-operation among co-operatives has been central in the struggle
of the national co-operative movement for their own media. After the new law, co-operatives across the
country have started to organize national networks of audiovisual production, to collaborate and diffuse
their practices, besides defending themselves against what they perceive as attacks of private ﬁrms.
One of such networks is Usina de Medios (Media Factory) that is connecting co-operatives in radio,
press and TV to produce content, and to which CPEtv belongs. This project questions mainstream
economics, as the coordinator of the program indicated:
“We think that the paradigm of the solidarity economy together with co-operativism offer
the model of a human-scale economy that gives answers to contemporary challenges. Capital-
ism is not left aside, because any type of venture requires capital, tools, machines and labor
force. But the most important difference is that in a human-scale economy, men use money
for human development, and not just for making more money as in capitalism” (Usina de
Medios coordinator, 10/10/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires,
Argentina).
This co-operative discourse keeps a clearly critical stance toward what it calls capitalism, or the con-
centration of resources in the hands of few and in speciﬁc geographic regions, which is a perspective
that contrasts with the uncritical view of a market based economy that the creative economy policy
discourses defend. Speciﬁcally, the co-operatives oppose the notion that culture and communication
can be considered as just another commodity; for instance, a scheme employed by Usina de Medios
coordinator to interpret the global situation is that “there is a major global dispute over the nature
of communication. Is it a commodity or a human right? We state it is a human right, as the current
government holds” (Usina de Medios coordinator, 10/10/2013, interview with & translated by the au-
thor in Buenos Aires, Argentina). As part of the network, CPEtv shares this perspective of the national
co-operative movement and ideas with the national government in this area, differing from the perspec-
tives of the creative economy policy discourses. This clearly alludes to the tensions between UNESCO
and UNCTAD on their understanding of culture, communication and development. The former sid-
ing more with cultural diversity and considering communication as a human right, whereas the latter
comprehends that trade and economic growth are like silver-bullets to promote ‘development’ in every
sector, irrespective of local contacts.
In this national context, CPE had already been diffusing co-operative principles through an edito-
rial that publishes books of local authors of Santa Rosa and La Pampa (CPE 2013a) and a monthly
magazine elaborated by CPE’s press sector and distributed to the co-operative associates (CPE 2013c).
The creation of their own TV channel, CPEtv, complemented and enhanced the previous two mecha-
nisms they had for diffusing co-operative principles, practices and content. According to the president
of the co-operative who led the political battle in 2003: “For us, they are all part of a co-operative cul-
tural policy, which is a ﬁght against the homogenizing discourse of large corporations. Instead, we want
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our own discourse, a regional discourse for our people and associates” (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). There are two important things to high-
light in this statement. First, Nocetti expresses their desire to build their own discourse respecting
the regional idiosyncrasies, and addresses those supporting co-operativism. Second, he makes explicit
their opposition against ‘large corporations’ that in this context refers to the cultural and communica-
tion networks concentrated in Buenos Aires, undermining regional productions and co-operativism. It
is relevant to observe that this statement is an implicit critique of the tenets of the cultural industries
policy discourse in the country, which sides with successful mass market products in demise of other
less saleable and more locally relevant cultural products and expressions. Similarly, it is linked with
the historical tensions and struggles that CPE had against private ﬁrms, as the following quote by
its president illustrates: “The co-operative was founded as a reaction to the abuses of a multinational
company. It’s in the genes of the co-operative to combat big monopolies” (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, inter-
view with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). This clearly contrasts with creative
economy policy discourses, because co-operatives, since the beginning of the movement - ideally - try to
surpass the for-proﬁt only logic, tackling as well issues of social inequality and exclusion processes, as
represented in their ideal of a human scale economy.
The co-operative discourse and its different understanding of how an economy ought to work is one
of the main reasons why it is so important for co-operativists to diffuse their practices. The following
words of the coordinator of CPEtv, a co-operativist trained in journalism, show this:
“Our goal is to change the agenda, so that the priority is not only on governmental de-
cisions, which of course are important, but also on many other things that we believe are
equally or even more relevant. Such as getting people to show more solidarity and be partic-
ipative. This, in the long run, is reﬂected in the people you elect to represent you, or at least,
it ensures that there is not so much passivity from citizens” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).
This statement reveals CPEtv’s goal to disseminate co-operative values and practices of solidarity and
participation in their community, which has to be understood in context. During the 1990s, the ideology
of neoliberalism expanded all over Latin America, and Argentina was not an exception. Although the
term is understood in different ways in each country, some common elements are its strong focus on
privatizations, despise of state intervention and encouragement of individualism (Grimson 2007). In
particular, the type of individualism advocated by neoliberalism ignores the ‘social’, understood as the
capacity of the individual to act collectively for other reasons beyond pure ‘self-interest’ (Domenech
2007, p. 75). This description of neoliberalism matches part of the deﬁnition of the creative industries
emanating from the UK, which as I referenced in chapter 1, precisely speaks of individual creativity.
In contrast, the co-operative movement opposes such associations in the ﬁeld of media and culture, and
instead advocates solidarity, participation and co-operation.
But, if the co-operative already had an editorial and a magazine, why do they need a television chan-
nel as well? The following statement explains the concerns that management had during ﬁeldwork:
“Inhabitants of Santa Rosa relate quality of life to the co-operative and they support the
organization, but this does not mean they adhere to co-operativism. So that is the task that
we have with our media, to communicate that within a classical economy, co-operativism is
a form of management with a human face. Something that large private companies do not
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have” (O. Nocetti, 14/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa,
Argentina).
In other words, even though the co-operative offers several services in town and enjoys the support of
part of the inhabitants, the management thinks the existence of the co-operative and its services are
taken for granted, irrespective of its principles. They hypothesized the problem resides in the scarce
contact that inhabitants have with content about co-operative ideas, given that most of the content
they receive through television, the most used media, comes from the private oriented and individual
practices associated with neoliberalism. Therefore, under the lens of SKAD, their project of a TV media
channel can be understood as a dispositive to further disseminate the imaginary of co-operativism,
reinforcing their associated practices, as the following quote of the channel’s coordinator reveals:
“Co-operative TV channels basically innovate in content, which involves the use of media
to diffuse co-operative principles and values. The dissemination of the principles of solidar-
ity, co-operation, sharing, mutual aid, want to give the message that it is important to get
involved in matters that have to do with helping others and collaboration. It would already
be a success if people collaborated with the campaigns that we spread, but even more if they
started taking an active role in third sector organizations” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).
Consequently, the co-operative has to depart from mainstream content that private channels diffuse.
As the coordinator further details:
“We do not want to be a mere repeater of canned TV content, instead we want to produce
our own high quality material. [...] Relatively speaking, we intend to be a mini Encuen-
tro channel, that is to say, with a cultural and educational proﬁle in our content, far from
magazines and soap operas. We want to focus on programming that reﬂects local lifestyles”
(CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa,
Argentina).
There are three relevant points to remark in this statement. First, the co-operative aims to elaborate
‘high quality material’, which refers to the production of audiovisual content respecting the established
quality patterns with the required sophisticated technology. As I shall show in chapter 7, the aim of
‘high quality’ might be counterproductive, because it does not break with the quality patterns that
mainstream audiovisual ﬁrms and training centers have established in the country, neglecting the
regional variations in Argentina. Additionally, in chapter 6 I shall detail that the co-operative has
acquired advanced foreign technology and costly equipment for fulﬁlling such aim. On the one hand,
this set up has allowed them to elaborate content following a production process that does not differ
much from a private commercial channel. On the other hand, the setup has created dependence on
foreign providers.
Second, Encuentro (Gathering in English) is a popular Argentinean public TV channel created in
2005, which focuses on educational content about the different provinces of the country, Latin America
and the world. University professors that I interviewed remarked that it has been a new actor that
promotes through its buying power the production of educational content that private TV channels
previously did not demand. Of course, the coverage they can give is limited by the time they have,
and within these material constraints, the province of La Pampa is not the most relevant one, because
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it is the penultimate one in terms of inhabitants of the 23 provinces that Argentina has. Thus, it is
overlooked in their coverage. Nonetheless, the co-operative aspires to copy their model, to ﬁll this gap
by focusing in Santa Rosa and the province of La Pampa.
Third, CPEtv wants to focus on local content and lifestyles, which refers to co-operative content,
but it also aims to portray the cultural diversity of the city and the province. Once again, this shows
the closeness of their initiative with the perspective of cultural diversity from UNESCO. At the same
time, together with the editorial, CPEtv wants to recover, save and diffuse local history and practices
that would otherwise be ignored or lost. It is important to highlight that this goes against the logic
of the cultural industries, which do not give much importance to a city or province with only around
110.000 and 350.000 inhabitants respectively. Evidently, an equation based only on proﬁts disregards
such small market, in comparison to the larger millions in other cities and provinces. This might
explain why despite the expansion of the idea of cultural industries at the national level and of creative
industries in Buenos Aires, neither of these concepts have been of concern for the co-operative. As
CPEtv coordinator explains:
“We did not discuss cultural industries in a straightforward manner, and less with that
terminology. Maybe those words were not used due to ignorance. But we did discuss on
what type of content we wanted to display and how distinct it should be regarding other
local productions. Speciﬁcally, we focus on having a plurality of voices in news, politically
balanced, with no clear editorial line, except for those topics that address speciﬁc issues of the
co-operative” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in
Santa Rosa, Argentina).
The ﬁrst part of the statement illustrates a point I shall show again in the rest of the media for social
transformation: their neglect of the concepts of creative or cultural industries policies, but an opposition
to the ideas they represent. This gap between the terms employed at the grassroots level with those
at the policy level point out that the concepts used in the latter are clearly oriented toward sectors
industrially organized in large urban areas, disregarding other types of experiences. Therefore, it
reinforces the arguments criticizing the creative economy policy discourses of the previous chapter.
Additionally, the last part of the statement deﬁnes how CPEtv wants to differentiate from preexisting
news channels in the city: one is a state channel, and the other is owned by Clarín. According to co-
operative members, the former focuses almost exclusively on issues related to government, whereas the
latter, defends the position of private ﬁrms. Therefore, they claim to offer a more balanced coverage,
stressing of course the position of the co-operative, given their importance in the province of La Pampa.
As regards the protection of their content, the coordinator of CPEtv explained that: “The co-operative
owns the content produced entirely by us, whereas in the case of co-productions, with each agreement we
consider diverse alternatives. But all our licenses are more traditional, neither Creative Commons nor
free licenses” (CPEtv coordinator, 11/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa,
Argentina). Neither CPEtv nor CPE’s editorial used alternative licenses for their productions, but
rather the protection offered by traditional authors’ rights law. This points to a contradictory aspect
in their approach to culture and communication, because if they keep the same protection practices
of the ﬁrms they criticize, they just repeat a similar operational mode, but on a smaller scale. At the
time of ﬁeldwork, this point was still under discussion by the leadership of the national network Usina
de Medios, as its coordinator explained: “Creative Commons is one part of our sustainability model,
because these licenses allow you to generate a legal platform for co-productions. Otherwise, it is very dif-
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ﬁcult” (Usina de Medios coordinator, 10/10/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos
Aires, Argentina). However, this was still more a project than a fact during ﬁeldwork. The advan-
tages are evident, because such licenses would allow them to share knowledge among the different
co-operatives and avoid the issues and costs of standard intellectual property rights. Nevertheless, an-
other perspective registered during ﬁeldwork maintains that those who diffuse content for free, under
Creative Commons or other licenses, just do this because they have found no way to sell their content,
which is of bad ‘quality’. This statement matches creative economy policy discourses by associating
culture with proﬁts, but at the same time, it would imply that all that is not sold is not culture. This
preconception is quite extended among established artists, which can be interpreted as a strategy to
keep the privileged position they have reached, despising those experimenting with alternative dissem-
ination strategies. Nonetheless, research evidence casts doubts on the fear to content freely distributed
online. For instance, research studies on speciﬁc cases show that in the ﬁlm industry the distribution of
free content, under particular circumstances, might increase sales (Smith and Telang 2009), whereas
in the publishing industry sales are not necessarily reduced by the free distribution of the book in elec-
tronic format (Hilton III and Wiley 2010). Despite these potential advantages, in the case of CPEtv
and the associated organizations I interviewed, there was not even knowledge about the existence of
Creative Commons or other alternatives. Despite the fact that these different licenses might have al-
ready been quite useful to issues they were facing to preserve the works of local artists and to organize
audiovisual co-productions. Consequently, even though the national network wants to promote such an
approach, there is ﬁrst a need of knowledge transfer to the interior of the country.
In sum, the imaginary of this co-operative emanates from a speciﬁc historical context in the province
of Santa Rosa, where co-operatives have been central in offering public services. Speciﬁcally, the foun-
dational story of CPE set the example on how citizens could organize against foreign private ﬁrms that
wanted to obtain excessive proﬁts from local inhabitants. Therefore, there has been a tradition for over
80 years of opposing perspectives that put proﬁts above anything else. This has been the motor that
inspired the opposition of CPE against the law, which banned them from having their own media, and
encouraged it to strive for media democratization. This tension between the for-proﬁt ﬁrms that oppose
co-operative projects to acquire media, characterize the opposition that the latter have to discourses
that put proﬁts above everything else, such as the creative economy policy discourses advocate in the
ﬁeld of culture and media. In this context, the imaginary of CPEtv clearly has dimensions against the
commercialization of communications, such as its understanding of communication as a human right
and the stimulation of cultural, co-operative and local audiovisual content, which would otherwise be
neglected by a commercial orientation to culture and communication. Despite their utopian claims of
constructing an economy with a human face, it is also true that the co-operative movement - and CPE
in particular - does not exclude practices that resemble those of commercial audiovisual ﬁrms. For
example, the employment of similar technologies and quality patterns, or as I shall show in chapter
8, the use of advertising and the cost of cable service as a source of income. This paradoxical position
is a product of the broader aspects of the co-operative discourses that I discussed, which criticizes the
capitalist economic system, but still thinks it can reform it from within. This will contrast with other
cases that take more extreme positions, such as the next one.
129
5.3 Barricada TV, Argentina
In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV has a shorter history, though not less inﬂuential in terms of paving
the way for a particular imaginary challenging those of the creative economy policy discourses. In this
subsection, I will ﬁrst describe the speciﬁc context in which Barricada TV emerged. This will help to
explain the main features of its imaginary synthesized in Table 5.1. Then, I will describe the imaginary
of Barricada TV, and how it departs from the creative economy policy discourses in several dimensions,
like in its objectives, actors and addressees. Therefore, I shall show another example that connects
culture, media and society, different from the creative economy policy discourses.
5.3.1 Context and History
Barricada TV is considered by its members to be an alternative, popular and community channel, which
joins several of the categories I mentioned in Section 2.3, illustrating the challenge to the clear-cut
deﬁnitions suggested by Western researchers. It is located in the middle of Buenos Aires and started
to operate before the passage of the new audiovisual communication services law, due to the social
conﬂicts in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century in the country. I shall argue that their particular origin
offers insightful contrasts with the creative economy policy discourses and the context and history of
the previous co-operative case, which has a longer history and is located far from the capital.
Barricada TV’s founders began to think of such a project during their coverage of social conﬂicts
in Argentina for the TV of the piqueteros3 movement in 2002 (Cardillo 2011). During the next years,
they produced roaming coverages of different cultural centers in resource-scarce communities and of
particular events; for example, in 2005 they transmitted a mobilization against the visit of G.W. Bush
to Argentina, rejecting his plan to set up a free trade area for the Americas, which was ﬁnally dropped
by that USA administration. In 2007, they realized the need of speciﬁc audiovisual training to not only
produce counter informative content with respect to mass narratives, but also to have ‘quality’ to be
able to reach a mass audience. The following year, after the organization of a training workshop, they
adopted the name Barricada TV and started to cover national social conﬂicts, and, at that time, they
focused on discussions about the new audiovisual communication services law for the country, where
they represented and advocated for the speciﬁc needs of alternative media. In contrast with CPEtv,
they lacked resources (ﬁnancial and infrastructural) to continuously elaborate audiovisual content.
The speciﬁc imaginary of Barricada TV has been inﬂuenced by the organization where it has been
operating since 2009, Industrias Metalúrgicas y Plásticas Argentina (IMPA - Metallurgical and Plastic
Industries of Argentina), where they set up a TV studio to produce daily live and deferred programs.
What is IMPA? At that time, it was the ﬁrst factory recovered by its workers (Pérez 2013). The ﬁrm had
a long history: Like CPE, it was founded as a private factory in 1918 and from 1933 onwards it focused
on the production of ﬂat rolled aluminum (La Vaca 2007). In 1948, during Peron’s government, the ﬁrm
was nationalized and reached its ‘golden era’. From then onwards, its performance decayed, and in
1961 the government relented two of the three production plants, and offered the third to the workers
to establish a co-operative (La Vaca 2007). However, even though it theoretically was a co-operative,
in practice it kept a stark division between management and employees (Robertazzi et al. 2008), disre-
specting the co-operative ideal. During the 1990s, the economic situation of the co-operative worsened
3. This word is a neologism, which refers to street mobilizations that emerged in Argentina during the 1990s and reached
their peak after the economic crisis of 2001. These demonstrators, who blocked streets and occupied governmental buildings,
faced different conﬂictive situations with the police and citizens not sharing their views.
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and in 1997 it entered a process of arrangement with creditors before declaring its bankruptcy. In 1998,
this situation pushed the workers to displace the management and take the co-operative back into their
hands (La Vaca 2007), turning it into one of the pioneering cases of the Movimiento Nacional de Empre-
sas Recuperadas (MNER - National Movement of Recovered Enterprises). In 2001, the economic and
social crisis pushed several other factories to a similar process, with workers facing the loss of their
jobs due to bankruptcy and managers eager to escape with no concern at all for their employees. In
that context, IMPA became a model to at least 160 recovered factories (Rohter 2003). IMPA’s leadership
advised and supported experiences that wanted to switch to such an alternative organizational model
(Robertazzi et al. 2008): a factory collectively owned and managed by its workers. The following years
were not easy for the enterprise, because they had several conﬂicts with the state and mass media. The
clashes with the former involved legal conﬂicts and also physical clashes with the police, which exerted
violence against members of IMPA in several situations (Barricada TV 2010a). As regards mass media,
according to the members of the co-operative, it misinformed more than it informed about what was
happening with IMPA and other recovered factories (Barricada TV 2010a) that were constructing the
MNER (MNER 2013). Indeed, IMPA decided to support the initiative of Barricada TV, which offered a
communication channel more in tune with their struggles and imaginary, to counterbalance the scarce
coverage of its positions and the biased ones about its practices. A plausible interpretation of this ne-
glect is that the MNER challenged the status quo, the dominant hierarchical way of organizing ﬁrms
within a capitalist economy. Therefore, given the close links between private mass media and differ-
ent industries through advertising, it is not a surprise that such movement has not been welcomed by
mainstream commercial journalism that depends on such a model.
Henceforth, Barricada TV operates at IMPA’s factory located in the capital city of the country,
Buenos Aires, but covering topics related to workers struggles and consequently inﬂuenced by the
broader discourse of the MNER. This gives a different departure point with respect to CPEtv, because
even though co-operativism and this movement want to alter the capitalist hierarchical structure in
ﬁrms, the proposed strategies differ. Co-operatives follow essentially similar business practices and
respect private property rights, guided by their seven principles and a democratic decision making
process. Contrariwise, the MNER eliminated the hierarchies and operated under a logic of collective
property from the start. Besides, the conﬂicts that this movement had in 2001 were far more violent -
legally and physically - than the experience in Santa Rosa. Despite these differences, a common point
between them is that IMPA and CPE both aim to expand their particular practices and ideals, opposing
- though with nuances - the primacy of economics in the ﬁelds of communication and culture. For exam-
ple, Figure 5.2 shows a photo of the entrance to IMPA’s main building, which has a mural with written
concepts representing elements of the essential issues that the enterprise ﬁghts for. From left to right
it reads: Culture, Work, Resistance and Education, which I interpret as a reference to the culture of
self management by the working class, the resistance to what they perceive as an exploitative economic
and hierarchical model of private ﬁrms, and the importance of work and education for all its members
(Documentales semillas 2011). The inclusion of culture also refers to the support that IMPA gives to
cultural activities in its factory for neighbors, among which Barricada TV is an example. It is worth-
while to remark that the interpretation of these concepts within the context of IMPA constitutes an
opposition to the creative economy policy discourses, because they are questioning what they consider
an unjust and exploitative economic system, where once again the idea of culture and media organized
just for proﬁts is a foreign one, besides neglecting their speciﬁc practices. Furthermore, their concept
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Figure 5.2: IMPA’s entrance door, where Barricada TV operates. The sign from top to bottom, and
left to right says: “IMPA: The factory. Cultural City. Struggle, Work and Culture”. Above each of the
four men in the mural, from left to right, it says: “Culture, Work, Resistance and Education”. Source:
(Barricada TV 2012e).
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Figure 5.3: Logo of Barricada TV. Source: Barricada TV 2009b.
of culture aims to embrace the local inhabitants and workers, without creating a separation between
those that can be ‘creative’ versus those who cannot.
In sum, Barricada TV emerged in a context marked by the experimentation with new ways of or-
ganization by parts of the working class, which tried to look for solutions to the consequences of the
Argentinean crisis of 2001. These new practices have suffered from bias and neglect by mass media,
which stimulated the emergence of their media organization to cover the ongoing events from their
perspective. Therefore, the aims of Barricada TV, their organizational methods and their perspectives
on media and culture depart from and oppose those of the creative economy policy discourses, as I shall
detail in the next subsection.
5.3.2 The Channel and its Imaginary
Barricada TV’s imaginary can be considered as an example of initiatives of the alternative and popular
media movement and as part of the new audiovisual communication services law, which stimulates
NGO media I deﬁned in chapter 4. The following online manifesto of the channel details the main
features of their imaginary:
“Barricada TV is an audiovisual political action group, with the format of popular
news. We are not artists nor is our goal aesthetic. We are primarily political and social
activists decided to produce videos as a tool for organization. That’s why Barricada TV is
not just a group of people dedicated to ﬁlm various conﬂicts and popular experiences, but we
are primarily an action group working within a political organization that seeks to carry
out a project to transform the reality we live in. Thus, we think that counter informa-
tion can not be divorced from political intervention in a particular conjuncture. Hence,
we seek to contribute to build a counter-hegemonic discourse, to expose disinformation
disseminated by mass media, to stimulate mobilizations and debates, to think and ques-
tion our own way of working, and to win comrades for our struggle” (Barricada TV 2009a,
translated by the author).
This paragraph offers key insights about Barricada TV. First, it makes evident that they consider
themselves as activists with a political aim of social transformation, a position that is neglected in the
creative economy policy discourses. Although they are not part of an organized political party, they do
have the orientation to defend workers’ parties, evidently inﬂuenced by the context they operate in, a
recovered factory. Indeed, the symbol of Barricada TV shown on the left in Figure 5.3 has the typical
red star historically associated with socialist or communist ideas, whereas on the right of the photo it
shows IMPA’s factory referring to their association with the working class.
Second, they understand mass media as a disinformation tool that hides urgent social issues, and
for this reason they promote their channel with the slogan “all the news that you do not see on TV” (Bar-
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ricada TV 2009b, translated by the author). Accordingly, the aim of Barricada TV is to act as a counter
information source, turning upside down stories that pretend to be ‘objective’ and ‘rational’, but that
they understand as just covering one way of interpreting a given event, misrepresenting news related
to other sectors of society that do not have access to mass media. This relates to their perspective on
journalism, which a member of Barricada TV, Natalia Vinelli, described with the following words:
“Alternative media represent a space where another journalism is possible. A dependent
journalism taking sides with a social class with the aim to counter inform against the claim
of objectivity that hegemonic media has, trying to naturalize the bourgeoisie perspective as
unique and universal” (Vinelli 2011c, p. 31, translated by the author).
These statements show their scheme to understand mass media as an instrument of the ‘bourgeoisie’,
or more precisely higher income sectors that distribute information that defends their worldview as if it
were ‘natural’. Contrarily, Barricada TV in that context is a media that challenges the content diffused
by the former. Therefore, both can be understood as dispositives within the terminology suggested by
SKAD; but the objectives, actors and addresses in each case varies. For Barricada TV, the aim is to
openly express that their content is subjective, representing workers perspectives on local, national
and international news, leaving aside what they consider as the cynical claims of objectivity of mass
media. In this sense, this case resembles conceptualizations inspired by Marxism about alternative
media introduced in chapter 2, such as radical media. Why? Because they try to capture cases that
through critical content defy mass media messages, which they do not consider as objective, but rather
as the product of speciﬁc economic and class structures that sustain such organizations.
Third, Barricada TV members remark in their manifesto that they are not artists and that they
are not going to be limited by aesthetic concerns, which is an important difference to CPEtv, which
strives to produce high quality material. As I shall show in chapter 7, this refers to the decision of
not following mainstream audiovisual production quality schemes that private media ﬁrms employ. By
stating that they are not constrained by these schemes, they express that what matters more in their
case is to produce and distribute the content that reﬂects their imaginary, rather than the ways this
transmission is accomplished.
Fourth, they claim to be a source of counter-hegemonic discourse that represents the “popular and
working class”, stimulating “new values based on solidarity, egalitarianism, commitment to each other,
co-operation, socialism” (Barricada TV 2009b, translated by the author). These values are also shared
by the co-operative case, but as a difference with CPEtv, Barricada TV has a stronger opposition to
mass media - both private and public - that is not pronounced as much in the co-operative movement,
particularly against the state, as I shall show in chapter 8. Additionally, solidarity and collaboration in
the imaginary of Barricada TV are important because they shape their practices in a distinctive way,
such as the following quote of one of its members suggests:
“To ﬁll a grid with 6 hours of own production from the popular ﬁeld, we are bound to
collaborate and share the materials we produce among us. This is a departure point com-
pletely different from the one of hegemonic media, whether private or public, that organize
their work based on scoops” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated
by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
Indeed, most private media have to buy the content they distribute, except for that distributed for free
by the state. Conversely, Barricada TV establishes exchanges with other experiences of the ‘alternative,
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popular and community’ media ﬁeld, which refers to their exchange of material among such groups in
order to have enough content for a continuous transmission. This allows them to overcome the bar-
riers of buying such material, because they exchange them for free with other organizations, such as
independent audiovisual producers, social movements, journalists, trade unions, etc., providing critical
content about conﬂicts not reported in mass media. This suggests a network of collaborating organi-
zations that sustain their activities without depending on advertising or state funding, but on barter
like transactions that allow to obtain the needed materials. Otherwise, they fear they would become
constrained by the need of ﬁnancial sources and, consequently, their imaginary would not be so critical
(Vinelli 2011c). In effect, this is one of the reasons why they do not want to use direct advertising, as
the following quote by one of its members reveals:
“New channels must have their own agenda, not imposed by any power, whether economic
or political. [...] along with aesthetics that breaks with machismo, consumerism, stereotypes
and the logic of a commercial media system oriented toward advertising sales” (Vinelli 2011a,
p. 85, translated by the author).
This statement shows how Barricada TV opposes the functioning of media organizations by advertising
or political publicity I sketched in Figure 2.2. Conversely, they want to replace these logics by one of
collaboration and solidarity among peers sharing their imaginary. Furthermore, collaboration and
solidarity are important for Barricada TV to attract and maintain their human resources. As Vinelli
explains: “Without a core of activists capable of putting the collective over the individual, and at the same
time, without stimulating participation policies that address different levels of commitment, popular TV
would be an eternal dream” (Vinelli 2011c, p. 28, translated by the author). Given the aim of social
transformation they have, the initiative is sustained by a group of activists, with different levels of
participation, who voluntarily dedicate their time to the project. This is one way of understanding
solidarity, which puts a collective project above what they consider the petty interests of private media
of just making proﬁts at all costs, which would be the sole and only aim of a media organized following
the creative economy policy discourses. Thus, Barricada TV illustrates another type of cases that would
oppose the standardization the supporters of the commercially oriented discourses defend.
Barricada TV and CPEtv share similarities in terms of their aims to reach mass audiences. In the
words of one of its founders: “Why should we ﬁght to be massive? Because if we defend a project of
social transformation and we assume that communication is a strategic tool, then it is essential for us
to go beyond the boundaries of the circle of people that share our same opinion” (Vinelli 2011b, p. 224,
translated by the author). However, as I shall show in chapter 6, the technologies of content distribution
to achieve these aims differ, Barricada TV lacks the ﬁnancial resources to acquire the costly equipment
that CPEtv has, but instead it has been faster to adopt online technologies. Thus, they have a mixture
of old and modern technologies, and in particular the online technologies have allowed them a further
reach, but not without new constraints to their imaginary.
As regards the international discussion about the differences between the creative versus cultural
industries, this was not a conceptual issue neither in Barricada TV nor in the alternative TV movement.
However, they do have a negative perspective on cultural industries which is the most disseminated
term at the national level in Argentina. According to one of its members:
“We understand that cultural industries do not break with the mainstream communica-
tion paradigm, where culture is an industry that produces for markets. On the contrary,
135
alternative communication completely breaks with it, and we do not think it is an idealistic
perspective, after all, the need for a new communication paradigm motivated the change of
the audiovisual communication services law” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
This statement supports the divisions highlighted in chapter 4 between the two groups of discourses:
those that understand culture and communication mainly as a commodity versus those that resist such
a position. In addition, it shows once again that academic discussions to decide whether ‘creative in-
dustries’ or ‘cultural industries’ is the right term are irrelevant at the grassroots level. In contrast, the
statement suggests that what matters at this level is the inclusion of groups that have been neglected in
the conceptualizations of what I named creative economy policy discourses. At the same time, the state-
ment shows how the members of this media for social transformation grasp the contradictions present
in national policies, which, on the one hand, introduced a new communication services law striving for
media democratization; and on the other, stimulated an industrial approach to culture - including me-
dia - that disregards the groups they wanted to include in the former. Indeed, despite the fact that there
has been a big change in the communication sector to encourage media logics beyond state funding and
private advertising, the cultural policies still support commercial culture through the idea of ‘cultural
industries’. Therefore, this initiative, which is interested in helping resource-scarce sectors of society,
criticizes the idea of cultural industries (whether in media or in other sectors), because it ignores the
different and unequal distribution of cultural capital. As one member of Barricada TV explains:
“The cultural industries policies are characterized by strong state intervention together
with stimulus for markets. However, they do not support the alive and dynamic experiences
of the popular classes, but that of the middle or upper classes that have a certain level of
cultural development and that use state support for individual and creative work, which is
not at all collective” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the
author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
This quote connects with the criticism of the concept of a ‘creative class’, which assumes that in a cre-
ative economy only certain groups of people are ‘creative’ enough to produce ‘culture’. This reinforces
a hierarchy of who is to be valued to elaborate products for markets and generate wealth, and who is
to be neglected, and in the worst case despised for being uncreative. This conﬁrms my criticism of a
commercial approach to culture, which, in contexts of high inequalities in terms of income distribution,
overlooks the barriers to access education and specialized training, causing differences to access knowl-
edge to work on varied cultural sectors. Additionally, the last part of the statement highlights the idea
of cultural industries relying on the notion of the individual artist, ignoring collective cultural expres-
sions. This is one of the arguments that grassroots experiences employ to reject the ‘entrepreneurial’
and ‘individual’ approach of the creative economy policy discourses, undermining the role of collec-
tive experiences striving for social transformations. For these reasons, from the standpoint of actors
striving for social change toward more egalitarian societies, the commercial approach of the creative
economy policy discourses has to be substantially criticized.
A ﬁnal feature to remark regarding Barricada TV’s imaginary is their view on work organization
and property, as one member describes: “We work collaboratively, in community, with roles that keep
changing. There is no unique owner of the means of production, instead they are collectively owned”
(Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Ar-
gentina). This can be understood as the translation of IMPA’s practices of workers’ self-management
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and collective property to this media organization, which also departs from traditional ways of intellec-
tual property rights, like the ones CPEtv used. Conversely, Barricada TV employs Creative Commons
licenses, because of the following two reasons explained by one of its members:
“First, because what matters most to us is that our contents circulate to contest the con-
struction of subjectivities. We want to reach everyone. Second, because we think that knowl-
edge is collective and that culture is a shared common. We only ask for an acknowledgment
of our work and that it is not used for proﬁt. In sum, we think that the more you liberate
content, the more it ﬂows” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated
by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
The last reason in this statement clearly sides with the perspective of collective creativity that I dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, opposing the individual perspective defended by the DCMS. Furthermore, the
ﬁrst reason supports the argument that the channel is a sort of dispositive to disseminate the speciﬁc
imaginary and practices of the organization, since it puts the focus on the ‘construction of subjectivities’,
which in the language of SKAD would mean the offering of new subject positions.
In the ﬁnal analysis, Barricada TV and CPEtv both illustrate how their imaginaries have been
shaped by historical processes in a speciﬁc geographic location, which leads to producing different
types of interpretation schemes, with particular knowledge and varying degrees of opposition to the
creative economy policy discourses. Despite the several points these two cases share, there are also
differences that are worth insisting on. First, the co-operative movement is an international initiative
that also emanated from the UK, which is a paradoxical element it has in common with the creative
industries discourse. Conversely, the MNER was autochthonous from Argentina, although it evidently
has been inﬂuenced by anarchist, Marxist and socialist thought and practice. Therefore, the actors and
the type of knowledge they aim to disseminate, differs from the former. Second, they share the same
criticism against mass media and coincide in the need to create alternative networks of communication
to inﬂuence social change, to spread values of collaboration, co-operation and solidarity. But, while the
co-operatives have a set of normative principles to follow the aim of slowly changing society, and in
general avoiding direct overt conﬂict, Barricada TV presents another picture. It defends the struggle
of factories without the bosses movement, where conﬂict has been more recent and violent, and thus
the urge to transform the prevailing social order is greater. Accordingly, their imaginary has a stronger
utopian side. Third, co-operatives by principle accept members of all political orientations, while the
alternative channels are clearly oriented toward those parties that defend workers’ positions, opposing
the ‘bourgeoisie’. Fourth, both cases aim to reach mass audiences, but with different strategies. The
co-operatives want to compete in markets for viewers’ attention and proﬁts to diffuse their own princi-
ples and values, whereas Barricada TV uses a different strategy of sustainability relying on a network
of collaborators and income not obtained through advertising or propaganda. Last but not least, this
difference in terms of the sources of ﬁnancial income affect the technological and infrastructural con-
ditions of each case, which is an issue I shall detail in chapter 6. Nonetheless, I shall also discuss in
chapter 7 that higher technological investment does not necessarily mean that they have been more
effective in spreading their imaginary.
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5.4 Wall Kintún TV, Argentina
This case illustrates a different type of media for social transformation, whose main difference derives
from the actors that run this channel, members of the Mapuche indigenous community of Argentina.
In this section, I shall ﬁrst show how the adverse historical conditions that these communities have
suffered inﬂuenced their demands to have their own media. Nonetheless, I will describe that in contrast
to the previous two cases, Wall Kintún TV experienced a serious conﬂict during the process of setting up
its channel that hampered its full operation. Taking into account this hurdle in the second subsection,
I shall analyze the main features of the imaginary of this case synthesized in Table 5.1, pointing out
how it opposes the creative economy policy discourses.
5.4.1 The Mapuches and the Road to the Channel
Alternative media approaches take the existence of a media structure dominated by the state and pri-
vate ﬁrms for granted; notwithstanding, this perspective leaves aside actors that existed before nation
states. As I explained in chapter 3, in the 1870s Argentina conducted the so-called ‘conquest of the
desert’, which acquired almost the entire lower half of the current territory of the country. Moyano
(2013) remarks that for the Argentinean elite of the 19th century this campaign was the apex of the
construction of the national project. However, he points out that the indigenous community occupy-
ing the territories, the Mapuche, had the role of ‘the wretched of the earth’, a phrase in allusion to
Fanon, who described a similar oppression within another context so well (Fanon 2008). Why? Because
the expansion implied a brutal attack on the Mapuche, backed by the ofﬁcial version of Argentinean
history at that time, which argued that as the Mapuche originated in the Paciﬁc coast and crossed
the Andes to settle on the other side of the cordillera (Ministerio de Cultura y Educación 1982), they
were ‘foreign’ to the territories claimed by the Argentinean military. Contrarily, for the Mapuche it
had always been their land, called Wallmapu, which in the Mapuche language - Mapunzugun - means
‘Mapuche nation’. There they had their own political organization, language, culture, etc. (Moyano
2013), before the existence of Argentina. However, the Mapuche were defeated and their territories
were given to army personnel or those close to the government, even though members of the indige-
nous community still inhabited them. This illustrates how the Mapuche were victims of the expansion
of the Argentinean nation-state that continued the European colonial project (Moyano 2013). During
the 20th century, the state reinforced the control of the newly acquired territories, and the Mapuche
had no other choice than to accept and learn the customs the winners imposed, such as the Spanish
language and cultural schemes needed to survive and adapt to the new conditions. Notwithstanding,
since the return of democracy to Argentina, there has been an increase of claims from Mapuche com-
munities to recover what they understand as theirs, which has led to conﬂictive confrontations with
the nation-state, but also to advancements, such as the privileged inclusion of indigenous communities
in the new audiovisual communication services law I described in Section 4.1.2.2. This new legislation
ﬁnally paved the way for these communities to obtain their media, which in theory would become tools
to counterbalance what they frame as the biased coverage of mass media, both private and public.
In this historical context, the channel Wall Kintun TV is located in the city of Bariloche, in the
province of Río Negro, which is an Argentinean city that contrasts a lot with the previous two. Let
me set the stage. The city has around 110.000 inhabitants and, given its privileged location next to a
lake and at the foot of a mountain, it is one of the most famous touristic attractions for nationals and
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foreigners to enjoy the wonderful landscapes and outdoor sports. The ofﬁcial narrative states that the
city is an European invention (Moyano 2013); although this statement might hold true for some areas
of Bariloche that even copy Swiss architecture, it is deﬁnitely not true for all. The Mapuche lived there
long before the arrival of the conquerors and the creation of Argentina. In fact, the city’s name is an
inheritance of their past, because Bariloche in Mapunzugun means ‘people from behind the mountain’,
in reference to the Mapuche, who lived facing the other side of the Andes on the shores of the paciﬁc
ocean. There are several Mapuche communities living in the surroundings of the city and in other parts
of the province and neighboring ones. However, for most tourists - and even locals - the Mapuche are
invisible, until some conﬂict erupts with the state and private landowners. Considering this neglect,
the Lonko (chief in Mapunzugun) of the Buenoleo Mapuche community in Bariloche had the idea to
start their own media in order to report about land struggles in the region from their point of view. In
this way, they aimed to unveil what they considered biases in the coverage of the ‘white skinned men’
media (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bar-
iloche, Argentina). They originally applied for a radio license, but to their surprise, government ofﬁcials
proposed a TV channel license and promised to provide everything they would need for its operation.
Why did this offer take place? It can only be understood in the context of the national struggle at the
time between the government and the Clarín Group over the enactment of the new audiovisual media
law, which I described in chapter 3. Because, although the law had been issued in 2009, since then it
had been legally questioned by the most inﬂuential media ﬁrm, Clarín, which introduced injunctions to
stop its full application. However, these injunctions expired December 7th, 2012, a date called the 7D by
the government, which organized campaigns and acts to defend the new law and mobilize against the
media conglomerate (Wikipedia 2014b). In this scenario of political tensions, the Buenoleo community
received the proposal to set up the TV channel few weeks before the 7D and the whole process was
expedited so that they could inaugurate the channel on that day. An interpretation of these events is
that the state wanted to show how the new law was democratizing voices, giving loudspeakers to those
who had been historically silenced by mass media and the state. Nonetheless, this particular context
of confrontation and the need of the government to speed up the project led to the alternative interpre-
tation that the regime was attempting to control the NGO media encouraged by the new law. Indeed,
this perspective was supported by errors in the process of accelerating Wall Kintun TV’s project; for
example, some weeks prior to the launch of the channel, the Buenoleo community found out that its
name had already been chosen by government ofﬁcials: Wall Kintun TV, which in Mapunzugun means
“to look or search around” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in
San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). The problem with this is that from the start the community had a
reduced level of participation in the process of constructing their own media, thus opposing the ideals
of the new law to foster independent NGO media; a situation that would further escalate, as I will
describe in the next paragraphs.
On December 7th, the project was inaugurated during one of the events in Bariloche under MICA,
the state program promoting the cultural industries policy discourse in the region. The inauguration
of the channel was widely disseminated by the local and national government as a success in media
democratization and as a way to undermine the criticism the new audiovisual communication services
law was receiving from Clarín and other media opposing the national administration. As an illustra-
tion, one of the public servants of the government, Pereira Cotaro, working for the Consejo de Desarrollo
de las Comunidades Indígenas (CODECI - Council for the Development of Indigenous Communities)
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that was involved in setting up the TV channel, stated:
“We believe there is an information deﬁcit in Bariloche, because the only open television
channel is part of Clarín and functions with little content of Bariloche and not reﬂecting the
communities surrounding the city. So, our idea is to make a general channel, but with a clear
editorial line that makes Mapuche in Bariloche visible, because a large part of the population,
or perhaps most, is Mapuche. We also seek to generate an internal reﬂection in society about
where we come from and where do we go” (Terra Argentina 2012, translated by the author).
As this quote illustrates, the aim of the channel at that point was quite similar to the previous two
cases: to generate content relevant for local communities in opposition to mass media, which ignored
their perspectives. However, the actor disseminating the imaginary of Wall Kintun TV was part of
the national administration at that time, something that contrasts with the previous two cases, and
something that would quickly change.
At ﬁrst sight, this inauguration at the end of 2012 was a success. One of the indigenous com-
munities that have been suffering from oppression by the state and mass media ﬁrms, would ﬁnally
start reporting from its perspective through audiovisual media. But this honeymoon would not last
long, as one member of Wall Kintun TV described: “The government drove us to do this, and then left
us there” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de
Bariloche, Argentina). What happened? In 2013, the spokesperson of the Buenoleo community pub-
licly denounced that the political authorities intervened in the channel, stating that, one year after its
inauguration, Wall Kintun TV was still a “TV channel without cameras” and an “opportunistic manip-
ulation of ‘ofﬁcials hampering the full exercise of our rights”’ (Señales 2013, translated by the author).
Which were the reasons for this denouncement? Members of the Buenoleo community recount that:
“These people already had everything planned, the name of the channel, the team, even the date for
the inauguration! The emblematic 7D ... Thus, they misused the media law for their political conﬂicts
that are foreign to indigenous communities. So, in that rush, they borrowed all the necessary things”
(Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche,
Argentina). This testimony shows how members of Wall Kintun TV share the interpretation that they
were used by the national administration as part of the national struggle between the state and the
Clarín group described in Section 3.4.2. The state wanted to show how the new law was democratiz-
ing voices by showing the successful implementation of an indigenous community channel, yet this
required technologies and knowledge on how to use them that the Mapuche community certainly did
not have. Accordingly, to show results in a few days, the management of the channel and the decision
of what would be ﬁlmed, were left in the hands of members close to the government4 and not part of
the Buenoleo Mapuche community, which still carried all the legal responsibility for what could hap-
pen in the workplace (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San
Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This had some advantages, but also clear disadvantages that would
limit the original aims of the media project demanded by the Mapuche. On the one hand, those who
took charge would be able to produce content related to the Mapuche quickly, satisfying the need for
content that a continuous TV channel has. On the other hand, those in charge had a close connection
with the government and thus they would not show the most conﬂictive issues that the Mapuche have
4. It is worth pointing out that some of those who took charge of the channel were Mapuche but not from the Buenoleo
community, and in some cases had already received training in audiovisual media, even though they were partisans of the
government.
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over territories disputing the state. Additionally, there was limited participation of the members of the
Buenoleo community in the project; thus, they felt as outsiders even though the channel was ‘theirs’.
In sum, these features are well known in development studies, they characterize a typical top-down
approach to project implementation, closely connected with the ruling party, that in this case conspired
against the democratization aims of the initiative to express the voice of the indigenous community,
which was left in an underdog position.
In 2013, one year after the ofﬁcial inauguration, the public denouncement by the Buenoleo commu-
nity led to the expulsion of the previous management of the channel. Unfortunately, the management
took with them most of what they had brought to the experience, such as equipment, the working team
and the contacts and knowledge for operating the channel. This, and in general the delay of the channel
to enter into operation, received a lot of coverage in private mass media, which attacked the govern-
ment and the new law, such as articles in the newspapers Clarín, La Nación and Perﬁl that belong to
the Clarín group (Andrade 2012; Crettaz 2013; Direnzo 2014). In all cases, the aim was to cast doubt
on the democratization objectives of the new audiovisual communication services law, which they por-
trayed just as a way of the government to limit mass media private ﬁrms freedom of expression. After
the public denouncement, Wall Kintun TV has been receiving support from different state organiza-
tions to reverse the problematic foundation so that they could get the needed ﬁnancial and technical
resources to produce content. When I was conducting ﬁeldwork, the Buenoleo community directly as-
sumed the management of the channel, trying to solve the hurdles blocking their project. To conclude,
the historical struggles of indigenous communities and the particular facts in the process of setting up
their channel delineate a completely different trajectory from the previous two, which once again leads
to a peculiar imaginary opposing the creative economy policy discourses in several dimensions, as I
shall show in the next section.
5.4.2 The Imaginary
Similarly to the previous cases, the imaginary of Wall Kintun TV is a product of the speciﬁc historical
conditions that led the actors - in this case the Mapuche - to strive for their own media channel. How-
ever, Wall Kintun TV is different compared to the previous two cases, because the conﬂicts in setting
up their TV channel that I described in the previous section stopped them from producing continuous
audiovisual content, at least during the time I conducted ﬁeldwork. Consequently, the description of
the imaginary of this case substantially more concerns its utopian dimension or vision of how it would
operate in the future if they are able to surpass the limits they encountered during ﬁeldwork. To delin-
eate the main characteristics of their imaginary, I focus on statements of the members of the Buenoleo
Mapuche community that express what they would like to do with their channel, giving less impor-
tance to those uttered by the ﬁrst management linked to the national government, although I quote
some initial content where these different projects are still covered.
The ﬁrst element to consider is the aim of the channel, which is illustrated by the following state-
ment of one of the members of Wall Kintún TV:
“[...] to empower ourselves through this media and to start building a communication
platform to disseminate and have impact. Why? Because until now, only the oppressors have
spoken, and only those who have speciﬁc interests in the Mapuche territories, only those trying
to discredit our legitimate and historical struggle, which is holding on to rights” (Wall Kin-
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tun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche,
Argentina).
This quote is linked with the reasons that led them to ask for a channel in the ﬁrst place: to spread
narratives of their realities from their points of view, covering the struggles to recover the territories
they argue that the state illegally obtained from them. Furthermore, the expression that only the op-
pressors have spoken so far, uses the language of anti- and post-colonial struggles worldwide, revealing
that they consider obtaining their own media, as a decolonization tool against the biased or total lack
of coverage in mass media of their struggles. This aim sharply contrasts with the one of the creative
economy policy discourses, which just encourage media for proﬁts, but not the ﬁght against historical
processes of oppression. This is an important observation that supports the argument on how such
policy discourses cannot fully become an inclusive ‘development’ option.
A second important aspect to point out is that the members of Wall Kintún TV reject the classiﬁ-
cations of their media project as an alternative, community, co-operative, popular or radical channel.
Instead, one of its members explained that: “We are not a community channel, as they want to label
us. Neither is it a state channel nor any other of those labels that they try to put on us. We are a Ma-
puche channel that has a different philosophy and worldview from the Western one” (Wall Kintun TV,
15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This
statement stresses that they are an indigenous channel, which, as I explained in chapter 2, makes
evident the limits of the terms employed by Western academics who are missing the point with the
speciﬁcities of the initiatives by indigenous communities.
The aim of the Buenoleo community of diffusing the Mapuche worldview, together with the actors,
addressees of their imaginary and their perspective on technology are present in the following text of
the teaser used for the ﬁrst inauguration of the channel:
“Nature has always communicated with us. We are part of it. Through technology, we
were invaded from thousands of kilometers away, by foreign information that we do not
need. That was the only way we had been informed, until now. The ﬁrst indigenous Argen-
tinean channel has arrived to Bariloche, Wall Kintún has arrived, ‘To search around’. Com-
munication from the origins, with a complete schedule, analysis, entertainment, information
from our city, from the world, from our town and from the world’s indigenous movements.
A unique audiovisual service, a local, intercultural Mapuche channel. A new, broad, diverse,
balanced and democratic TV. Wall Kintun TV has arrived for all. We are the ﬁrst ones,
we are not going to be the only ones” (Wall Kintun TV 2012, translated by the author).
The quote employs personal pronouns to refer to the actors that will produce content for the channel,
members of the Mapuche community and also of indigenous movements in similar struggles around
the country and the world. Additionally, it makes clear that even though the content is going to be
focused on indigenous communities, they aim to reach everyone. Apart from the previous point, the
statement describes the position that this case has with respect to mass media and technology. Indeed,
they acknowledge that they were ‘invaded’ by foreign information, particularly referring to media,
such as TV, press and radio, which from their perspective disseminate Western values and ideas in
Argentina, emanating from Buenos Aires. This point of view would match the interpretation that
I have been stressing of media as dispositives of different types of discourses. From the Mapuches
standpoint, the existing media only reinforced the ideas, practices and values of those that have a
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Western origin. Conversely, with their channel they aim to inform in a different way, thus suggesting
their own media would act as a dispositive, but this time to stimulate the perspective of indigenous
communities. However, at the time I conducted ﬁeldwork, they were technologically dependent from
other organizations and the state, which borrowed or donated the equipment they had. Furthermore,
there were no clear practical guidelines on how to distance themselves from the ‘professional’ patterns
of audiovisual production followed by mainstream media; issues that I shall discuss further in chapter
6 and 7 respectively.
As regards the Mapuche worldview, they claim that they respect nature, quite different from the
Western industrial civilization. According to Grebe (2005), this is due to the Mapuche cosmovision that
believes in the existence of spirits, which guard different types of natural resources (woods, stones, wa-
ter, etc.) and with whom the Mapuche must enter into a respectful dialog in case they want to use the
resources the spirits preserve. Regardless if one shares such a belief or not, it shows a different media-
tion between humans and nature that departs from the Western approach to knowledge as a tool over
nature (Sagasti 2000). More generally, a central objective of Wall Kintun TV’s project is to preserve and
disseminate their worldview and practices for future generations, as one member expressed: “Maybe
someday in the future, our grandchildren will be enjoying a channel like discovery, but dedicated to
indigenous communities. That is the project that we have, let’s see if we can carry it out” (Wall Kintun
TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). But
which are the speciﬁcities of the Mapuche worldview? As Grebe et al. (1972) explain, the Mapuches
have a dualistic cosmovision that can be analyzed in different dimensions. Vertically, they believe that
the cosmos is made up by seven horizontal platforms, where one is the natural world, two levels are
occupied by evil spirits and the remaining four by good spirits, ancestors and gods. Horizontally, they
organize their natural level with the cardinal points, but by taking the East as our North, a decision
that might be inﬂuenced by the place where they emerged, looking to the Paciﬁc and the Andes. They
believe that these levels are inhabited by good and bad supernatural and human beings. They also
have a circular organization of time and space, which rotates counterclockwise, which inﬂuences how
their houses (ruka in Mapunzugun) are constructed and the communication patterns they use in ritu-
als and other everyday activities. Thus, their cosmovision, of which I only presented a very synthetic
glance, clearly departs from the Western one and has been the cause of conﬂicts around land disputes,
where Western laws and the Mapuche perspective on land collide (Grebe, Pacheco, and Segura 1972).
This particular worldview explains their desire to record and disseminate their traditions by them-
selves through their own perspectives, as a way to preserve their culture and their stories, which are
given little attention in mass media, and implicitly neglected in the creative economy policy discourses
due to their scarce contribution to economic growth. Evidently, commercial cultural policies do not
tackle the needs of these communities to preserve and expand their cultural practices and worldviews.
But the Mapuche consider the preservation and dissemination of their practices as urgent, because of
the threats of what they call a ‘neoxtractivist model’ implemented by the national government (Praﬁl
2013), based on the extraction of natural resources, with negative environmental consequences. In
many cases, the Mapuche and other indigenous organizations living in such territories suffer the con-
sequences, which not only threatens their particular worldview, but their lives, as the following quote
by one of its members shows: “The Mapuche have their own way of interacting with nature, but if
these communities disappear, also a culture will be lost. That is why we reject such policies. We are
not struggling for money or just for land, but for life itself” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview
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with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Consequently, this threat
puts the imaginary of the Mapuche in a position of sharp mistrust against initiatives that put proﬁts
above anything else, because from their point of view precisely such a perspective is threatening their
survival.
As regards participation, the imaginary that Wall Kintun TV members want to implement has
speciﬁc limits to what sorts of actors will be covered, which is explained in the next quote by one of the
members of the channel:
“We are not going to spread much material about the Mapuche who are part of political
parties or the Catholic Church, because these contents are Western. Besides, religion is still
a colonization force, and political parties have many own interests contrary to the life of the
Mapuche people. For example, the pacts the government made with oil and mining ﬁrms”
(Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de
Bariloche, Argentina).
Indeed, the statement reveals how after the conﬂict with governmental ofﬁcials during the foundation
of the channel, the new Mapuche management has decided to avoid intromissions in national poli-
tics. Instead, they want to focus on their own people and its expressions, which the same interviewee
described:
“The Mapuche worldview is circular. We understand we are not going to speak in the
name of the Mapuche, instead the Mapuche people will speak on the screen. The idea is to
record everyone. from children to the elderly and varied Mapuche expressions” (Wall Kin-
tun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche,
Argentina).
On the one hand, this quote refers to their concept of participation, which mirrors the name of the
channel - to look around - and their logo, even though they were not chosen by the Buenoleo community.
On the other hand, the emphasis on their circular perspective also stresses their particular worldview.
Indeed, Figure 5.4 shows the logo of the channel, whose circle to the left of the name of the experience
represents the Mapuche cosmovision of dividing the earth in four cardinal points (Grebe, Pacheco,
and Segura 1972), assigning to each quadrant speciﬁc qualities of good and evil that exemplify their
“dialectic, dualistic, spiritualist” cosmovision (Grebe 1973, p. 28).
Neither the cultural industries nor intellectual property rights were matters of concern for Wall
Kintun TV. On the one hand, this has to do with the fact that they are not yet continuously produc-
ing, and thus did not discuss strategies to attract funds for sustaining their activities. On the other
hand, the initiative resembles Barricada TV more than CPEtv in terms of aims and working prac-
tices, because the Mapuche are inclined toward a collective approach to property and knowledge, and
in disseminating content about their struggles independent of a commercial ambition. Once again, the
creative or cultural industries strategy for culture and communication oriented mostly just for proﬁt,
does not match the stated objectives of this grassroots experience.
To conclude, Wall Kintun TV offers an example of a different type of media for social transformation,
led by members of an indigenous community, which are often neglected in Western research, given the
underrepresentation of these actors in academia. Similarly to the previous two cases, Wall Kintun TV
aims to disseminate content about the speciﬁc imaginary they believe in, but in contrast, this imag-
inary wants to preserve and reproduce a worldview and practices previous to the expansion of the
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citizens media emerged to cover what mass media ignored or purposefully misrepresented. One of
them, Mídia NINJA, quickly attracted a lot of national and even international attention5, due to their
reporting of street violence, evidencing how mass media ignored the situation and questioning their
presumed objectivity. I shall analyze this case in detail, which operates in a different media system
and was inﬂuenced by the speciﬁc political tensions and discussions on cultural policies that took place
in Brazil. Thus, the structural conditions deﬁne different departure points. Indeed, I shall describe
that Mídia NINJA is a spin-off of a network of cultural collectives that emerged and expanded - in part
- to the inﬂuence of the national policies favoring network organizations and the adoption of ICT. I shall
argue that this network, called Fora do Eixo (FDE - Off Axis), is essential to understand this media
for social transformation. A second key difference with the other cases is that Mídia NINJA diffuses
all of its content online, and in the midst of the protests in Brazil was able to challenge national mass
media in ways unthought of in the previous three cases in Argentina. However, this case is not just
another media experience based on ICT; contrariwise, Mídia NINJA is part of a network that has
been advancing a speciﬁc imaginary striving for a more collaborative economy and society. This aim
has shaped their practices, in particular those in their media experience, and delineates a peculiar
imaginary, which I will synthesize in Table 5.1. For these reasons, I shall ﬁrst describe the main
features of FDE, which then allow me to explain the speciﬁc context of emergence of Mídia NINJA.
Finally, I will connect these facts with an analysis of the main dimensions of the peculiar imaginary of
this media for social transformation, contrasting it with those of the creative economy policy discourses.
5.5.1 History of Fora do Eixo
FDE’s history goes back to an experience created in 2001 in the city of Cuiabá, in the interior of Matto
Grosso, a state in the south-west of Brazil. This experience, called Espaço Cubo (Cube Space), was
founded by four students of social communication, who wanted to offer a new model in opposition to
the ‘conservative business models’ that prevailed in the city (Ferreira 2007). Espaço Cubo operated col-
lectively, which meant that every member lived in a collective house, with shared maintenance costs,
food and even clothes among its members. At the time, this was a radical decision due to their lack
of resources, but a decision that would later turn out to be productive. Their aim was to organize
festivals, events and to support the creative production process of local bands and their circulation to
other Brazilian cities, trying to overcome the difﬁculties of being far from the leading cultural centers
in the country (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro). For achieving this, they introduced two extra innova-
tions. First, they employed Creative Commons to diffuse the productions of the artists they supported,
challenging the prevailing copyrights business model. Second, they implemented a complementary
currency to ﬁnance their activities and to exchange with their partners, which I shall detail in chap-
ter 6. Therefore, the collective lifestyle and their approach to IPR siding with free or open licenses,
already sets a clear boundary separating this cultural network from the commercial practices of the
creative economy policy discourses, which in the extreme version of the DCMS assume individualism
and traditional copyrights to sell cultural products and services.
In December 2005, three other collectives from small cities of the interior of Brazil (Uberlândia
in Minas Gerias, Rio Branco in Accre and Londrina in Paraná), joined with Espaço Cubo to create
the cultural circuit FDE. Their aims were to stimulate the production, circulation and distribution of
5. Indeed, the coverages of Mídia NINJA were reported by The New York Times (Romero, Simon and Neuman, William 2013),
The Guardian (Bainbridge 2014), Deutsche Welle (Krieger, Renate and Weise, Christina 2013), among others.
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content from the interior of Brazil, which was ignored by the so-called ‘axis’ (São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro). In particular, FDE began its operations in the music sector, beneﬁting from the technological
change in ICT that allowed collaborative and creative commons practices to ﬂourish for distributing
artistic productions (Freire Zangrandi 2011). From 2006 to 2008, the network diffused its ideas through
cultural events and conferences, but just kept the same number of collectives. From 2008 onwards, the
network expanded after the organization of the ﬁrst FDE congress in Cuiabá. As members of the
network pointed out, they ofﬁcially launched their complementary currency (more details in chapter
6), ‘Cards’ and invited other collectives to join. Given the similar restrictive conditions that cultural
collectives in other cities were facing, many found the model of the network attractive and joined. Three
years later, FDE was composed of 120 collectives emulating, although with different degrees, the model
of Espaço Cubo.
According to Cláudio Prado, an ex policy maker in the area of digital culture of the Ministry of
Culture and now contributing with FDE, the network was quite successful because:
“[...] they looked at the problem from the point of view of a band, which needs to gather, to
play and to displace from one city to another for their performances. Today bands departing
from the northeast cross Brazil entirely and visit other Latin American countries, all with
solidarity hosting and solidarity food. Their articulation is digital, but it is something ana-
logical what they constructed that did not exist before” (C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview with
& translated with the author in São Paulo, Brazil).
What is important to highlight from the statement is how an experience departing considerably from
the principles of the creative economy policy discourses was able to expand all across the country and
address unfulﬁlled issues in the music sector thanks to its collaborative practices of organization, such
as ‘solidarity hosting’ or ‘solidarity food’. As I shall explain in chapter 6, these are all practices that
challenge the intermediation of national currency for the exchange of goods and services, by using other
ways of establishing the transactions instead, with the aim to address the lack of ﬁnancial resources.
In this way, the network has been able to surpass some of its ﬁnancial limits, and in the middle, it
created a speciﬁc imaginary that reinforces these different ‘collaborative’ practices. The following text
from a video distributed in 2013 captures some essential elements of the imaginary, which is important
to later understand the organization from which Mídia NINJA emerged:
“The strength of indigenous and urban communities derives from their shared knowl-
edge processes that create feedbacks among them and the organic structures of another
new possible world.
‘The collective is making the change, not an individual’
Festivals, actions, projects, become ﬁelds of free training, where we are all learning
and teaching (#vivencias #percursosinﬁnitos). The city and cognitive environments are
formative, the training is free and in ﬂow. Houses become collective homes and a hive of
cultural inventions that create and make possible new ways of life. To support this process
the economy is reinvented, social currencies, collective cash arise, which promote and
sustain methodologies marked by generosity.
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From griôs6 to hackers, from urban tribes7 to ‘povos de terreiro’8, from cyber-
activists to indigenous communities. The sum of differences approaches and recreates
connections; plurality and potency; elaborates narratives; afﬁrms identities, new ways of liv-
ing are reinvented; what was only thought now has become practice. It has never been
as possible. They can call us optimistic. Yes, in fact we are. To change the world, one
must believe, work every day in its construction, so that we can advance. Work and life
go together, with will, courage, and enough force to make it happen. The new tomorrow
already began yesterday” (Fora do Eixo 2013a).
First, the text includes worlds that reveal the utopian bent of the network, in the sense of what I
discussed in chapter 2, an imaginary that claims to offer a different type of society. This can be detected,
on the basis of the employment of the term ‘another new possible world’, which is the motto of the World
Social Forum (Fisher and Ponniah 2003). Its inclusion is not a coincidence, given that the forum began
in Brazil and inspired several civil society organizations and social movements to keep on struggling
to transform realities they consider to be unjust. Furthermore, during the last paragraph they make
another indirect reference to the utopian character of their endeavor, declaring that their construction
of their new possible world has already began, and thus, it is a concrete utopia, and not something
distant in the future such as Francis Bacon’s ‘New Atlantis’ or Thomas Moro’s ‘Utopia’.
Second, the text introduces key concepts that are part of the discourse of the collaborative economy
that they want to put into practice through ICT. For example, the term ‘shared knowledge processes’ is
connected to their concept of free training, which does not only refer to the fact that they do not charge,
but also to the lack of rigidity in transmitting knowledge. In other words, an attempt to eliminate
disciplinary boundaries brought with specialization, which have been central for training Mídia NINJA
journalists. Similarly, in the text they mention ‘generosity’ that also points to the free sharing of
knowledge, which implicitly is a challenge to the approach of protected, and restricted copyrights of the
initial versions of the creative economy policy discourses. As I explained in chapter 4, the perspective of
FDE is relevant to allow resource-scarce sectors of the population to access knowledge. Finally, the text
refers to several concepts that reveal the importance of ICT in the experience, such as Twitter tags, or
the use of the word ‘ﬂow’, which is theoretically related to discussions on cyberculture (Lévy 1999), a
neologism that alludes to the new practices that ICT paved the way for, thanks to the easy access and
the sharing of diverse types of knowledge.
Third, the text states that the network puts the collective over the individual, which is clearly op-
posite to the DCMS perspective on the creative industries, where culture is an individual act. Indeed,
as I discussed in Section 4.2, the more general subject position of the ‘creative entrepreneur’ suggests
an individual person, instead of a collective organization. But, what does FDE mean with ‘collective’?
The connotation of the word emanates from the founding of the organization described in the previ-
ous section, Espaço Cubo, the ﬁrst collective of FDE, which from the start operated with its members
living in a collective way, changing the relation of humans and property by sharing the same physical
space, food, clothes, etc., and thus establishing a collective approach to their creative endeavors. It is
6. This neologism is a Brazilian word inspired by the term griot, which refers to West African storytellers who keep the tradi-
tion through oral stories. As a difference, in Brazil the concept was broadened to include any person (not only Afro-descendant)
who shares stories and traditions of particular Brazilian communities (Grãos de Luz Griô 2012).
7. This alludes to the concept of urban tribe (Maffesoli 1988), as a group with similar worldviews, dressing styles, musical
taste, etc., which are in contact with FDE and the cultural activities they promote.
8. This refers to Afro-descendant communities in Brazil and their spaces to preserve African worldviews and religious prac-
tices, which are also important in strengthening the social ties in their location (Instituto de Políticas Relacionais 2013).
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important to realize that this practice rejects the predominant principles in any bureaucratic cultural
organization or ﬁrm that is based on the tenets that the creative industries policy discourses assume.
The latter assume a hierarchy of control, standardization processes and speciﬁc rules and norms that
contribute to a system based on individualist practices, aiming at efﬁciency and proﬁts, and focused
on private property (Morais 2013). Conversely, the collective way of living deﬁes the implicit accepted
relation between individuality and property, and as I shall later describe, alters the ends of these
organizations beyond ﬁnancial proﬁts. Furthermore, this collective organization encourages group pro-
cesses of creativity, which my discussions in Section 4.2 illustrated, coinciding with the observations
from the sociology of knowledge and research on creativity (Runco 2007; Zerubavel 1997), which claim
that creativity is never a purely individual act, but always inﬂuenced by the context and the sources the
inventors or the creators had contact with. Accordingly, the collective lifestyle of FDE seems to make
these results from research more evident, breaking the ﬁctitious barriers of authorship in cultural and
media works that are introduced by a commercial approach.
Fourth, this collective ideal led them to question the socially accepted way of economic exchange,
which is mentioned in the text when they refer to reinventing the economy. This alludes to the use of
different exchange systems for products and services than the national currency, which is an instance
of the global increase in community currencies worldwide as a way to address the issues that the
scarcity of national or regional currencies generates9. In chapter 6, I shall detail these technologies; in
particular, how they shaped the reinterpretation of media technologies by Mídia NINJA.
Fifth, the text stresses some of the actors and addressees that are part of the experience by consid-
ering a diversity of groups, such as Afro-descendant, cyberactivists, indigenous communities, among
others. This broad list considerably departs from the creative economy policy discourses, because it
directly addresses actors that the economically oriented perspectives usually neglect. But who are the
members of this network? Despite the diversity of those mentioned in the text, those interviewed de-
ﬁne themselves to be part of the middle class or the new middle class, thus although they focus a lot
of their activities to the excluded sectors in Brazil, not all belong strictly to such a group. The network
has members of different ethnic backgrounds (Afro-descendant, indigenous, European, Asian). The
majority of their members are young adults up to 35 years old, although it also has older members and
collaborators above that age limit. The relatively young average age of FDE’s members might explain
why it has been quite successful with digital technologies, because many of its members are digital na-
tives. It is also relevant here to point out that despite the horizontality in discourse, there is deﬁnitely
a hierarchy in the network, not only in terms of functions, but also in terms of the relevance of the
collective houses and the experience that each member has.
An important fact to highlight is that the inclusion of a diversity of addressees reveals the inﬂuence
on FDE by the ongoing changes in national cultural policies at the time in Brazil. As I explained in Sec-
tion 3.4.3, the arrival of Lula to power in 2003 made the musician Gilberto Gil Minister of Culture, who
stimulated the creation of networks of cultural practices spanning the diversity of previously neglected
ethnic and resource-scarce groups in Brazil, trying to counter-balance the preexisting commercially
oriented policies. Moreover, Gilberto Gil introduced policies to promote solidarity economy practices,
cyberculture and the dissemination of Creative Commons as an alternative way to understand authors’
rights (Ministério da Cultura 2005). Thus, it is reasonable to think that the presence of those features
in FDE were inﬂuenced by the national policies at the time. Indeed, one of the founders of FDE later
9. For example, see the bibliography summarized online about community currencies (Schroeder 2013) or the International
Journal of Community Currency Research.
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remarked during a television interview that:
“We can state with conviction that what we did is the result of policies of what has hap-
pened in Brazil from 2003 onwards. Especially with the new cultural policies of the Ministry
of Culture, spearheaded by Gil and Juca Ferreira, which was a fundamental team that pro-
duced a turn in cultural policy discussions in Brazil” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).
Additionally, FDE had several connections with the Cultura Viva program I described in chapter
4.1.2.1. First, some of their collective houses from time to time received support by the Cultura Viva
program. Second, members and collaborators of FDE are quite active in the Cultura Viva movement,
such as the povos de terreiro. Thus, the approach of FDE shares the perspective advanced during Gil’s
and Ferreira’s administration at the Ministry of Culture, where they challenged the previous hierarchy
of high culture versus popular culture, associating the former with the one that really matters whereas
the latter with ‘low quality’. This logic is illustrated by the contrast that members of the network re-
mark between those who state that “we will take culture there” (Fora do Eixo member I, 13/03/2014,
interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil), that is to say, to disseminate ‘high
culture’ to unknown places to those who are not supposed to have it. Conversely, FDE claims to reﬂect
another approach, as the same member described: “We identify culture, people, projects and then we re-
late to them” (Fora do Eixo member I, 13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém
do Pará, Brazil). In sum, the key point is that the speciﬁc imaginary of FDE cannot be understood
without comprehending the inﬂuences of the national cultural policies at the time, which challenged
the creative economy policy discourses as schematized by UNCTAD or the DCMS.
From 2008 to 2011, the network expanded considerably. FDE afﬁrms to have reached 120 collec-
tives, 2000 members, a presence in 10 countries, the organization of 300 festivals, among others (Fora
do Eixo 2013d). Between 2011 to 2013 the network expanded even further in terms of the number of
collectives, distribution along the country and in diversifying its activities beyond the musical sector. In
2012, they declared to be present in 200 Brazilian cities and also expanded to the main urban centers
as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro (Fora do Eixo 2013d). This growth in size also went hand in hand
with a diversiﬁcation of their activities and a complexiﬁcation of the network. According to one of its
founders, Pablo Capilé: “Fora do Eixo works as an incubator” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).
That is to say, FDE began with the experience of Espaço Cubo almost a decade ago, and now supports
a wide variety of projects and alternative practices departing from the creative economy discourses.
Indeed, these projects are organized in four fronts: Universidade (University), Partido (Party), Banco
(Bank) and Mídia (Media). The university front is in charge of systematizing and replicating the unique
collaborative and other knowledge and practices the network generates. The party front is dedicated
to create and experiment with network policies (Morais 2013), beyond adherence to just one political
party and to the divisions of the political spectrum between left and right (Corrêa 2013). However, it is
also true that this claim to have a dialog with many parties, does not mean they do not have clear pref-
erences. Indeed, in social networks they have clearly supported the PT of Lula and Dilma against the
PSDB during the 2014 national election, not without expressing their differences. The bank front or-
ganizes the transactions of complementary currencies and coordinates how collectives deal with them.
Finally, the media front disseminates cultural expressions and activities of FDE, and precisely within
it, the project of Mídia NINJA emerged, as I shall describe in the next subsection.
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5.5.2 Toward Mídia NINJA
From 2011 onwards, FDE increased its level of activism and participation in national political debates,
beyond issues related to the cultural activities of the network. Thus, they did not only intervene against
the changes in cultural policies during Dilma’s ﬁrst government, but also became more outspoken in
struggles for LGBT rights, the legalization of drugs, protection of indigenous people, among others.
This expanded politicization is important for the research, because it paved the way for the emergence
of their own media, Mídia NINJA, which aimed to cover these political perspectives of the network. I
shall show how the emergence of this media for social transformation is linked with the previous media
experiences of FDE and the changes at the national level, together with the broader expansion of ICT
and the pressure this produced on journalism as a profession. These points shall illustrate the different
context of emergence of this case with respect to the previous three Argentinean ones.
A ﬁrst factor that contributed to the emergence of Mídia NINJA and its particular practices is the
previous experience that FDE already had in their media front. This area, which diffuses content of
different cultural expressions of the network across the country, pioneered the ﬁrst streaming coverage
of a mobilization called Marcha da Liberdade (March of Freedom) in São Paulo in 2011. This was
a protest against violent police repression that took place in a previous march in favor of marijuana
legalization, and more broadly to preserve the freedom to demonstrate (Galhardo 2011). Members of
FDE loaned equipment, a CPU in a backpack with a camera and a microphone, to transmit what was
happening online (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil). To their surprise, they had over 5.000 online followers, which showed them
that the format of live transmissions of events, without editions or cuts, could be attractive to viewers,
which led them to replicate the experience. Speciﬁcally, members of FDE thought it could be useful
to address the problem of the cultural peripheries in Brazil (those far from the axis São Paulo-Rio de
Janeiro I described in Section 3.4.1), as the following quote of the founder of FDE explains:
“The cities’ mass media do not disseminate what is happening in other states, because they
hardly disclose what happens in their own cities. The Folha de Estado de Matto Grosso does
not diffuse what happens in the state’s culture. It only disseminates what takes place in Rio
de Janeiro or São Paulo. Thus, as we had no way of knowing what was going on in Accre, we
said ‘No!’, we will also have to create our own media” (Soares 2014, translated by the author).
This experience became known as Pôs-TV, because it contrasts with the traditional structured pro-
gramming grid of a typical TV channel, as one Mídia NINJA member describes: “The basic principles
we thought was for a TV after the TV, or Pôs-TV, prioritizing freedom of content and decentralizing
production” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil). Pôs-TV quickly became the inspiration for a way of distributing content in a format
posterior to the rigid continuous TV grid. FDE members began to use cellphones, notebooks and other
cameras to stream conferences, events, interviews, etc., to an online live audience10 through social
networks. This allowed a low cost ﬂow of information within and outside FDE, which implied that
the knowledge to make such transmissions was quickly replicated in most nodes of the network. The
point I want to highlight is that an initial experiment with streaming led FDE to institutionalize the
practice, in the sense of Berger & Luckmann (1966), because FDE members and their audience started
to routinize the live transmissions of events through cellphones and notebooks, which became a usual
10. A diversity of videos is accessible from their webpage that links to YouTube (Fora do Eixo 2014b).
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practice in every event organized or covered by the network. This practice of audiovisual production
opened alternative spaces where content could be recorded and diffused, which would later become
central to Mídia NINJA, differing from those of mass media and also of the three previous Argentinean
cases.
As regards national policies, after the arrival of Dilma to power, she selected a new Minister of
Culture, Ana de Hollanda, who broke with previous policies in the sector during Lula’s administration.
As I mentioned in chapter 4.1.1.2, the new administration returned to focus on artists, introduced the
creative economy as a national program, gave a strong endorsement to intellectual property rights and
cut support to the Cultura Viva program 11. Thus, Ana de Hollanda reduced the priority that previous
policies gave to the funding of resource-scarce, popular cultural expressions and digital culture. These
new policies were totally contrary to what the government had done in previous years, which allowed
FDE and other digital culture experiences to ﬂourish. Consequently, it is of no surprise that the net-
work became actively involved in political mobilizations to see this new minister resign (Mello Dias
2012). For these reasons, the network started to cover cultural policy discussions and to intervene
more actively in broader political debates that affected their interests, which made them understand
the importance of media for the dissemination of their perspectives.
The third factor was the massive expansion of ICT and the changes these brought to the practice of
journalism as a profession, as the next quote of a Mídia NINJA member shows:
“The crisis in journalism today is a crisis of intermediaries, because there are many more
people doing journalism, many more news channels, it is easier to access the internet and
social networks, and to get the tools, such as a computer or a cell phone. Today, it is far
easier than seven years ago to buy a computer, because interest decreased and there have
been governmental policies for poor people to access these tools” (Mídia NINJA member II,
18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).
Statistics conﬁrm this easiness to use ICT. Indeed, in 2013 Brazil passed the barrier of 100 million
internet users (UOL 2013), while in 2008 they had less than 40 million (Teleco 2014). As regards smart
phones, in 2013 analysts estimated Brazil was the country ranked fourth in terms of smart phone users,
with a total of 70 million (Reuters SP 2013). Finally, social networks in general are quite popular in
Latin American countries, and in particular in Brazil; for instance, during 2013 Facebook reached 76
million users (Reuters SP 2013). What is important to remark is that these technologies opened the
doors for new channels of communication and sources of information, besides mass media. Apart from
a broader access to ICT, the statement also points out the last factor, the crisis in journalism. The ex-
pansion of the internet and digital culture that challenged the music sector at the beginning of the 20th
century, has recently been affecting established journalism business models as well. One of the main
reasons for this is that internet users can read online news without paying or can distribute content
by themselves bypassing traditional media organizations. Accordingly, traditional media, like news-
papers, have been suffering a reduction in their audiences. Brazil was not an exception to this global
tendency, where the crisis in media was understood not only as a product of the introduction of ICT,
but also as a consequence of the way journalists were failing to cover the complexities in contemporary
societies (Martins Costa 2013a).
11. For the position of Ana de Hollanda, see her different blog posts (Hollanda 2014). For an example of the critics, see (Turino
2013).
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In this context, Mídia NINJA was founded at the end of 2012 by members of FDE. The project,
although not yet formalized, began with coverages of the World Social Forum 2013 in Tunisia (Diniz
2013) and with the reporting of the trial of murders of two environmental activists in the state of Pará,
in the Brazilian Amazon. During that half of the year, the journalism crisis in Brazil intensiﬁed, and
several journalists were ﬁred from diverse media in São Paulo, with scarce chances of being rehired
by media ﬁrms. Taking into account that situation, on June 5th, 2013, Bruno Torturra, one of the
founders of Mídia NINJA, published an article inviting unemployed journalists to a meeting to join a
new experience, Mídia NINJA, explaining the following:
“Is journalism dying? Or the business model of information distribution? Does the craft
of catalyzing public dialogue with facts and opinions have its days numbered? Or just an
analogical and greedy thought, based on circulation ﬁgures and advertising sales? [...] For
me one thing is clear: the net will kill the newspaper to save journalism” (Torturra 2013,
translated by the author).
This statement is important because it already delineates how Mídia NINJA emerged as one alterna-
tive model in the midst of the crisis of mass media ﬁrms at the time. As Torturra suggests, they started
their project trying to operate beyond the for-proﬁt principles that rule commercial media, thus, op-
posing as well the creative economy policy discourses. It is important for the reader to remember that
this is an example of the broader tensions that new media (online media) have been generating for the
established business models of commercial media I mentioned in chapter 2. The tension does not only
emanate from the emergence of new ways of journalism, but rather from the threat to business mod-
els based on the scarcity of information distributed through print, radio or air TV. Instead, ICT have
paved the way for models that break with the previous for-proﬁt logic, giving spaces to new experiences
to emerge, such as Mídia NINJA.
However, the meeting that the founder of Mídia NINJA had organized never took place, because
during that day massive riots began in São Paulo and the rest of the country, violence took place be-
tween demonstrators and the police, and it unleashed a national political crisis due to huge protests
not seen for years in Brazil (Wikipedia 2015b). During those days, Mídia NINJA, led by Bruno Tor-
turra and other journalists, made several live transmissions of the events that were taking place on
the streets. They used live streaming with smartphones to interview the demonstrators and to obtain
scoops of police violence, and were one of the few independent media - as they call themselves - covering
these events, whereas mass media at ﬁrst criticized rioters and ignored their positions. Conversely, Mí-
dia NINJA started to cover several mobilizations in the main cities of the country where FDE members
lived. These videos went viral in social networks and considerably increased its followers on Facebook
and during their live transmissions. What is important to highlight about this case is that this spe-
ciﬁc context of emergence during June 2013 shot up Mídia NINJA’s popularity, which allowed them to
attract the attention of viewers and mass media up to levels that the Argentinean cases never expe-
rienced. This put the experience of FDE and Mídia NINJA under the spotlight of mainstream media,
although not necessarily in a friendly tone. Contrarily, very soon after their coverages exposing mass
media’s biased role, Mídia NINJA received attacks from the incumbents of the sector that pressured the
project, an issue I shall analyze in chapter 8. Despite the hurdles it had to endure, this case emerged
as a new type of online and collective media for social transformation, operating under a collaborative
logic that challenges for-proﬁt media.
To conclude this section, I want to emphasize that the context of emergence of this media for social
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transformation differs considerably from the previous three in Argentina. Although Brazil did not have
legal advances in terms of media democratization, the cultural policies during Lula’s administration
and the posterior political debates, stimulated network organizations, such as FDE, to experiment with
ICT, which indirectly led to new cultural and media practices challenging mass media. Therefore, the
case of Mídia NINJA gives a good counterbalance to the Argentinean cases, because it is completely
based on ICT, but also on new collaborative practices that emanate from the particular context of emer-
gence of FDE. Despite these differences, Mídia NINJA shares a central aspect with the Argentinean
cases, a particular imaginary that tries to oppose the for-proﬁt, commercial approach to culture and
communication that the creative economy policy discourses represent, as I shall detail in the next
section.
5.5.3 The Imaginary
The following months, Mídia NINJA kept on covering diverse conﬂicts in several cities of the country
and expanding its structure of operation. At the time of my ﬁeldwork, the initiative consisted of around
20 FDE members, who are part of the core of the experience, distributed in several FDE houses and
collectives across the country. The main base is in Rio de Janeiro, and they also have NINJA operating
in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Belém, among other cities. Besides, Mídia NINJA receives support from a
varying number of collaborators, who are academics, citizens and other free media collectives and who
contribute with diverse type of materials, such as photos, videos and written articles. Therefore, this
media for social transformation is a spin-off network from the FDE network of cultural agents. This is
a central feature of this case that offers an operational structure different from the Argentinean cases,
which just broadcast from one ﬁxed location. Furthermore, FDE inspired much of the practices and
the speciﬁc dimensions of the imaginary of this case, which I shall introduce by analyzing the following
fragment available on their web page.
“We are Mídia NINJA (Independent Narratives, Journalism and Action), a net-
work of communicators who produce and distribute information in movement and action.
We rely on a collaborative logic for content creation and sharing - features of the network
society - to make reports, documentaries and investigations in Brazil and worldwide. Our
agenda follows social struggles and expressions of cultural, political, economic and
environmental transformations.
The internet has changed journalism and we are part of this transformation. We live
in a peer to peer (P2P) culture, which allows the direct exchange of information between
people, without the presence of old intermediaries. New technologies and applications
have enabled the emergence of new spaces for exchanges, where people not only receive,
but also produce information. In this new era of networks connected to the streets, mul-
timedia citizens have emerged with the ability to build and share their opinion in virtual
environments. These new storytellers make Mídia NINJA” (Mídia NINJA 2014i, translated
by the author).
This paragraph emphasizes several key terms that delineate Mídia NINJA’s discourse. For example,
in their name they claim that their narratives are ‘independent’, which means that their news are
not dependent on those who advertise in their network as in private commercial media, because they
neither claim not to ﬁnance their coverages through advertising nor directly through state propaganda,
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although they have been denounced for the latter (Diniz 2013). This clearly differs from the model
in which a standard commercial or public channel operates, putting them close to the deﬁnition of
‘independent media’, which I surveyed in Section 2.1. Furthermore, the inclusion of ‘action’ in the
acronym name of this experience gives an idea of the actors that establish it, activists, because it refers
to their ideal of reporting in the middle of where events are taking place. This type of actors also leads
to the speciﬁc objective of covering mostly social struggles and different types of transformations that
take place in Brazil, but from their perspective, performed in a different way than what mass media
journalists do. As one member of the network remarks: “The difference is that we are inside what’s
going on, while mass media journalists are not. They are afraid of being hit by stones” (Mídia NINJA III,
13/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil). For this reason, they
do not report at a distance from their interviewees or the situation they are covering, as a ‘professional’
and ‘objective’ journalist in Brazil tends to do. Conversely, in the words of one of its founders: “Mídia
NINJA is a sort of public service, because it protects the protestor, who before being a protestor is a
citizen. So, by covering demonstrations, we are protecting democracy” (Corrêa 2013, translated by the
author). Consequently, they think that by taking a deﬁnite stance they give voice to those who have
been excluded from mass media and shield them from frequent police violence during riots, covered
in chapter 8, contributing with this activity to what they understand as an ongoing democratization
process in Brazil. Thus, there is a strong element of activism in this experience, which they understand
as the capability to “believe in the agenda that we cover” (Mídia NINJA III, 13/03/2014, interview with
& translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil). This implies a speciﬁc cut or slice of what to
show in the world, on what topics are relevant and which ones are not, departing from the claim to
‘objectivity’ (a point I will develop further in chapter 7).
Coupled with the previous points is the belief that they are a product of the network society, but
operating under a collaborative logic, which is related to the discourse of the Cultura Viva policy dis-
course and its opposition to a purely commercial logic for cultural and media activities. Indeed, in FDE
they more broadly speak of the ‘collaborative economy’ as a new synthesis between the ideas of the
creative economy and the solidarity economy that inspired Cultura Viva. For example, Pablo Capilé,
one of the founders of FDE explains:
“We always discuss the difﬁculties that the solidarity economy and the creative economy
have to enter into dialog. From the creative economy perspective, the solidarity economy is
too radical, whereas from the solidarity economy perspective, the creative economy is still
too connected to capitalism. In the middle, we want to create a collaborative economy with
a narrative that generates a new economy. This narrative gives the possibility to engender
new desires in people that will stimulate them to act so that the narrative comes true. Thus,
even though you might have the capacity to fund this narrative through a traditional and
standardized format, what really matters is to help people to understand that their desire
to act differently is being activated by the emergence of that new narrative” (Soares 2014,
translated by the author).
This statement elucidates that FDE and Mídia NINJA are offering an imaginary that mixes aspects
of the creative and solidarity economy, to produce a new synthesis that they call a collaborative econ-
omy. Indeed, in their posts in social networks they have used the following ‘equation’, ‘collaborative
economy=creative economy+solidarity economy’, which is more of a slogan than a strict mathematical
relation, but still indicates well their aim to mix and challenge the available and opposing discourses
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at the national level in Brazil. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the founder of the network
seems to be speaking about what I call discourse/imaginary when he employs the term ‘narrative’, be-
cause he thinks that the new story for action that they are offering is what stimulates the recipients to
follow practices that depart and challenge the ones offered by mainstream commercially oriented policy
discourses. In the language of SKAD, they are offering new subject positions, such as the collaborative
practices I described in the previous section. According to one of the interviewees of the network: “We
are creating another culture!” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the
author in Brasília, Brazil), which refers to how their collaborative practices are offering new pathways
for action beyond the ones given by a commercially oriented approach to culture and media that they
heavily criticize. For instance, in the words of Pablo Capilé, one of FDE’s leaders:
“Working eight hours a day and being tortured in order to earn money that you can spend
the other eight hours to forget the torture, and then sleep another eight hours. This is a
nightmare composed of this schizophrenia of torture and money, you earn money to forget the
torture, and that is how you are supposed to live and dream” (Soares 2014, translated by the
author).
In like manner, another member of the network explained:
“In order to be happy or successful we are told to follow the sequence of school-university-
work-family-dog-car, etc. We are under pressure from our family, friends and media to enter
into this life pattern that is supposed to lead to success or happiness. But many people are
not happy with it at all” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated
by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil).
These statements expose a criticism of the subject positions for action and identity construction that
the members of FDE have been given in Brazil and that they oppose, because they perceive that they
do not lead to the hypothesized levels of ‘happiness’ that they promise. Economic wealth might help,
but to reduce it as the sole and only factor as economists tend to do, is at least not enough for those
belonging to this network. Contrarily, during the interviews I had with members of FDE, a frequent
explanation of their reasons to join FDE was to experience a collective lifestyle dedicating most of their
day to cultural activities or management, which would have not been possible for many of them if
they had just been subject to ‘market forces’. According to one of the founders of FDE, this in part
was possible to the implementation of what they call ‘social technologies’, such as houses for collective
living and complementary currencies that allow the exchange of products and services in the network
(I shall explain this in detail in chapter 6). He explains:
“In a certain way, we were able to ﬁnd a solution to give available time to our activists.
They have 24h per day and at a very low cost. We began to understand that one of the biggest
disputes for the 21st century is time distribution” (translated by the author).
This statement makes evident that the proposal to those who want to join the network is that they
will have enough time to focus on a creative endeavor of their interest, while they contribute to the
social and collective projects of the network. In theory, this liberates FDE members and takes them
to a state of ‘happiness’, which according to them would not be attainable from what they consider as
the oppressive market forces that would otherwise push them to boring and monotonous jobs. As one
observer of FDE remarked: “I think that the GDH explains a lot more about how Fora do Eixo works
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than their GDP, where the GDH is their Gross Domestic Happiness” (C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview
with & translated with the author in São Paulo, Brazil). The point the observer has is that members
of the network are not necessarily becoming ‘rich’ in terms of ﬁnancial income. Contrariwise, their
lifestyle is quite far from that vision. Nevertheless, according to members of the network, the collective
way they live allows them to reach happiness levels far from those that money could give. Although
it is difﬁcult to assess the truth of these utterances, given that I did not research psychological well-
being, the statement points to the fact that happiness is subjective, relative and related to the meaning
patterns that a collective or group creates to understand and act in the context in which they live.
Although I have not gone deeper into a scientiﬁc analysis of that perspective, it has been a recurrent
observation among the members of FDE, and consequently Mídia NINJA, and I hypothesize that it is
a big inﬂuence for them to pursue such initiative that departs from a commercial approach to culture.
Taking into account this understanding of the collaborative economy and its challenge to the cre-
ative economy policy discourses, Mídia NINJA can be understood as the main dispositive of the network
to advance their collaborative discourse. Indeed, they sustain that: “Communication is essential for an-
other new possible world” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the
author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil), which stresses the importance of having their own media to dissem-
inate the practices of the new economy or new world that they dream about. Finally, this stance points
to the utopian feature of their discourse in the sense I described in Section 2.2 of offering a new future
perspective understood to be ‘better’ than the current one.
The collaborative imaginary of FDE takes a particular perspective in global media discussions, be-
cause Mídia NINJA states that they are part of a new culture that is challenging journalism thanks to
the internet that breeds a participatory culture (Jenkins et al. 2009), which breaks with old models of
mass communication. From this point of view, information is no longer just formatted by few producers
and received passively by audiences; instead, the internet has given new tools for people to start pro-
ducing and sharing their own content in a peer two peer (P2P) way12. FDE grasped this opportunity
given by new technologies and built a distributed network across the country, with their own media,
which taking into account the experience in cultural sector, led to a new conceptualization of what a
journalist is and who can play such role. Speciﬁcally, from Mídia NINJA’s perspective “everyone can
become a NINJA” (Caperuto 2013, translated by the author), that is to say a journalist of their network
that contributes to their narrative. Indeed, although the logo of the experience alludes to ninjas, as
Figure 5.5 shows, this has nothing to do with covert agents or mercenaries as in feudal Japan. Instead,
the anonymous face in the picture matches well the idea that everyone can become part of the network
and report in an ‘independent’ way, once the necessary skills of using a smartphone and its videocamera
have been acquired. As one member of Mídia NINJA remarks:
“There are dozens of ways of narrating the world, and we are doing just one; with people
who have training in media and advertising, but also with people who are lawyers and who
like to take pictures, with collaborators, with young people who are passionate about social
movements and who want to contribute in some way. In short, with people who have very
few connections with traditional journalistic work. We are in fact a network” (Mídia NINJA
12. P2P (peer to peer) became a widely diffused concept with the success of software like Napster to share music encoded in MP3
format. In essence, the software created a network of users connected and exchanging among themselves, without a third party
charging for the transactions of the ﬁles. During the ﬁrst years of the 21st century, this challenged the music sector business
model of charging for the access to songs. More recently, the same idea has been expanding to any experience where users share
in a decentralized way diverse types of information. For further examples, see (P2P Foundation 2012).
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Figure 5.5: Mídia Ninja’s logo. Source: Mídia NINJA.
member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).
Furthermore, this broad perspective of journalism as an activity that everyone can do and not just
professionals also inﬂuences their perspective on what quality patterns they follow, which challenge the
accepted ‘quality’ schemes of professional journalism. Indeed, the following quote by a Mídia NINJA
member exempliﬁes how they challenge the language (what I call quality schemes) of professional
journalism and its tendency to just focus on hard facts, irrespective of the context:
“In universities, people learn about the traditional language of journalism, but we are giving
it a new meaning and we are learning to report in a different way. We run, listen and feel
with the interviewees during our streamings, which is a very strong real time coverage that
requires new languages to narrate the situations. How are we going to report the woman that
was dragged by a military police car? Shall we only describe the fact or shall we cover it
within a national context in which the military police is violent and gruesome? Why was she
there? In other words, not only the fact, the hard news, such as ‘Dragged woman there!’, but
rather trying to answer: Why was she dragged? What does that show in a general context?
What is it representing?” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated
by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil).
Such an approach is both a challenge to journalism as a profession and to the copyright system
on how news are exchanged. Why? Because the P2P culture reduces intermediaries, and does not
necessarily use a monetary exchange among users to obtain what they share. Thus, traditional media
business models, such as newspapers, and more generally those cultural sectors that can be digitized,
such as the music industry, have been under pressure. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst paragraph quoted in this
section mentions the concept of ‘old intermediaries’, which in the context of Mídia NINJA alludes to
the power of mass media, which defend and practice an opposite commercial model. As mentioned
in chapter 4, the most inﬂuential media group in Brazil, Globo, has been organizing events about
the creative economy with a clear commercial approach, which is opposed to a collaborative economy
organized in a P2P way.
With respect to content, Mídia NINJA aims to offer diversiﬁed material that mass media does not.
For example, one one of NINJA’s members explains: “The dispute is for more voices, and to be able to
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receive information of all kinds” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated
by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). Another member further describes: “In our coverages, we
highlight themes that do not have much visibility or that have a distorted visibility. We also bring new
perspectives of covered themes, for example with the World Cup” (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014,
interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil). Apart from this, they oppose the top-
down approach mass media use, and instead state that: “We want people to receive information from
various sources so that by analyzing them they can build their own reading of events and facts. We call
this a mosaic of partialities” (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the
author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil).
As regards copyrights, ICT and P2P exchanges allow to surpass traditional models, where authors
assume an individual right to the creation and a need to be paid for it, surpassing the intermediaries
that distribute such creations. Mídia NINJA respects those authors that keep this position and some
even collaborate with them signing with their name, but, as they explain in their FAQ:
“Collective authorship is an individual choice, every Mídia NINJA participant, creator
and collaborator has the freedom to choose how to present their work, signing it collectively
or individually. Nevertheless, we believe that no single production of images or any other
content, is the outcome of an individual person, since it is linked to a broader process that
goes from the collective conception of a piece to the dissemination of its results by several
people” (Mídia NINJA 2014a).
In sum, Mídia NINJA did not emerge out of nowhere during the Brazilian riots of 2013. It is a product
of a network of cultural agents that began to operate in small cities of Brazil, which later expanded
all across the country and to main urban centers. From the northern Amazon to the southern state of
Rio Grande do Sul, from the Western state of Accre to the eastern state of Paraíba, in all places it is
possible to ﬁnd an FDE collective diffusing a collaborative economy imaginary that deﬁes the creative
economy policy discourses. Mídia NINJA, as a product of this network, challenges commercial mass
media practices, and in this sense, shares objectives with the previous Argentinean cases. However,
it also has speciﬁc characteristics based on the Brazilian context and the peculiarities of FDE and its
collective practices, which gave them windows of opportunity to reach and inﬂuence - although for a
short time - the public opinion and to challenge and criticize mass media coverages in the process.
5.6 Concluding Discussion
This chapter showed the existence of a diversity of experiences in media that departs from a commer-
cial focused approach to communications. These experiences oppose the claim of culture as an economic
resource as ‘the way’ to structure culture and communications. Far from what the supporters of cre-
ative economy policy discourses would accept, the four cases illustrate different visions and ends for
communication experiences. Therefore, one of the main conclusions from this chapter is that the strate-
gies of the creative economy policy discourses are not all embracing ‘development’ as their advocates
claim. Contrariwise, the broad terminology that they employ overlooks several experiences, including
the ones I examined in this chapter.
A second conclusion is that having an imaginary with features that oppose the commercial ones
of the creative economy policy discourses is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient condition for media for
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social transformation to succeed with their projects. For instance, the ﬁrst case, CPE TV, defends the
co-operative ideal of a human-faced economy, respecting the seven co-operative principles. Thus, the
project aims to diffuse content with this ethical stance to contribute toward a society that would suffer
less from economic exploitation. The second case, Barricada TV, illustrates the strand of practices that
emerged after the Argentinean crisis in 2001, when workers started to recover factories and dissemi-
nate a vision of society where they could own and lead their own ﬁrms collectively, reducing the negative
effects of ownership concentration and state inﬂuence. The aim of this media for social transformation
is to counter-inform what they consider to be the biased coverages of commercial mass media, focusing
instead on workers and social movements. The third case, Wall Kintún TV, aims to (re)produce the
worldview of the Mapuche, besides communicating the struggles that indigenous communities have in
the country, which are neglected in mass media. Accordingly, the channel is a tool to combat the contin-
uous violence against their lifestyle since the arrival of the European colonial project to the continent.
Finally, Mídia NINJA, inﬂuenced by FDE, practices journalism based on the principles of a collabora-
tive economy, where knowledge and property are collective. This case is based on a network of cultural
collectives that operates with social technologies and offers new lifestyles to escape what it considers
economic exploitation. In sum, these four imaginaries are examples that make evident the diversity of
potential approaches to culture and communications beyond those just geared to proﬁts, which leads
me to reject the claim of the creative economy policy discourses of embracing all cultural and media
projects.
It is important to point out that the diversity of ways to conceptualize culture and communication
shows the relevance of interpretations of what the different actors make of their ‘reality’. In the in-
terpretationalist tradition in social sciences, SKAD has been useful to delineate the similarities and
differences among the four studied imaginaries of the media for social transformation, which have
in common the aim of disseminating discourses with objectives and by actors that do not match the
generic term of ‘creative or cultural entrepreneurs’ or ‘industries’ operating mostly for proﬁts of the
creative economy policy discourses. The creative economy policy discourses overlook these variations
in interpretation, focusing only on the economic dimension that might favor and fulﬁll the aims of
some sectors of the population, but deﬁnitely not everyone. Therefore, it ignores the differences that
emanate from speciﬁc historical and social contexts (Keller, Knoblauch, and Reichertz 2013), which
have been described in detail to abstract the main features of the speciﬁc imaginaries that each case
represents. Accordingly, any claim of universality by policy discourses will face similar challenges of
local discourses that have followed different historical trajectories. This is the case in this research,
because in none of the four imaginaries a purely commercial objective prevails, though it is true that
in some cases, clearly the co-operatives, the boundaries are blurry. Instead, each case offers a differ-
ent vision or imaginary - some more utopian than others - that aims to give loudspeakers to neglected
groups in society, with varied practices that depart from the structure of the creative economy policy
discourses. For this reason, the idea that DCMS or UNCTAD disseminated globally of the ‘creative in-
dustries’ or ‘creative economy’ as global development options, seems highly problematic in the context
of Argentina and Brazil, because although it might be true that the concepts have certain ﬂexibility, it
is also evident from the analyzed four cases that the focus on commercial practices becomes a tool to
prune the diversity of discourses on culture and communication that exist locally. Indeed, given their
focus on commercial culture and media, the creative economy policy discourses do not have enough
elasticity to include non-proﬁt experiences, and (un)consciously their supporters despise the inclusion
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of such ‘other’ perspectives and visions, unacceptably generating a direct violence against different
worldviews. Consequently, the four cases that I studied in this chapter are initiatives that are kept
off the radar, either for having ‘too small’ audiences or because they are purposefully underreported by
for-proﬁt mass media. For these reasons, the creative economy policy discourses cannot be accepted if
the ﬁnal aim is ‘development’, understood in a broader way than just economic growth, because they do
not address the pressing inequality problems that haunt Argentina and Brazil at all, and more general,
the whole of Latin America. Conversely, I argue that the counter-discourses I described in chapter 4,
which inspired the four cases I analyzed in this chapter to varying degrees, are an indispensable ele-
ment of the puzzle of a broader notion of ‘development’, or ‘post-development’ to be in synchrony with
the discussions at the introduction, which care about minorities and resource-scarce groups that have
systematically suffered from structural inequalities in both countries.
Despite the usefulness to apply SKAD to understand the symbolic and power-effect differences
among the policy discourses and the four cases studied in this chapter, I experienced that the dis-
course analysis approach is not enough to thoroughly research the speciﬁc barriers that these projects
face in practice and the strategies they employ to overcome them. In the process of implementation,
these hurdles might alter the aims of their imaginaries, leading to a sort of dialectical relation between
the ideal and the resources available to put them into operation, which can lead to unexpected results,
not necessarily converging with the aims of the initial projects. This is particularly the case when try-
ing to understand the constraints that the cases face, which as I shall show in the next chapters can be
understood as ‘dispositives’ in the language of SKAD. However, such terminology needs to be comple-
mented with other concepts from diverse ﬁelds, in order to comprehend how these four cases have been
able (or not) to challenge the commercially oriented media and culture discourses in practice, despite
the aims to do so discursively as described in this chapter.
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Chapter 6
Technologies
“I do not want to live in a world where everything around me is designed in California and made in
China by somebody that just makes stuff, because otherwise they will drive the choices we make, they
will drive the way we will be creative” (Banzi, Massimo - Arduino creator - quoted in Rochlitz 2015).
In this chapter, I will apply the concepts from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the phi-
losophy of technology I introduced in Section 2.3 to understand the role of technologies in the media
cases. This includes the idea that technologies have a certain ‘script’, a way planned by their design-
ers on how they are supposed to be used and for what purpose (Akrich 1992). The second concept is
‘multistablity’, which refers to the existence of multiple ways of using a technology, irrespective of its
original design, although this depends on the speciﬁc context of use and of the reinterpretation that
users make of the ‘script’ (Ihde 2012). I shall argue that unless there is a change of the context of
use and a reinterpretation of the roles of technologies, the employment of the available media tech-
nologies paves the way for a commercial approach to communications. Although employing the same
technology as commercial media might have certain advantages, it contradicts the explicit objectives
of challenging for-proﬁt principles of the imaginaries of some of the cases of media for social trans-
formation. Consequently, technologies can act as dispositives stimulating a commercial approach to
communications, limiting the potential for change of the imaginaries described in the previous chapter.
Considering the two concepts, I shall show that the four media for social transformation cases can be
ranked on a scale according to up to what extent the technologies they employ have been reinterpreted
to match the objectives of their imaginaries. Conversely, up to what extent the actors of these media
cases act following the designs implicit in ‘scripts’ of the media technologies they have acquired. Figure
6.1 shows how I classiﬁed the four cases, based on the data analyzed in the rest of the chapter. Despite
the differences in the two dimensions between the cases, what they have in common is the role that
technologies play either as an element that enhances or blocks their imaginaries. Consequently, these
non-human objects do play an important role, because they can interfere in the media projects, much
more than what theories focusing only on the symbolic or on the human agency would accept.
Before entering into details of the analysis of each case, it is important to highlight two aspects of
the national policies in Argentina and Brazil. As regards the former, although the new audiovisual
media law has the aim to democratize voices by supporting more community media, there are implicit
limits to what sort of media can be legalized. NGOs can require a license to broadcast an audiovisual
signal and also to become cableoperators, such as CPEtv. However, in its implementation the law did
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Figure 6.1: Classiﬁcation of the cases according to the relevance of the concepts of ‘script’ and ‘multi-
stability’ in explaining their technological conﬁguration.
not consider to fund the needed equipment for such media, in particular in the case of TVs which are
more expensive than radios. Thus, it leaves the problem to be solved by each petitioner, neglecting that
the technological equipment is not produced in the country and is highly costly to import, given the
national economic situation with restrictions to imports and currency exchange. Therefore, costs deﬁ-
nitely are a barrier to media democratization if such a hurdle is not tackled in another way. Besides,
during ﬁeldwork there was almost no nationally funded technological development to address the need
of these new channels, although according to practitioners it is something quite feasible to produce low
cost equipment to meet the needs of the applicants for new radio and TV licenses. Finally, internet
media was not even mentioned in the new law, ignoring the technological changes that are taking place
in media platforms. These points indicate that TV channels in Argentina under the new law have been
pushed toward one type of technological conﬁguration, which is not necessarily the most appropriate
one for the cases with scarce ﬁnancial resources. I should describe how each of the three cases dealt
with this restriction with a different strategy. On the contrary, Brazil did not have a new national
audiovisual law, but in contrast was more active in introducing pioneering policies to stimulate digi-
tal culture and the creation of independent media networks using ICT. Although high concentration
levels in terms of media ownership remain, the expansion of these tools and the corresponding prac-
tices fostered the emergence of new media experiences that defy terrestrial and cable TV technological
conﬁgurations. In other words, the national context and the speciﬁc cultural and media policies have
undoubtedly been an important factor in inﬂuencing the differences in terms of technologies that I will
examine in this chapter, but not the only one.
6.1 CPEtv, Argentina
I locate the case of the channel of the co-operative, CPEtv, at the extreme left of Figure 6.1, because this
media organization has copied the style of a typical commercial TV channel with little change to the
context of use, although striving to produce content under a different imaginary. I shall show in this
section that the technologies they have implemented led CPE to a commercial model quite similar to
other private media ﬁrms, which follows the ‘script’ of operation of such technologies. Indeed, the ﬁrst
decision that CPE took in this direction was becoming a cableoperator according to the requirements
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of the new audiovisual communication services law in Argentina, instead of just offering an air TV
signal. CPE’s management selected this option for two reasons. First, they already had a network in
Santa Rosa to offer access to the internet that could be used to transmit cable TV as well. Second,
this cable model would allow them to charge for the service and obtain resources to fund their own TV
community channel. But, this decision initiated a commercial path that departed from the aims of the
mobilizations of 2003 that I described in chapter 5, where they just broadcasted signals for free to the
population. Figure 6.2 shows a synthesis of the technological conﬁguration that CPEtv built to receive
and transmit TV signals, which has three levels with different types of technologies to highlight: the
reception of TV signals; the elaboration of their own signal; and the distribution of these signals to
clients.
The ﬁrst level in this system covers the required artifacts to receive other TV signals through satel-
lite, such as ESPN, Fox, national channels, among others. This is an indispensable element to become
a cableoperator, since CPE has to compete with the other local providers by offering at least the same
amount of channels. Thus, they had to pay for the access to the foreign and national TV signals. In
terms of costs, this would have not been affordable for the co-operative if they had negotiated alone with
the signal providers. However, CPE had the advantage that a co-operative in Córdoba, Cooperativa de
Provisión y Comercialización de Servicios Comunitarios de Radiodifusión (COLSECOR - Cooperative
of Supply and Marketing of Broadcasting Community Services), precisely offered such service to small
private cable operators in the country. Thus, thanks to the 6th co-operative principle, they have been
able to collectively bargain for lower costs and download the signals of other TV channels, so as to have
another similar to private cableoperators. However, this system still needs the installment of expensive
antennas and hardware for the satellite reception of the signals and its digitization, which are not pro-
duced in Argentina, but in the USA. Therefore, the objective of competition with private ﬁrms led them
to acquire similar foreign technology, which is a barrier in terms of investment that not every initiative
can overcome if they choose to become cableoperators. Additionally, it pushes the co-operative toward
fundraising to cover their costs, which explains why they charge for their cable service. Consequently,
the copy of the cableoperator technological ‘script’ of commercial ﬁrms, also leads to a commercial model
of operations, contradicting their initial project of 2003 to offer free access to audiovisual content to the
local population.
The second level of Figure 6.2 comprises CPEtv’s channel, which is located in the main building of
CPE in Santa Rosa. From this location, they produce their own TV signal, and there are two features
I want to highlight. First, CPEtv has a studio of 43m2 to ﬁlm part of their programs. As Figure 6.3
shows, the studio is modern, has a plasma and does not envy much the design or aesthetics that other
leading private channels in terms of audience have in Argentina. Indeed, CPEtv members explained it
was designed by a professional from Buenos Aires, which can be understood as a strategy to compete
against private ﬁrms (I will elaborate this argument further in Section 7.1.2, comparing CPE’s studio
with the one of the leading national news program of a private ﬁrm). Nonetheless, as the coordinator
of the channel explains, the available space is a constraint for more participatory formats of content
production:
“The studio affects what kind of program you can produce. Given our reduced space, I
can neither produce a program with the participation of people nor use a forum. A larger
space, widens the range of possible programs, but it is not an impediment to produce content”
(CPEtv coordinator, 27/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa,
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Figure 6.3: The studio of CPEtv. Source: CPEtv.
Argentina).
The second point I highlight from CPEtv’s channel relates to the technologies they employ to ﬁlm
and broadcast. Essentially, these consist of: First, the cameras and all the accessories for recording
audiovisual signals; second, the editing stations and other notebooks to work with such signals; third,
the software and hardware needed to organize the programming, to ﬁlm in the studio and to edit the
audiovisual signals, which are not produced in Argentina. For instance, US technicians arrived in
Santa Rosa to transfer the ‘know-how’ on how to operate hardware (CPE 2011), such as the program-
ming server that loads all the content to daily broadcast. As regards software, CPE acquired licenses
from foreign ﬁrms that developed the software to edit audiovisual signals. In all these cases, what is
important to highlight is how the whole set of technologies used is foreign and acquired from ﬁrms that
operate under a for-proﬁt logic. Additionally, as these technologies are not nationally produced, the co-
operative has to spend large amounts of their income to acquire them and to continuously pay for the
used licenses. Similarly to the equipment to receive signals, this is a paradoxical situation, because the
acquisition of foreign hardware and software produces the escape of the community´s resources abroad,
precisely what CPE has been criticizing private ﬁrms for in the province, such as the case of the SU-
DAM in the 1930s and more recently Cablevisión with TV signals (see Section 5.2). Thus, contrarily
to the founding story of the co-operative where the technology to produce electricity broke the depen-
dence with the foreign ‘oppressing’ ﬁrm, in this case the technology only reinforces the dependence
between them. The root of this technological dependence is the decision to compete with commercial
channels, which led CPE to emulate their technologies. However, the co-operative does not have a po-
sition that questions this role of technology as a source of dependence, and thus takes it for granted,
without challenging the implicit design or ‘script’, which is tied to the commercial logic of operation
of the technology suppliers. This is a hurdle hard to surpass for many organizations that do not have
enough ﬁnancial resources and a general national bottleneck of the new audiovisual communications
law, because there has been no governmental research and development in the sector or support for
national media technology ﬁrms. Accordingly, new NGO channels have to acquire technologies abroad,
establishing the dependence with their commercial logic. CPE is one of the exceptions, because of the
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income it generates through other services, such as energy distribution. However, many other organi-
zations, as the next two cases illustrate, suffer from this technological constraint in terms of hardware
and software access. This shortcoming points to a need of governmental intervention in the sector to
stimulate media technology ﬁrms, not necessarily to copy the most advanced high tech equipment, but
at least to develop appropriate media technologies for these new NGO experiences. Given the speci-
ﬁcities of audiovisual hardware production, perhaps the country has more competitive advantages in
software development. In fact, there is already a federation of 23 ICT co-operatives (FACTTIC 2014),
which claimed to be working on these aspects, although with no known results by the time I ﬁnished
ﬁeldwork.
In spite of my argument that the dependence on foreign technologies might lead to a commercial
business model in NGO media projects, the new experiences in Argentina suggest this business ori-
ented approach does not even work in these new cases. Why? Because if an organization follows the
model that CPEtv did, it has to invest a lot of ﬁnancial resources to acquire the needed equipment,
which are costs that need to be recovered somehow. Two strategies are possible for this: ﬁrst, to ob-
tain income from the costs of the cable service, which in the case of CPEtv cannot be too high given
their interest to broaden access as much as possible and cheaper than the local private ﬁrm’s service.
Furthermore, this option is only accessible to those organizations that have enough ﬁnancial resources
to become cableoperators in the ﬁrst place, which are few in comparison to the total amount of new
NGO media that might emerge with the new law. The second strategy is to use advertising, just like a
typical commercial TV channel, but this is also problematic in the cities of the interior of the country,
as the following statement by a university professor in Santa Rosa illustrates: “There is no advertising
culture. If you ask on the street for sponsors, advertising is seen as if they are doing you a favor, but not
as an investment” (Argentinean University professor III, 29/08/2013, interview with & translated by
the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). Furthermore, according to interviewees the price of advertising
in Santa Rosa is quite low, because advertising in the state TV channel is too cheap. Therefore, NGO
media cannot recover easily the initial investments through the main strategy that private channels
employ, and only the most resourceful ones can rely on income from the cable service. Thus, the de-
pendence on expensive foreign technology limits the number of new media projects that can emerge
with the new media law, and even those that can surpass such hurdles face ﬁnancial difﬁculties that
threaten the elaboration of content about their imaginaries. In this sense, the selection of commercial
like technologies leads to a ‘trap’ that CPE and similar organizations are ﬁnding hard to escape.
The third and last level of the technological network in Figure 6.2 refers to all those elements that
are used to distribute content. In particular, I want to stress how a technological trajectory might
explain why CPE differs from other commercial ﬁrms that allowed them to start their channel fast,
and to point out how they did not adopt social network technologies. As regards the former, CPE
built its network to distribute TV signals based on the preexisting network to offer the service to
access internet. According to the engineer in charge of telecommunications, the management took “a
very brave decision” in 2000 (CPE engineer, 16/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author
in Santa Rosa, Argentina) that gave the co-operative an advantage, because CPE decided to deploy
a coaxial cable network to offer internet, instead of one based on copper twister-pairs. The engineer
remarked this network’s design allows to transmit TV signals as well without further investments.
Thus, even though in the year 2000 CPE’s management did not have a clear horizon on whether they
would have a channel in the future, the decision to construct such a network later paid off, because they
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did not need to adapt the network to offer the TV service. On the one hand, this shows a technological
trajectory, because a decision taken almost ten years before the beginning of the channel, beneﬁted the
organization to quickly set up the distribution of TV signals, something that many new NGO media
lack. On the other hand, this previous decision can also be understood as a sort of ‘technological trap’,
because the investments in the network stopped CPE from exploring other technologies that might
have reduced the dependence with expensive foreign technologies in the transmission of their content.
Indeed, despite the role that social networks and online platforms have to diffuse content to mass
audiences, even one year after ﬁeldwork CPEtv has scarcely used them to distribute content. According
to CPEtv’s management, this might be explained by a general delay that the co-operative has to adopt
technologies given the lengthy discussions needed within the administrative and management bodies
of CPE. However, I also think that the existence of the previous network limited the space to explore
for such other alternatives, something that will contrast with the next cases.
On the whole, although in chapter 5 I described that CPEtv’s imaginary is critical to the commer-
cialization of culture and media, striving instead for a co-operative and participative future with more
solidarity, the technologies surveyed in this section suggest that they are quite close to a typical com-
mercial TV channel. In fact, they employ similar foreign technologies and expensive, modern studios
to elaborate their content. Furthermore, in the whole description I made, in this case there was no
reinterpretation or challenge to the design of these foreign technologies, both hardware and software.
Thus, I conclude that the technologies they employ act as a ‘script’ reinforcing the need to acquire funds
for their operation directly.
6.2 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina
As described in Section 5.4, Wall Kintun TV aims to show the stories and conﬂicts of the Mapuche from
their perspective. However, this case is the most clear example of how even though they might have a
very consistent imaginary, the lack of a stabilized network of actors puts a serious limit on how they
can achieve their vision in practice. Wall Kintun TV suffers from many limitations, starting with the
historical discrimination against the indigenous community, which has scarce ﬁnancial resources to
invest in the needed equipment and physical space to set up a channel, not to talk about the knowledge
to run it. Thus, the analysis of this case illustrates both missing connections in their technological
conﬁguration and the ones they have. In Figure 6.1, I located Wall Kintun TV after CPEtv, because
although the channel tries to depart from and criticizes foreign technology, in practice they have not
been able to challenge or reinterpret it, as the next two cases do.
Before describing the conditions recorded during ﬁeldwork, it is worth pointing out once more that
the network of media technologies of each case is dynamic. As I explained in chapter 5, Wall Kintun
TV started with a lot of support from the state, when a co-operative was formed with members of the
indigenous community and outsiders with expertise in management of audiovisual experiences. The
latter obtained cameras, PCs, and other hardware for recording. However, after the conﬂict between
the local Buenoleo Mapuche community and the management partisans of the national regime was
unleashed, those that participated in that ﬁrst period took most of the equipment with them, and con-
sequently, during ﬁeldwork Wall Kintun TV was in a weak position in terms of resources. This conﬁrms
one of the critics of Actor-Network Theory for media research that tends to focus on a successful stabi-
lized relation of human and non-human objects, but ignores that these networks are dynamic, and as
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this case shows, their ‘equilibriums’ are unstable (Couldry 2008).
At the moment of ﬁeldwork, Wall Kintun TV operated in a space ceded by the municipality of
Bariloche, which has three rooms of no more than 40 m2. This place is far from the city’s downtown
prepared for tourists. Although it is just around 15 blocks away from it, it is located in a neighborhood
with fewer resources; unpaved roads and informal salesmen on the streets suggest this. This setting
contrasts with the location of the other two channels I studied in Argentina, which have their own
buildings and which did not depend so evidently on the local government to transmit. Nonetheless,
this geographical location is not the main hurdle. As one of the members of Wall Kintun TV publicly
denounced after the conﬂict discussed in chapter 5:
“What is Wall Kintun TV? A transmitter loaned from the AFSCA, a PC with a playout
loaned from AVC Video Cable, and a space provided by the province of Rio Negro in the
provincial administrative center. It is a group of people working without a salary, it is a
television channel without cameras, without editing machines. It is an empty space” (Señales
2013).
This testimony exposes the very precarious condition in comparison to the previous case, and also how
Wall Kintun TV demands media technologies to operate in a way similar to CPEtv’s channel. The only
available ones at the time of ﬁeldwork were not even owned by the community channel, such as the
equipment to broadcast. This included loans from the AFSCA and the help of one of the local cableop-
erators, AVC, which incorporates their signal in their cable distribution in Bariloche. However, their
competitors, owned by the Clarín multimedia group, do not include the channel in their grid, in clear
deﬁance to the new media law that requires cable operators to include local air channels in their grids.
Therefore, the ongoing national conﬂict between the state and this multimedia ﬁrm also negatively
impacts new NGO media experiences, which face a barrier to their legal right to be included in the
transmissions of every private cableoperator, reducing their potential audience. In stark contrast to
CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV lacked the needed essential equipment to produce their own content, such as:
cameras, the hardware to organize a programming grid or to appropriately save and store new content.
Likewise, they do not even have a studio, where they could improvise and record interviews and pro-
grams. Thus, this case illustrates one of the contradictions of the new media law in Argentina, which
does open the legal door for NGO media to have their own channels, but offers scarce help for them
to acquire the needed equipment to start operating. This is a hurdle that can only be overcome by
organizations that can acquire ﬁnancial resources through other means, but deﬁnitely not by those or-
ganizations that have been historically excluded and suffering from poverty conditions. Consequently,
so far the new political rights for NGO media have not addressed the preexisting economic inequali-
ties, which precisely limit the voices and claims of these excluded sectors of the Argentinean population,
which are the ones more missing in media.
These limitations produce a strong gap between the utopia of the channel’s imaginary as a media for
all Mapuche and the available means to put it into practice. Did they have other options? If acquiring
expensive equipment was never a viable strategy for the community, what about other technologies
based on the internet, such as cell phones and streaming? Unfortunately, the geographic location of
the experience in a province far from the national urban centers puts infrastructural limits to such a
strategy. In Bariloche, internet speed is neither as good nor as cheap as in other urban areas. Accord-
ingly, Wall Kintun TV cannot consider transmitting content online live. Therefore, the utopias of ICT
as tools giving voices to everyone everywhere as mentioned in Section 2.3, in practice, seem still far
169
from the evident limits of the available technological infrastructure and the income restrictions that
people and organizations living in many parts of the world still face. Therefore, I agree with critical
positions that recognize the importance of ICT, but also warn that these are not enough to solve other
types of preexisting issues.
Despite the scarcity of ﬁnancial resources in comparison with CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV is using
different mechanisms to disseminate content. First, they broadcast their signal over the air, but only to
those living a few blocks around their building. Second, they also distribute their signal by cable to at
least one of the cableoperators of the city, which further extends their audience reach, although limited
to the number of subscribers to that ﬁrm, which has as a maximum limit of approximately 100.000 (the
number of inhabitants of Bariloche). Despite this, the TV channel is heavily constrained to capture
ﬁnancial resources. This is not only related to the lack of content produced by the initiative, but also by
the fact that the hardware they have to distribute their signal through cable does not offer a very good
quality. Under these circumstances, Wall Kintun TV members think they have few chances to attract
sponsors for advertising in their channel, which is the only possible strategy that they have to acquire
funds through their content. In contrast to CPEtv, they are not cableoperators, and the members of
the Mapuche community are not ﬁnancially resourceful due to the historical reasons I explained in
chapter 3. Therefore, this situation describes a poverty trap: Without technologies and skills, they
can neither produce content nor a good image to attract audiences; without audiences, they cannot
attract sponsors to invest in advertising in their channel; without funds, their experience cannot be
ﬁnancially sustained nor can they acquire the needed tools to break the trap. This gloomy scenario
has slightly improved after the Wall Kintun TV management made a public denouncement against
the state. Indeed, during ﬁeldwork they received the promise of the state to fund their equipment and
started to receive training, which even led them to start elaborating and distributing scarce audiovisual
content, which I will analyze in the next chapter. Still, by far their TV transmissions mostly repeat
content obtained from other sources, and as one member of the channel expressed, the state support
so far has not been enough: “Training is essential and is very useful to us. But not so much, if we
do not have the equipment to put into practice what we learned during the training” (Wall Kintun TV,
15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina).
In contrast to CPEtv, Wall Kintun TV has been using a third mechanism to disseminate its content
(text, images and few videos) related to the Mapuche lifestyles and struggles: online social networks.
Indeed, this can be considered as an example of the multistability of Facebook, which offers different
possibilities of reinterpretation for its use, as in this case, becoming the main platform of content
distribution of an indigenous Mapuche media organization. As one member explains: “We have a lot
of Facebook followers whose numbers began to grow in September 2013, when we started to upload
material on what is happening in the territory with the Mapuches and other indigenous communities”
(Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche,
Argentina). Returning to Figure 6.1, I positioned Wall Kintun TV on the right of CPEtv, because of
this use of social networks. However, their level of reinterpretation is still quite low, because they
are demanding technologies from the state to operate quite similar to those of private commercial
channels, without challenging them much in practice, contradicting their imaginary, where they cite
that the indigenous communities have been invaded through technology (Section 5.4.2 ). However, the
distance between CPE and Wall Kintun TV in terms of access to technologies is abysmal; while CPEtv
has acquired advanced foreign media technologies, Wall Kintun TV has almost none. Paraphrasing
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Latour, in this case the lack of technology also does something. Non-human objects such as cameras,
cellphones, internet infrastructure, programming grids, etc. are missing and undermine the intention
of the members of the Mapuche indigenous community to transmit through audiovisual media their
worldviews and their perspective on the conﬂicts they have in the Argentinean South. Their difﬁculty to
access these technologies is a product of the weak state support, the poor infrastructure in comparison
to the one in urban centers, and of course, the ﬁnancial weaknesses of Mapuche communities, which
are an inheritance from a war with the Argentinean state and decades of discrimination against them.
These observations agree with Couldry’s (2008) criticism to Actor-Network Theory, because it shows
the importance of history and context to understand why there is no operating actor-network. Wall
Kintun TV’s imaginary is far from being put completely into practice, because it struggles with long
term processes that affect the distribution of resources and the possibilities of networks to arise in the
ﬁrst place.
6.3 Barricada TV, Argentina
In Figure 6.1, I located Barricada TV on the axis where the reinterpretation of technologies is more
prominent, which is one of the main differences between this case and the previous two. Indeed, in
this subsection I will ﬁrst argue that the context of production of Barricada TV differs in certain ways,
which explains how they apply media technologies for content generation and diffusion differently, even
though they still share similar technological methods of content production with commercial media.
The main difference between Barricada TV and CPEtv is the way these channels organize work.
Despite the fact that both cases have an imaginary that is critical of an economy just focused on for-
proﬁt practices, the latter follows a pattern similar to private ﬁrms, establishing a standard salary
relation for a given amount of work hours, and keeping a hierarchical organization, though following
co-operative principles. Conversely, the former operates through ‘militant collective work’, which I in-
terpret as an inﬂuence of the practices at IMPA, the leading case of the MNER in Argentina. First,
this means that the members of Barricada TV are not hierarchically organized, but instead they ro-
tate roles within their audiovisual content production process. Second, the militant adjective refers to
the fact that they are not working for a salary, but rather for a strong support of social change issues
they believe in. Therefore, their funding does not come from advertising nor from any other commer-
cial strategy, but from the support of organizations that share their claim to an independent approach
to communications or through other income sources that members have, disconnected from the me-
dia project. I shall show that this context of production opened different possibilities of using media
technologies that CPEtv neglected, although they still share some similarities.
As regards content generation, Barricada TV operates in the fourth ﬂoor of IMPA, which supports
the channel’s infrastructure. This has helped Barricada TV to bypass the barrier to ﬁnd a place from
where to broadcast. In comparison with CPEtv, this studio is smaller, older and with less modern
technologies; for instance, they do not have the equipment to broadcast with HD image quality. Simi-
larly, the studio ties the initiative to the format of producing much of their audiovisual content within
that space, and in employing cameras adapted to studio recording. Thus, this implies a certain script
(Akrich 1992), which as in the case of CPEtv, shares similarities with commercial audiovisual ﬁrms
elaborating content within studios, although with nuances in quality patterns that I shall cover in
the next chapter. Furthermore, the experience keeps the technological dependence with foreign ﬁrms
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that supply the audiovisual equipment for recording, such as cameras; but, it can be considered less
dependent than CPEtv, because their technologies are not so high-tech, and thus, cheaper.
The contrasts of Barricada TV with CPEtv are more evident in the different distribution technolo-
gies they employ. As one of the members of the channel explains:
“We transmit with the most backward technology, and also with the most ‘modern’. I say
this in quotation marks because there are far better available technologies, but we transmit
by air TV, which is a totally outdated technology and a big problem. However, we also use
internet streaming, which is something still to explore in this country. It has issues that
depend on the quality of the bandwidth of the receiver, but also on the amount that we can
upload, which is always less than the one for download. Moreover, the services we use are
free, but they put intrusive advertising in our signals. A lot of elements that hinder reception”
(Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
There are two points to remark about this quotation on how distribution technologies mediate Barri-
cada TV’s dissemination of content. First, they use over-the-air broadcasting, which is a cheap and old
technology and almost useless in the city of Buenos Aires, because paid TV (cable or satellite) already
represents 90% of the market (LAMAC 2014). Thus, even though this technology is one of the cheapest
to provide access for media for social transformation, it does not offer them a viable way to reach the
‘mass audiences’ as they claim in their imaginary, because few viewers are willing to go back in time
and install an antenna to capture just the signal of Barricada TV. As a result, Barricada TV’s mem-
bers estimate that very few people watch this signal, which is also geographically restricted in terms
of reach. Nonetheless, the members of this and other cases think this could change, because the new
audiovisual communication services law requires that cableoperators in the country include in their
transmissions the signals of every legalized air channel in their locality. In this way, media channels
that only transmit through air technology would be able to at least reach the larger TV audiences that
use the cable service. However, the most important cableoperator in the country, the Clarín group,
neither complied with such legal requirements at the moment of ﬁeldwork nor almost two years later.
Therefore, this technology has not been very successful so far.
The second point to remark from the last quotation is how Barricada TV is exploring ICT to balance
the shortcomings that their broadcasting faces. Speciﬁcally, the are using free streaming technologies
to diffuse their content live through the internet, which has been an innovation that allowed them to
surpass the obvious limits of their air broadcasting technologies. This is something not practiced by
the previous two cases, because they have not thought of such alternative, at least while I conducted
ﬁeldwork. I understand this practice as a reinterpretation of the online streaming platforms, which
were not designed to become the main distribution platform of an alternative channel in Argentina.
Indeed, this conﬁrms the ‘multistability’ of technologies, and how their context of use might alter their
original commercial designs. Although the member of the channel classiﬁes these technologies as ‘mod-
ern’, she is not defending the utopian positions that I reviewed in Section 2.3, which claim that ICT can
allow the production, distribution and access of content online almost with no restriction1. Instead, the
quotation makes evident the limits to produce, distribute and access content through ICT. Indeed, the
member of Barricada TV refers to two types of constraints that they have to face when they stream au-
diovisual content live. One of the limits is that these technologies demand enough ﬁnancial resources
1. Of course, this statement refers to countries where there is no censorship to internet access.
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to pay for a fast internet bandwidth to upload live audiovisual signals, which is a hurdle for media
for social transformation. Equally, the transmission of this signal with good deﬁnition requires a paid
streaming service, but again this is a big hurdle for these type of media that in general cannot afford
such services. In particular the latter, which operate abroad from Argentina and charge in dollars,
which is almost impossible to meet for such experiences, given the restrictions for a cross-border trans-
fer of funds existing at the time of ﬁeldwork. Thus, the only option left for Barricada TV is to use a free
streaming technology, such as Ustream and to put online videos on YouTube. Notwithstanding, this
decision puts them once again into a paradoxical situation, because the opportunity to stream their
message for ‘free’, is not completely costless. Contrarily, both providers of the service introduce during
the transmissions overlapping advertising over the signal that Barricada TV transmits, which dissem-
inates commercial content to their audiences that has nothing to do with the political orientation or the
concerns of social change of Barricada TV. Therefore, this distribution technology includes commercial
messages that distort and contradict Barricada TV’s imaginary of not employing commercial practices
such as advertising, showing how these technologies not only mediate but also transform the content
they distribute. Finally, there is another barrier to take into account in the use of these streaming ser-
vices that resides on the reception side, because not all internet users have a fast internet connection
in Argentina. In fact, statistics elaborated by a US ﬁrm on national average download speeds ranked
the country n° 109, with just 6,4 Mbs on average, versus 12,7 Mbs of Brazil or 31,9 Mbs of the USA
(Infobae 2013). Accordingly, the streaming download speed is limited by the contemporary internet
infrastructure in the country, which once again puts boundaries on the cyberutopian positions that
romanticize ICT as tools for free communications, but overlooks the hurdles of their implementation.
In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV is quite active in the use of other online technological platforms
for the distribution of their content. They are present in social networks such as Facebook and Twitter,
they have a website updated with news and coverages of their programming and a YouTube video
channel. This goes hand in hand with a different approach to technology than the one CPEtv has.
In contrast to co-operatives, these alternative media have the objective of reappropriating or adapting
ICT that were thought for other purposes in speciﬁc socio-historical environments, to match their own
counter-information objectives (Caballero 2011). For instance, online social networks or streaming
platforms have been produced to capture content from its users, to sell advertising. Thus, they are
tools that clearly side with the commercial approach to communications. By using these technologies,
cases such as Barricada TV contribute to this logic, as the case with advertising has shown, these
technologies do something, they mediate and side with the creative economy policy discourses. But,
this non-human ‘agency’ is not unidirectional, because up to a certain degree, it can be questioned,
reinterpreted, hacked and employed for other means. For this reason, I position Barricada TV more
to the right of Figure 6.1, because they try to reinterpret the ‘scripts’ of online social media, both
social networks and streaming platforms, to disseminate a non-commercial perspective. It is true that
this activity is not without limits, but my point is that they face fewer barriers than if they had just
followed a distribution strategy based on air broadcasting of their studio transmissions. In other words,
Barricada TV and other organizations put these media technologies into use for different aims, and in
many cases opposite to the one of their designers, as the next case will further illustrate.
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6.4 Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA, Brazil
I located Mídia NINJA on the right of Figure 6.1, because it is the case that best illustrates Ihde’s
(2012) concept of ‘multistability’, in reference to how technologies can be reinterpreted depending on
their different context of use. In the ﬁrst subsection, I will describe three organizational technologies,
which members of FDE and Mídia NINJA call ‘social technologies’2, and which set the stage for a
different context of use of their media technologies that I will explain in the second subsection. I shall
show how these different contexts of use give Mídia NINJA its distinctive features with respect to the
other three media projects, allowing it to overcome some of the hurdles for content production beyond
commercial principles, but also introducing new challenges.
6.4.1 Fora do Eixo and their ‘Social Technologies’
Up to this point, the technological limits of the previous three cases should be quite clear. Although
they challenge what they describe as mass media, they are all to different degrees employing produc-
tion technologies similar to those of the ﬁrms they criticize. Therefore, their space for challenging
commercial practices is bounded by the commercial requirements for accessing and maintaining such
technologies. In a certain way, the model of the commercial TV channel, ideally composed of a studio,
with heavy and costly equipment for recording and editing audiovisual content, ends up playing the
role of a limiting ‘script’ for the Argentinean cases, by creating difﬁcult material barriers to the chan-
nels and their imaginaries. Conversely, the Brazilian experience of Mídia NINJA is entirely based on
ICT. However, the uniqueness of this case does not only rely on these new technologies, which some of
the previous cases and many of the creative economy also use, but rather on how and in what context
they are employed. Speciﬁcally, in this section I will describe two of their ‘social technologies’: their
network organization in collective houses and their practices to fund their activities through comple-
mentary currencies. These are important because they are key instruments in pushing the members
of the organization to experience the utopian collective life their imaginary heralds on a daily basis,
challenging the assumptions of creative economy policy discourses on how cultural and media activities
ought to be organized.
The ﬁrst social technology of FDE relevant to understand Mídia NINJA is their organization in
collectives. It is worth to remember that FDE was founded by four collectives, emulating the ﬁrst
experience of Espaço Cubo, with members living together in a house or ﬂat, sharing costs, clothes
and food. These initial experiences marked the future of the network, and the following two deﬁnitions
synthesize this foundational practice. According to the dictionary of terms that the network distributes,
there are two types of collectives: 1) FDE houses, and 2) FDE points. On the one hand, the houses are
deﬁned as:
“Headquarters of local, regional or national articulation points in a certain city. For
their sustainability, they apply methodologies and social technologies used in the network,
such as collective cash, regular production of local events, solidarity hosting, complementary
currencies, among others. Each house operates as a residence, workspace and a space for
the exchange of values, methodologies, technologies and experiences of the network without
2. Due to the intense use of ICT by FDE and Mídia NINJA members, this emic concept can be understood as a word game, in
the sense that they call their unconventional ways of organization ‘technologies’ as well. However, these social technologies do
not involve the creation of an artifact, but rather the use of existing ones in different ways from the usual ones by variations on
how humans employ them.
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restrictions. Every house is a campus of the Fora do Eixo University” (Fora do Eixo 2013c,
translated by the author).
On the other hand, an FDE Point is deﬁned as a:
“Collective that aims to organize the local creative scene, to identify partners, the public,
potential exchanges, artists, communicators and other stakeholders, in order to articulate,
execute and stimulate strategic actions for the local cultural scene. The collectives also act in
a speciﬁc language” (translated by the author).
Which are their similarities and differences? The FDE points refer to those nodes of the network
that follow a collective organization, but not necessarily apply all the ‘social technologies’ later created
by FDE. For example, not all of their members live in the same house, or not all of them have their
own complementary currency. Still, these points play a crucial role to articulate and stimulate the
cultural activities in different small cities in Brazil, by focusing on what FDE members call different
‘languages’3. As a difference, the FDE houses thoroughly apply the social technologies with a collabora-
tive logic that characterize the imaginary of the network. One of the main ones is that all the members
live together in the same house and work in the same place, following the example of the foundational
collective. For instance, the FDE house of São Paulo, where around 20 members of the network from
different places of Brazil live and work collectively, sharing their food, clothes and other resources. Ad-
ditionally, many of these houses host members of the hardcore of FDE, that is to say, those whose main
priority in life is to work in the network, following the collective lifestyle (Fora do Eixo 2013c), which
also implies that although they have a horizontal and collaborative logic, there seems to be an implicit
hierarchy depending on the levels of commitment of each member. According to the members of the
network, in 2013 they had at least 200 FDE points distributed across the country, and among them
seven houses. Generally speaking, the houses can be understood as the nodes that articulate the work
of the regional collectives. Given that the FDE network is working nationally, in part this division was
a pragmatic decision to deal with the regional variations that exist in a country the size of Brazil. This
variety is reﬂected in the houses, which have speciﬁc features and focus. For instance, the house in
Fortaleza (in the northeast) on music and other cultural initiatives to address the enormous social gaps
between the rich and poor, whereas the house of Rio de Janeiro specializes on Mídia NINJA, because
most of the riots after June 2013 were concentrated there.
There are two important things to remark about this organizational technology. First, it stimulates
the creation of networks within FDE, which is a practice that emulates the Cultura Viva program
introduced in Section 4.1.2.1. Second, the sharing of basic things such as clothes, food, and housing
among its members reinforces the collective lifestyle that the network offers through its imaginary.
For these reasons, these organizational technologies act as a dispositive to (re)produce their collabora-
tive practices. However, these are not exempt of challenges, as one member of the network remarks:
“We always say that the ﬁrst challenge of a house is to harmonize the relationships among people, then
comes the question of work and the division of labor” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview
with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil). As another member of the hardcore of the
network remarks: “Food brings so much reﬂection” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview
3. This word refers to the speciﬁc cultural sector they focus on; for instance, one collective might specialize in elaborating
audiovisual material, another one might specialize in music, a different collective on environmental issues, and so on and so
forth.
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with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil), because sharing food with different people of dif-
ferent genres and body sizes is deﬁnitely a challenge that raises contemplations on how to distribute
scarce resources. These collective organizational technologies that FDE uses are deﬁnitely not new;
for example, in the 1950s the agricultural communities in Israel, the kibbutzim, worked in a similar
collective way to practice socialist and Zionist ideals. This involved that everything members of the
kibbutz (chaverim) produced belonged to the whole community: Children were brought up collectively,
private property was not allowed, salaries were equal, among other features that characterized a col-
lective lifestyle (Spiro 1971). Despite their visions of a better future, these collective experiences were
not without tensions or conﬂict, like the ones that arise whenever an individual challenges majority
decisions. These are shortcomings of these collective organizational practices, which might have their
advantages in opposing those just oriented for-proﬁts and extreme individualism, but that also have
their inevitable tensions, some of which have been at the center of a public controversy that FDE suf-
fered and that I shall acknowledge in Section 8.1.4.
The second group of social technologies that contribute to the (re)production of the imaginary of free
culture and of collaborative practices in FDE and Mídia NINJA are their complementary currencies and
their collective cash. I shall describe how these introduce a peculiar way of organizing their activities,
reinforcing their imaginary by favoring collaboration and the collective lifestyle, and at the same time,
paving the way for a particular reinterpretation of ICT.
The ﬁrst organizational technology belongs to the group of different types of currencies that have
been on the rise within social movements and organizations, which have varied names and imple-
mentation strategies, such as social currencies, community currencies, complementary currencies, etc.
Despite their differences, their main common aim is to alter what they perceive as the oppressive role
that standard national currencies have by changing the nature of exchange, favoring and dynamizing
trade within speciﬁc ‘communities’ or geographic spaces. Among the advantages to use such curren-
cies, research remarks that they are spent on a local territory; thus, promoting local production and
reducing the dependence on foreign products and services (Laville and Cattani 2005). As regards FDE,
its ﬁrst collective, Espaço Cubo, introduced the ﬁrst complementary currency to offer their services in
exchange for resources needed for survival. According to one of the founders of this collective, at that
time its members did not know about preexisting experiences with other types of currencies, but were
rather just inspired by the need to obtain resources for their services, and only later were perfected
through exchanges with the solidarity economy movement that pioneered such practices in Brazil. The
key feature of this complementary currency is that it allows the emitter to obtain a product or service
from the receiver at the moment, based on the promise to pay back with another product or service in
the future that is made explicit by the new paper money. Therefore, trust is essential. This practice
proved useful for the collective, and for this reason, it was later copied by other points and houses, as
a way to exchange their services without using the national currency, the Real. This original experi-
ence was later systematized and with the expansion of the network, FDE encourages each collective in
the network to develop its own complementary currency, which is something territorial. For example,
Figure 6.4 shows the paper money of the collective named Goma from the city of Uberlândia in Minas
Gerais, which created the complementary currency called Goma Card. As can be seen in the image, it
is simple paper money employed as a means of exchange.
Some of the advantages that the members of FDE assign to their complementary currencies are
implicit in the following deﬁnition, which refers to the generic name given to the diversity of these
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Figure 6.4: Paper money used by one of the founding collectives of FDE, the Goma collective. Source:
(Goma Card 2009).
currencies, the Card:
“Complementary currency that organizes the exchange of knowledge, technologies, services
and products of Fora do Eixo. It is guided by the principles of the solidarity economy and this
system moves the labor market of the collectives involved by encouraging new alternatives
for collective sustainability. Its circulation beneﬁts the redistribution of resources within the
sphere of the community. Each FDE $ 1.00 equals US $ 1.00” (Fora do Eixo 2013h).
The ﬁrst point to highlight is that the system establishes a one to one correspondence to the national
currency, but is not backed by it. It is just a way of making barter explicit. Thus, the key element
for the system to work is the enlargement of the network or circuit of actors who participate in the
exchange of products and services. The more actors included in the circuit, the less exchanges they
need with the ‘real economy’ based on the Real. According to a collaborator of FDE, this allowed them
to create complementary currency circuits in the interior of Brazil that funded artists from small towns
with scarce resources to circulate in ways that had been impossible before if they had just depended on
ﬁnancial resources in Brazilian Reais. However, as one member of FDE remarks: “The most difﬁcult
part is to create the circuit” (Fora do Eixo member IV, 08/03/2014, interview with & translated by the
author in Fortaleza, Brazil), but once that difﬁculty is overcome, the members claim that they can “do
more with less” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil), because they can exchange products and services without having the Reais. Thus,
they can cover different operational costs or needed equipment, which have been important for Mídia
NINJA to operate. As I pointed out before, in such a barter system trust is essential, because those
who intervene in transactions have to be trustful enough to fulﬁll the promise of providing a product or
service in the future for receiving a product or service now. According to members of FDE, the network
comes into action and acts as a control mechanism (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview
with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil), because if someone breaks a promise, then the
entire network will know and the unreliable actor will no longer be part of the system.
The second point to highlight is that complementary currencies allow FDE to (re)produce their
collaborative practices, by making explicit a particular way of valuing their products and services and
in exchanging them. According to the member of FDE who coordinates the Cards:
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“We trade our currency in three ways. First, direct exchanges between objects, irrespective
of their value, but dependent on the need for them. Two collectives have even exchanged an
air conditioner for a car. Second, we exchange by hour, so we deﬁne a value per work hour
and charge that, but we use the same value among us, because we believe that there is no type
of work more valuable than another. The work of a bricklayer is equal to that of a designer
and others. They are worth the same. In this way we do not enter into a slave relationship.
Third, we exchange by service, irrespective of how long it lasts” (Fora do Eixo member II,
19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).
This fragment shows that the transactions of products and services of these collectives do not aim
to accumulate national currency, opposing the ﬁnal aim of creative entrepreneurs from the creative
economy policy discourses. Conversely, the members of FDE want to switch as much as possible to such
an alternative system of exchange, which is based on the collaboration of the members of the network
and trust around the complementary currencies, a position illustrated by the following words from the
FDE’s member who coordinates the cards: “People have to understand that we do not want to acquire
national currencies. Contrarily, the more activities we can accomplish without their intermediation the
better” (Fora do Eixo member II, 19/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília,
Brazil).
The system is not without its problems, which generally arise at the interfaces with the national
currency, that is to say when they have to acquire products or services from the ‘real economy’ with
agents who do not want to be part of their complementary currency system. Thus, they have to acquire
Reais somewhere for instance when they need to buy a PC or any other electronic equipment for Mí-
dia NINJA. In contrast to other social currencies, the cards are not backed by the national currency.
Therefore, for each printed Card there is no equivalent amount of Reais possessed by the network, but
rather it is backed by the number of services they can offer. This has already been problematic, as the
founder of FDE, Pablo Capilé, remarks:
“At ﬁrst we made the mistake of giving too much of our currency, and we had a ‘sub prime’
crisis, because there was much more money on the streets than we could pay back. Then,
we approached the solidarity economy movement, we understood backing and we began to
regulate the distribution of our currency to avoid inﬂation and speculative capital” (Soares
2014).
Another disadvantage is caused by the geographic boundedness of the currencies, because there is a
variation in the sort of products or services that enter into circulation in each circuit created by each
particular complementary currency. For instance, in some cases the network of actors participating in
the exchange of products or services could trade medical products with the complementary currency,
but in others it was impossible, making evident that they are far from establishing a system indepen-
dent from the exchange of national currencies. Despite its shortcomings, the employment of comple-
mentary currencies helped FDE to (re)produce their collaboration practices, based on the attraction of
new agents to the network of exchange and the imaginary of the organization. For this reason, the
complementary currency can be understood as a dispositive (Keller 2013), because by depending less
on the national currency, it does not only challenge the accumulation of the national currency system,
which is the main aim of the commercial policy discourses, but also reinforces the collective lifestyle of
the organization.
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The second key organizational technology for the (re)production of FDE’s imaginary is what they call
collective cash, deﬁned as a: “Technology to manage resources collaboratively. It is a way to approximate
the members of a collective through the exercise of collaboratively managing ﬁnancial resources that
each member individually generates” (Fora do Eixo 2013c). This deﬁnition might seem vague, but it
just refers to the fact that the members of FDE houses have - in theory - equal access to use the
funds that each collective member generates, including both complementary, international and national
currencies. Within this structure, the collective cash is the bank of, on the one hand, national and
international currencies, and on the other hand, complementary currencies. These are not owned by
anyone in particular of the team, but by everyone at the same time, which, as the following quote by
a member of FDE illustrates, requires to build up collaborative practices so that the resources are not
misused.
“When we set up a collective cash we share everything. This allows to see in practice how
the dynamic of a collective life works. Giving up everything you have is very difﬁcult. But
people in the hardcore of Fora do Eixo did so with many things, which is why we speak of
free culture” (Universidade Fora do Eixo member, 07/02/2014, interview with & translated
by the author in São Paulo, Brazil).
The founder of FDE remarked the importance of this organizational technology in the national congress
in Brasília: “The collective cash is the special thing of our movement. Not the rest. This is what leads us
to a state of permanent utopia” (Capilé, personal communication). This quote refers to the importance
of the collective cash to make explicit the collective sharing of resources on a daily basis, because ev-
eryone has to think why and how are they going to use them, taking into account the needs of the other
members of the collective. Additionally, what one gains becomes part of what all have at their disposal
in the collective cash, and thus all gain at the same time, which allows them to surpass the precarity
they would face if they only worked individually as creative entrepreneurs. Equally, a wrong use of
resources by one member would negatively affect the rest. Therefore, the collective cash is also a dis-
positive that pushes the members of the organization to experience the collective lifestyle they advocate
in their imaginary on a daily basis (see Section 5.5.3), challenging all the basic assumptions of creative
economy discourses based on private property, which is one way of organizing cultural activities, but
not necessarily the unique and global one. In sum, FDE is a unique organization among the others
that host media for social transformation channels, because it has implemented two dispositives, the
complementary currencies and the collective cash, which reinforce practices of collaboration challeng-
ing the supremacy of individualism, private property and sharp hierarchical patterns of organization.
This is important, because as I shall show in the next section, these different contexts of use pave the
way for the reinterpretations of technologies present in Mídia NINJA.
6.4.2 Mídia NINJA
The previous two dispositives from FDE that reinforce their collaborative imaginary play an important
role in leading to speciﬁc reinterpretations of widely available ICT that Mídia NINJA employs, but
they are not the only ones. Additionally, FDE defends an active perspective of reinterpretation of
technologies, which they call ‘hacking’, deﬁned as a: “Lifestyle, tactical behavior. It is to radicalize the
use of platforms, tools, objects and technologies. ‘Hacking’ is improvisation and the use of open source
to give life to what is stagnant, openly sharing the beneﬁts of usage” (translated by the author). Taking
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of the technology used by Mídia NINJA to cover events and mobilizations. In
this case, they were covering a meeting between the governor of Minas Gerais, Antonio Anastasia, and
professors. Source: Mídia NINJA.
into account these peculiarities of this case, in this subsection I will explain why I located Mídia NINJA
at the right of the gradients in Figure 6.1, also underlining the limits of their peculiar technological
conﬁguration.
As regards content production, their technological system is simple and complex at the same time.
Simple, because it just requires elements that have become easily accessible in parts of Brazil, like
smartphones or webcameras to capture a mobilization, an event, or a conversation among arranged
speakers. For instance, Figure 6.5 shows how a Mídia NINJA reporter is covering the speech of a politi-
cian live with his smartphone, while he receives comments from the viewers. Based on the concepts
proposed by Ihde (2012), what is important to remark from this technological conﬁguration is that the
cell phone creates a new embodiment-relation with the Mídia NINJA reporter, by giving the possibility
of transmitting an event live and at the same time interacting with the users who comment on the
audiovisual signal. This contrasts with the previous human-technology relation in the previous cases,
where the use of heavy cameras excluded the possibility of direct viewer participation. At the same
time, these technologies are complex, because they depend on the establishment of advanced techno-
logical infrastructure and networks, whose limits are evident precisely in those places where they do
not work. For example, the Brazilian states in the Amazon that have less developed mobile phone
networks, which precludes the use of streaming technologies. Despite these regional chasms, ICT have
opened the way for online experiences such as Mídia NINJA to use the new recording devices to cap-
ture and distribute information, bypassing the need to acquire costly recording equipment of typical
commercial TV channels as in the Argentinean cases.
Apart from the speciﬁc use of smartphones as the main artifact to record audiovisual signals, the
distinctive feature of Mídia NINJA is how such recording processes are organized. Indeed, the members
of the network speak of ‘collaborative coverage’, which according to their deﬁnition encompasses:
“[...] the coverage of an event performed by people with skills in different areas of commu-
nication and guided by free media principles and open participation. This generates textual,
photographic, audiovisual, podcasts and content updates in social networks. It produces a
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collaborative and diversiﬁed result by allowing everyone to put his gaze on the subject” (Fora
do Eixo 2013c, translated by the author).
For instance, in any prearranged event that they want to report about collaboratively, Mídia NINJA
invites people from the network and externals to become NINJAs. This involves a premeeting to di-
vide roles; who will take photographs, who will write about the event, who will ﬁlm and transmit via
streaming, who will receive the material and distribute it through social networks, etc. Therefore, they
collaboratively cover the event with a team contingent to the speciﬁc people having interest in it, and
diffuse varied types of materials through social networks, which differs from other media that might
also use cellphones for recording news, without challenging their hierarchical, for-proﬁt orientation.
Thus, I understand this as a reinterpretation of ICT to cover events, which has its origin in the collec-
tive practices that I described in the previous subsection. In other words, if the members of the network
live together by sharing their food, clothes and even ﬁnancial resources, covering the events collectively
is just an extension of those practices to their media project. Additionally, the coverages so far have
not been done to earn income by distributing their content, that is to say, they do not have the position
that information is a commodity. Indeed, those who produce content for the network are either part of
FDE or circumstantial collaborators. The former dedicate most of their time to the initiative and are
part of the hardcore, given that FDE covers their living costs through complementary currencies and
their living space in one of the houses or points of the network. For this reason, they have a big advan-
tage with respect to other media, which need to sustain their living costs through activities beyond the
communication sector or earn money from the initiative itself, something usually quite challenging. As
regards collaborators, they contribute to the network with material that they would like to distribute
to a wider audience, and in general, there is no ﬁnancial reward for such collaboration. Nonetheless,
it is important to stress that the lack of explicit for-proﬁt ends in Mídia NINJA would not be possi-
ble without the support of FDE, which covers the costs of its operation. Indeed, Mídia NINJA can be
comprehended as a dispositive, as an investment by FDE to disseminate its collaborative imaginary,
though hiding that the resources for its operation come from other activities of the network that do
depend on state funds and commercial practices of organizing cultural events.
During the ﬁrst months of the experience, Mídia NINJA began with a similar reinterpretation
of different online media technologies to distribute their content, such as Facebook, Twitcasting and
YouTube. The key innovation was that they disseminated their content exclusively online. For exam-
ple, their Facebook page was the main place where they posted photos and descriptions of the reported
events, which allowed anyone interested in their coverage to access and comment on their content.
Thus, they had a participatory bend, with continuous feedback from those following their sites, which
is not present in traditional top-down communication models. Furthermore, an important innovation
was to employ the service offered for free by the app called Twitcasting, which allows to stream content
from cameras connected to the internet, such as smartphones or notebooks. This became their main
tool to report live coverages, surpassing the need to acquire expensive recording and diffusion equip-
ment as in the Argentinean cases. Additionally, Mídia NINJA used YouTube to distribute their own
videos and also others they received from collaborators. Similarly, Mídia NINJA and FDE have been
active users of Twitter too, using the number of members of the network to push tags of their interest
as trending topics and to link the content distributed in the other platforms. In contrast to these four
main media of distribution, in 2014 they launched their own web site to distribute news, which accord-
ing to Mídia NINJA members (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by
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the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil), has been an advancement with respect to their previous situation
of dependence on Facebook, because they were no longer limited by the feed format that must follow
one narrative per time. On the contrary, their site allows them to simultaneously publish events in
different sections, thus segmenting the topics to report.
Despite the advantages ICT offer, they have their negative side too, which at least puts three con-
straints to Mídia NINJA. First, there is a certain precarity in their technological conﬁguration; for
instance, live streamings frequently experience cuts during transmissions, and the image in many
cases is too pixelated or slow, which irritates the viewer. Beyond that, as with the case of Barricada
TV, streaming technology has certain prerequisites to operate well, both for the transmission and the
reception of the signal, like requiring a fast internet connection for uploading and downloading. Un-
luckily, this is not equally accessible all across the country, except for the richer states of Brazil, such
as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Belo Horizonte that have better online infrastructure than others.
As a consequence, by using this technology Mídia NINJA might reinforce content production of those
regions where it operates, neglecting those where it does not, although these might be places with more
social conﬂicts to cover, as in the states located in the Amazon region.
A second limit introduced by their technologies is that Mídia NINJA has a strong dependence on
social networks, which in the end are the products of private organizations, mostly from the USA, op-
erating under proﬁts and against their collaborative logic. These technological platforms continuously
include advertising along with the content that Mídia NINJA distributes through them, similarly to
what happened to Barricada TV. Therefore, Mídia NINJA might be distributing content about their
collaborative imaginary, but at the same time - and opposed to their aims - the tools they use distribute
the commercial practices that Facebook and other social networks need for their ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity. Thus, these media technologies have a ‘script’ that stimulates a commercial approach to culture
and communications, whose effect will depend on the viewers receiving such a mixture of imaginaries.
Apart from this, Mídia NINJA is subject to the changing policy conditions that such social networks
have; for example, whether content is admissible or not. These requirements might collide with the
interest of Mídia NINJA to cover social struggles or critical content, which might get censored; for in-
stance, in 2013 Facebook blocked their page after receiving complaints from viewers. Immediately after
this censorship, Mídia NINJA protested by posting the following message in the Fora do Eixo Facebook
account:
“URGENT! CENSORSHIP! Facebook blocked NINJA’s page! We were denounced due
to improper or pornographic content. Facebook is ‘analyzing the case’. But we had no de-
tailed argument or chance of written defense. We believe it may have been the result of com-
plaints from viewers against yesterday’s photos of the anti-priest gay manifestation. Pictures
in which there was no pornography, only explicit material of affection and happiness. We
ask you to share and pressure Facebook to put it back online. Unfortunately, for now, this is
our main platform of our dedicated independent coverage of protests in Brazil” (Fora do Eixo
2013h, 22/06/2013, translated by the author).
Who blocked the page? Were simply users complaining about the content? Was it the government to
stop the diffusion of content that would enrage the population? It is hard to know when media plat-
forms do not offer access to such information, such as Facebook in this case. Therefore, this case clearly
illustrates that what at ﬁrst might seem like independence from the high costs needed to acquire tech-
nologies for a standard TV channel, in fact ends up being a different, but subtler dependence relation
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regarding the conditions, design and practices of these commercial social networks, which coincides
with the skeptical position of Morozov (2011) that he named net-delusion. Indeed, in November 2013
this issue was a big topic of discussion in an event organized by Mídia NINJA to gather independent
media collectives for discussions (Mídia NINJA 2013a). Basically there were two positions. On the
one hand, those that stated that commercial platforms are not a good decision and should be com-
pletely abandoned, because they are controlled by private ﬁrms, which includes advertising to make
proﬁts with their content, besides sharing information with intelligence services of different countries.
Accordingly, this position assumes that the ‘script’ of these media platforms reinforce the commercial
practices, associated with the creative economy policy discourse, but that they cannot be challenged.
On the other hand, a second position coincided with these fears, but rather thinks that what really
matters is to have media that grant access to as many people as possible with the least possible costs,
assuming viewers will ignore the commercial inﬂuence of these platforms, which reveals the possibility
of reinterpreting these technologies. Within such a perspective, mainstream social media networks,
despite their risks, are still useful, and this second position prevails in Mídia NINJA and FDE. Nev-
ertheless, there have been attempts to escape such a dependence as the development of their own web
portal or intentions to use alternative social networks. But, the problem for the latter is that most
users still communicate through mainstream platforms like Facebook and Twitter, and ignoring them
would just mean to miss many potential viewers.
Apart from this, and supposing the audiences switched to new platforms, it is not so simple to set
up alternative online networks of communication, just like it is not so simple to set up an audiovisual
channel with own equipment without national R&D efforts. This requires the capabilities to build
or alter communication networks, which are concentrated in actors that do not necessarily share the
perspectives of media for social transformation. Indeed, FDE has been trying to do so by hiring pro-
grammers interested in social movements and free software, which they call hackers, but it has not
been an easy task, as the following member explains:
“Today hackers are overvalued in the market, then it is difﬁcult to attract them. When
you invite programmers to join a social movement, they reply they are already free software
activists who work in private ﬁrms earning tons of money, but then they accuse us of being
sheepskins for using proprietary software! When in fact what we need is hacktivists to work
on building software for social movements” (Fora do Eixo member V, 21/02/2014, interview
with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).
A third constraint is the ﬁnancial one, because their lack of national currency hinders expanding their
content distribution through other media beyond the internet. Although streaming and other online
media technologies have been central in this media organization, the lack of ﬁnancial resources does
not allow them to have other media to reach resource-scarce sectors of the Brazilian population. Par-
ticularly in the northern states, where inequalities in terms of income and access to technologies are
higher, and where the need to cover conﬂicts and give loudspeakers to the unheard is larger.
In sum, Mídia NINJA is far more than just the application of new media technologies as some techno
utopians would understand, but rather a case where the collaborative practices and the hacking per-
spective to technology lead to a considerable reinterpretation of the available ICT. Thus, this case has
taken advantage of the multistability of ICT, because although most have been designed for other pur-
poses than establishing an independent media, the members of this case reinterpreted them towards
such an objective, respecting their collaborative practices. This has allowed Mídia NINJA to build an
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experience traditional technological designs for commercial TV channels would have never permitted
with few resources. Nonetheless, the reinterpretation of technologies also carries constraints, because
as I mentioned, the online media platforms they use still transmit advertising, limit and spy on the
content produced by its users. Therefore, there are spaces for reinterpretation, but they are limited
or more bounded than what the concept of ‘multistability’ might suggest, because in this case the em-
ployed technology - social networks or streaming sites - are still under the control of their designers
who host the servers. Thus, they can alter the programs and partly intervene in what users’ do with
their technological platforms. This situation is quite different from the examples that Ihde (2012, p.
172) gives to illustrate multistability; for instance, how a musical instrument can be used to produce
music, by hitting it in a rhythmic way, disregarding the formal way of playing it. The difference is that
the artifact or technology is ﬁnished and under the control of the users, whereas the social networks
are not.
6.5 Concluding Discussion
In this chapter, I stressed the essential role of technologies in shaping the imaginaries of the cases,
though not necessarily towards the directions desired by the initiatives. On the one hand, I showed
that the different media technologies put limits on the imaginaries of the analyzed cases, either by
(re)producing practices that are part of a commercial approach to culture and information or by creat-
ing a dependence on the commercial ﬁrms producing these technologies. Thus, they can be seen as a
dispositive reinforcing such discourses. More precisely, in this chapter I employed the concept of ‘script’
(Akrich 1992) to reveal that the original design of these technologies is the cause of the limits that the
four studied media suffer, though to varying degrees. This does not mean that the technology ‘does’
something, but rather that its design - if not questioned - leads to a particular use or interpretation
which does not necessarily coincide with the objectives of the imaginaries. In this sense, the experiences
cannot be understood as an independent symbolic imaginary ﬂoating in the air, because this ignores the
ties and interactions with non-human objects that may be limiting the practical implementation of the
imaginaries analyzed in chapter 5. For example, the Argentinean cases, to different degrees, employ
technologies following the typical commercial TV channel structure, with expensive equipment, a stu-
dio and trained human resources. In part, this is a consequence of the new audiovisual media law that
gives licenses to this type of channels. However, this requires that the media initiatives get the needed
ﬁnancial resources for such an infrastructure, either from advertising or partners, but as was evident
from these cases, this is a big hurdle for new experiences to overcome. Only those that have enough
resources (ﬁnancial and relational) can achieve this objective, as the co-operative case, whereas others
with reduced access to such resources simply face insurmountable barriers altering or in the worse
cases blocking the implementation of their imaginaries, such as Wall Kintun TV. Consequently, even
though the new law in Argentina paved the way for the legal existence of windows of opportunity for
new channels to emerge, it did not address the ﬁnancial and technological barriers that the commercial
like TV technological model that they stimulated requires. In the case of Argentina, this points to a big
deﬁcit in the new audiovisual communication services law, which implied a technological conﬁguration
not appropriate for most NGOs. At the same time, it indicates the need of a policy to develop local and
appropriate technologies that match the size and scale of these channels.
On the other hand, I showed that despite the limits that the scripts of the media technologies impose
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on the cases, these technologies are open to interpretation, revealing the dimension that Ihde called
‘multistability’. Therefore, some of the cases have been able to counterbalance their lack of resources
and own web technologies, by employing the ones available online and transmitting information in
innovative ways, departing from the distribution technologies employed by traditional commercial me-
dia. This seems to depend on the existence of an imaginary precisely acknowledging the open nature of
technologies, rather than a perspective that takes them for granted, closed, stabilized, and unchange-
able. For instance, Barricada TV employs a TV model similar to CPEtv, but subverting the hierarchical
and commercially implied model of organization depending on advertising. However, this required a
speciﬁc imaginary that questions such principles of organization, like the inﬂuence that the factories
without bosses movement had on this media experience. In a similar vein, I showed that the speciﬁc
collaborative practices of Mídia NINJA (collective organization, complementary currencies and collec-
tive cash), together with the ‘hacking’ element in their imaginary, reinterpreted existing ICT to match
their objectives and practices. Nonetheless, the analysis of the case that most reappropriated ICT, Mí-
dia NINJA, also makes evident that the ‘script’ introduced by the designers into the technology, does
not completely disappear, but might rather coexist and its effects might vary according to the technol-
ogy and to those using it. Nonetheless, the multistable nature of technologies is important for media for
social transformation to take into account, in order to generate strategies to employ the tools offered by
commercial ﬁrms to advance their non-commercial projects, and in the process, challenge the creative
economy policy discourses.
With respect to the conceptual framework, in this chapter I showed how the concept of ‘script’ and
the idea of ‘multistability’ of technologies are more precise for the study of the technologies of speciﬁc
case studies, rather than just saying in a comprehensive manner that these might play the role of ‘dis-
positives’. Although the latter might be true and a valuable metaphor to highlight in a broad way the
technical aspects of social phenomena (Peeters and Charlier 1999), it is a vague concept that does not
give recommendations on how to analyze the speciﬁc features of the technology under analysis. Indeed,
I already remarked in chapter 2 that SKAD only has interest on the meaning patterns, classiﬁcation
schemes, phenomenal structures and narrative structures (Keller 2008b) of dispositives, which is not
enough to comprehend how the design of technologies limit the potential action of its users. There-
fore, the concept of script is better suited to focus on the main design that a technology is supposed to
have that paves the way for particular types of human action, without determining them. However,
it says nothing on how the conditions created by it might be challenged or reinterpreted. Accordingly,
the idea of multistability from the philosophy of technology points to the spaces of reinterpretation of
technologies that users might perform, questioning their original designs (Ihde 2012). This perspective
joining ‘script’ with ‘multistability’ advanced by Verbeek (2006) is an important contribution to avoid
deterministic or lineal readings of the effects of technology. Additionally, it coincides with Couldry’s
(2008) critique of ANT, which, according to him, neglects such processes of reinterpretation once an
actor-network becomes stabilized. According to Ihde (2012), the space of reinterpretations is inﬁnite,
but my data shows that if the technology is still partly in control of its designers while the users apply
it, then the spaces of reinterpretation are bounded, though varied according to the contexts of use.
For instance, it is true that Facebook can be reinterpreted and employed for different purposes, but if
the aim is to produce news, then the possibilities for presenting them in the network are not inﬁnite.
Likewise, Facebook cannot be stopped from changing the conditions of using its platform or of spying
and censoring the content that users publish on it. For this reason, I argue that the concepts of script
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and the multistability of technologies are complementary to understand how technologies might shape
human action, and that the weight of each one does not depend only on the context of use, but also
on a dimension in the imaginaries that consider technologies as open works, and not just closed black
boxes. Taking into account the boundaries that technologies create to the implementation of the imagi-
naries of the cases, the next chapter analyzes different dimensions of content production and reception,
which shed light on further hurdles and strategies to surpass, employed by the studied media for social
transformation.
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Chapter 7
Content Production and Reception
Each of the four media cases under analysis has a particular imaginary that aims to produce content
that differs and challenges mainstream ones. But, how far have they been able to do so? To answer
this question, this chapter sheds light on three main dimensions. In the ﬁrst section, I shall argue
that the content produced by the experiences matches their imaginaries, which spans an analysis of
the main types of themes covered by these media. Nonetheless, I shall also argue that the production
process of these cases is in some cases limited by the existing ‘quality’ patterns established by the
aesthetics of mass and professional media considered as ‘good’, overlooking the rest. Therefore, these
mainstream ‘quality’ patterns act as dispositives that have inﬂuenced each case to varying degrees. In
the second section, I will apply the concept of participation in media research introduced in Section
2.3, to discuss up to what extent do these cases match the ideal of a maximalist model of participation,
in contrast to the minimalist models of mass media ﬁrms. Opposing the optimistic claims of these
organizations, I shall argue that they are still far from fulﬁlling the extreme ideals of participation due
to their imaginaries and material limits of production. Finally, in the third section I will examine data
about content reception by audiences, which delineate some limits to the expansion of these new media
projects and their potential to democratize the ‘public sphere’ (Downey and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010).
The analysis in the three sections is based on interviews and observations from ﬁeldwork conducted in
each of the analyzed cases, together with an analysis of the audiovisual outputs of these organizations.
A shortcoming of these sources is that not all cases employ the same distribution technologies, or had
the same amount of information available in terms of quantities of videos to compare. Although these
constraints limit a full comparative analysis, still the gathered material offers insights of the type of
audiovisual content produced and its further dissemination.
7.1 Content Production
7.1.1 Imaginaries and Themes
In chapter 5, I argued that media for social transformation could be considered as dispositives of the
speciﬁc imaginaries that each case represents. Indeed, the actors putting forward the four experiences
belong to networks that have their own proposals on how the economy and society at large ought to be
changed, addressing what they understand as the problems that for-proﬁt principles above anything
else are causing. Nonetheless, the directions of change advanced by each case differ and have distinct
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addressees. In this ﬁrst section, I shall exemplify what sort of audiovisual content the four cases have
been elaborating, which are examples of the discursive practices (Keller 2013) of the cases and their
addressees. This is important, because it displays the different types of topics they have been covering
related to themes in the international development agenda, such as the environment, gender, minority
groups, etc., together with more local ones linked to their imaginaries. Furthermore, I will discuss
the differences of the discursive practice among the cases, illustrating how some formats have been
more comprehensive in covering the topics of interest for the cases. In this way, the section stresses the
importance of these media to generate material that, according to their members, would have otherwise
received scarce coverage from state or private local media, or more broadly, by principles patterned by
the creative economy policy discourses.
7.1.1.1 CPEtv, Argentina
Globally, co-operatives have a hard time to diffuse their principles and practices in mass media; for
instance, the International Year of Co-operatives by the United Nations was one of the top 10 most
censored news (Project Censored 2013). These challenges are even more pronounced in the interior of
Argentina, and for these reasons CPEtv has the aim to overcome the lack of content about co-operative
principles and practices. In chapter 5, I explained that CPE wants to inﬂuence Santa Rosa’s inhab-
itants to become more participative and co-operative, and to express greater solidarity so that these
attitudes get reﬂected in people’s daily lives. To achieve such aims, CPEtv has been elaborating and
disseminating a diversity of TV programs, which I understand as the discursive practices of their imag-
inary. Actually, in August 2013 they broadcasted 16 programs to meet these objectives, out of which
six were entirely produced by the organization, four were elaborated in collaboration with other local
organizations, and independent producers made the remaining six.
Figure 7.1 shows the 16 programs classiﬁed according to categories that I deﬁned to capture their
main object of concern1. From bottom up, the ﬁrst category ‘culture’ includes ﬁve programs, two dedi-
cated to diffuse content about local culture, where the rest disseminate music not necessarily restricted
to the province of La Pampa. The largest number of programs in this category conﬁrms the claim of
CPEtv members in Section 5.2.3 that they want to focus on cultural themes. The second category
includes two programs about health that diffuse recommendations and advice to citizens. The third
category includes two programs dedicated to provincial politics. The co-operativism category refers to
two programs related to the movement. Besides, there is a local news program. The rest cover issues
of education, historical events of the province and local sports. In the following paragraphs, I will give
concrete examples of what themes the discursive practices of content production covered, highlighting
those related to the international development agenda and the imaginary of the case. I shall show how
the imaginary of CPE is represented in the content elaborated by some of these programs, nonetheless,
the audiovisual material that they diffuse is not restricted by it. For instance, they also broadcast
programs about health, sports or music concerts in the city. This in part is a consequence of the new
audiovisual communication services law in the country, which requires the co-operative to produce 30%
of own content and to have at least 10% of local content elaborated by external producers in their emis-
sions (Ley 26.522 2009). The aim of this requisite is to contribute to the growth of local audiovisual
1. To compile this table I employed the information offered by the web page of CPEtv at that time, which gave the title and
a short description of every program that they broadcasted. Additionally, I had sample videos of each program from their TV
transmissions to cross validate that my classiﬁcation was correct. Based on this material, I assigned just one category to each of
the programs, according to their main object of concern.
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and reproductive women’s rights . A plausible hypothesis to test in future research is whether this
has to do with the for-proﬁt principles guiding private media, which favor content that attracts large
audiences. Indeed, a popular slogan among journalists is that ‘only bad news are good news’, which
implies that news without violence or that just try to prevent harmful behavior or situations might not
be attractive for commercial media, irrespective of the consequences this lack of content could produce.
As regards environmental issues, the CPE news program has been covering issues of concern for
the province of La Pampa that receive little attention in national mass media, showing the importance
of local media for such themes. Take the example of the co-operative giving voice to discussions about
water conﬂicts with the neighboring province of Mendoza. During the late 1940s, the latter built a
dam that considerably reduced the ﬂow of the Atuel river that ﬂows across both provinces, causing
desertiﬁcation and the emigration of local inhabitants. According to interviewees, the state favored
this decision as a consequence of the larger political and economic inﬂuence that Mendoza has in the
country in comparison with La Pampa (in terms of population and provincial GDP). Despite these
imbalances, there have been continuous popular struggles around this water conﬂict which are still in
legal dispute, although with scarce results in favor of La Pampa. In this context, CPEtv claims to offer
a new space for NGOs and citizens to claim for more action from the part of the provincial government
to solve the conﬂict, and to generate further content to raise awareness of the controversy.
Besides the daily news, the program that most clearly represents the aim of CPEtv is called Con
principio emprendedor (with entrepreneurial principles), which according to the coordinator of CPEtv:
“We intend to be a window for all those third sector institutions in Santa Rosa, which are in pursuit
of improving the daily quality of life for all citizens, by disseminating their initiatives” (CPEtv 2012,
translated by the author). In this program they disseminate content on how different co-operatives and
other NGOs in the province operate, they explain their models of organization, their entrepreneurship
in starting the experiences, their context, products and services, among other features. In this way,
they generate and diffuse content of what they understand as the other ‘human faced’ co-operative
economy, which tries to ﬁll the lack of content covering how these organizations operate in the province
and in the country. Thus, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, the content disseminates the
practices of organizations following the co-operative principles and stimulates viewers to take such
subject-position. In particular, let me stress once again that the creative economy policy discourses only
speak of creative or cultural entrepreneurs oriented for proﬁts, in the extreme cases just ‘individuals’,
contrarily, this program highlights the entrepreneurial activities but within the framework of the co-
operative movement, stressing the social contributions of these organizations. For these reasons, this
is one of the programs that most clearly disseminates the speciﬁcities of the imaginary that CPEtv
defends.
In the same vein, the program Editorial Voces (voices editorial) is the program of the co-operative’s
editorial that interviews local artists and researchers of the province (or who work there) to diffuse
their projects every week. According to the coordinator of the editorial: “The TV program has led the
publisher to a level of dissemination it did not have before” (Editorial Voces coordinator, 28/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). The importance of this state-
ment has to be understood in the context described in Section 3.4. The city of Santa Rosa, although a
provincial capital, is still in the cultural periphery of the country, and every worker in a creative sector
or researcher knows that if they want ‘success’, they have to go to Buenos Aires. However, this causes a
negative consequence in the province due to the drain of human resources. Under these circumstances,
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Editorial Voces’ coordinator thinks that the program humbly tries to offset such centrifugal force by
encouraging and recovering local cultural expressions, which would otherwise be ignored.
A last program worth to mention is called Todo es Cultura (everything is culture), which according
to its producers aims to:
“Give priority to people who are most vulnerable economically, socially, as well as cultur-
ally, whose expressions are not valued or are despised by the elite. We take the whole culture
of the city and that is why our program is called everything is culture” (Todo es Cultura coor-
dinator, 19/09/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).
This statement makes visible another center-periphery division, but this time within the city of Santa
Rosa. The producers declare that they elaborate content about all cultural expressions, and not just
those located near downtown where the ‘elite’ cultural events usually take place. Conversely, they
claim to cover cultural events of peripheral neighborhoods within the city that are resource-scarce,
suffer negative stereotypes, but still elaborate cultural expressions that are part of the city. The argu-
ment they employ resembles my criticism of the creative industries policy discourses in chapter 4 at
the national level. Furthermore, it conﬁrms that unless organizations do something to highlight the
cultural productions of minority or resource-scarce groups, these are neglected - and in the worst cases
despised - by those resourceful sectors that can easily access and proﬁt from the opportunities created
by a commercial approach to culture and communication.
In short, CPEtv is a channel oriented to the production and dissemination of content related to
co-operatives, the life in Santa Rosa and the province of La Pampa, striving for an expansion of co-
operativism. This is achieved by the elaboration of content organized in 16 programs, illustrating an
industrial like process of production, and at the same time a large amount of material that contributes
to (re)produce their imaginary and to extend co-operative principles and practices.
7.1.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina
As described in chapter 5, the imaginary of this case aims to counter inform mass media, giving space
to left-wing and workers’ perspectives from Argentina, particularly those identiﬁed with the MNER.
To achieve these aims, during 2014 they broadcasted 21 programs, out of which 13 were elaborated
by Barricada TV, while the rest by other nonproﬁt audiovisual producers of Argentina and other Latin
American countries. Similarly to CPEtv, this case offers a varied number of programs, which suggests
that they follow an industrial like process of production to keep the audiovisual transmissions going. As
in the previous case, I classiﬁed these programs according to their main object of concern2. Figure 7.2
shows nine categories, with slightly more than half of them falling into the culture and politics class.
These are followed by three programs dedicated to news, and ﬁnally by six other programs that cover
varied themes, such as the economy, recovered factories, history, among others. In a like manner to
CPEtv, Barricada TV has a cultural proﬁle, but as a difference, it elaborates more programs dedicated
to discuss political issues. This is consistent with the explanation I gave on Section 5.3.2 that this
case is more politically oriented than CPEtv, due to its different historical trajectories. In the following
paragraphs, I will give concrete examples of what themes the discursive practices of content production
2. I employed the same procedure as with the programs of CPEtv. First, I used the online information of each of the programs
that included its title and a short description. Second, I collected a sample of videos from each program, to cross-validate what
topics they covered. Based on this material, I assigned just one category to each of the programs according to their main object
of concern.
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Figure 7.2: Barricada TV programs classiﬁed by the researcher according to their main object of con-
cern.
have covered, highlighting those related to the international development agenda and the imaginary
of the case.
The ﬁrst two categories, ‘culture’ and ‘politics’, delineate the main focus of the program, which is
to give voices to actors and themes that have scarce spaces in commercial media. As regards ‘cul-
ture’, it includes programs that cover cultural expressions that do not have space in mass media due
to their reduced audiences; for instance, they transmit a program about bands from the alternative
music scene in Buenos Aires (Barricada TV 2012a) and a program for broadcasting alternative au-
diovisual productions (Barricada TV 2010b). In this way, they contribute to the diffusion of cultural
expressions on which the ‘cultural and creative industries’ do not shed their light, because they are not
proﬁtable to be part of mass circuits. Likewise, the ‘culture’ category includes a program that covers
the cultural activities that IMPA supports in its neighborhood (Barricada TV 2011c), and a program
of interviews analyzing the interconnections between art and politics (Barricada TV 2013a), among
others from independent producers. As regards ‘politics’, Barricada TV transmits a program of inter-
views with politicians, academics and representatives of social organizations involved in issues of social
transformation (Barricada TV 2012b) . In all cases, they do so from a left-wing point of view, claiming
to give voice to actors who are underrepresented in mass media, and thus contributing to a democra-
tization of perspectives. Apart from these, the category includes a program elaborated by Barricada
TV’s members that diffuses content discussing issues of other Latin American countries (Barricada TV
2012f). Besides, the channel broadcasts other regional programs covering similar issues. In both cases,
the aim is to raise awareness of the potentials of Latin American integration, which is a strong focus
less present in CPEtv.
As in the co-operative case, the central emission is a weekly news program called Noticiero Popular
(popular news), which is “built from a committed look with workers and the people. With coverages
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from Buenos Aires and the country, and interviews with mobilized sectors of society that are made
invisible by mainstream media” (Barricada TV 2015b). These interviews are central to Barricada TV’s
aim of counter-information, because with marginalized actors they discuss the same themes touched
by mass media, but from different and less diffused points of view. For instance, their most viewed
video on YouTube is an interview with one of the supporters for changing the national drug law, so that
consumers are no longer punished, but instead the effort is focused on dealers (Barricada TV 2011a).
Similarly, interviews with leaders of trade unions during strikes are another example, because they
give them space to express their opinion (Barricada TV 2011b), whereas in mass media their presence
might be reduced and often with a negative portrayal of their actions. Accordingly, it illustrates the
aims of the imaginary of this case that I introduced in chapter 5, and the activist orientation of the
members of the channel that strives for social transformation.
A further example worth mentioning is a program about recovered factories, where members of
these several experiences in Argentina give interviews, explaining the process they went through, the
suffering they resisted during the economic crisis, how they were able to overcome the difﬁculties and
ﬁnally recover the factories (Barricada TV 2012e). This discursive practice disseminates audiovisual
content of the utopian dimension of the imaginary, in the sense that it gives examples on how the
emerging recovered factories illustrate the feasibility of an economy with ﬁrms managed by its workers,
defending collective work and property. Consequently, the program plays a similar role to the one
that CPEtv has to disseminate co-operative entrepreneurial principles, because it offers the subject-
position of a workers self-managed initiative, though departing from the practices of co-operatives due
to the focus on collective work and property. It is important to recall how this contrasts with the
creative economy policy discourses that take private, individual property and the employer-employee
hierarchic relations for granted, disseminating the private, for-proﬁt oriented, creative entrepreneur
subject-position. Contrarily, these experiences claim to offer a different and more democratic way to
organize the workplace, which obviously challenges mainstream organizational practices, and might
be one of the main reasons they are neglected in commercial media that follow precisely the opposite
principles of organization.
Apart from these, the remaining categories encompass a diversity of themes that illustrate further
actors and topics that are scarcely covered in mainstream media. For example, Barricada TV transmits
a program about economic issues in Argentina and other countries, but from a heterodox left-wing eco-
nomic perspective (Barricada TV 2012d). With respect to other underrepresented sectors of society, this
case elaborates a program covering issues of people with disabilities (Barricada TV 2012c). Addition-
ally, it broadcasts the ﬁrst Latin American Islamic channel, Annur TV, based in Buenos Aires (Annur
TV 2014), together with other Latin American programs that are retransmitted by the organization.
In sum, Barricada TV does offer a space to diffuse information related to social transformation is-
sues, questioning content transmitted in mass media and giving space to underrepresented actors.
Thus, they fulﬁll the aim to (re)produce their imaginary related to the MNER that challenge the
employer-employee relation in private ﬁrms, and more generally (re)produce left-wing perspectives.
In contrast to CPEtv, the focus of the channel is more oriented toward political issues and social con-
ﬂicts mostly related to Argentina, and to a lesser extent to other countries. As I explained in Section
5.3.2, the reason for this higher level of political activism might be related to the origin of the project,
inspired by the economic, political and social struggles unleashed during the 2002 crisis in Argentina,
contrasting with the co-operative movements that have a longer and a less conﬂictive history with the
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state during the last decades.
7.1.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina
As regards Wall Kintun TV, it is not possible to make a similar analysis as in the previous two cases,
because the experience is still not producing content continuously due to the material constraints and
the conﬂicts they suffered, which I explained in chapter 5. Despite these hurdles, the channel broad-
casts a signal, but most of its content is either taken from national public audiovisual access data banks
or they repeat content from public national channels. Additionally, they neither make their program-
ming grid public nor do they have a list of ordered programs as in the case of CPEtv and Barricada TV.
Therefore, this case gives a sharp contrast with the previous two, because despite the existence of a law
giving them the right to disseminate their imaginary, the material limits create a large gap between
their aims and the possibilities of putting them into practice.
In spite of these difﬁculties, Wall Kintun TV has started to diffuse videos through Facebook and
YouTube, though still scarce (up to January 2015 they had only distributed nine videos on their ac-
tive YouTube channel and two through Facebook). I shall mention some examples of these videos that
illustrate the imaginary of this case, which can be considered experimental implementations of their
project. For instance, one video is a transmission done by Wall Kintun TV in 2013 of a conﬂict between
the Mapuche and the provincial government of Chubut. The latter sided with the position of private
actors who had organized a mountain bike competition that passed through indigenous community
territories, disrespecting a previous legal decision that had banned what the Mapuche perceive as an
‘invasion’. In reply, members of the Mapuche community cut the road and stopped the event from tak-
ing place, and the video precisely registered one of the moments of negotiation between the Mapuche
and representatives of the provincial government (Wall Kintun TV 2013). The importance of this con-
tent is that the Mapuche themselves are elaborating audiovisual material that record these conﬂicts
with private and state actors, explaining their perspective and hopefully acting as a counterbalance to
the biased reporting of members of the community in local and national media. A second example is the
realization of an interview with a Mapuche leader that was partly subtitled in Spanish during the min-
utes that they spoke in Mapunzugun (Wall Kintun TV 2014b). This video suggests one of the strategies
that the Mapuche will possibly continue to (re)produce their speciﬁc worldview: the transmission of
audiovisual material in their language, which has been undermined under the supremacy of Spanish
at educational and governmental levels. This is important for their aims of preserving their cultural
practices, also making evident with the subtitle that they address not only Mapuche, but wider sectors
of the population so that they become aware of their cultural speciﬁcities. A third example was the
diffusion of a video in their Facebook account covering a public event in Bariloche to commemorate the
general struggle of indigenous communities on the continent, and in particular those of the Mapuche
in the region. In this way, the channel might also contribute to strengthen their collective memory and
pride in their identity, reversing the negative stereotypes that mass media frequently disseminate. A
ﬁnal relevant example is the coverage of events and the work of artists and researchers that diffuse
content with or related to the Mapuche and other indigenous communities issues (Wall Kintun TV
2014a), because they contribute to (re)produce their imaginary.
Although the magnitude of the recorded material is far less than in the other cases, the four exam-
ples I cited reveal how the imaginary of this case has different actors, addressees and aims opposing
those of the creative economy policy discourses. On the one hand, someone assessing the project from
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Figure 7.3: Mídia NINJA’s streamings organized according to their main object of concern.
a business perspective would deﬁnitely conclude that this project makes no sense given its reduced
audiences, and thus, its reduced for proﬁts potential. On the other hand, from a perspective that puts
cultural diversity and the importance of media democratization ﬁrst, it is not only logical, but also
indispensable to settle the historical debts that the state has with such communities. Despite the hur-
dles in their implementation, I conclude that these coverages are highly valuable for the Mapuche and
other indigenous communities, who strive for a different way society, the economy and nature ought to
be organized.
7.1.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil
In contrast to the previous cases, Mídia NINJA does not have a ﬁxed grid with different programs to
cover speciﬁc themes, instead, they just diffuse streamings of different topics, which give the viewer the
impression that their content is chaotic and unstructured. However, this does not mean that everything
goes, because the members of the organization have an implicit framing or selection of what topics to
report over others, which I shall show that matches the objectives of their imaginary. To reveal such
a structure, I coded 1.222 streaming videos available online at Mídia NINJA’s Twitcasting platform3,
obtaining the results of Figure 7.3.
From the ten categories of Figure 7.3, almost eight correspond to coverages of diverse types of
mobilizations across cities of Brazil, conﬁrming that the experience is fulﬁlling its aim of reporting
3. This distribution technology platform was selected instead of YouTube, because it is the main instrument Mídia NINJA uses
to diffuse their live streamings, whereas in the latter they also include the contributions from collaborators and other citizens,
without giving information to distinguish one from the other clearly. Contrariwise, the Twitcasting channel has content only
produced by them. Thus, it gives information on their implicit frame to focus on topics. As regards the coding process, I followed
a similar approach as with CPEtv and Barricada TV, but in this case I deﬁned the codes for each video based on its abstract and
tags, instead of for each program. Additionally, in cases of doubt I watched part of the videos to determine their category.
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protests in Brazil as explained in Section 5.5.3. Indeed, the category with most videos encompasses
citizens’ mobilizations, mainly focusing on those that began in June and continued during July 2013.
These were inspired by claims to cut the increase in transports fares, but quickly included many other
complaints, such as the need to ﬁght corruption, to improve public health and education, among others.
The coverage of Mídia NINJA focused on the demonstrations in large cities, such as Rio de Janeiro
(Mídia NINJA 2013b), Belo Horizonte (Mídia NINJA 2014d) and São Paulo (Mídia NINJA 2013e).
The third category with more videos covers strikes, which are a second class of mobilizations re-
ported by this media for social transformation. For instance, the coverage of garbage collectors in Rio
de Janeiro, who mobilized for better work conditions (Mídia NINJA 2014d). The streamings gave am-
ple space to rioters to express themselves, to communicate their personal life experience and how they
have been affected by the oppressive working conditions, exemplifying the way this media for social
transformation covers actors overlooked by mass media who suffer negative stereotypes product of the
Brazilian colonial history.
Similarly, Mídia NINJA coverages have focused on mobilizations by different indigenous and pe-
ripheral communities. As I explained in chapter 3, the historical denigration of these groups and their
lifestyles is still present in Brazil, and Mídia NINJA has been reporting about some of the conﬂicts that
these communities have with the national and regional governments. For instance, they streamed sev-
eral riots where indigenous communities reclaim their rights in front of the executive and legislative
power in Brasília (Mídia NINJA 2013d) and in the Aldeia Maracaná in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA
2013f). Another example was the coverage of a conﬂict between the Tenharim indigenous community
in Manaus (Amazon) versus non-indigenous inhabitants, who were threatening many of the indige-
nous communities due to the disappearance of three locals. As one of the NINJA’s remarked: “The
population, if not stopped, would have killed the whole indigenous population in the village, it was
close to a genocide just as the one that happened 500 years ago, but in 2014!” (Mídia NINJA mem-
ber IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). Thus, Mídia
NINJA members interpret that their coverages are contributing to reverse the negative stereotypes
about these actors that still remain in Brazilian media and society. Likewise, the ﬁfth category with
most watched videos illustrates that Mídia NINJA also covers mobilizations of peripheral communities.
For instance, streamings have covered the riots in shopping centers of São Paulo by youth from favelas
(slums) who had been discriminated by the security personnel and stopped from getting inside (Mídia
NINJA 2014g). At that time, these events were part of national debates too, because they unveiled
the persisting high levels of discrimination against resource-scarce sectors of the population, which
due to historical processes of unequal distribution tend to coincide with those with an Afro-descendant
background. This data illustrates that Mídia NINJA aims to cover these actors’ points of view, trying
to reverse the existing bias against them.
Apart from these, there are three other relevant types of mobilizations covered by Mídia NINJA: of
social movements, against police violence and large private ﬁrms. As regards social movements, Mídia
NINJA streams demonstrations of those that have positions close to their imaginary; for instance, the
coverage of the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST - Landless Workers’ Movement), which
organized a mobilization to claim an agrarian reform in the country (Mídia NINJA 2014e). As regards
the next category, Mídia NINJA has disseminated videos exposing police violence; for instance, the
streaming of forced evictions that the police carried out in favelas, like the violence in the favela de
Mangueira in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2014e) or citizens’ mobilizations to claim the freedom of
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those journalists and activists that were imprisoned during the riots that took place against the World
Cup (Mídia NINJA 2014b). These show the police violence to control social mobilizations in Brazil,
which as I shall stress in the next chapter, also threaten the projects of journalists of media for social
transformation. The last category of mobilizations worth mentioning are those against large private
ﬁrms, such as mass media or mining companies. Take the example of the coverage that Mídia NINJA
elaborated of free media activists that protested in front of Globo’s building in Rio de Janeiro, which
were not reported by the multimedia (Mídia NINJA 2013c).
The remaining category related to mobilizations includes topics that have less videos, but that are
not less important on the agenda of FDE and Mídia NINJA, like gender issues. Indeed, in 2014 the
network organized a Latin American women’s congress that had diverse panels to debate about femi-
nism in the 21st century (Portal Forum 2014). In the same vein, with Mídia NINJA they cover related
mobilizations to give space to gender struggles, such as social movements striving for the recognition of
LGBT rights (Mídia NINJA 2014f), and for better conditions for prostitutes as workers (Mídia NINJA
2013e). The inclusion of this topic is important because it contributes to raise awareness against the
preexisting gender bias on Brazilian TV against women and minority sexual orientations beyond het-
erosexuals. There are many examples that a foreigner can easily detect on TV; for example, a popular
program of Globo led by a man has a tribune of women desperate to obey his orders in exchange for
money, or the same channel every year conducts a contest to ﬁnd the black beauty samba dancer, re-
inforcing an overly sexualized stereotype of black skinned women (Arraes 2015). The need to reverse
these tendencies is an important aim for many Brazilian social movements, because the stigmatization
of women in this country goes hand in hand with high levels of daily violence; for example, according to
2013 statistics every ten minutes a women is raped in Brazil (Madeiro 2014). Therefore, this shows how
media for social transformation can make a contribution to objectives on the international development
agenda, albeit limited by different types of hurdles.
Besides mobilizations, the second category with most Mídia NINJA videos includes transmissions
of conferences and debates of votings in the national congress. With regard to the former, it spans
videos of collaborators of Mídia NINJA and other free media activists exchanging views and possible
roads of action during events (Mídia NINJA 2014c), such as a gathering of Brazilian and other Latin
American free media initiatives organized by Mídia NINJA in Rio de Janeiro (Mídia NINJA 2013a).
Furthermore, this category encompasses videos of votings in congress of policies that the group consid-
ers relevant, like the streaming of the day in which the support to the Cultura Viva initiated during
Lula’s administration was ﬁnally passed as a national law (Mídia NINJA 2014h). This does not only
show their support to the Cultura Viva policy discourse, but also how the network tended towards
more involvement in national political debates. Finally, the ‘Others’ category includes diverse mate-
rial, among which I want to highlight the distribution of videos where they explain how to imitate
their production and distribution model with smartphones and online platforms (Mídia NINJA 2013g).
This example together with the previous ones, illustrate that Mídia NINJA as a media channel is a
dispositive for disseminating the imaginary of Fora do Eixo among its viewers.
In sum, this media experience also offers a new channel of communication to underrepresented ac-
tors to express their points of view and demands, with a strong focus on social mobilizations. From
the perspective of interviewees of Mídia NINJA, these issues are covered counter-informing the main-
stream perspectives in mass media about these actors, which tend to be despised or overlooked for
historical reasons but also due to the lack of proﬁts that such coverages might produce for ﬁrms oper-
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ating under a commercial logic. Therefore, the proﬁle of the channel is closer to Barricada TV and its
interest in the political, in contrast to CPEtv, which is focused more on broadcasting cultural content
related to co-operatives employing commercial practices.
7.1.2 Quality
In this section, I shall point out the relevance of the ‘quality patterns’ of audiovisual productions in
constraining the discursive practices of media for social transformation. This dimension, although
recognized in some local research (Benevenuto Jr. 2005), has been overlooked in recent calls in the En-
glish literature for more theorization about alternative media and media for development (Fuchs 2010;
Huesca 1995; Gumucio-Dagron 2011; Pettit, Salazar, and Gumucio Dagron 2009; Thomas 2015). This
is understandable, given that the acquisition of resources for operation and of appropriate technologies
might be more relevant for the projects to start in the ﬁrst place. However, I shall argue that once
in operation, the media for social transformation face the hurdle of positioning their production in the
existing classiﬁcation schemes that determine what is good in terms of the ‘quality’ of their audiovisual
content productions.
Based on research by Bourdieu (1984) on cultural taste in France, I shall adopt the perspective
that audiovisual production ‘quality’ patterns are relative. However, given the concentration patterns
in terms of knowledge creation and production in few universities and commercial media ﬁrms, the
accepted schemes of what is ‘good’ are linked to these organizations and not others, setting classiﬁcation
schemes that oppose (and in the worst cases despise) those projects that want to depart from these
established positions. Therefore, this idea of ‘quality pattern’ or ‘quality scheme’ matches the notion of
the dispositive in SKAD, which I shall argue (re)produces the commercial quality patterns of leading
audiovisual production ﬁrms to the detriment of alternative practices. It is worth stressing that I use
the term in a descriptive way, to what interviewees identify as such. However, it was not within the
scope of this research to study thoroughly whether their assumptions about these quality schemes
are correct, which would require another type of method focusing on mass media content analysis
and survey analysis with a large number of audiovisual producers in both countries. Contrarily, I shall
examine the limits from the perspective of the audiovisual producers of media for social transformation.
My analysis was inspired by the relativity of quality links with the discussions about journalism,
which I introduced in Section 2.3. Indeed, I shall show that the notion of ‘quality’ is closely linked to
the debates on what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ journalism, because mass media ﬁrms tend to associate qual-
ity with professionalization, involving a particular and specialized training, which is useful for media
professionals to generate barriers of entry against others (Carpentier 2011). Conversely, media that
want to differ from these ﬁrms try to experiment with alternative ways of production not guided by
professional standards. In the light of these concepts, in this section I will examine the structure of
typical content elaborated by the news programs of each media for social transformation, comparing
how ‘professional’ signal elaboration is. In particular, I focused on how the different media for social
transformation cover and disseminate news, by selecting4 highly popular videos that illustrate the way
4. It is worth pointing out that the amount of videos available from each case varied. In some, like CPEtv, Barricada TV and
Mídia NINJA, I had an excess of videos to select and analyze, whereas in Wall Kintun TV very few. Thus, in the latter I watched
and coded all the videos that covered news. As regards the former, this was not a feasible strategy, given that some cases had
more than 1.000 videos (Mídia NINJA), which would have been impossible to code and analyze with the available resources for
this project. Therefore, for the former I assumed that the ways they transmit news is more or less stable. With this hypothesis,
I selected a sample of videos which I watched and took written notes of, and later coded two from each case following the video
hermeneutics approach (Raab and Tänzler 2012). Although this has allowed me to build the results of this section, it is worth
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they structure their content. I shall show that some cases do not differ much from a commercial media
ﬁrm – CPEtv – whereas others have tried to break with the association of ‘quality’ with profession-
alization. The empirical data supporting these different strategies will lead me to discuss how these
decisions can challenge the commercial practices promoted by creative economy policy discourses.
7.1.2.1 CPEtv, Argentina
The co-operative media is the case that most resembles a private media ﬁrm in its production of audio-
visual content, this means that they want to show themselves as ‘objective’ professional journalists that
elaborate high ‘quality’ material. Let me describe the main elements of a typical transmission of the
daily news program of CPEtv5. The news program lasts around 48 minutes, it is divided in four blocks
of approximately 12 minutes, and in addition it has around 12 minutes of advertising distributed in
three cuts, making evident their employment of a commercial strategy. The program starts and ends
with a series of images from the city and CPE, which depict public local spaces such as the central
plaza, the Don Tomás Lagoon, among others. Thus, it tries to makes explicit their focus on the city and
its local concerns. After this, the news program starts with the studio and the two presenters shown in
Figure 7.4. The scenario has a desk for the two presenters with the logo of the co-operative. On the left,
there is a plasma display and the co-operative’s logo, and in the background there is a map of the world.
Both presenters are formally dressed. The man wears a gray suit and a tie, and the woman a dark red
dress. They both have notebooks in front of them and follow different strategies to communicate their
news that I shall later describe in more detail. On the whole, these observations give the impression
of a ‘modern’ and ‘professional’ environment, which does not differ much from what commercial mass
media programs in Argentina try to transmit. Take the case of Figure 7.5 that shows the studio of TN
Noticias, the news program of the Argentinean largest private mass media ﬁrm, Clarín. This image
makes evident the qualitative similarities among both settings, though in this case located in the city
of Buenos Aires. Therefore, a ﬁrst impression suggests that CPEtv emulates the aesthetic patterns of
private media news channels.
Additionally, the examination of how CPEtv structures the news to be presented in their program
reveals a technical complexity in news coverage similar to those present in high-technological mass
media channels. Indeed, the video-hermeneutics from Appendix E shows that they present news in
at least three ways. First, the main news are summarized with short audiovisual images, one next
to the other, illustrating the main points of the day, which requires the preprocessing of the gathered
audiovisual material, such as its edition and selection of what to include or not by members of CPEtv.
Second, these news are expanded in more detail, which includes the news elaborated by the channel’s
personnel, together with those obtained from other national or international sources. In the ﬁrst case,
it generally involves an interview with an actor related to the news, plus the superposition of audio-
visual signals of the place where the event took place. For example, the perspective of the leader of
an NGO who complains about the lack of progress in negotiations related to water regulation between
indicating ways to improve this in future projects. I believe that the most important one is to organize a team to code the different
videos separately, and then discuss them. This would not only help to cover more material, but also to cross-check the ways in
which the different fragments are coded.
5. This description is based on the audiovisual material and the ﬁeldwork notes gathered from CPEtv. In particular, I will
describe one video transmission, whose content is explicit in Appendix E. I used video hermeneutics as a method of analysis
(Raab and Tänzler 2012), which suggests to record the multimodal properties of audiovisual material, consisting not only of
transcribing what is said, but also when, how, and with what background images. This offers a detailed analysis of videos,
showing its time structure and the aesthetics employed.
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Figure 7.4: CPEtv’s news program and its scenography 07/08/2013. Source: CPEtv Noticias.
Figure 7.5: TN Noticias, the main news program of the Clarín mass media ﬁrm in Argentina. Source:
TN Notícias online streaming 16/03/2015.
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the province of La Pampa and Mendoza (see Appendix E). Thus, members of CPEtv not only have to
record audiovisual material related to the news, but also of the surroundings, which needs further edi-
tion once back in the studio. The transmission is not live, but recorded approximately one hour before
the broadcasting, so that there is time for the edition of the content to transmit, which according to
the channel’s manager is a consequence of the lack of human resources. As regards the national and
international news, the journalists comment over audiovisual images obtained from other media. In
these cases, the signal might be of less deﬁnition. Third, the news program broadcasts a summary of
other news that are not further detailed in the program, which can be of any of the three types (local,
national or international). Overall, these data show that CPEtv tries to efﬁciently control and man-
age the process of news production in a ‘professional’ way, but giving priority to local content that the
channel’s management estimates to represent around 80% of their content.
However, the highly efﬁcient and technical process of news production goes hand in hand with
speciﬁc ‘quality’ patterns of news elaboration. Indeed, CPEtv considers a requisite to transmit every
program in high deﬁnition (HD), which is a feature they remark as an achievement of their service
as a way to compete with local private media ﬁrms. Nonetheless, it is also one of the reasons why
they did not advance towards the diffusion of their videos on social networks during ﬁeldwork. As the
co-ordinator of the channel explains:
“We made some tests to upload videos to online platforms, such as YouTube, but that led
us to discussions of image quality, on which we place great emphasis. However, if we upload
with the quality that we want, the users’ internet speed is not enough to play the videos well
and it did not convince us” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013, interview with & translated by
the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina).
This statement shows an important difference between this and the next cases, because here the requi-
site of transmitting all content through HD constrained them from using tools to further expand their
content through the internet. This self-imposed limit has stopped them from actively using online plat-
forms, which have the potential to augment their co-operative principles and values beyond the city of
Santa Rosa. Contrarily, some of the next cases will reverse these priorities, putting content dissem-
ination before any quality criteria. But, why did they keep such restrictions that limit their aim of
disseminating their imaginary? The explanation offered by the channel’s management in the previous
quote suggests that uploading HD videos to the internet would reduce the satisfaction of their clients
with the internet service that they provide, eventually loosing some of them. Therefore, this makes
evident their commercial interest, just as another private media ﬁrm. This conclusion is not a surprise
given the imaginary of this case that wants to compete with local private media, however, it puts bound-
aries to their objectives of differing from private media. Take the case of the professional image that
CPEtv wants to transmit, which as I described is not only communicated by the way that journalists
dress, but also by the ‘modern’ studio they use. Indeed, the coordinator of the channel explains:
“We did not only want to distinguish ourselves in terms of technology but also in terms of con-
tent and aesthetics. But as there were no designers in the city who worked with the materials
we wanted for giving the impression of modernity, we started to work with designers from
Buenos Aires” (CPEtv coordinator, 06/08/2013, interview with & translated by the author in
Santa Rosa, Argentina).
This utterance points out that if they want to look ‘professional’, then they need an appearance similar
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to the one Argentinean producers understand as such, which in the case of elaborating the studio is a
knowledge only at the reach of designers in the capital city. Additionally, even the Spanish pronunci-
ation that the presenters employ is similar to that of the capital, and not so much to the local accent
in Santa Rosa. But if the aim of the co-operative has been to create a new regional TV, representing
co-operative values, why is it so similar to mass media ﬁrms in terms of aesthetics? An academic at the
University of La Pampa offers a plausible explanation:
“TV does not only need to follow the schemes that major channels from Buenos Aires
offer. Every place and region has its own peculiarities, and our target is to build another TV
that identiﬁes more with our regional speciﬁcities. That’s the idea, but it is very difﬁcult to
put it forward, mainly because of two problems. First, most people trained in audiovisual
arts learned mainstream schemes. Second, audiences are used to those schemes. So you
ﬁnd yourself with the problem that ‘if it looks like audiovisual content coming from Buenos
Aires, then it is good, otherwise it is not’” (Argentinean University professor III, 29/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author).
The previous two statements point to the existence of the dispositive that leads to speciﬁc audiovisual
production patterns in order to elaborate content of ‘good quality’. This dispositive is composed of the
actors operating in the most important audiovisual ﬁrms (private and state mass media) mostly con-
centrated in the capital city, and of the most relevant audiovisual training institutes that are clustered
in large cities, such as Buenos Aires, Córdoba and La Plata. These centers, particularly the former, are
known for training professionals for mass media or audiovisual producers concentrated in the capital
and working with commercial models. Thus, the previous two statements suggest that the accepted
and acquired knowledge seems to be locked-in with a speciﬁc production system, reinforcing aesthet-
ics patterns of production aimed to attract mass audiences, which are useful in mass media, but not
necessarily in alternative experiences. Although I do not have quantitative evidence proving this, such
as interpretation scheme was usual in most of the interviews I conducted in Argentina. If they are
true, from my point of view this constructs a geopolitics of audiovisual knowledge production, where
the ‘center’ establishes what is of ‘good quality’, while the ‘peripheries’ are doomed to either emulate
the centers or to perish, given that audiences are more used to speciﬁc ways of content production.
In this context, CPEtv has accepted and sided with the existing ‘quality’ classiﬁcation schemes, which
seem to be internalized in its personnel that has been trained in journalism or media studies in main-
stream training institutes. But given the concentrations in audiovisual knowledge production in few
urban centers, this implies following the patterns of large commercial mass media ﬁrms. Consequently,
CPEtv accepts the quality patterns of private mass media ﬁrms, considerably reducing their distance
from them, and leaving aside the original project of a more regional TV. Thus, the quality scheme
dispositive reduced their potential pathways to experiment with other ways of news production. One
could say that this strategy has been useful up to a certain extent, because the co-operative employs
the well tested technical model of private media ﬁrms, but adding innovations in terms of content. In
other words, the same bottle, with different wine. However, the claims of building a different TV not
guided by the pressures and standards of commercial media seem to have been left aside, a point in
which some of the next cases shall show a big contrast.
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7.1.2.2 Barricada TV, Argentina
This case is a ﬁrst example of a media for social transformation that departs from the ‘quality scheme’
accepted by CPEtv, thus cultivating a different type of aesthetics. In this section, I shall argue that
this is a strategy coherent with their opposition to mass media ﬁrms, and their aim of implementing
an experience beyond for proﬁts aims. I shall analyze such differences by describing the main patterns
that appear in the structure of videos of the weekly news program of Barricada TV, Noticiero Popular
(popular news), highlighting the similarities and differences in the way it reports news with respect
to CPEtv. This will lead to discussing the contrasting notions of ‘quality’ and the divisions between
journalists that claim to be objective versus others that defend their subjective points of view.
The news program is broadcasted live once per week, lasting one hour, which already shows a con-
trast to CPEtv’s news that are broadcasted daily. Although Barricada TV might have more access to
information sources located in the national capital, just one program per week might indicate a focus on
speciﬁc topics that counter inform about what mass media diffuses, and of course, limits the resources
for its elaboration. Despite this difference, in both cases viewers know precisely and in advance when
to see the program, because they respect the programming grid, something that contrasts with the
remaining cases. Let me sketch the main elements of a typical transmission that I detailed in the
video-hermeneutics in the Appendix F6. The program begins with the logo of the name of the program
Noticiero Popular, and the red star with the name of Barricada TV. Then, although it claims to be a
news program, it does not exactly follow the same format as CPEtv summarizing all news of the week.
Instead, they usually focus on counterinforming about a trending topic discussed in mass media, both
private and public, which coincides with its main objective described in Section 5.3. This is achieved
with an interview with someone who holds an underrepresented position of the themes of interest. For
instance, a critic to the position of the government with the new audiovisual communication services
law (Barricada TV 2011e), or interviews with representatives of left-wing political parties that have
reduced space in mass media (Barricada TV 2013b). Despite this difference, it is true that the audiovi-
sual techniques that they employ to segment the news indicate that they employ audiovisual recording
and editing techniques similar to CPEtv. For example, the videos show smooth transitions between
the takes of different cameras in the studio. Additionally, the audiovisual material they disseminate
includes extra data recorded or obtained about the news too, which are simultaneously broadcasted in
two panels together with the images of the interview. This, together with the rational organization of
time, makes evident the editing job behind the scenes, suggesting a technological sophistication similar
to that of any other commercial media channel, which not all of the next cases have.
In spite of these similarities, Barricada TV’s news videos show a number of features worth high-
lighting that illustrate their different approach to ‘quality’ and journalism. As regards ‘quality’, in
Section 5.3 I showed that Barricada TV’s imaginary does not care much about aesthetics, because their
aim in the end is to disseminate counter-information, without caring too much about how this is done.
Thus, they claim to put their content dissemination aims above aesthetic concerns, which explains why
they did not impose themselves limits on what to diffuse or not based on the ‘quality’ of the audiovisual
recorded images, as it happened with CPEtv. For instance, Figure 7.6 shows a capture of one of their
online streamings that has a resolution far from the one of CPEtv’s HD quality. Nevertheless, this
‘bad quality’ has not been a reason for Barricada TV to stop disseminating the content they produce.
6. The main source of videos was Barricada TV’s YouTube channel. I analyzed a selection of the most viewed videos, following
the video hermeneutics method used in the previous case, but I coded only two out of the ones available online.
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This is an important point, because it means they challenged the established ‘quality schemes’ that
highly technological media ﬁrms have established. Instead of classifying themselves as ‘worthless’ for
not matching the high-tech standards, they still elaborate and stream the content that they consider
important for their objectives of counter-information. Thus, the features of the imaginary helped them
to surpass the dispositive that would have blocked them, which suggests, similar to my argument in
chapter 6, that the reinterpretations that these cases create of the conditions they face, inﬂuence how
much they can surpass them.
Apart from this, Barricada TV reporters transmit an image that opposes the notion of ‘profession-
alization’ and ‘objectivity’ that CPEtv tries to emulate from commercial media channels. The studio
of Barricada TV and how the journalists are dressed indicate these differences. For example, Figure
7.6 shows that their studio in IMPA is not only smaller than the one of CPEtv, but also has a less
elaborated scenography with just a circular table and chairs for the participants. This indicates that
they have no intention of simulating the ‘modern’ standards of private mass media ﬁrms. Furthermore,
the female journalists’ dress code is informal, sharply in contrast with the formality of the presenters
in Figures 7.5 and 7.4. I understand these contrasts as a reﬂection of their imaginary, which not only
rejects aesthetic concerns, but also opposes mass media and focuses on social movements and the work-
ing class. Therefore, the way they dress and present news seems to be closer to the living standards of
their addressees. A ﬁnal connection worth pointing out is that these different aesthetics opposing the
‘professionalization’ image that mass media commercial ﬁrms try to transmit, goes hand in hand with
an opposition to claims of objectivity in their coverages. Indeed, one of the member of Barricada TV
claims that: “Objectivity does not exist. In our news it is clear that we inform from our perspective that
is not neutral” (Castro 2011, translated by the author) . For these reasons, I argue that Barricada TV
makes a different connection between ‘quality’ and journalism, opposing what interviewees understand
as the ‘professional’ mainstream schemes of commercial media.
Although it can be said that Barricada TV is employing a different aesthetic in its audiovisual pro-
ductions, this does not mean that they have been completely unaffected by what I called mainstream
‘quality patterns’ in the previous section. Indeed, they still face the hurdle of lack of appropriate knowl-
edge in training centers that matches their needs, as the following quote by a member of Barricada TV
details:
“Alternative, popular and community media have been neglected subjects in media and
communication universities in the country. However, with the new audiovisual communica-
tion services law they are starting to emerge once again, well ... they have realized that these
media exist and that they might be interesting” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
The exception to the observation seems to be the same interviewee, who gives a course on alterna-
tive, popular and community media at the University of Buenos Aires (Vinelli 2014); but such syllabi
are conspicuously absent from other national universities. Why? Media and communication univer-
sities focus their training of professionals on mass media, and have undermined the speciﬁc technical
knowledge and quality classiﬁcation schemes that are relevant for alternative, popular, community or
co-operative media. This adds to a general problem of audiovisual knowledge concentration in the city
of Buenos Aires. Although this is not so prominent in the case of Barricada TV, which operates in the
capital, it is another difﬁcult hurdle to surpass for organizations far from Buenos Aires, who want to
build media collectives.
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Figure 7.6: Noticiero Popular elaborated by Barricada TV. Interview with the editor of the THC maga-
zine, during the program broadcasted on 22/06/2011. Source: Barricada TV.
Once again, the last statement points to the existence of a dispositive: ‘quality patterns’, which
classify what type of knowledge is ‘good’ and useful, neglecting the rest. This highlights once again the
important connection that Foucault remarked on how knowledge leads to speciﬁc power-effects, which
is an idea incorporated in SKAD (Keller 2013). If knowledge on how to put forward such media for social
transformation is difﬁcult to acquire and the offered one leads to unwanted directions (commercial
aesthetics) and practices, then the spaces of operation and growth for cases opposing commercial policy
discourses will be considerably limited. The perspective of interviewees of Barricada TV coincides with
this interpretation, such as the following quote shows:
“We think that media universities should broaden the training they offer, so that students
can think beyond just reaching and working in massive private and commercial media. In-
stead, they should offer other possible professional developments, where students can artic-
ulate political work, community work and journalism” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
In effect, in the language of SKAD this member of Barricada TV points out that the subject-positions
offered to students related to communications in universities lead them with high probabilities to work
in private media ﬁrms, overlooking other type of career choices more related to social issues. It is worth
pointing out that although the interviewee does not make a direct reference, this critique matches
the conceptual one I made in the previous chapter of the creative industries policy discourses. Such
approaches to culture in general, and media in particular, precisely reinforce the idea that only the
commercial career choices matter. Conversely, the audiovisual communication services law and the
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discourse it includes about NGO media is starting to offer new spaces for different knowledge, though
still scarce in the landscape of media training offered in the country.
7.1.2.3 Wall Kintun, Argentina
Given the constraints and conﬂicts that this case has been struggling with, there was very little au-
diovisual material for analysis, because Wall Kintun TV had not yet organized a news program at the
moment of ﬁeldwork. The only available information are sparse videos uploaded online, which show
signs of how they are planning to implement their imaginary. Therefore, in this section I shall examine
one of these videos to argue that the case is also facing in these initial implementations the limits of
mainstream ‘quality patterns’. I remind the reader that the members of Wall Kintun TV want to create
a different TV, not inﬂuenced by what they call Western ideas. However, in practice this faces limits as
well.
I shall refer to a video7 that Wall Kintun TV diffused in April 2014 about an interview with Ma-
puche werken (messenger in Mapunzugun) (Wall Kintun TV 2014b). I selected this short video of
slightly over six minutes, because it captures part of their aim to (re)produce the Mapuche worldview.
In effect, the emission begins with the symbol of Wall Kintun TV, the Meli Witran Mapu that rep-
resents the Mapuche cosmovision of earth and the four cardinal points (Grebe, Pacheco, and Segura
1972), which appears together with Mapuche background music. The interview took place at the ofﬁce
of the Mapuche Council of the province of Rio Negro, and was conducted by a member of Wall Kintun
TV who does not appear in the screen. Instead, the journalist just employs short questions to stimulate
the interviewee to express his point of view. During the ﬁrst minute, the conversation was only in
Mapunzugun, with Spanish subtitles (see Figure 7.7). This is important, because the language of the
Mapuche is one of the products of their cultural distinctiveness with respect to what they consider the
Western inﬂuence, and in particular given that the Spanish language is predominant in education and
in media in the country. Therefore, the use of Mapunzugun in their media will contribute to preserve
and strengthen its use, which also shows how their media channel has the potential to become a dis-
positive of their imaginary. Nonetheless, the remaining ﬁve minutes of the interview were conducted
in Spanish, perhaps signifying that they are not yet sure about in what language to transmit in order
to attract audiences. The rest of the interview touched several points of concern for the Mapuche. For
example, their mistrust of politicians that from their point of view are not doing enough to stop the ille-
gal appropriation of Mapuche lands and the destruction of the environment. As I explained in chapter
5, this is important because it disseminates the perspective of the Mapuche on topics of the national
and international development agenda, which are often neglected in mass media. As regards the aes-
thetics of the video, while the interviewee exposed about these points, it shows images added during
their edition that illustrate what the speaker refers to; for example, an image of polluted water or of
animals in danger due to environmental degradation. However, the transitions are not very smooth,
which suggests that they still lack the technical editing skills that the two previous cases mastered.
The video ends with the same Mapuche symbology it had at the beginning.
Although the video is short, it still manifests two important points. First, the introduction of images
and of subtitles indicates that Wall Kintun TV members are learning and applying a similar style of
edition present in commercial channels, which is not a surprise given that they are receiving training
7. For this case, the main source of videos was available on YouTube or diffused through Wall Kintun TV’s Facebook page.
Similarly to the previous cases, I analyzed the video employing the video-hermeneutics method. The results are shown in
Appendix G.
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Figure 7.7: Wall Kintun TV interview with a werken (Mapuche messenger), conducted part in Mapun-
zugun and subtitled in Spanish, and the rest completely in Spanish. Source: Wall Kintun TV.
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from specialists of INCAA, the national audiovisual institute from Buenos Aires (CineramaPlus+ 2013).
However, these videos have not been exempt of criticism; for instance, the video received sarcastic
comments on Facebook complaining about its amateurish edition, evident in the transitions between
the interview and the images. This illustrates once again the existence of the dispositive of accepted
‘quality patterns’ that their content is supposed to match to in order to be considered ‘good’. Indeed,
the training they are receiving suggests how their practices are being tainted by those emanating
from the capital. Nonetheless, the problem with this practice is that in the end they might not differ
too much from the commercial private and Western media they try to oppose. The second point is
that Wall Kintun TV has not made explicit their position with respect to professionalization. Given
their imaginary and their aim to disseminate the perspectives of the Mapuche that are overlooked or
misrepresented in mass media, it would be reasonable for them to adopt a more subjective approach,
stressing their perspectives over others. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how they are going to fulﬁll
such dimension of their imaginary, if they just use the skills taught by audiovisual specialists from the
capital city that associate quality with professionalization and objectivity. In that direction, it is worth
pointing out that members of the AFSCA, which supports the organization through funding, remarked
that they had received the demands of the Mapuche to organize audiovisual training workshops, along
with others related to Mapuche philosophy and worldview. The aim of mixing these two different types
of knowledge is to stimulate a new synthesis between both perspectives, avoiding the direct copy of
what I called mainstream commercial schemes; though, the results are still to be seen.
7.1.2.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil
In this section, I shall show that the links between quality, professionalization and objectivity in this
case sharply oppose those of commercial media. I understand this strategy as a challenge to the dis-
positive of mainstream ‘quality patterns’ in Brazil, which reinforces the commercial aesthetic above
others. Indeed, Brazilian researchers have described it as the ‘Globo aesthetic pattern’, in reference
to the ‘quality’ requirements that Globo has introduced in audiovisual production in the country (Ben-
evenuto Jr. 2005). These generate barriers of entry to community and resource-scarce media in the
country, that cannot afford the costs of the needed equipment to ﬁlm with the sophistication Globo
does. Contrariwise, I shall ﬁrst show how Mídia NINJA broke with these quality schemes by describ-
ing and analyzing the main features of their online streamings. Then, I will discuss the connection
between this new technological conﬁguration and quality scheme, with their notion of objectivity in
journalism, making evident their contrast with commercial mass media.
Mídia NINJA’s streamings are live coverages of the different types of mobilizations I described in
Section 7.1.1.4, which have been produced following a process and a quality scheme quite different
from mainstream ones. I shall illustrate these differences by highlighting results of the analysis of one
video presented in Appendix H8, together with the following ﬁeld notes I elaborated while watching
that streaming live:
“Around 250 persons are watching the transmission of the strike of Rio de Janeiro’s
garbage collectors live, which is not being covered by other mass media on TV. The NINJA
reporter starts making a summary of the mobilizations of the previous days, and starts to
8. This video is an example from the whole group that I obtained from Mídia NINJA’s Twitcasting channel elaborated between
the end of June 2013 and December 2014. The ﬁeldnotes I quote correspond to the same video I analyzed in Appendix H through
the video hermeneutics method.
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interview rioters while they await the results of an ongoing negotiation taking place among
stakeholders in front of the labor tribunal. The central issue is that garbage collectors think
they deserve a better salary for the tough public service they offer, rather than just the US$
266 per month they get paid currently. Most of the garbage collectors are black skinned, which
suggests the skin color association with precarious jobs. There is a delay between the image
and the sound. The latter is relatively good, at least I can hear it continuously, although it is
not very clear what is being said all the time, whereas the image is really bad, and that ruins
the transmission, because for moments I cannot see what is happening, and feel tempted to
shut it down. The garbage collectors march despite the rain, which shows their perseverance
in their claim, and the difﬁcult situation they are trying to alter. The NINJA reporter makes
several interviews, among them with a female garbage collector of around 40 years, who ex-
plains her point of view of the situation, and also tells the reporter she has two kids studying
at university, illustrating her struggle to give them better life opportunities. I think it is also
a way to challenge the negative stereotypes about garbage collectors, like the one claiming
that they are all criminals or lazy people. Her testimony contradicts these prejudgments; for
example, she explains that every day she wakes up at around 5 AM to commute to work. The
interview was good to show the woman’s reality. Many online viewers comment they liked the
story, and are suggesting an edition and further YouTube diffusion. That seems to be the key
to Mídia NINJA’s approach, the live, close interviews with people on the street. Mídia NINJA
gives them space to communicate and diffuse their stories with detail and live. Meanwhile, in
O Globo they are just broadcasting a dubbed Portuguese version of the ﬁlm ‘Shall we dance?’,
with Richard Gere as protagonist and set in New York. An outrageous gap ... On the one
hand, live social mobilizations to address oppressive social conditions, and on the other the
most inﬂuential mass media just broadcasting a superﬁcial movie, were there are no social
problems, just people who want to be ‘happy’ in a completely different context ...” (Field notes
written by the author in Fortaleza, Brazil, 08/03/2014).
These personal observations, together with the structure of the full video of almost 90 minutes, reveal
the main features of the quality scheme of Mídia NINJA’s streamings. The ﬁrst point to highlight is that
their transmissions - which can last from a few minutes to around four hours - are streamed, in other
words, disseminated completely live with no edition. This is a sharp contrast with mainstream quality
schemes, and even with those of the previous cases, which in their news coverage try to generate a
linear, smooth transition from one image to the other by editing and preprocessing the raw audiovisual
images they collect. Accordingly, this practice helps them to bypass the barriers that video edition
imposes on any new audiovisual initiative, that is to say, to acquire speciﬁc hardware and software,
besides complicating the audiovisual production process.
Additionally, thanks to the use of smartphones, Mídia NINJA records content wherever they can,
eliminating the costs of setting up a studio and of acquiring costly equipment. Accordingly, they have
more freedom to ﬁlm their material in places where events, mobilizations or meetings are taking place.
This simple decision has wide impacts too, because it breaks with the ‘quality patterns’ of a typical
commercial TV channel that requires a studio to ﬁlm their productions, aiming toward the best pos-
sible image deﬁnition. Therefore, they broke with the barriers that the three Argentinean cases are
struggling with. However, the use of these different tools for recording content push them to depart
from the established ‘quality patterns’. In effect, as the smartphone is usually kept in the hand of
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Figure 7.8: Mídia NINJA’s coverage of a strike by garbage collectors from the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Date: 08/03/2014. Source: Mídia NINJA.
a Mídia NINJA reporter, the recording of audiovisual signals is more chaotic than with large video-
cameras; thus, the transitions from one shot to another are bumpy. Moreover, the image deﬁnition is
poorer than in the previous two cases, as Figure 7.8 shows, which is also a product of the constraints
in terms of uploading and downloading from free streaming servers. As with the case of Barricada
TV, Mídia NINJA does not have enough resources to pay for a good online server, which once again
shows that despite the beneﬁts of not depending on the excessive costs of equipment to transmit as a
typical broadcasting commercial channel, they are still dependent on the barriers imposed by the new
intermediaries that control the online distribution platforms. Furthermore, as I will show in Appendix
H, the audio or video of the transmissions (or both) are cut intermittently, which severely affects the
experience of the viewer, as I remarked in my ﬁeld notes. In sum, the different media technologies for
content production and distribution has led to a departure from what is considered to be aesthetically
and professionally ‘good’ by mainstream commercial ﬁrms.
Despite these limits in terms of low image deﬁnition and the bumpy ﬁlming, Mídia NINJA has not
decided to block the diffusion of their content as CPEtv did. Contrarily, they just disseminate it, because
they believe that the most important thing is to diffuse the information, rather than restricting it due
to the ways it was produced. This is a strong departure from mainstream ‘quality patterns’, which
has been a source of criticism to the work of Mídia NINJA by journalists in mass media, who argue
that what they do is ‘low quality’ or sometimes worse, not even journalism (Gabeira 2013; Otavio 2013;
Azevedo 2013a). This does not only refer to the bad deﬁnition of their images, but also to what they
understand as extremely long raw streamings and their subjective coverages, where reporters clearly
side with one position. I understand this contempt as a strategy by the incumbents to defend their work
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against that of challengers, by constructing a barrier, a classiﬁcation scheme, a border in terms of what
is ‘taste’ (Bourdieu 1984), of what is ‘good’ journalism. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA members are proud
of their partiality and claim that their coverages are more genuine than those of mass media, because
they do not hide their point of view through an editing process. For instance, one of the founders of the
organizations explains:
“Mainstream media ﬁrms have to learn that the new objectivity comes from a clear trans-
parency in their thinking positions and how that information is produced. We do not hide
anything, we transmit our interviews radically live, and we express very clearly what we
think” (Corrêa 2013, translated by the author).
This statement is not an exaggeration, but a fact that is exempliﬁed in Appendix H, which shows the
length of the transmissions and the clear position in favor of the garbage collectors that Mídia NINJA
adopted. The same pattern is present in the rest of their streamings, where the Mídia NINJA reporters
defend the position of marginalized groups (Afro-descendant, indigenous, peripheral), clearly in tune
with the aims of their imaginary, but also evidently breaking with the Western journalist claims to
‘objective’. Conversely, Mídia NINJA defends the partial role of their reporters, who are no longer just
a ‘passive’ or ‘objective’ observer of a situation, but someone who is actively participating and taking
a stance. From their point of view, this is essential to generate trust with their interviewees and to
advance the processes of social transformation they side with, something that in their opinion mass
media does not achieve; for instance, a Mídia NINJA member describes:
“The main difference is that instead of just covering what’s happening, we are amidst
what’s going on, we are talking to the protesters, we are understanding and feeling. We think
that it is useless just to talk about what’s going on, if we do not have minimal contact and
dialog with the local people. They already know what mass media say, with those reporters
covering from their helicopters at a distance. In that case, the person on the ground thinks the
journalist is afraid to cover, descend and speak with the protesters, because they are afraid of
being stoned or something like that, but we have this facility. Indeed, we have the interest and
the thirst to be talking, to be understanding and to be feeling” (Mídia NINJA III, 13/03/2014,
interview with & translated by the author in Belém do Pará, Brazil).
Therefore, Mídia NINJA established a connection between their unconventional image quality stan-
dards and their view of journalism, deﬁning a different ‘quality pattern’ from the mainstream one.
This is an important strategy for media for social transformation to take into account while challeng-
ing for proﬁt principles, because it helped to break with the dispositive that would have led them to
emulate commercial ﬁrms, or in the worst case, to fail to produce content due to their gap in elaborating
what the mainstream standards demand. But this perspective cannot be explained just by the use of
ICT, after all, the streaming platforms were also present in the case of Barricada TV, but they did not
completely break with the commercial studio model of transmission. Although it is true that Barricada
TV has been limited by the requisites of the new audiovisual communications law, I highlight that one
of the main differences lies in the imaginary of each case. In particular in their context of emergence;
in effect, Mídia NINJA is part of FDE, a network of cultural collectives that from its founding day have
aimed to challenge the cultural practices concentrated in the largest urban cities. From its beginning,
FDE has been experimenting with new aesthetics and collaborative organizational methods that op-
pose those of mainstream private ﬁrms. Therefore, Mídia NINJA can be explained as a continuation
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of these practices in the media sector, which is an important contrast with the Argentinean cases that
did not have such background.
Despite the employment of such unconventional aesthetics, I shall show in section 7.3 that Mídia
NINJA was able to attract the attention of mass audiences more than the other three Argentinean
cases. Thus, they are an example of how these different schemes can also become massive. Some may
argue that their popularity was not a consequence of their quality pattern, but rather contingent on
the content that they covered, which was quite demanded in Brazil at that time. Although that is
deﬁnitely an important factor, it is also true that many other organizations were producing material
about the riots in 2013, but only Mídia NINJA occupied the center of the spotlight. In addition, in most
of the national and international coverages about the organization they speciﬁcally mentioned their
peculiar way of covering online the mobilizations and other events, besides their content. Therefore,
I claim that their quality patterns equally matter in a context where many people had lost trust in
mass media. However, it is also true that such advantages small media might have to experiment
with new aesthetics of reporting might be temporarily. Indeed, interviewees related to Mídia NINJA
in Brazil remarked that mass media organizations had started to emulate independent media, by also
streamings with their journalists without the ofﬁcial uniforms of their organization, as if they were just
part of another free media or citizen media. This points to a competition and dynamics of the aesthetics
of news coverage, which could be further research across media in future projects.
7.2 Participation
In chapter 2, I introduced two ideal poles to speak about participation in media (Carpentier 2011).
On the one hand, a model that offers minimal participation, because the content is produced only by
professionals, and the only space that audiences have for interaction is to comment on the content that
the media organization elaborates. Furthermore, in this case media overlook the ‘political’ (Carpen-
tier 2011), in the sense of underrepresenting the antagonist relations of humans beyond those in the
political system, which according to Carpentier leads to a focus on homogeneous audiences. On the
other hand, the maximalist model of participation considers that content can be produced by amateurs
and citizens’, audiences can intervene in media management by selecting what topics to cover, and the
‘political’ is not excluded nor hidden by claims of ‘objectivity’. Therefore, this leads to an heterogeneity
of covered audiences. Carpentier claims that the former matches mass media, whereas the latter alter-
native or citizens’ media, or more generally what I called media for social transformation. However, the
classiﬁcation of each media case according to the dimensions of the minimalist and maximalist models
of participation in media that I presented in Table 7.1 suggest that the four cases I analyzed are indeed
still far from such practices. I shall argue this is linked to the limits that the news production cycle
and its technologies put on them, which at the same time question the hypothesis that media for social
transformation can cover heterogeneous audiences.
Along the last chapters, I have shown that CPEtv is the channel that most closely resembles a
private commercial one, and the analysis of participation in their experience is not an exception. CPEtv
management is restricted to the members of the channel that have been rigorously selected after a
tender in the city. At best, it has received and adopted suggestions and guidelines emanating from the
administrative council of the co-operative that has over 100 members, and its advisory board that is in
charge of management decisions. For instance, the former intervened during the selection of what sort
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declares that: “The idea is to reﬂect what happens to common citizens” (CPEtv coordinator, 08/08/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina), which is a noble thing needed in
the context of Santa Rosa, but it is still done using the lens of co-operative journalists. Therefore, there
are limited spaces of participation for audiences in content selection or media management. Similarly,
without employing more participatory media technologies or organizational methods, the technological
conﬁguration employed still puts the decision on what to include or exclude in the hands of the channel’s
management. Thus, CPEtv is far from the most participatory approach of citizen media, and for these
reasons, I arrive at the conclusion that the co-operative channel operates under a model that tends
toward the minimalist pole.
In contrast to CPEtv, Barricada TV is closer to the ideal of the maximalist model of participation
in media, for the following three reasons. First, in their web page this organization invites interested
viewers to: “[...] join a trench that disputes sense with the mainstream discourse” (Barricada TV 2015a,
translated by the author). In this way, interested viewers can co-operate with the experience and
participate in their collective media project, without needing previous professional knowledge in media
production. Therefore, the case is more open to amateurs and citizens to join in the management
of the channel, which contrasts with the formal selection process of audiovisual professionals that
CPE implemented, emulating commercial ﬁrms. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that despite
this easier access to be part of the media management, there is no other open space for viewers to
contribute content without joining the project. Therefore, the selection of the agenda of what topics
from mass media they will counter-inform about, is still decided by members within the organization.
Second, I showed at the beginning of this chapter how this case covers political issues, adopting a
confrontational stance with mass media not present in the co-operative case, including conﬂictive topics
beyond those of institutionalized politics, such as issues related to social movements. Therefore, the
‘political’ is expressed in the different themes that they cover to counter-inform mass media narratives.
However, their focus is limited on workers’ or social movements perspectives. It can be argued that
they covered heterogeneous groups within them, but they clearly excluded the positions of mass media
journalists and ﬁrms they oppose. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to afﬁrm that they address a heterogeneous
audience, but rather those who share their perspective. Third, a stark difference with the previous
case lies in the active use of online social networks by Barricada TV. These online platforms, such
as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and Ustream, allow this organization to offer a space for audiences
to react to and interact with the disseminated content, either with converging or diverging points of
view. For example, through comments to their videos on YouTube or to the posts about them on their
Facebook channel. Consequently, there are more spaces for participation, but they do not use the
whole potential of online media technologies to allow external users to elaborate content. Another
shortcoming is that statistics up to November 27th 2014 showed that the top ten most viewed videos
had been accessed 39.345 times, but with only 101 comments, which represent 0,25% of the views. This
low level of feedback is paradoxical, because despite the opportunity of audiences to provide reactions to
the content they watch, the data suggests that the levels of interaction are quite low. In brief, Barricada
TV is closer to the maximalist model of participation, but as Table 7.1 shows, not entirely matching the
ideal.
As regards Wall Kintun TV, this case too can be located closer to the ideal of the maximalist model
of participation than CPEtv, but less than Barricada TV. The main reason for this difference is that
the participation in content production is restricted to members of the Mapuche community. In effect,
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during ﬁeldwork the channel was in charge just of the Buenoleo community, with not much partici-
pation of other Mapuche communities nor from other indigenous communities. Given their hurdles to
organize their audiovisual production process, they do not formally invite viewers to join the experi-
ence. Therefore, there are scarce spaces for participation in the channel’s management by audiences.
The only exception is when audiovisual producers entered into contact with them to diffuse content
about the Mapuche and other indigenous communities in the channel. Still, participation in content
management was bounded to those who had material related to their topic of interest, and who where
willing to disseminate it for free (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the au-
thor in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). Consequently, spaces for audiences in proposing content
to be broadcasted are quite reduced. Similarly to Barricada TV, the channel aims to reach broad audi-
ences, but the exclusive focus on indigenous communities casts doubt on such a claim, rather exposing
their focus on members of such groups at the expense of others. With respect to leaving aside claims
to ‘objectivity’, I already explained that Wall Kintun TV did not make this explicit statement, though
the stance they take of representing the Mapuche perspective can be understood already as taking a
subjective point of view that will oppose those against it. Furthermore, they are aiming to unveil the
political side of conﬂicts that the state and private ﬁrms have with the community. Thus, in this sense
they are closer to the maximalist model of participation. Likewise, Wall Kintun TV employs online
media platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube, though not in the same intensity as Barricada TV,
and they do not employ streamings either. Thus, the level of use of these participatory technologies is
higher than CPEtv but lower than Barricada TV. However, as with the case of Barricada TV, the nine
online videos in the last active YouTube channel received 793 visits, but only three comments, which
represent 0,37% of the received views. As a result, I classify this case between CPEtv and Barricada
TV, though closer to the maximalist model of participation.
Among the four cases, Mídia NINJA goes the furthest in trying to implement a maximalist notion
of participation through the use of online media technologies. The ﬁrst difference with the previous
cases is that the reporters of this case make streamings of the mobilizations that they cover with
smartphones. This allows them, on the one hand, to receive and react to comments that viewers post
on the online platform they use during the reporting. Thus, viewers can interact with journalists
live. On the other hand, the format of live transmissions is also more participatory than those of the
previous media that only report edited news. Contrariwise, in this case Mídia NINJA cannot control
what or how people are going to express themselves, as is usual in other media that ﬁlter politically
inconvenient expressions. The second difference is that Mídia NINJA receives and diffuses content
recorded by citizens not part of the FDE network through its YouTube channel, who use the same
streaming practices with smartphones to elaborate videos or that collaborate by writing articles in
Mídia NINJA’s web portal (Mídia NINJA member IV, 19/03/2014, interview with & translated by the
author in Belo Horizonte, Brazil). In both cases, this implies that the audience can contribute more
actively with the production of text and videos than in the previous cases, because part of the process
of content production is external to the members of the organization. However, this does not eliminate
the ﬁlter of Mídia NINJA, who has the ﬁnal decision on whether to upload or not such material to their
distribution channels. Regardless, the point is that at least there is a medium open for receiving the
productions of citizens, beyond the material elaborated by the members of the project. This coincides
with the observations of Carpentier (2011) that the locus of the production process can be categorized
depending up to what extent it is done inside or outside the organization. Among the four cases, Mídia
215
NINJA is the only one that employs technologies so that part of their content is produced by members
not belonging to the organization. As regards the rest of the dimensions in Table 7.1, Mídia NINJA
covers political themes in its transmissions, taking a subjective point of view. Furthermore, the social
network sites that they employ also give space for viewers to express their points of view and react
to their content, both praising and disapproving commentaries. In contrast to Barricada TV and Wall
Kintun TV, the diffusion of YouTube videos has a far larger amount of visitors, but in percent the
quantity of comments is even lower. For instance, by December 27th 2014 the top ten most viewed had
a total of 2.236.830 views, notwithstanding it only received 5.126 comments that represent 0,23% of the
total number of visits, which is the lowest percentage of the three considered cases. As shown, these
features point out that Mídia NINJA satisﬁes the conditions to be classiﬁed closer to the maximalist
pole of participation in media more than the rest of the cases, but it cannot be tagged as fulﬁlling all
the requisites, either.
These four cases and their distance from maximalist participation models sketch the limits of the
claims that media for social transformation are a potential solution to solve the minimalist participa-
tion models of mass media. I argue that the problem to achieve this ideal can be explained by the
imaginaries of each case, and the technologies that they employ in the news production cycle. As re-
gards the latter, the three Argentinean ones follow up, though with nuances, a model of production
based on the chain of planning, recording, editing and ﬁnally distributing content. In these cases, only
members of the organization use the recording equipment, then material limits constrain the cover-
age of issues, and push to a selection of what to include or exclude. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA takes
advantage of the wide use of smartphones among its members and other citizens, who can record and
share different sorts of materials with the media collective. Therefore, the locus of content production
is in part external to the hardcore members of the organization, which allows to multiply the possible
videotaping sources, bypassing part of the constraints imposed by the technologies employed in the Ar-
gentinean cases. This shows that some technologies give more space to participatory processes of news
production than others do (Carpentier 2011), which is an observation that coincides with the ideal per-
spectives on ICT as increasing sources of participation and democratization in societies. Nonetheless,
even in the case of Mídia NINJA, which employs the most participatory technologies, the process is not
entirely random and peer-driven, because in the end members of the organization always act as gate-
keepers of their communication channels, by deciding what is published and what is left out. I argue
that this is a product of the selected cases that have particular imaginaries they want to defend. In-
deed, the objectives of each of the four analyzed media for social transformation is to elaborate content
that addresses what they understand as biases in mass media coverages. Accordingly, from their per-
spective it is justiﬁable to limit what type of content or editorial line they shall follow in their coverages,
because they want to use the scarce resources they have to focus on speciﬁc themes. Additionally, the
news production cycle requires the continuous production of new material, rather than just publishing
a video or an article once in a while, as the way a writer works in the publishing sector. This requires
a certain ‘bureaucratization’ of the production process, and with this I refer to the use of Max Weber’s
concept to criticize the proponents of peer-production processes (Kreiss, Finn, and Turner 2011). In the
sense that to fulﬁll the continuous production of material these experiences need a set of institution-
alized rules of operation, more or less explicit or stable, depending on the case under analysis, which
limits the easy incorporation of outsiders to the experience if they want to keep the speed in publishing
news. Therefore, the concept of ‘participation’ as an ideal situation in which everyone and every voice
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could be heard in every given topic in a speciﬁc media project, seems unattainable in practice, unless
the constraints of the imaginaries are dropped and the news cycle is disregarded. For these reasons,
I claim that the pretense of communication enterprises and projects to be participatory is misleading.
In contrast, I hypothesize that what might be more relevant for future research is to inquire what sort
of representation different voices have in the total sum of projects in a given media space, which could
help to capture up to what extent different points of view are represented. Nonetheless, the existence
of media diversity might assure the existence of a variety of positions, but it does not guarantee that
such content will have adequate diffusion, a point I will discuss in the next section.
7.3 Audiences and Content Reception
What has been the reception of the content produced by the four studied media experiences? This is a
relevant question, because the implicit argument behind the promotion of these media - as advocated
by the MacBride Report (UNESCO 1980), optimistic supporters of ICT and civil society organizations
in both countries - is that they can contribute to pluralize the types of content that viewers can have
access to, helping to democratize communications. In the context of Argentina and Brazil this means
that viewers will go beyond the offer that the most inﬂuential commercial media ﬁrms have: Clarín and
Globo respectively. I want to remind the reader that these two media groups have the largest amount
of viewers. Indeed, estimates conﬁrm this statement; for example, the state concluded that in 2013
Clarín had 38,78% of open TV, 58,61% of subscription TV and 41,88% of radio market shares (Télam
2013). Likewise, appraisals indicate that in 2014 Globo had around half of the TV prime market share
in Brazil (around 91 million people) (Economist 2014). For these reasons, they are considered as mass
media by media for social transformation as mass media, and it is not an exaggeration to say that they
represent a big portion of the public sphere in both countries. According to the academic literature,
the expansion of new media and in general of those that I included under the name of media for social
transformation, would increase the offer of content, leading to a democratization of the public sphere
directly by introducing new popular media; or for instance, Downey and Fenton (2003) hypothesize that
the public sphere will include more and more content from the counter-public sphere, given the growth
of the latter thanks to the internet and new media. Nevertheless, in this section I shall show that these
statements are excessively optimistic, because althoughmedia for social transformationmight generate
new and more diversiﬁed content covering marginalized actors and themes overlooked by mass media,
this does not mean that such information will be massively accessed or incorporated by mass media
ﬁrms. Furthermore, it does not necessarily mean that viewers shall like and access this content, either.
To show these points, in this section I shall adopt the perspective of the audience as masses (J. G.
Webster 1998), in other words, as viewers, to estimate the quantity of accesses to the content elaborated
by the four studied media cases. Unfortunately, I cannot compare all cases systematically, because they
operate with different distribution technologies that are not fully comparable; for instance, CPEtv uses
only cable transmissions, whereas Mídia NINJA online technologies. Therefore, different methods are
needed to make a thorough comparison between the four cases and the two main media ﬁrms in each
country. However, this would require different types of data collection methods, such as those used in
audience research or online media, but particularly the former was out of the scope of this research
project, though it would have been more suitable to match my methods of participant observation on
the side of content production. Nonetheless, I shall show statistics that reveal that although the four
217
analyzed cases of media for social transformation were selected due to their coverage in mass media
- and thus they were quite ‘popular’ in comparison to others that remain off the radar - their number
of viewers are quite reduced in comparison to those of the largest media groups. Therefore, except for
particular crisis situations, they have not been able to continuously inﬂuence the content of the public
sphere as stated in the literature.
In September 2013, CPEtv had 8.500 cable connections to their service (La Arena 2013) out of
an estimated total of 22.000 in Santa Rosa. Thus, in the best of the cases, if we assume that every
connected house was watching their news program at 8 PM (the time of the daily news program), they
would have an audience of at least 8.500 connections. An extra plausible hypothesis is to consider that
on average Argentinean families are made up of 4 members (Rodríguez 2012), which would give the
estimate of a potential audience of 34.000 inhabitants, almost 31% of the total population of the city.
This generous estimation might be large for the city, but completely insigniﬁcant if we consider the
total Argentinean population of 40 million. Furthermore, content is transmitted just once, and so far
not repeated through other means. Therefore, the circulation of content provided by CPEtv is mostly
local and dependent on the transmission time, which is one of the challenges in terms of content reach
for this co-operative experience. As regards which content is preferred by audiences, it was neither
possible to assess this empirically within the scope of this research nor was this information elaborated
by the co-operative. In sum, the content created by CPE might be a large local contribution, but is
still irrelevant at the national level, where the co-operatives want to compete against commercial mass
media.
As regards Wall Kintun TV, the operational challenges they face imply that they have a low quantity
of online videos. Notwithstanding, the changes in management have left traces online, such as the
existence of three channels on YouTube. For example, the ﬁrst one in Table 7.2 was created by the ﬁrst
management, while the second and third one belong to the contemporary administration, but only the
third one has remained active. Despite this division, only one video stands out from the rest, the ﬁrst
trailer that announces the creation of Wall Kintun TV (Wall Kintun TV 2012), which on 02/02/2015
had 10.485 views. According to media opposing the national administration, this might be explained
by the repetition of this trailer in public media siding with the regime (Crettaz 2012), which attracted
viewers online. In contrast, on the same date the statistics for the table were gathered, the rest of
the videos on both channels did not surpass 1.000 views. Indeed, the most viewed videos on the third
YouTube channel has have an even lower maximum, with only 600 viewers. This fact suggests that the
trailer did become ‘popular’ or ‘viral’ due to the political diffusion of the inauguration of Wall Kintun
TV during the struggle between the government and Clarín, and its dissemination in mass media
siding with the government’s position. Apparently, this would conﬁrm Downey’s and Fenton’s (2003)
hypothesis of mass media - in this case public - disseminating content of counter-public spheres into
the mainstream. However, I interpret this more as an exception - an outlier - rather than the rule,
because as the statistics of the rest of the videos show, the interest in content related to the Mapuche
has been quite low online, at least on YouTube. Thus, once the regime lost interest in publicizing the
Mapuche channel through their public media, there was scarce interest of viewers to access its content
online. This data does not only contradict Downey’s hypothesis, but also the optimistic claims that
online media platforms shall offer ‘equal’ conditions to every media. Although it might be true in terms
of distribution, from this case it is clear that the access to their content is dependent on other means
beyond access to ICT.
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Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 3
# Videos 4 2 9
# Visits most viewed video 10.485 433 577
# Visits least viewed video 716 139 23
Table 7.2: Number of videos, number of visits of most and least viewed videos in the three YouTube
channels associated with Wall Kintun TV. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 02/02/2015.
The cases of Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA have produced and distributed abundant audiovisual
material in online media, employing in part the same distribution platforms, which is the case with
Facebook and YouTube. With that data, I shall give more evidence on how the utopian claim of ICT
democratizing communications overlooks the high inﬂuence that mass media groups still have. Con-
trariwise, I shall show some cases in terms of video distribution where the access to videos of media for
social transformation has surpassed that of commercial mass media ﬁrms, and I will give reasons why
this might have taken place.
Facebook offers a count of the followers that each ‘page’ has. Although this indicator is not without
problems, it can still be considered a proxy of the magnitude that separates the size of the ‘audiences’
of the four studied media organizations with respect to mass media present in the platform. Table
7.3 shows the total number of likes registered by December 19th 2014, which offers relevant points
to highlight. First, both Clarín news and Globo have a number of followers far superior to those of
the four studied channels in their respective countries. In effect, the followers of the Argentinean
cases (Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV) together only represent 0,09% of the total number Clarín
has. Similarly, Mídia NINJA followers represent 8,32% of the total number Globo has. Therefore,
even though everyone and every media can create a Facebook channel, this data shows that the two
most important mass media conglomerates in Argentina and Brazil still attract far more followers
on Facebook than media for social transformation. Second, the media for social transformation differ
considerably among themselves, with Mídia NINJA leading in the number of followers, while the other
cases together only have 1,3% of NINJA’s total. This can be explained by Mídia NINJA’s operational
network structure, which, on the one hand, allows a coverage of diverse topics of national and local
interest attracting wider and diverse audiences. On the other hand, Mídia NINJA proﬁts from the
same marketing techniques that FDE implements, which basically consists of members of the network
posting links to the content that Mídia NINJA generates, unleashing a sort of snowball effect in their
social networks that is not present in the two other Argentinean cases. Altogether, these statistics
question the utopian and extremely optimistic claims that online platforms put all media producers
in the same condition to attract audiences. Although it is true that they equalize the possibilities to
distribute content, it is not a coincidence that the leading ﬁrms in terms of market share in TV are
the ones that have massive numbers of online followers as well. This points out the importance of
the differences in the processes of content production that each organization has. The largest mass
media ﬁrms in each country have radios, TV channels, newspapers, their own web sites, and decades
of operation in both countries. For these reasons, it is plausible to think that users of online platforms
might also have a longer exposition to such mass media through other distribution technologies, and
thus, they also have an interest in following such organizations on Facebook. Conversely, the four
analyzed media have far less resources for content production and less means of distributing them.
This constrains the diffusion of content to smaller circles, irrespective of the media used. The exception
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Facebook Channel Likes
Barricada TV (ARG) 2,152
Wall Kintun TV (ARG) 1,763
Diario Clarín (ARG) 4,267,054
Globo (BR) 3,706,782
Mídia NINJA (BR) 308,471
Table 7.3: Facebook followers by channel. Source: Statistics compiled by the author from Facebook on
19/12/2014.
among the four studied media for social transformation seems to be Mídia NINJA, which has the beneﬁt
of operating with a network structure across several parts of Brazil, and the advantage of having
captured - at least for some weeks - the attention of a wider national audience during the exceptional
circumstances of the Brazilian riots of 2013.
In contrast to the statistics in Table 7.3, those in Table 7.4 are ambivalent, because they do show
the strength of mass media but also suggest that there are spaces for media for social transformation
to compete with commercial mass media. Indeed, these statistics that I compiled9 from YouTube and
Twitcasting, show that through certain new technological platforms, media for social transformation
might have chances to disseminate their content with more reach than those of mass media ﬁrms
within the same platform10. As regards Barricada TV, it has 2,5 times the number of videos that Clarín
diffused through YouTube, but the average number of views Clarín videos received is ﬁve times higher
than the ones of Barricada TV. Consequently, although Barricada TV has more videos, they do not have
such a large reception. But it is also true that the popularity of Clarín’s videos is concentrated in few
(the 5% most watched represent 71% of the total views), whereas Barricada TV has a less concentrated
distribution (the 5% most watched represent 35% of the total views). On the one hand, these numbers
show that Barricada TV has been able to attract a more even audience to their videos. On the other
hand, they still show that despite the equal access to YouTube and an even larger dissemination of
content of Barricada TV on this platform with respect to Clarín, the latter still attracts more viewers.
The data about Mídia NINJA and Globo on YouTube offers a different picture, because the videos of
the former have almost 4,5 times the number of views of the latter, although they have less than a
third of their number of videos. This suggests that Globo is not very popular on YouTube, and also
points to the success of Mídia NINJA to attract huge audiences in the distribution of content through
YouTube, which is far larger than what one would expect given their scarce material and ﬁnancial
resources in comparison to Globo. It is clear that some content can attract large audiences, despite the
imbalances in terms of its production with respect to mass media. Another contrast between both cases
is that Globo has 402 videos, but just 20 explain 85% of the views, whereas the distribution of the 5%
most watched Mídia NIINJA’s videos (seven) represent 48% of the total views. Similarly to the case
of Barricada TV, this shows this media for social transformation has been able to attract a more even
number of videos than those of mass media, which tend to be concentrated in few. To conclude, the
9. These statistics were elaborated by constructing an Application Programming Interface (API), offered by Kimonolabs, to
gather the data from Twitcasting and YouTube (see Appendix D). This allowed to systematically collect data from videos, such
as the number of views, number of likes, date published, title, and if available, a summary of the videos.
10. It is worth mentioning that both Clarín and Globo have their own platforms for video distribution that link directly from
their respective main web portals. Thus, visitors to their websites do not leave the domain to other platforms, which means that
the statistics of Facebook and YouTube underrepresent part of their online audience that never leave their respective websites.
For this reason, the statistics of Table 7.4 only illustrate the competition of mass media with two of the studied cases within
Facebook and YouTube, but says nothing about other means to access their respective content.
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Media platform YouTube
Case Mídia NINJA Barricada TV Clarín Globo
Total # of videos 146 660 272 402
Total # of views 3,937,714 212,597 2,080,206 881,283
Average views per video 26,971 322 7,648 2,209
# of views of 5% most watched videos/Total 48% 35% 71% 85%
Table 7.4: Total number of videos, total number of views, average views per video and number of
views of most watched videos over the total, per platform and comparing different experiences. Source:
compiled by the author after querying YouTube’s API in November 2014.
statistics on YouTube offer another picture from the ones in Facebook, making evident that the media
for social transformation can employ them to disseminate a large quantity of their videos, attracting in
some cases even more viewers than mass media ﬁrms on the same platform. However, this seems to
be dependent too on the organizational structure of the media and contingent on the types of content
covered in relation to broader national events. In effect, the main difference I detect between Barricada
TV andMídia NINJA is that the former has been covering events that were not as massive and shocking
for the national public opinion as the 2013 Brazilian riots.
Apart from these statistics, the information available online about Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA’s
YouTube channel allows an extra comparison about what sort of content the users mainly accessed.
This is important, because it gives insights about their preferences, which might not coincide with the
imaginaries of the media experiences. Thus, although it does not offer the richness of an ethnographic
approach to audience research, it still highlights that audiences are composed by active actors, which
select what to watch based on varying criteria (J. G. Webster 1998), many times disregarding the aims
of the media that disseminated such contents in the ﬁrst place.
Table 7.5 shows a list with the titles of the ten most viewed videos of Barricada TV on YouTube,
seven of which were part of their popular news show. Most of them were interviews with different actors
challenging mass media positions; for example, the second most viewed video records an interview with
a member of an organization advocating for a new drug law for the country, which has been a serious
national debate given that the previous law pushed the police to punish those who consume drugs,
instead of focusing on producers and dealers (For more details see Appendix F where I particularly
analyze such a video). Another example is the third most viewed video, which is an interview with an
economist discussing a topic of debate in the national agenda: the nationalization of the most relevant
oil ﬁrm that was previously owned by a Spanish enterprise. In this video, the interviewee defended the
decision to nationalize, but still expressed a negative opinion on how it had been implemented by the
national government. The rest of the interviews share similar features with these examples, because
they connect with themes discussed in the national media agenda, though analyzed from a left-wing or
workers’ perspective. In such cases, it can be stated that the audiences did select counter informative
content, matching the imaginary of the experience I described in chapter 5. Nevertheless, it is also true
that the most viewed video has been a transmission of a rock show titled ‘Crazy eyes - good morning’,
which although it might be important for the alternative Argentinean rock scene, in my opinion is far
from the imaginary of social transformation Barricada TV advocates. This dissonance with the other
videos suggests that audiences not necessarily put the priority on the topics in which the imaginary of
this experience lies. It also suggests that the critical content produced by Barricada TV might be part
of a reduced counter-public, whereas the musical show connects with the interest of viewers that like
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English Title # Views Program Type
Crazy eyes - good morning 6,244 Music Music
Decriminalization of Marijuana for personal consumption: THC interview 4,971 Noticiero Popular Interview
Expropriation of Repsol YPF: Claudio Katz’s opinion 4,461 Noticiero Popular Interview
Good day Montoneros. Firsthand about combatant Peronism 4,397 Noticiero Popular Interview
Juana Azurduy. The war of independence in the Alto Perú 4,267 Dale Fuego Interview
Protest against the visit of Alvaro Uribe to Buenos Aires 3,633 Noticiero Popular Mobilization coverage
Bicentenary - Interview with Néstor Kohan (part 1) 3,216 Noticiero Popular Interview
Malvinas according to the Argentina left: Montoneros, PRT and PO/1 2,810 Noticiero Popular Interview
SKA-P in Zanon, what does it represent? 2,757 no info Music show coverage
For the second and deﬁnitive independence of Our America 2,589 Noticiero Popular Conference
Table 7.5: Top ten most viewed Barricada TV videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the
videos translated to English, the total number of views, the program under which they were produced
and the type of video. Source: Compiled by the author from YouTube 27/11/2014.
the performance, but not necessarily the political position of the organization. Therefore, it also points
out the limits that media for social transformation face to expand their imaginaries beyond those that
are already sympathetic to them.
The statistics in Table 7.6 about the top ten most viewed videos of Mídia NINJA’s on YouTube show
similar results. In effect, from the list shown, only three are directly related to social mobilizations,
while the rest, including the ﬁrst four most seen videos, has nothing to do with issues of social trans-
formation as reﬂected in Mídia NINJA’s imaginary. For instance, the most diffused video is related to
an issue that took place during the World Cup 2014, when a nurse was ﬁred for laughing about the
injury the Brazilian player Neymar suffered. Similarly distant from Mídia NINJA’s concerns, the sec-
ond most viewed video shows how a dog was abandoned by its owner, whereas the third and fourth one
display conﬂicts among citizens, in a soccer stadium and during a trafﬁc jam respectively. Although
these videos might still stress relevant issues in Brazil, such as street violence or violence against pets,
the viral response of viewers to these topics departs from the focus that Mídia NINJA has on issues
of social mobilizations. The explanation for this is that Mídia NINJA also employs its YouTube chan-
nel to disseminate different content that was produced by citizens not part of the hardcore of Mídia
NINJA. Contrariwise, their Twitcasting channel is only used to disseminate streamings of mobiliza-
tions and other types of events reported by NINJAs. The advantage of this strategy is that it gives a
more participatory bend to their experience than the rest, which is achieved by having part of the locus
of content production out from the organization and its members. Accordingly, the covered topics can
attract the interest of larger audiences, which increases the popularity of the organization. However,
they run the risk of becoming popular for disseminating content divergent with their aims of reporting
social conﬂict and mobilizations. This once again suggests that the relation between the objectives that
media for social transformation have with their content, and the selection that audiences make of them
is not linear, but dependent on the active role of audiences on how content is perceived and valued as
important or not.
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Title # Views Type
Nurse is ﬁred after "laughing about" Neymar in a hospital in Fortaleza 467,080 Other
An owner abandons his dog in the middle of an avenue - 24/11/2013 355,000 Other
Violent ﬁght between fans of Atletico Paranaense and Vasco paralyze a game in Joinville - 12/08/2013 310,365 Other
A trafﬁc ﬁght almost ends in a tragedy in the Rio Mar mall parking lot Recife 214,182 Other
Riot policemen receive under arrest warrant for throwing a bomb on a precinct in Rio de Janeiro - 14/08/2013 202,384 Mobilization
Brazilians provoke Argentines, and ﬁghts take place after the goal for the title 187,835 Other
Judge humiliates waiter and exchanges insults with a customer in a bakery in RN - 12/29/2013 142,680 Other
Policemen beat teachers in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro - 09/28/2013 127,778 Mobilization
Black Bloc turn around a car of the Civil Police in São Paulo - 10/07/2013 125,917 Mobilization
A dog is abandoned "CONTINUED" 103,609 Other
Table 7.6: Top ten most viewed Mídia NINJA’s videos on YouTube. The table includes the titles of the
videos translated to English, the total number of views, and the type of coverage. Source: Compiled by
the author from YouTube 27/11/2014.
7.4 Concluding Discussion
The empirical data in this chapter gives insights about the relation between the imaginaries and the
types of content produced in each case, taking into account the aesthetics of production. Addition-
ally, the data allows to discuss how participatory these media projects are in practice, and to review
statistics about content reception to discuss the contribution of these cases to the national public and
counter-public spheres.
In the ﬁrst section of the chapter, I synthesized data that shows the discursive practices (Keller
2013) of each media channel, which illustrates what type of content each media elaborates. In effect,
the empirical data shows that the four cases fulﬁlled their aim of elaborating content in accordance
with their imaginaries, although to different degrees. For instance, CPEtv does represent co-operative
principles and values in its daily news and other programs about co-operatives. Likewise, Barricada
TV elaborates content related to the recovered factories movement and other left-wing standpoints
ignored in mass media. Similarly, Wall Kintun TV has begun to produce content related to the Mapuche
indigenous community, but still in an incipient way and far less continuous than the other two channels.
In a similar vein, Mídia NINJA has been successful to cover varied social mobilizations in main urban
areas in Brazil. For these reasons, the data I presented suggests that the media channels have become
dispositives of the different imaginaries each case has.
Despite the role of the media channels to disseminate the imaginaries of the cases, in this chapter
I stressed an important dimension overlooked in research about communication for development that
puts boundaries on the projects: quality patterns. In order to analyze this, my analysis was inspired by
the observations of Bourdieu (1984) that the ‘taste’ that people have in cultural consumption is relative,
and depending on the particular personal and social trajectories of who is being asked. Although this
stance deﬁnitely calls for ethnographic methods to research consumption patterns of audiences, within
the scope of this research I focused on interpreting with such a scheme the statements of audiovisual
producers of the media for social transformation, and related ones. This approach, though limited, still
revealed that media for social change are inevitably positioned in a social space of content production,
where hierarchies of what is of good and bad taste exist, often translated in this case to the discussion
on what is good and bad - or not even at all - journalism. These hierarchies are what I metaphorically
called ‘quality patterns’, which in both countries are associated with those deﬁned by leading commer-
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cial ﬁrms of the largest urban areas. These ﬁrms establish what journalism is (high image quality,
high technology, professional, objective), despising the experiences that depart from their standards. I
argued that the prevailing ‘quality’ patterns or schemes act as a dispositive for commercial practices
that the audiovisual producers have to deal with, because they assumed that mass audiences are used
to them, and that anything that departs will have to face the contempt of incumbents. The interpreta-
tion of ‘quality patterns’ as dispositives stresses that they are not natural, but related to the networks
of commercial audiovisual production ﬁrms and training institutions (re)producing such practices con-
centrated in cities, such as Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro. In effect, the cases I analyzed oppose the
respective large media groups in each country, Clarín in Argentina and Globo in Brazil, illustrating the
theoretical tension that Carpentier (2011) described between mass media and others. The former tend
to follow the strategies of claiming that their coverages are ‘objective’ and ‘professional’; whereas jour-
nalists working in media for social transformation leave aside such claims, because they want to show
situations that are often overlooked by the agenda of mass media, requiring a personal positioning to
try to alter the situations that they perceive as unjust. In the cases of countries like Argentina and
Brazil, I argue that this is not only a philosophical discussion between ‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’,
but a matter of the political economy of media and communications. My interpretation is that mass me-
dia ﬁrms use their capacity to shape mainstream quality schemes and the claim to carry out ‘objective’
reporting, as strategies to legitimize and strengthen their positions, which in these countries is associ-
ated with the wealthier classes, given the origins of the most inﬂuential private media conglomerates.
Conversely, media for social transformation are evidently reporting relevant topics to stimulate social
inclusion and environmental policies neglected by the former. In this context, the creative economy
policy discourses by ignoring the latter, clearly favor the former, and for this reason I reject that they
can represent ‘feasible development options’.
With respect to the main research question of this thesis, the existence of this dispositive does not
mean that media for social transformation are doomed to fall into commercial practices of audiovisual
production. Although it is true that it might be the easiest road to follow in case they want to com-
pete for audiences, my data shows it is not the only one. The case of Mídia NINJA clearly illustrates
this, because even though they broke almost every rule of what is supposed to be ‘good quality journal-
ism’ (good image quality, linear and clear narrative, objectivity), they where still able to attract large
numbers of viewers during the transmission of the 2013 riots in Brazil. One possible interpretation is
that what gave them the scoop was the coverage of speciﬁc content of those relevant national events in
Brazil. For sure, this played a role, but it was not the only factor. From my point of view, an equally
important aspect was their innovation to stream the content live, with a subjective coverage of what
they saw. Therefore, I argued that they not only had an advantage because of the situation covered, but
also due to the new technological means they employed to transmit it, which still had not been adopted
by mainstream media ﬁrms, and thus did not have a stabilized ‘accepted’ quality pattern.
In this chapter, I also examined the important question of how participatory these cases are, which
sheds light on the limits of the concept that has become a buzzword in development research in gen-
eral, and particularly in media and communication for development. Authors claim that a plurality
of media organizations (the different ones I included in the category of media for social transforma-
tion) shall deﬁnitely increase the levels of audience participation, contributing to the democratization
of the ‘public sphere’ (Downey and Fenton 2003; Fuchs 2010). Nonetheless, I showed that this argu-
ment needs to be closely examined, because participation can have different degrees. To analyze this, I
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employed the ideal poles suggested by Carpentier (2011) and classiﬁed the cases according to different
dimensions. In synthesis, my data suggests that each case gives voice to underrepresented groups,
whose perspectives are disregarded in other media, but in no way do they include a variety of other
groups, in particular those opposing them. Therefore, the data rejects the thesis of Carpentier that
alternative media have more heterogeneous audiences than mass media. I explained this based on the
imaginaries of each case that set discursive boundaries on what shall be considered in each media, thus
by deﬁnition limiting its potential to reach radical levels of participation. Furthermore, I claimed that
the material constraints to fulﬁll the news production cycle also draw boundaries to the radical ideal
of participation, because the need to continuously cover topics with scarce resources implies a selection
process, limiting the full implementation of any sort of participatory ideal. The best strategy to enlarge
participation seems to be to set part of the locus of content production outside the organization, such
as Mídia NINJA and its video production, although this might lead to content elaborated by viewers
not always in tune with the imaginary of the case. For these reasons, I claim that whenever a media
organization argues it is ‘participatory’, the term has to be looked at with suspicion, because in practice
there are many limitations to attain such ideal.
The last point I examined in this chapter was the link between the content disseminated by media
for social transformation and their audiences. The data conﬁrms part of the optimistic or cyberutopian
claims of the potentials of new media based on ICT, because the new online platforms have clearly
lowered the entry barriers to diverse types of organizations to disseminate their content online. The
claim that this contributes to the democratization of the online public sphere is based on the fact that
online platforms, such as Facebook or YouTube, do not discriminate among corporations, NGOs and
individuals who disseminate their content there. All are supposed to have the same opportunities of
access. Although this might be true, it still hides the enormous asymmetries that remain in terms
of the resources that mass media ﬁrms have for content production in comparison with media for so-
cial transformation, and also that the former do not necessarily actively use the online platforms for
content distribution. Indeed, I showed that Mídia NINJA had more YouTube viewers than Globo,
but this ignores the fact that millions of Brazilians still watch Globo from TV, or directly access their
videos from their web channels, and not from other USA based online platforms. For these reasons, I
agree with Downey and Fenton (2003) that media for social transformation are contributing to create
counter-public spheres, but I disagree with their hypothesis that these might feed on the public-sphere
controlled by mass media. At least in the context of Argentina and Brazil and the cases that I consid-
ered, where the contrast between the policy discourses that each defend seem to limit potential links for
deliberation. Contrarily, the data suggests that their best option to challenge a public-sphere to which
their access is limited, is to create their own networks and counter-publics, hoping that the situation
might change in the future. In effect, it is not a coincidence that the case that most advanced in such
direction, Mídia NINJA, had more chances to challenge commercial mass media in Brazil, and attract
– though for a short period of time – the attention of unexpectedly large audiences, despite the fact
that they are a ﬁnancially-resource scarce experience in comparison with mass media ﬁrms. Last but
not least, the new online platforms that have enlarged the capabilities of media for social transforma-
tion to disseminate their content also brought new limits and challenges, such as surveillance of their
content, and the introduction of commercial advertising, as I highlighted in chapter 6. Therefore, the
net-delusion thesis is partly upheld as well (Morozov 2011).
It is safe to say that the challenges in terms of quality patterns and audiences are of general nature
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for any media organization, even in Western countries. However, there are two relevant dimensions
to discuss that are more important in the context of non-Western countries. First, the emergence
of media for social transformation that want to challenge incumbents have to take into account the
frictions and even high levels of confrontation, which their projects have to resist to continue operating.
This requires resilience against different types of violence. Second, the sustainability of projects under
such more demanding contexts requires the acquisition and mobilization of different types of resources,
which I shall interpret as a proxy to power imbalances. Both are relevant topics covered in the next
chapter that help to understand the potential and limits of media for social transformation to challenge
for proﬁts media.
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Chapter 8
Resources and Violence
“Oppression is ultimately a matter of deﬁnition, and its perception is a product of a worldview. Change
the worldview, and what once seemed natural and legitimate becomes an instance of cruelty and
sadism” (Nandy 1987, p. 22).
The four media experiences studied in this work, as many others, want to introduce new imaginar-
ies. However, this is not an easy task, and not only due to scarce resources to set up their experience,
but equally important for the need of defending their projects against the oppression and violence of
incumbents. The ﬁrst part of the chapter covers the different types of violence that the four cases have
been facing, a dimension often overlooked in Western research, which as I argued in chapter 2 is more
interested in how media affect society, but not so much in the limits for their operation. The second
part complements the ﬁrst one by employing a resource-view of power to examine the varied types
of resources that media for social transformation acquired and mobilized beyond ﬁnancial resources.
Thus, I show how they try to increase their power to put forward their projects.
8.1 Violence
In chapter 2, I cited two inﬂuential conceptualizations of violence by Galtung (1969) and Bourdieu
(1989). On the one hand, the importance of their concepts is to make explicit the collective suffering
that speciﬁc symbolic structures generate, beyond just speaking of physical violence. On the other
hand, I pointed out that these deﬁnitions are broad and not explicit to what sort of structures they
refer to (Farmer et al. 2004). Based on those observations, in chapter 2 I introduced a typology of
different types of violence that the four analyzed media for social transformation have been suffering:
discursive, economic, legal and physical. I shall argue that this improves the previous concepts in
research of media for social transformation by explicitly naming the types of violence that hamper
the implementation of the projects. In that sense, they can be considered dispositives, because they
reward certain patterns of action, and punish those that deviate. However, these dispositives are not
necessarily the product of creative economy policy discourses, but rather of others, though still contrary
to the media for social transformation projects. Take the case of the repressive behavior of the military
police in Brazil, which is more a product of previous decisions taken during dictatorships and inner
conﬂicts within the country, rather than an issue of media or cultural policies.
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Table 8.1: Types of violence suffered by each of the analyzed case studies and related organizations.
The cross indicates the type of actor that initiated it (state or private ﬁrms). Compiled by the author.
With this analytical lens, in Table 8.1 I indicate the main types of violence that each case has
suffered, which I will detail with concrete examples in the next section. Thus, the table shows a case-
ordered display of ‘violence’ (Miles and Huberman 1994), which I elaborated by analyzing the references
to conﬂicts that interviewees from the media for social transformation expressed in connection with
incumbents. Then, I triangulated these claims with information available from secondary sources, to
arrive to the shown version of the table. It is worth pointing out that when I speak of ‘main types of
violence’ I limited the classiﬁcation to the direct type of violence they experience, although it might
be true that it might later cause others. For example, discursive violence may affect the reputation
of a media organization, reducing its strategies to acquire funds, thus causing also economic violence;
likewise, legal violence can lead to economic harm, due to limits to the operation of media for social
transformation; and so on and so forth. Finally, in the table I also note what type of incumbent exerted
the violence (the state or private ﬁrms).
8.1.1 Co-operatives and CPEtv, Argentina
In this case, instead of referring speciﬁcally to CPEtv, I shall make allusion to the co-operative move-
ment in general, because the types of violence they experienced were previous to obtaining their license
under the new law. In particular, I shall describe the economic and legal violence that co-operatives
have been ﬁghting against.
The ﬁrst type is legal violence that had been exercised since 1980 through Article 45° of law 22.285
passed during the Argentinean dictatorship. This article excluded organizations offering public ser-
vices to obtain an audiovisual channel, such as co-operatives, besides keeping the right of the state to
restrict the channels in case they threatened ‘national security’ (Ley 22.285 1980). After the return to
democracy in 1983, the legal framework was not altered until 2005, and only few co-operatives tried to
bypass these restrictions by operating as private ﬁrms, but with internal legal documents that showed
the ownership belonged to a co-operative (Hermosa 2013). Although the military dictatorship has been
blamed for establishing this violent legal framework against the freedom of speech of co-operatives and
other nonproﬁt organizations, it is also true that 25 years passed until such restrictions were lifted and
29 until a new audiovisual communication services law was introduced. This shows that unjust legal
frameworks, established in non democratic periods, can institutionalize an unfair system that is not
so easy to change democratically. As explained in chapter 3, a national political conﬂict and several
nationwide debates were needed to alter what co-operatives understand as an oppressive legislation.
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Therefore, although the military dictatorship carries the major responsibility, the political parties and
leaders that ignored and even reinforced the issue are also responsible, illustrating state legal violence.
Other examples of legal violence are the questionings that CPE and other co-operatives had to
withstand from private ﬁrms, and more speciﬁcally from those related to the Clarín group. For exam-
ple, CPE had to deal with injunctions presented by the local private cableoperator part of the Clarín
group, Cablevisión, that argued the co-operative should not get a license because they were already a
‘monopoly’ in the telephone service (Colsecor 2011a). Although it is true that these ﬁrms had the right
to present such objections, they were groundless and malicious accusations. In effect, the legal courts
sided with the co-operative, and declared the claims of private ﬁrms fallacies, since the co-operative
had already been competing with another local private ﬁrm. Nevertheless, the point to highlight is
that ﬁrms with far more resources were able to use the legal system in their favor, irrespective of the
truth of their allegations, to delay as much as possible the democratization process that the new law
initiated. Thus, exerting legal violence against the cooperatives.
The second type of violence suffered by co-operatives has been economic violence, exempliﬁed by the
use of dumping practices by the Clarín media conglomerate against them. According to the president of
the electric co-operative of the city of Punta Alta in Buenos Aires, Cablevisión charged AR$ 62 compared
to the AR$ 68 of the co-operative, but in a nearby city, Cablevisión charged 110$ for the same service (La
Arena 2010). This difference in prices led him to afﬁrm that Cablevisión was using unfair competition
practices, by offering a service for a very low price to eliminate the competition so as to later increase
the cost considerably, given that consumers would have no other option to choose from. Such economic
violence is possible given the operation of Cablevisión all across the country as a network, which was
built during years and is far from employing fair competition practices. Thus, this unequal distribution
of resources allowed such an attack against those who challenged their predominance in the cable and
TV market. The point is once again that incumbents can mobilize different types of resources to stop
the experiences from challenging them. Apart from this, in the case of Santa Rosa the consequences
of economic violence were suffered by the local inhabitants. It is important to underline that the main
argument used in 2003 by CPE to strive for their channel was the need to offer the population cheaper
access to communications than the private ﬁrm, which indeed took place. For example, before the co-
operative’s channel, in 2012 Cablevisión charged AR$ 140, but after CPEtv started to offer a similar
service at AR$ 85, the private ﬁrm had to lower costs to AR$ 110 (Nocetti 2012). This conﬁrms the
previous economic exploitation of the population that was charged higher prices and that had their
right to communications and information limited. The co-operative further argued against another
negative consequence of the Clarín group subsidiary in Santa Rosa, the money earned from the service
ﬂowed out from the city, whereas with the co-operative it would remain in the local economy (Señales
2012). In this context, it is not surprising that many subscribed to the service offered by CPE during
2013, and by the end of 2014 the co-operative even argues it surpassed the number of Cablevisión
subscribers (Amaya, Hernán 2014).
8.1.2 Barricada TV, Argentina
Barricada TV has been streaming continuously since 2009, but despite the passing of the new law,
this case still suffered discursive and legal violence. As regards the latter, it was not because of the
nonexistence of a legal framework, but rather because of the lack of its full and fast implementation. In
effect, in 2012 Barricada TV and other alternative channels created the organization Espacio Abierto de
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Televisoras Alternativas, Comunitarias y Populares (EATACP - open space of alternative, community
and popular TV channels) to demand full application of the new law. Concretely, they demanded speciﬁc
tenders for alternative and community TV and radio within the NGO category and a plan to stimulate
these media, without conditions from the state (Espacioabiertotv 2012). The reason they gave for these
claims was that the tag of ‘nongovernmental organizations’ is fuzzy; in the words of one member of
Barricada TV:
“They put us in the same place with large service co-operatives or big foundations, and
therefore they demand the same obligations. For example, to have recruited staff or to declare
employees. But it is not possible for us, because we are not governed by the logic of the
employer and employee” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated
by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
Therefore, the use of a broad tag hides the inherent differences among the actors that can fall within
the nonproﬁt and nongovernmental organizations category; for instance, CPE is an example of a co-
operative with far more resources than IMPA and Barricada TV, but it is still less resourceful than other
NGOs. Members of Barricada TV remarked it was not just a mere issue of classiﬁcation, but one with
practical consequences, because the tenders that the AFSCA released also had limiting assumptions
on who could request a license, as the following utterance illustrates:
“Tenders require that you declare assets, employees, an investment plan, that you have pro-
fessional operators under labor agreements, among others. Then, I wonder what happens to
the radio carried out by activists against mining consequences? Are we going to silence them
until they hire an operator under labor agreements?” (Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013,
interview with & translated by the author in Buenos Aires, Argentina).
Although it can be argued that these speciﬁcations try to avoid informality in the media sector, it is also
true that in their design they restrict the possible media ﬁrms to those operating under a commercial
logic, pushing the rest to becoming illegal. And worse yet, the acquisition of the tenders had a cost of
up to AR$ 140.000, which was a prize most alternative and community channels with scarce resources
could not pay (Barricada TV 2011d). An argument behind these requisites is to assure that the new
media ﬁrms will be ‘sustainable’ and that have already substantial ﬁnancial resources, but once again,
these alternative media have another point of view, as the following quote shows:
“We are not organized by a for-proﬁt logic. We do not have an employer nor employees.
We are a completely different thing. And it is not true that we are not ‘sustainable’, because
since 2009 we have been broadcasting live without state support, without market support”
(Barricada TV member, 31/07/2013, interview with & translated by the author in Buenos
Aires, Argentina).
These statements illustrate an example that is a mixture of, ﬁrst legal and second discursive violence,
because what members of Barricada TV and similar organizations have been complaining about is an
interpretation of the law contrary to their practices. Indeed, the policy instruments that the orga-
nization in charge of operationalizing the law introduced implicitly sides with the perspective of the
creative economy policy discourses above others, acting as dispositives that shape practices to speciﬁc
orientations. Accordingly, the practices of workers’ self management were neglected, revealing how
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they took sides with the commercial approach to communications. Indeed, four years after the intro-
duction of the new law, the demands of the network of alternative, community and popular TV and
radio organizations were still ignored, and remained ‘illegal’, although they did organize three public
mobilizations to the AFSCA to complain and reverse this situation (Espacioabiertotv 2013b). From
their perspective, this was a “discrimination against those without legalization, authorization or legal
recognition, preventing to compete and thus deepening inequalities” (Espacioabiertotv 2013a, translated
by the author); which illustrates the suffered violence.
It is important to remark that alternative media organizations, such as Barricada TV, have been
critical of the role of government in assigning licenses and in general, of how they implemented the
law. Thus, one possible interpretation for the legal violence is that it was on purpose, to limit their
critical voices. Another plausible explanation points to the state bureaucracy to deal with new situa-
tions, as it happened to CPEtv to obtain its license, although the deferral in this case has been much
longer. Whatever the reasons, the effects of this delay from the state implied that these alternative
media became ‘illegal’, excluding them from the beneﬁts of the new law, such as the opportunity to
compete in tenders. This constrained them, despite the existence of a legal framework to enact such
projects. In effect, not until the end of 2014, Barricada TV became the only legalized organization of the
EATACP network demanding a full application of the new law (Espacioabiertotv 2014). Its members
recognized the importance of this, but they also stressed that many organizations are still missing, and
so continued to demand the legalization of the remaining alternative media.
Despite the strenuous relationship with the state to obtain the license, Barricada TV has also suf-
fered discursive violence from private mass media in the form of libel. Speciﬁcally, one of the leading
political analysts working for the newspaper La Nación, related to the Clarín Group in terms of shares
and ideologically, defamed the experience by painting another explanation of the previous events. In
one of his articles, the journalist suggested close relationships between AFSCA’ s managers and Bar-
ricada TV, as if they were part of the government, besides he tagged these and other channels as
precarious and as not producing enough own content as the new law requires (Pagni, Carlos 2014).
These assertions were denied by Barricada TV, and it is not difﬁcult to conﬁrm their point of view,
taking into account the conﬂicts that the channel had with the AFSCA, the critical position they have
in their contents towards the Kirchner government and the amount of content produced (Barricada TV
2014). From their point of view:
“Pagni and La Nación underestimate our task, because they cannot comprehend commu-
nication exercised as a right and not just as a commodity. They warn against the presence of
our voices, which were always silenced or distorted in the radio spectrum” (translated by the
author).
This example once again shows the capacity of mass media to defame alternative media in the context
of a competition among discourses on how communication and culture ought to be organized.
8.1.3 Wall Kintun TV, Argentina
As described in chapter 5, the Mapuche suffered the political instrumentalization of their request,
government ofﬁcials offered and speeded up the TV channel for the Buenoleo community, but with-
out transferring the knowledge and the management to the community. This top-down and non-
participatory approach to the media project initiated a conﬂict that ﬁnally left the channel’s man-
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agement in the hands of members of the Buenoleo Mapuche community, but in the middle of it, doubt
was casted on the democratization aims of the law. As one member of Wall Kintun TV expressed: “We
have been promised many things, but ultimately they had another intention, and not necessarily to dis-
seminate what happens to the Mapuche people. Instead, they just wanted to politicize, it was politics
within politics” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2015, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos
de Bariloche, Argentina). Similarly, the CPI of Argentina states that:
“The creation of the Mapuche TV channel (Wall Kintun) was grossly manipulated. It
never had support or funding from the state. This suggests we have a dead law, unless the
government fulﬁlls its obligations to give resources to those voices that have been silenced by
mass media for decades” (Consejo Plurinacional Indígena 2014, translated by the author).
These statements are examples of the point of view of indigenous communities with respect to economic
violence exerted against Wall Kintun TV, and in general against indigenous communities, because of
the lack of resources transferred to them. It is important to contextualize this claim with the histor-
ical economic violence that the indigenous communities in Argentina have been suffering. Although
the state conquest of indigenous communities might have taken place more than 100 years ago, their
consequences in terms of impoverishing and undermining these communities had long term effects and
have been also part of their claims brought to the new audiovisual communication services law.
The case has also suffered legal violence, both from the Clarín group and the state. As regards
the former, its subsidiary ﬁrms do not respect the law yet, given the injunctions that were being de-
bated during ﬁeldwork. Consequently, their cable ﬁrm, Cablevisión, has not included Wall Kintun TV’s
channel in their programming grid. This can also be understood as a type of legal violence with eco-
nomic consequences, because by violating the law, Cablevisión excludes Wall Kintun TV from reaching
a larger potential audience for the Mapuche, which would be a channel to try to tackle their ﬁnancial
and audience limitations. As regards the state, according to Article 152° of the new law, indigenous
radios and TVs would be funded through a transfer from the national budget and other resources (Ley
26.522 2009). Although it is true that some governmental organizations have been transferring re-
sources to Wall Kintun TV, such as the AFSCA or INCAA, the promise to establish a percentage of the
national budget for these media has not been fulﬁlled, which would be a good solution to their resource-
scarcity problems. Consequently, this reluctance suggests that the current administration is not willing
to establish a transparent mechanism of resource transfer to empower indigenous communities’ media
projects. As private mass media journalists have suggested (Crettaz 2012), this might be interpreted as
the national administration aiming to ‘control’ the positions of the media they ﬁnance. One reason that
supports this point of view is that there are strong divergences between many indigenous organizations
and the government, because the former oppose the projects of extraction of natural resources that the
latter has been advancing, such as the unregulated expansion of industrial agriculture, mining and
now oil extraction, through the debated fracking method (Consejo Plurinacional Indígena 2014). In all
these cases, few private actors and the state proﬁt from these economic activities, with few concerns
about the destruction of the livelihoods of indigenous communities. In the end, these examples point to
the tensions within the state between the ideal of the new law to strive for a human rights approach
to communications and the political decisions that parties in power have made to acquire economic
resources in tandem with national and international private actors.
Last but not least, commercial mass media also exerted discursive violence against Wall Kintun
TV; for instance, by remarking in a pejorative way the weaknesses of the project and its appropriation
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by political activists (Andrade 2012). This is part of a more general trend of negative stereotyping
of indigenous communities projects; for example, a popular journalist working for the Clarín Group
expressed:
“I think decrees do not generate audience. This thing of demonopolizing media by creating
new media does not mean that these new ones will have audiences. One thing does not bring
the other. This stupidity of ‘let´s build the radio of the Wichís’, but, who the hell is going to
listen to the radio of Wichís? And what is worse, who is going to put ads on their radios? And
how are they going to pay the salaries of operators? This is real life and it is a business like
any industry” (Iglesias 2012, translated by the author).
This violent utterance against the existence of media of indigenous communities such as the Wichís,
which are indigenous people present in Argentina and Bolivia, reﬂects two things: on the one hand,
the stereotype of urban citizens inﬂuenced by Western ways of living that despise indigenous commu-
nities’ worldviews and practices, which are seen as ‘barbarian’. This parallels the perspectives that
inspired ‘the conquest of the desert’ in 1885 in the ﬁrst place, and until these days illustrate the power
imbalances among the inhabitants inﬂuenced by Western ideas versus those part of indigenous com-
munities. On the other hand, the statement shows the conﬂict between the different discourses on
culture and communication. The journalist clearly sides with the creative economy policy discourses,
which consider information just as another commodity and thus, only those with enough audiences and
proﬁts deserve to have a voice. From this perspective, the indigenous communities just do not matter,
because they cannot attract enough sponsors to advertise in their channels and pay for the salaries of
their workers. However, this statement not only hides the advantages leading ﬁrms obtained during
the dictatorship, but also overlooks the historically unequal conditions that indigenous communities
suffered and the discourses that strive for a human rights approach to communication.
8.1.4 Mídia NINJA, Brazil
The different national context in which Mídia NINJA operates adds examples of new types of violence
suffered by the organization, and also similar ones. As regards the latter, I shall cite examples of
the high levels of discursive violence against this organization. With respect to the former, Mídia
NINJA members had to face physical violence exerted by police forces. Indeed, According to Reporters
Without Borders, during the 2013 riots around 100 journalists suffered violence, mostly from the police
(Reporters Without Borders 2014, p. 21). For the same reason, Reporters Without Borders claim that
Brazil was the ‘the deadliest country for media personnel’ in the Americas in 2013, because 5 journalists
were killed, together with the daily physical dangers they face in day-to-day coverages. Mídia NINJA
members have not been exempt of such violence; for instance, the following paragraph describes the
account of an arrested Mídia NINJA reporter while he was in a police station in Rio de Janeiro:
“I have just been arrested for contempt. It happened while I was going through Arpoador1
carrying my camera, where I saw a commotion. I got closer to see what was happening, and
the crowd shouted ‘Arrastrão! Arrastrão!’2. I saw a lot of policemen twisting the arms of
1. A region located in the southern zone of Rio de Janeiro, in the intersection of the beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema.
2. This term in Portuguese refers to a group of criminals that act together to steal objects in a public space, which is frequent
in the beaches of Rio de Janeiro. According to media, the members of these gangs are usually under 18 years old and come from
favelas (slums) located nearby (Veja 2013; O Globo 2013).
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teenagers and attacking them. I grabbed my camera to register what was happening, took
photos and started to ﬁlm a video, but in less than 10 seconds a ﬁrst policemen got closer
and put his hands on my camera. He said that I could not register that, and thus he would
take my equipment. He pushed me backwards, an aggression, twisted my arm, while I said
‘I will not give you my camera! I´m working, I´m a journalist!’. In the end, they asked for my
identiﬁcation, but as I was on the beach, I did not have it3. So, they tried once again to grab
my camera, I said ‘This equipment is mine!’, and they replied ‘Prison! Contempt!’, and here I
am. My great contempt was holding on to my camera ...”’ (Jornal A Nova Democracia 2014,
translated by the author).
The imprisonment of a young Mídia NINJA female reporter of 19 years during her coverage of protests
against the World Cup in Belo Horizonte, gives another example of police physical violence. The frag-
ment of her testimony illustrates the aggressions:
“I was led to a police station nearby, where I was taken with three other people. Once there,
more aggressions took place: slapping, punching and we were even welcomed with spits.
When they identiﬁed me as the live narrator, they took my cell phone that was streaming.
They tried to unlock the device for further ‘investigation’, but as I did not know the password,
because it belonged to another NINJA, I was isolated from the group and placed on a table,
where 5 policemen - men and women - beat me up to force me to say the password.
At the time of the beating, one of them hit the left side of my head and I fainted for a while.
I woke up due to slaps and shouts of ‘Wake up, bitch!’. I regained consciousness. I was again
near the three other detained protesters. We were handcuffed and kept standing for about 2
hours, during which we heard their curses and we received spits on our eyes and further jerks.
Besides, I had to endure hoax songs calling me ‘Foxy!’, which were declared in a low voice so
that they were not heard by people around” (Magalhães 2014, translated by the author).
These testimonies are just samples of the military police physical violence (including mental as well)
against media workers, while they try to report during social mobilizations, which shows the stark con-
trast between the innovativeness of Mídia NINJA’s organization in using technologies to report social
mobilizations and the fragility of its members while they report on the streets. More generally, media
for social transformation in countries where there are no legal frameworks for the protection of journal-
ists, or where they are not respected, face these hurdles of the state monopoly over violence or similar
attacks from parastatal organizations, while they try to construct counter power networks, which in
the worst cases do not even arise due to the violence oppressing such initiatives. Unfortunately, a
majority of countries in the world withstands such dangerous conditions (Reporters Without Borders
2014). Therefore, violence cannot be ignored in theories of power in relation to media in non-Western
contexts.
In addition to physical violence, Mídia NINJA had to endure discursive violence in the form of li-
bel soon after the events of June 2013, because the experience attracted the attention of mass media
journalists who wrote an avalanche of criticism against them. These were not strictly related to the
practices or coverage of Mídia NINJA, but to the organization where it emerged from, FDE, and the
whole process was unleashed after the publication of two testimonies by ex-members of FDE (Martins
Costa 2013b; Rovai 2013), who used the same social network that gave popularity to the experience,
3. In Rio de Janeiro it is advised not to carry documents while on the beach, to avoid problems if you are robbed.
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Facebook. Both right-wing media, such as the most read magazine in Brazil, Veja, and the TV channel
O Globo, and also left-wing media disseminated a high amount of accusations against the organiza-
tion. First, Fora do Eixo was accused of not being nonpartisan as they claim, but instead related to the
Worker’s Party in power and other left-wing ones (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Passa Palavra 2013b;
Boaro 2013; Azevedo 2013a; Passa Palavra 2013c). Second, articles remarked that Mídia NINJA was
not ‘independent’, because they fund their activity through FDE that obtains funds from tenders and
from private ﬁrms (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Noblat 2013; Passa Palavra 2013b; Bocchini and Lo-
catelli 2013; Boaro 2013; Otavio 2013; Passa Palavra 2013a; Azevedo 2013a). Third, journalists accused
the organization of not being horizontal, but of having a clear structure that in the worst case was de-
scribed as authoritarian or as a ‘sect’ (Maisonnave 2013; Noblat 2013; Azevedo 2013b; Passa Palavra
2013a). Fourth, other critics attacked one of the founders of the network, Pablo Capilé, who was por-
trayed as a manipulative ‘guru’ or dictator (Borges 2013; Gabeira 2013; Noblat 2013; Azevedo 2013b;
Bocchini and Locatelli 2013). Fifth, authors cast doubt on the complementary currencies that the net-
work uses (Borges 2013), which according to Marxist analysis just hides the exploitation of the workers’
surplus, by not remunerating their jobs (Passa Palavra 2013a). Sixth, articles remark the ‘low quality’
of the coverages of Mídia NINJA, also pointing out that their lack of ‘objectivity’ cannot be considered
journalism (Gabeira 2013; Otavio 2013; Azevedo 2013a). Seventh, left-wing antagonists argue that the
network is just a new type of capitalist ﬁrm that appropriates the symbolic production of precarious
creative workers and other social movements for their own beneﬁt (Passa Palavra 2013d, 2013c; Boaro
2013). For instance, they stress that FDE is not organically connected to social struggles, but just
covering them as a niche specialization to attract viewers (Passa Palavra 2013a, 2013b). Last but not
least, based on the testimonies of some ex-members, authors have made disparate accusations against
the network, such as their preference to apply sexist practices or to exploit ‘slave’ work (Noblat 2013;
Azevedo 2013b; Passa Palavra 2013a; Bocchini and Locatelli 2013; Boaro 2013), among other negative
consequences they associate with the psychological pressure that the network exerts on its members.
Conversely, others remarked the previous pile of allegations disseminated in mass media and social
networks as evidence of extremism both of right and left-wing journalists, against a new experience
they did not understand (Nassif 2013; Martins Costa 2013b). Understandably, FDE rejects all accusa-
tions that they considered libel or biased and diffused various messages of support from several mem-
bers and collaborators of the network that present opposite perspectives (Fora do Eixo 2013b, 2013g).
However, they did admit some mistakes in handling personal relations with ex members, which I guess
is something that usually happens in every work place. Nonetheless, the diffusion of this message
was only through their web portal, which undoubtedly had less distribution than other mass media
that disseminated the negative perspectives of the network. Beyond assessing the truthfulness of the
allegations, what is important for this research is the conﬂict of positions that emerged between in-
cumbents and Mídia NINJA, and the imbalance the latter faced while trying to defend itself against
attacks on their reputation.
At least three reasons explain the violence Mídia NINJA suffered from private mass media. First,
this case, along with other similar organizations in Brazil, holds negative perceptions of mass media
ﬁrms and vice versa. It is important to remember the existing tensions described in chapter 3 among
media conglomerates in Brazil - with excessive political inﬂuence - versus government and the social
movements striving for a democratization of communications. These have been conﬂictive during the
last years, similarly to the Argentinean case, but as a difference, so far no legislation has been advanced
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by the government in Brazil to alter the high levels of ownership concentration. This context explains
the opposition and violence between media for social transformation projects and mass media ﬁrms,
among which I focused on the aggressions of the latter to the former. However, I do recognize that the
violence is bi-directional, but asymmetrical; for example, Mídia NINJA reporters covered a mobiliza-
tion of organizations striving for media democratization and other citizens to the main building of the
largest media ﬁrm, Globo, to denounce what they understood as an unpaid debt the ﬁrm had with the
state (Felinto 2013). During this transmission, Mídia NINJA’s streaming covered negative portrayals
and aggressive statements against Globo, which exemplify the negative perception and construction
of mass media as enemies that these organizations have, delineating conﬂicts between them hard to
prevent.
A second important feature of Mídia NINJA that collides with for-proﬁt mass media ﬁrms lies in
their organizational models, speciﬁcally the collaborative practices this case employs. As one collabo-
rator from Mídia NINJA observes:
“In the last instance, digital culture is the elimination of intermediaries that do not add
value, and that explains the whole ﬁght. If you start to produce a TV, you dare to make inter-
mediations that cut proﬁts from another intermediary, you are in fact challenging the system”
(C. Prado, 17/12/2013, interview with & translated by the author in São Paulo, Brazil).
This quote illustrates the tensions between old media business models and the challenges introduced by
collaborative ones based on ICT. As remarked in chapter 2 and 5, the ‘monopoly’ of the professional jour-
nalist as the only one capable of disseminating news within an organization based for proﬁts through
advertising and audience cultivation, is under pressure from new peer based models, with different
logics of organization and retribution. Mídia NINJA is an example of the latter, where journalists are
trained on the job and do not necessarily have university training in the area; their retribution is not
only based on national currencies, but also on the system of exchanges that the FDE network created;
and ﬁnally they report in an explicit subjective way challenging the claims of ‘objectivity’ of mass me-
dia. From my perspective, these tensions between different visions on what journalism is all about are
in the background of the violence mass media ﬁrms exert on the experience, and thus are examples of
discursive violence.
The third reason for tensions is related to the attraction of viewers that Mídia NINJA achieved
during the mobilizations that took place in Brazil in June/July 2013, which contributed to question
the role of mass media in contemporary societies. Mídia NINJA attained this thanks to their live
coverage of what was happening on the streets during the riots, which made evident violence between
the military police and demonstrators, whereas mass media kept the usual programming ignoring what
was going on (Diniz 2013). These coverages challenged mass media and decreased their ‘reputation’ in
the face of viewers, who started to follow independent media like Mídia NINJA’s streamings, which had
estimated peaks of 150.000 viewers per day. Furthermore, two leaders of the network appeared in a
very popular national talk show program that interviews national and international renowned ﬁgures,
the Roda Viva. This interview gave a lot of public visibility to Mídia NINJA, Fora do Eixo and their
collaborative imaginary, because it was broadcasted in a mass public media and went viral in social
networks4. Therefore, this case gained far more popularity than the Argentinean ones, and directly
challenged, although for few days, the modus operandi of for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
4. Among the more than 100 videos in their online YouTube channel, Mídia NINJA’s interview was the ﬁrst most watched
video by February 27th, 2015 with 282,322 views.
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The attacks from mass media are understandable, given the challenge the experience posed to their
coverage. Nevertheless, criticism from the left-wing oriented press, which understands FDE and Mídia
NINJA as a “new dynamics of capitalist accumulation” (Passa Palavra 2013a, translated by the author),
seems at ﬁrst more paradoxical given that NINJA argues it is on that side. A ﬁrst explanation of this
paradox has to do with a broader schism in the Brazilian left, between those in favor of a ‘solidarity
economy’ project that tries to create a new possible world within the existing one, versus the classi-
cal Marxist approach of struggle and confrontation with ﬁrms and the state for the ‘emancipation’ of
workers, who consider the solidarity economy and its practices as functional for ‘capital’ (Martini 2012;
Ramos Wellen 2008).
A second explanation is that the left-wing critics have been using old concepts in new situations,
which only generate caricatures of what this new activism might be all about (Bentes 2011). According
to Bentes, a university professor in Rio de Janeiro who collaborates with Mídia NINJA: “The idea that
in order to have ‘rights’, we must be ‘subjected’ in an employer-employee relationship through ‘wage’ is
a frankly conservative idea. Instead, the cognitive precariat, the precarious youth from the economies
of culture are reinventing labor relations” (translated by the author). This point is important because
it once again connects with the discussion of the creative economy policy discourses. As highlighted in
the introduction, the ‘autonomous’ creative workers tag hides precarious labour, dependent on unstable
projects and social networks, which puts huge pressure on these types of workers. Bentes remarks that
this ‘cognitive capitalism’ - a term used by Marxist intellectuals to refer to the knowledge economy -
is the cause of such precarious jobs in cultural sectors in Brazil. From her point of view, FDE is not
a capitalist ﬁrm exploiting these workers, but an organization that is appropriating the tools of other
purely commercial ﬁrms, to create networks and spaces with other rules that transcend the limits
of traditional employer-employee relations and give new opportunities to precarious workers (Bentes
2011). Accordingly, what the ‘old’ Marxists see as new relations of oppression and capitalist accumula-
tion, those siding with FDE interpret them as new opportunities for organization given to precarious
labor. It is worth pointing out this has been a similar point of conﬂict with Barricada TV and the state
in Argentina. What matters in both cases is the emergence of new relations of production, mediated
by ICT, which break the logic of previous models of news elaboration and remuneration. In a broader
sense, these conﬂicts are not exclusive to these cases of media for social transformation, but they are
already present in other sectors, where collaborative or share economy practices have expanded; for
example, the opposition to Uber as a threat to the established taxi system or to Airbnb for challenging
the regulated hotel sector (Schulz 2015) However, these two cases still operate within a for-proﬁt logic,
whereas FDE and Mídia NINJA employ the new opportunities that ICT give to generate other systems
of exchange and remuneration.
In sum, the importance of this section is to shed light on the different types of violence that might
damage or hinder nongovernmental and nonproﬁt ﬁrms from operating. The attacks that new organiza-
tions received are varied, including not only physical or economic violence through unfair competition,
but also institutionalized legal ways of aggression or oppression, as with the existence of laws limiting
their operation. Additionally, projects that want to advance a human-rights approach to communica-
tion might quickly ﬁnd their perspective attacked and ridiculed by other discourses. The general point
is that the asymmetries in resources among new media projects and incumbents, allow the latter to
use different types of dispositives to limit the experiences that might challenge their positions. The in-
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troduction of fair laws and regulations seem to reduce the most extreme cases of physical violence, but
that does not mean that others shall not remain in terms of how the new legislations are interpreted
and implemented. The empirical data shows that power imbalances do remain, and thus, NGOs and
social movements need to keep on mobilizing and protesting to achieve their aims. For this reason,
media for social transformation need the acquisition and mobilization of different types of resources
against the varied types of violence they have to endure, and to sustain their operations points that I
will further detail in the next sub section.
8.2 Resources
In chapter 2, I argued that the focus on power in media research aims to understand how media can
inﬂuence ‘society’, that is to say, how much power media can have over audiences. This approach is
useful in order to comprehend the role of mass media, but it is not enough to understand the lack of
power that media for social transformation suffer. Indeed, policy makers and analysts often argue that
the most important thing that these organizations have to acquire is ﬁnancial resources (Carpentier,
Lie, and Servaes 2008; Saeed 2009); thus, they would have enough power to sustain their projects. In
this section I will partly accept this view, but I will also expand it by employing a resource-based view
of power to explain how the acquisition and mobilization of resources by the different media cases allow
them to sustain their operations and tackle the different types of violence that hamper their projects.
My main argument is that although ﬁnancial resources are relevant, they are not necessarily the only
or the most important ones. Contrariwise, I shall show that the cases that have challenged a for-
proﬁt approach to media and culture the most were able to draw and mobilize a diversity of resources
through noncommercial means. To show this, my analysis was partly inspired by the interdisciplinary
perspective of Avelino & Rotmans (2009), which guided my data collection of different types of resources
that media for social transformation have been using to face the conﬂicts they had. The collected
qualitative and quantitative empirical data allowed me to construct nine key categories of resources
that have been important, to varying degrees, in the four studied cases.
In Table 8.2, I show the results by building a case-ordered display for the categories (Miles and
Huberman 1994), where I synthesize my subjective assessment of the level of intensity (Very much: 3
points, Moderate: 2 points, Few: 1 point, Nothing: 0 points) to which the four cases acquired and mobi-
lized the nine types of resources. It is important to point out that these scales are relative to the data
gathered of the four cases, but not strictly compared to mass media, which would have given a more
complete picture of the resource asymmetries among mass media and media for social transformation.
However, such an approach was out of the scope of this research. Additionally, the numbers reﬂect
orders in terms of qualitative degrees, and not necessarily quantitative differences. Thus, the table has
to be interpreted as a device to illustrate that some media for social transformation have been able to
acquire and mobilize more resources than others, contradicting the claim that ﬁnancial ones are the
only ones that matter. Therefore, I argue it gives a more complex and fair picture about the variety of
resources that media for social transformation can use, which I will detail resource by resource in the
next sections.
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8.2.1 Financial
People say money rules the world, and it certainly is one of the most relevant factors needed to set
up any sort of project. However, this evident truth conceals the varieties of sources for currencies and
how these can be obtained. In this section, I shall illustrate the different sources the four cases have
used, but I did not quantitatively compare these numbers, because such data was not accessible in
some cases. Instead, I shall describe the strategies of the organizations to acquire national currency
from diverse sources, such as consumers, ﬁrms, NGO, other jobs and state. In particular, in Table 8.2
I divided my assessment between the acquisition of funds through sales (advertising and the offer of
other services to viewers, such as cable), versus the acquisition of funds beyond advertising, together
with the employment of complementary currencies and other systems of exchange to sustain their
activities. Thus, the acquisition of national currency is relevant within the capitalist economic system
of Argentina and Brazil, but not the only strategy, which is an important fact to take into account for
new media for social transformation that want to initiate their projects with scarce funds.
As regards CPE, it has the advantage of being a large ﬁrm that offers electricity, access to the inter-
net and other services to the inhabitants of the city of Santa Rosa. Therefore, one of their main sources
of income is the sale of products and services, which allowed them to fund the needed investments to
set up their TV channel and acquire expensive equipment. Out of the four studied cases, it is the only
one that has been using a commercial model to sustain its enterprise. According to the coordinator
of the channel, the reason for this was: “We assumed that a local channel would always be deﬁcient,
not only at its beginnings, but throughout its history. Therefore, our aim is to keep an insigniﬁcant
deﬁcit in relation to revenues from the cable service” (CPEtv coordinator, 11/09/2013, interview with
& translated by the author in Santa Rosa, Argentina). This assumption is related to a shared under-
standing by members of the co-operative and also by ofﬁcials of public organisms that the advertising
market in the province is not enough to cover the costs of local channels. One explanation mentioned
by members of CPEtv was that the state channel already offers very cheap advertising spaces, which
pushes all other channels to offer similarly cheap ones. A second explanation is that the advertising
market is not large enough to cover the investments that CPEtv made. Furthermore, they think that
businesses in the city and the province still do not consider advertising as an investment to increase
the consumption of their products, and thus the prospects of growth of the advertising market were
considered quite low. Irrespective of which one is the most accurate explanation, the point is that even
accepting a commercial model based on advertising, the costs of this media experience cannot be com-
pletely covered. Consequently, the model based on advertising described in Section 2.1 was not enough
for the co-operative, and they had to resort to charge a basic subscription of AR$ 85 (around US$ 15
at that time), even though this decision puts limits to who could access their services, contrary to their
initial project of free access to information. In sum, CPEtv obtains the needed ﬁnancial resources from
offering the cable service to viewers, and made the initial investments with funds that the ﬁrm orig-
inally had from offering products and services to consumers (mostly local inhabitants, but also ﬁrms
and other local organizations), not differing much from other commercial TV channels. Due to this, I
assigned them 3 points in the category of national currency acquired through sales.
Barricada TV strongly opposes the commercialization of communications, thus they neither use ad-
vertising nor offer a cable service to gather funds. Accordingly, in terms of ﬁnancial resources they are
relatively poor in comparison with CPEtv. In contrast, their main ﬁnancial resource are the members
of the experience themselves, who fund their own time in the channel by having other jobs beyond this
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media project. For this reason, I only assigned them 3 points in the category of acquiring national
currency through other sources. However, they also compensate this lack with the support of IMPA
and non-ﬁnancial exchanges with other organizations and social movements; for example, they receive
donations of computers and other equipment from NGOs, trade unions and other organizations, which
are useful for the channel to operate. Additionally, Barricada TV exchanges audiovisual material with
other alternative and popular media of the country and the region to broadcast without being trapped
by the logic of buying content. These are examples of practices of the collaborative economy, which
allow Barricada TV to operate without a for-proﬁt aim and without state support (Vinelli 2011a).
Wall Kintun TV faces the toughest conditions to access ﬁnancial resources, as one member of the
case explained: “Advertising is difﬁcult to get, because they want a good image deﬁnition and a pro-
gramming grid” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with & translated by the author in San Carlos
de Bariloche, Argentina). Although they have a bunch of sponsors, as Wall Kintun TV can offer none
of the previous conditions, they are sharply limited. Therefore, the supposed main source of income
for sustaining a channel provided by the new law is not within reach for this case, and as if this were
not bad enough, the channel does not have a large number of viewers, which raises low interest from
potential sponsors. Thus, in this case once again the advertising business model is not feasible for
the ﬁnancial sustainability of the channel. Despite the conﬂicts that Wall Kintun TV had with some
public ofﬁcials, the most important support they have obtained so far came from different organiza-
tions of the national government. For example, INCAA funded audiovisual training of Wall Kintun
TV’s members (CineramaPlus+ 2013), and the AFSCA selected a project presented to a tender by Wall
Kintun TV (AFSCA 2013b). Nevertheless, at the moment of ﬁeldwork these transfers of resources had
not been enough to allow the channel to broadcast continuously. Because of this dependence on state
organizations, I assigned them 3 points for acquiring national currency from the state, and 1 point from
sales.
In the case of Mídia NINJA, the experience is sustained by the broader activities of the cultural
network FDE, which has been able to attract capital from diverse sources, such as public tenders or
projects funded by ﬁrms, like Vale or Petrobras (Fora do Eixo 2013f, 2013e). Additionally, the network
has received support from NGOs and international organizations; for example, the Dutch NGO Hivos
(Hivos 2013). Due to this variety of sources, Mídia NINJA enjoys more access to ﬁnancial resources
than other ‘independent’ media in Brazil, and this might explain that even though the case is not
commercial per se, it has been criticized of not being as ‘independent’ as they claim to be (Borges 2013).
Nevertheless, the amount of resources that the network acquires is in no sense close to those that mass
media ﬁrms have. Although I cannot prove this with numbers, which were unavailable, my empirical
observations of their working conditions already offer a sharp contrast to the ones of mass media. For
example, they lacked expensive hardware that any large commercial ﬁrm has, they neither had a studio
nor helicopters nor sophisticated cameras nor a large number of journalists, etc., which all indicates
that the criticism of Mídia NINJA about its acquisition of private and public funds are exaggerated.
Taking into account these observations, I assigned Mídia NINJA 3 points for the acquisition of national
currency through state tenders, and 2 with respect to sales and other sources, such as international
NGOs.
Actually, this case departs from the rest in its use of complementary currencies, which as I explained
in Section 6.4.1 is a system to make explicit barter within the network and associated ﬁrms or partners
that want to be part of their circuits of exchange. This mechanism has been central in FDE to fund
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the activities of members dedicated 100% to Mídia NINJA, whose living costs are covered from other
ﬁnancial sources that the network generates through competition in tenders or by offering cultural
products and services. According to the members of FDE and Mídia NINJA, the advantage of this
system is to dissipate the intermediation of national currencies, which would in many cases just stop
the transaction from taking place. This is an important difference with respect to other cases, whose
members either had monthly salaries for their job, as in CPEtv, or had to look for other employments
to fund their media experience, like in Barricada TV. Although this looks like an ingenious solution,
quite defended by the members of the network, it is also true that it is not without hurdles. The
most evident is that if the circuits of exchange are reduced, it is inevitable that the number of objects
to be traded is limited and thus they have to rely on national currencies and the ofﬁcial economy.
Additionally, within this system FDE and Mídia NINJA members are not part of the legal economic
system of Brazil, and thus become exempt from the respective legal protections. For these reasons,
critics have been horriﬁed by such systems of retribution, in contrast to the perceptions of those within
the network, who consider the complementary currency as an essential tool for gaining independence
and organizing their collaborative imaginary. From my perspective, this practice cannot be considered
‘slave work’ as the critics of the network claimed, because FDE members are volunteers. Nonetheless,
it is undeniable that they are in a fragile situation given that still not everything they are constructing
can be acquired from these alternative exchange networks. More generally, this system also shows the
utopian features of FDE’s imaginary and the hurdles of putting into practice their desire to reinvent
the economy. In general, this system shows the gray areas that are emerging with the expansion of new
practices of collaboration, fostered by ICT, which are operating outside the established and regulated
systems. Given these facts, I assigned 3 points to the community currency resource.
To conclude, media for social transformation like to say that they are ‘independent’, which means
not being conditioned either by state funding or advertising by private ﬁrms, but a close observation of
the operation of the four cases of media for social transformation clearly contradicts such statements.
Among the four cases, only Barricada TV has not been using direct funds from ﬁrms or the state, but
they are clearly dependent on the organizations that give other jobs to the members of the project.
The rest have tried to use those resources to acquire others, and this is understandable, given that the
initial poverty conditions hamper their media project in terms of ﬁnancial resources from which they
depart, as the case of Wall Kintun TV clearly shows. This contradiction between the nonproﬁt objec-
tive and the dependence on ﬁnancial resources to operate is inevitable, given that the experiences are
embedded in capitalist economic systems, putting boundaries to the claims of being noncommercial.
Therefore, the cases might be non-proﬁt but they are not so clearly separated from for proﬁt organi-
zations. However, the description of the different strategies shows that the cases have not only been
limiting advertising and own funds, but rather employed creative strategies to overcome the ﬁnancial
scarcities; like FDE and its alternative currency system or Barricada TV and its acquisition of funds
from others jobs. These cases give an important lesson to other experiences that might emerge in the
future, because they show that there are strategies to overcome the ﬁnancial shortages they face when
starting their operations. Nonetheless, if the state is really interested in expanding and sustaining
media for social transformation, it could implement transparent mechanisms for the distribution of
resources for new media channels, such as public advertising or funds assigned by law, to surpass the
initial investments and the ﬁxed operational costs that limit these type of projects. Otherwise, I am
afraid that the democratization of communications will remain a dream that will never come true for
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most experiences, but only to those few that already have access to other sources of income, or to other
types of resources to exchange them for.
8.2.2 Legal
As the Argentinean cases show, legislation can be both a source for enabling new media experiences,
and one that constrains their practices. Focusing on their potential, the law in Argentina paved the way
for the legalization of nongovernmental media, reversing the restrictive and repressive effects of the
previous one. CPEtv, Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV have all beneﬁted from the ofﬁcial recognitions
of their projects. In addition to having as an aim the democratization of media producers, the law is
trying to tackle the high levels of media ownership concentration the country still suffers. Despite these
pros, the experiences of the three Argentinean cases also show the hurdles in implementing a new law.
One part of the difﬁculties arose from conﬂicts with the largest media ﬁrm, the Clarín group, whose
economic interests would be damaged under the new law. Understandably, it did not only block the ap-
plication of the law as long as it could to reduce the consequences on its operations, but it also delayed
the co-operatives from obtaining a license to compete against them (COOPERAR 2013). Additionally,
the state has not always been impartial in the implementation of the law; for example, although Bar-
ricada TV classiﬁed as an NGO, it took them ﬁve years to be ofﬁcially recognized as a channel, despite
the organization of several public mobilizations against such disregard from the AFSCA. In a similar
vein, indigenous communities are still complaining that the state has not put in practice article n° 152
that promises public ﬁnancial resources to their projects (Ley 26.522 2009). These examples suggest
that the existence of a law does not directly imply its total fulﬁllment, given that either private ﬁrms
or the state can use their resources to delay or undermine its implementation, unfortunately in demise
of resource-scarce actors. Thus, the existence of a law is deﬁnitely a resource that media for social
transformation can employ, but not without limits in countries where its enforcement is not direct. For
these reasons, I classiﬁed the legal resource of the three Argentinean cases as ‘moderate’.
Despite the hurdles that the Argentinean law faces in its implementation, in comparison with the
previous situation in the country, it has undoubtedly been a step forward in the process of media
democratization. In contrast, in Brazil the context for nongovernmental and nonproﬁt media projects to
operate is far more repressive, including physical violence besides the larger asymmetries in acquiring
economic resources among projects. The only ‘advantage’ of the lack of regulations has been that media
experiences could experiment more freely with models that depart from the ones that a law might
legislate about. However, I argue that such a tradeoff is in the end negative, if one takes into account
the stronger types of violence against media workers in Brazil, which in the worse cases have lost
their lives due to the lack of adequate regulations. Therefore, in this case I gave no points to the legal
resource.
In sum, all these cases operate in a particular context in Latin America, where in many countries
left-wing oriented political parties in government are challenging - though to varying degrees - previous
assumed structures of concentrated media ownership. However, the introduction of a legal framework
to institutionalize media system changes are not easy to put into practice, because they involve polit-
ical decisions and risk that not all political parties in power can afford nor advance in a democratic
system. The case of Brazil is a clear example, because despite the rhetoric of Lula and then Dilma of
their intention to democratize communications, so far none of the projects proposed by civil society or-
ganizations could move forward. This was possibly not a consequence of neglect, but of the presidential
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assessment of a lack of ‘political power’ to put forward such a project against the political opposition
and mainstream private conglomerates, which have quite some political inﬂuence through other more
conservative parties. Despite these hurdles, I am afraid that without such changes in legal systems and
the full implementation of democratization laws, the asymmetries generated in previous decades will
remain, at the expense of the voices of marginalized groups in both countries. Likewise, the absence
of concern of the creative economy policy discourses on these issues supports my claims that these
discourses need to be seriously scrutinized, because their omissions just reinforce the contemporary
unjust structures, neglecting the concerns of underrepresented and minority groups.
8.2.3 Human
The people who work in the media experiences are undoubtedly an essential resource, but each case
has addressed their attraction in a different way, not only relying on wage relations. This is important
to highlight, because the creative economy policy discourses implicitly assume that humans are only
guided to participate in cultural and communicational activities based on ﬁnancial rewards. However,
I shall show in this section that this is a limited perspective to understand how the different cases
engage people to join and the sort of retribution strategies that they might establish.
In August 2013, CPEtv had ten members who had received professional training from technical
institutes or universities in disciplines related to media, journalism and design. Except for three who
were already part of the co-operative before the founding of the channel, the rest of CPEtv’s members
were selected after a public call. According to the coordinator of the channel, the objective of this se-
lection was to attract young and trained professionals, preferably local, who could adapt themselves
to the demands of such a new project in the city. The key point of contrast with the other cases is
that CPE hired all the professionals following the collective agreements of journalism and press trade
unions. This implies that the experience operates with employer-employee relations, and the assign-
ment of wages as a remuneration for their labor. According to CPE’s leadership, this was important
in the province of Santa Rosa, because the professionals of the audiovisual sector had previously been
offered precarious jobs only; for this reason, the co-operative members claim that they are contributing
to attract and retain young trained professionals. In sum, the engagement of personnel in this case was
a mixture of economic incentives plus the desire to contribute to a new audiovisual enterprise, which
matches the creative economy policy discourses rhetoric of increasing employment.
As regards Barricada TV, although some of their members had training in communication, learning
by doing has been central in this case, because the interest to start the experience was not for-proﬁt
aims but the representation of political positions underreported in mass media. Consequently, activism
is essentially what keeps on attracting students from universities or citizens to join and collaborate
with the experience. In contrast to CPEtv, members of Barricada TV do not receive a salary as remu-
neration, because there are no proﬁts to distribute. For critics, this is considered an exploitation of the
working force, because its members do not receive a compensation for their labor. Conversely, from Bar-
ricada TV’s perspective this organizational structure is a way to break with the ties that advertising
and publicity generate to commercial channels on what to cover. Therefore, those who join the experi-
ence are not looking for ﬁnancial incentives, but the satisfaction of other desires. For this reason, the
members of the channel have to fund their living costs with other jobs, together with the contribution of
related organizations that allow them to operate. However, the negative side of this different structure
of attraction of human resources implies that their production of content is less ‘industrialized’, and
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infrequent in comparison to other adequately funded media; though, for the same reasons, I think it is
more creative and far from standardized schemes.
At the time of ﬁeldwork, Wall Kintun TV had a team of four members, three out of whom where
members of the Buenoleo Mapuche community. Given the hurdles they faced, none of them was receiv-
ing a salary, and as in the previous case they were funding their participation in the project through
other jobs or sources external to the project. In contrast to Barricada TV, the inexistence of salaries was
not a choice, but a product of the poverty conditions in which they took charge of the project. Similarly
to Barricada TV, their participation in the project was explained by the desire of giving a voice to the
Mapuche, rather than a for-proﬁt objective. Therefore, their main source of engaging members is the
aim to defend and preserve what Mapuche consider their unique and opposing identity to the one of
Westerners.
Finally, during ﬁeldwork the case of Mídia NINJA had at least 14 active members distributed in
different parts of the country that conformed the hardcore of the group. These are members of FDE
who live in collective houses, applying collaborative principles of coexistence, and who continuously
contribute content to Mídia NINJA. In some cases, the members had studied communication, but not
all of them had ﬁnished their degrees before joining. Others had no previous experience with media,
but in all cases they learned through the collaborative sharing practices of knowledge that FDE estab-
lished. As explained in chapter 6, this puts this case apart from the rest, because they institutionalized
their own way of training human resources, avoiding dependence on formal university training. Sim-
ilarly to Barricada TV, the members of Mídia NINJA do not receive a salary for their work, but as a
difference they all have their living costs covered, because they are funded with the products and ser-
vices that FDE offers, transferred in part to the different collectives through their own complementary
currencies. This curious system has a clear practical advantage for their media project, because Mídia
NINJA’s members can completely dedicate themselves to elaborating content. Conversely, it is prob-
lematic, because it makes evident that members of the network do not get a salary for their labor, and
if they have to help their families, there is no way they can do so within this scheme, reason why some
members left the organization. Nonetheless, the point is that those in the organization have not been
attracted by ﬁnancial incentives, but rather by the desire to experiment with the collective practices of
FDE.
To conclude, the empirical data suggests that the attraction of human resources is not a linear
process just based on the promise of proﬁts. Although it is true that ﬁnancial incentives are useful
in cases where the experiences are organized based on a salary structure as in CPEtv, it is not a
comprehensive explanation for all the cases, where other incentives have been in operation beyond
purely ﬁnancial ones. This is an important observation, because it opposes the standardization on how
media should operate and attract human resources present in the creative economy policy discourses,
making evident that such proposals neglect the diversity of grassroots practices.
8.2.4 Political
This category refers to the capacity of each media for social transformation and the broader organiza-
tion where they operate to gather ‘political capital’, both at the local and national level, with the aim
to legitimize their imaginaries and gather support for their projects. Based on the empirical data, I
shall discuss the following three sources of political capital: the capacity to mobilize citizens in favor of
their causes; the participation of the leadership of the media for social transformation in mass media
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to gather support; the use of ‘historical debts’ to obtain other types of resources for their projects.
CPE offers a good example of the ﬁrst strategy; for instance, the mobilizations of Santa Rosa’s
citizens in 2003 and in 2011 to claim for a change in the audiovisual media law and for its full im-
plementation respectively. These examples that I detailed in chapter 5 implied a political positioning
in favor of a human rights approach to communications over the commercial one defended by private
ﬁrms, and became a symbolic act of the co-operative struggle for the new law, making evident the
citizens’ support they had. In this particular case, the backing might be related to the strong connec-
tions CPE has been cultivating in Santa Rosa for years, not only due to the offered services, but also
thanks to their activities in supporting NGOs, schools, and organizing local events. In a similar vein,
Barricada TV together with other alternative media in Argentina have been mobilizing citizens and
journalists to complain against the state and the delays in the implementation of the new audiovisual
communication services law. However, the mobilizations have not been massive; thus, I assigned them
2 points. As regards Wall Kintun TV, I did not detect the mobilization of citizens in favor of the project
previous or during ﬁeldwork, so I did not assign them points. Contrarily, since 2011 Mídia NINJA and
FDE have stimulated social mobilizations in Brazil and raised political issues to their viewers through
their coverages; for example, they diffused content about the importance of voting a civil framework for
the internet in the country, and also disseminated the voting for a law institutionalizing the Cultura
Viva program. Both these mobilizations were relevant for the growth of their collaborative economy
practices. I estimate that the national reach of their mobilizations have been larger than those of the
Argentinean cases, possibly due to their network structure of operation. Accordingly, I assigned them 3
points in this dimension. In sum, the common element in these examples is the raise of a concern and
the mobilization of citizens and netizens for their support.
The second strategy refers to the participation of the leadership of these cases in national disputes
in mass media. Although Mídia NINJA and FDE claim to be horizontal, only few members have ap-
peared frequently in several mass media coverages; for example; the most named one has been the
founder of the network, Pablo Capilé, who was interviewed by journalists of several media to narrate
their story, though not necessarily portrayed in a positive way. This case had far more appearances of
their leaderships in mass media programs; thus, I assigned them 3 points in this resource. However,
the participation has been ambivalent; on the one hand, it helped to disseminate knowledge about the
network and its collaborative practices. On the other hand, the negative portrayal of its leaders and
other members seems to have damaged the reputation of the project. Similarly, the cases of CPEtv and
Barricada TV both had leaders that appeared in mass media coverages. As regards the co-operative,
during the struggle against private ﬁrms and the acquisition of their license its president was visible
mostly in local media, and to a lesser extent in national media; for example, he was interviewed by a
famous journalist that sides with the government position of media democratization (Morales 2012).
Similarly, Natalia Vinelli, a member of Barricada TV, has been present in different channels exposing
the practices of alternative media, mainly by defending the law and disseminating their imaginary
in the country (Calicchio and Vinelli 2012; Suárez, Mariano 2014). In comparison with the Brazilian
case, the participation of these two leaders in mass media was reduced, perhaps because they were not
involved directly in a controversy of national scale as Mídia NINJA was in Brazil during 2013. There-
fore, I assigned them 2 points. Furthermore, this shows that despite the collective and collaborative
ideals and practices that these cases defend, the role of leaders in these processes to attract resources
cannot be neglected. With respect to Wall Kintun TV, the leaders of the last management appeared
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only during the denouncement of the problems that they had with the state, but then hardly anymore.
Thus, I assigned them 1 point.
A ﬁnal strategy used in the political arena by the Argentinean cases has been the rhetorical device
of demanding a compensation for historical debts. The most evident example of this strategy is Wall
Kintun TV, as the next quote illustrates: “The state knows the poverty and misery levels into which
they have plunged indigenous communities. As a consequence of this situation, it is very difﬁcult for
us to buy equipment or cameras, and maintain a salary” (Wall Kintun TV, 15/01/2014, interview with
& translated by the author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This statement shows how the
Mapuche link the historical attacks of the state against their livelihoods as a cause of their poverty,
which from their perspective justiﬁes - somehow - the need of repayments from the state. This situa-
tion has been ignored historically, but since the return to democracy representatives of this and other
indigenous communities claim that the state has to payback for the committed violence against them,
and the contradictory support to this media seems to go in such direction. A similar argument has been
used by co-operatives and alternative channels during the mobilizations for a new media law, but in
these cases arguing the need to undo the consequences of the institutions set up by the last military
dictatorship. In both cases, these strategies to mobilize resources have found certain echoes due to a
political context in which human rights are central to the governmental agenda, together with the un-
doing of the consequences of the state terrorism of the 1970s. However, this strategy has been stronger
in Wall Kintun TV and CPEtv than in Barricada TV. Therefore, I assigned 3 points to the former, and
1 to the latter. In the case of Mídia NINJA, I did not detect such strategy.
In brief, these three strategies remark the importance of the political dimension as a resource of
media for social transformation to mobilize in exchange for others. I argue that this dimension is
another central aspect overlooked by the creative economy policy discourses, which do not question
the status quo at all. This bias might emerge from the origin of the discourse, both in the UK and
at UNCTAD, which given its claims to universality, depoliticize the intervention they propose, so that
it can be transferred with less resistance to other contexts. Nevertheless, I claim that this approach
is highly problematic, because, for example, these discourses could have easily operated under the
dictatorship scenario of the 1970s, irrespective of the violation of human rights at the time, including
the disrespect of the right to information. Contrariwise, this section underscores the importance of the
political, and related strategies of media for social transformation to inﬂuence national discussions,
apart from acquiring ﬁnancial and other resources for their operation.
8.2.5 Relational: Networks
The four cases differ in the set of alliances or networks that they have been able to construct with
different types of actors, with whom they exchange resources (not always intermediated by money).
The aim of this section is to unveil the intensity and diversity of ties that each case has established,
which help to explain the different types of resources that the cases have been able to acquire. I shall
argue that the more links the cases have, the more types of other resources they can acquire. This
in part has points in common with the concept of ‘social capital’ (Bourdieu 1986; Lin 1999), which
suggests that the types of links that actors form allow them to exchange and obtain resources that
they do not directly have. In Figure 8.1, I show my assessment of the intensity and types of the main
alliances that each case had, which was based on qualitative information acquired from interviews and
material elaborated by the cases collected during ﬁeldwork; for example, their videos and webpages.
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These actors were classiﬁed into ten categories5, and the ‘intensity’ represents the relative ‘strength’ of
the connection.
It is worth pointing out that these graphics suffer two shortcomings. One of them is that they do
not take into account the change in time of the networks. The second one is that they include my
personal assessment of the strength of the links, which I added based on my posterior knowledge of
the importance of each type of link. For instance, despite Wall Kintun TV had sharp conﬂicts with the
government, it has still been central for their advancement of the project. Thus, I gave the Government
category 3 points. The ideal way to solve this issue would have been to acquire data about the intervie-
wees’ own assessment of the intensity of the links, and not just the links. However, I could not gather
this information systematically in practice, due to the difﬁculties or denial of interviewees to provide
such direct sensitive data, maybe out of fear of revealing a whole picture of their network. Accordingly,
I tried to compensate this lack with the employment of secondary information, which gives a better,
though still approximate, picture of the relational networks of each case than if I had just relied on the
collected data from interviews.
In CPEtv’s spider diagram, the two most recurrent types of alliances have been with co-operatives
and NGOs. The former refers to alliances with national and provincial networks, such as TRAMA (the
network of co-operatives that aims to create audiovisual content nationally), and an emerging network
that CPEtv is leading of audiovisual media co-operatives in the province. Besides, it includes the links
that CPE previously had with other co-operatives in the country, such as COLSECOR, which allowed
CPE to obtain audiovisual signals for its cable service. These have been key links to collectively strive
for a new law and to advance in content production, which is reasonable taking into account the 6th
principle of co-operativism: co-operation among co-operatives. As regards NGOs, these links were pre-
existing connections that CPE had before setting up their TV channel, for example, with the Chadileuvú
foundation, schools, and ten organizations that receive ﬁnancial donations from CPE (CPEtv 2011). Be-
sides, the co-operative has contacts with other NGOs beyond the city of Santa Rosa that are covered
in their programs. In all these cases, these connections paved the way for the further elaboration of
content about civil society actors. Equally important have been the links with politicians (I refer to
those in politics, but not in government), although these interactions have varied considerably in time
and cannot be captured in the static diagram; for instance, they passed from opposition to their project
in 2003 to a promotion of their channel six years later. Yet, CPE has interactions with politicians from
the city and the province due to different issues concerning their enterprise. Additionally, they received
support from politicians of the national government to advance with their communications project. In-
deed, the president, Cristina Kirchner, inaugurated the channel through video conference, and they
also received a recognition from the senate for their successful and pioneering initiative (DERF 2012).
Moreover, CPEtv has close connections with local academics of the University of La Pampa, which are
ties that are part of previous contacts and possibly generated by members of CPE that are university
professors. With respect to media, the contact or interaction has been reduced to those in the city
of Santa Rosa and others related to co-operatives; for example, the local newspaper La Arena. The
5. The ﬁrst category, Academics, includes university professors. The second category, Government, refers to policy makers
and politicians in the national administration. The third category, Politicians, includes the rest of politicians not part of the
national government. The fourth category, Mass media, includes the appearance of those cases in either private or public mass
media ﬁrms. The ﬁfth category, Worker-owned ﬁrms, includes co-operatives and factories recovered by its workers; in other
words, actors of the so-called social and solidarity economy. The sixth category, Indigenous communities, comprehends links
with different types of organizations of indigenous people. The seventh category covers Social movements. The eighth category
includes the links with other media for social transformation. The ninth category estimates the links with ﬁrms. Finally, the
tenth category considers the relations with NGOs.
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contact with ﬁrms beyond co-operatives is also important in this case, since CPEtv depends on suppli-
ers to acquire electronic equipment and software for their channel. What is missing in this network
is a connection with more radical, alternative channels, indigenous communities and more generally,
organized social movements not part of NGOs. Therefore, the pattern of relations shows there are
scarce connections with other media for social transformation not part of the co-operative movement.
As I highlighted in previous chapters, this shows the difference among the imaginaries of these media,
which although they might share an opposition to commercially oriented practices, their differences
seem to rule out co-operation among them.
Barricada TV’s spider diagram offers a different set of connections with respect to the previous case.
First, it has links with left-wing political parties, whose representatives frequently appear in their
broadcasting; for example, members of the Workers’ Party and trade unions. Second, Barricada TV has
ties with academics who hold different and non-mainstream perspectives on themes covered in mass
media, similarly with the other dimensions, these have Marxist or communist perspectives. Third, as
part of a network of alternative media, Barricada TV has links with similar experiences across the
country (but not co-operative media), with whom they exchange material for broadcasting, besides mo-
bilizing for their interests. Fourth, in their transmissions they frequently interview representatives
of diverse social and political movements from the country and neighboring ones; for example, move-
ments in favor of drug legalization, students’ movements, and ex and current members of left-wing
social movements. Additionally, the channel reports about recovered factories, which are following sim-
ilar models to the one IMPA initiated. The case had few appearances in mass media, as mentioned
before, it was attacked by private mass media, but was also positively portrayed in public ones that
highlighted the importance of alternative media after a publication of a book about them by one of
its members (Gomes Diez 2015; Suárez, Mariano 2014) . The relation with government organizations
has been strenuous and dynamic, but in general confrontational as explained at the beginning of the
chapter. In sum, this structure of connections shows a clear link to organizations and movements with
a left-wing perspective and concerns of social transformation. In contrast to CPEtv, they lack contacts
with foundations. A ﬁnal point to remark is that despite the similarities with media co-operatives,
their different tactics of social change - more connected with left-wing standpoints - might explain why
there have been scarce or almost no ties between them.
The main difference to remark of Wall Kintun TV’s spider diagram is the lack of diversity in their
connections. The two most important ones have been, ﬁrst, the support of the Mapuche and other
indigenous communities in the country that have been mobilizing for a new media law, and the fur-
ther backing after the Buenoleo community recovered the channel from the ﬁrst management. Second,
the encouragement from different governmental organizations to put forward the experience, although
this relation had its peaks and valleys as previously explained. Additionally, Wall Kintun TV received
coverage in varied mass media, with framings both in favor and against the government’s new au-
diovisual media law project. The former remarked the nature of the experience as an example of the
democratization process initiated by the new audiovisual communication services law, whereas the lat-
ter challenged such view, underscoring the disastrous conditions in which the case was left by public
ofﬁcials. Furthermore, Wall Kintun TV received the support of a couple of ﬁrms, such as the local cable
operators who borrowed equipment and broadcast their signal, and a local bus that sponsors the ex-
perience. The channel also had some incipient connections with researchers studying communications
of indigenous communities. In comparison with the other three cases, this experience had the lowest
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number and diversity of connections, although the existing ones still allowed them to acquire resources
without paying for them. This scarcity of relations points to another of the weaknesses of the channel;
conversely, the more diversiﬁed the structure, the easier it would be to exchange different types of re-
sources. This underscores a general problem that new media for social transformation have to address,
which is out of the scope of the new law, but in my opinion a strategy of network building that each
organization needs to pursue, so as to counterbalance their lack of ﬁnancial resources.
In comparison with the other three cases, the spider diagram of FDE and Mídia NINJA shows it has
the strongest and most diverse types of links. First, this includes different types of social movements
covered in their streamings. Second, they receive support from different Brazilian academics who side
with the collaborative imaginary they are disseminating. Third, they have connections with politicians;
for instance, they have been close to the ex-minister of culture and to senators. Furthermore, according
to Pablo Capilé, the founder of FDE, members of the network have been elected as politicians in some
regions of Brazil (Soares 2014). Additionally, Mídia NINJA has been establishing connections with
other national and international alternative media. Perhaps one of the most relevant has been the
creation of a project of media collectives from Latin American, which diffuses regional news (Facción
2014). As regards links with ﬁrms, this category also covers those enterprises providing software and
hardware, and indirectly those with whom FDE interacts to acquire funds or exchange other products
and services. Moreover, there are connections with international NGOs and organizations sharing
similar objectives or from whom they receive funding. With respect to mass media, the organization
had ambivalent links, one the one hand, they received a lot of coverage during June and July 2013 that
in most of the cases attacked their project. On the other hand, those same events allowed the further
national and international diffusion of their experience, thus reaching broader audiences. In contrast
with the previous three spider diagrams, this one misses links with co-operatives and other types of
worker-owned ﬁrms beyond cultural collectives, which is paradoxical given that they share a similar
aim in terms of the imaginary to challenge a for-proﬁt only orientation in the economy. Once again, this
suggests that the alternative projects do not establish links among them so easily, maybe due to tactical
differences in terms of reaching their imaginaries. But it is also true that the co-operatives have been
less active in Brazil in the media and cultural sector, in comparison with those of Argentina. On the
whole, I hypothesize that the diversity of connections present in this case derives from the network
structure of FDE in which Mídia NINJA is embedded. This is a resource in itself, because each FDE
house and collective has its set of alliances and networks, that when summed all together in common
projects add a diversity of partners that would not be possible to achieve for a media case operating in
a restricted geographic place. The negative side of this dependence on FDE was that Mídia NINJA was
defamed based on the tensions and conﬂicts that the network caused in the past.
In sum, these spider diagrams show the different structures of types of connections that each case
had at the time of data collection, which not only represent part of their imaginary by showing the
actors involved, but that are also illustrative to comprehend how they obtained resources beyond just
ﬁnancial ones. Despite their shortcomings, the spider diagrams coincide with the order of Table 8.2.
In other words, the cases with more relations are the ones that acquired and mobilized more different
types of resources. Although a strict proof of this would need a detail reconstruction of the networks
and the ﬂow of resources among its nodes, which was out of the scope of this research, the correlation
seems reasonable. Indeed, Mídia NINJA, the case that has been structured as a network, has been
the one with a major diversity of resources. Therefore, these results suggest that the cultivation of a
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diverse and intense network of contacts is a strategy for media for social transformation to surpass
their lack of ﬁnancial resources, and more broadly, to oppose the practices of the creative economy
policy discourses.
8.2.6 Technological and Infrastructural
In Table 8.2, I synthesize the results from chapter 6, which analyze the role of technology and in-
frastructure in each of the media cases. Their acquisition has been relevant for the cases to operate,
although not without putting certain constraints on their practices. In effect, all cases depended on
foreign specialized technological ﬁrms that produce the media technologies they employ (cameras, cell-
phones, notebooks, etc.). As these companies operate under for-proﬁt principles, media for social trans-
formation must acquire the needed ﬁnancial resources to buy the technologies or ﬁnd non-ﬁnancial ex-
changes with intermediaries. As regards the former, the most illustrative case of the former is CPEtv,
which bought high-tech equipment thanks to the income the co-operative generates. Wall Kintun TV
is a good example of the latter, because it lacks funds, but was able to acquire some – though not all-
of the needed technologies and equipment from donations made by other organizations or the state.
Apart from the strategies to access technologies, in Table 8.2 I stress the capacity that speciﬁc cases
had to reinterpret the use of their available ones, as the case of Barricada TV and Mídia NINJA best
illustrate. Following the broad deﬁnition of Avelino & Rotmans (2009), this can also be considered as
a sort of ‘mental’ resource, because it allowed these cases to offset their ﬁnancial limits to acquire the
latest media technologies that commercial channels use. Instead, such approach led them to use avail-
able ones in new ways, disregarding accepted ‘quality patterns’ that would have excluded such new
audiovisual production practices under the criteria of not being ‘good’ enough.
The importance of infrastructure as a resource was relative to the technological conﬁguration of
each media. In the three Argentinean cases it played an important role, because the channels adopted
the model of having a physical space from where to broadcast. On the one hand, two cases acquired
this resource from the mother institution that founded the media experience, such as CPE or IMPA,
which set aside the needed physical space to build the studios and editing rooms. On the other hand,
the resource was obtained through alliances or donations from the state and private ﬁrms, such as Wall
Kintun TV that got some - but not all - of the needed resources from the state. Conversely, Mídia NINJA
did not have a dependence on a ﬁxed physical space to operate, because the mobility of smartphones
and their lack of concern of following mass media ‘aesthetics’ allowed them to ﬁlm wherever they go, as
if they had a mobile studio. Consequently, they were not bounded by a requisite of high investments in
infrastructure to operate, which is a potential experience to emulate by other projects of communication
for social change facing similar hurdles. But once again, this requires a change in perceptions on
what is of ‘good quality’ and the will to experiment with new technologies of content production and
distribution. To conclude, in this case the ranking of Table 8.2 might be misleading, because although
CPEtv is the one with more infrastructural resources, this does not mean they employ the best strategy
to follow. It might be if the studio based TV channel model is respected, but deﬁnitely not if it is left
aside.
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8.2.7 Knowledge
In this section, I will divide the knowledge resource in two, ﬁrst, I shall consider the different strategies
that media for social transformation have employed to acquire the needed knowledge for audiovisual
production. Second, I will examine the institutionalization strategies that two of the cases have em-
ployed, which allowed them to replicate their practices and expand their networks.
8.2.7.1 Knowledge of Audiovisual Production
Technologies and infrastructure would be worthless without the acquisition of speciﬁc knowledge for
audiovisual production, such as editing, reporting and broadcasting. In this sense, each case had differ-
ent sources and strategies to gather and cultivate such indispensable knowledge. In this section I will
describe different approaches and I ﬁnally discuss how some of the cases departed from the professional
approach advanced by the creative economy policy discourses.
In the case of CPEtv, the acquisition of knowledge was indirectly from formal channels and mediated
by the use of their ﬁnancial resources; for example, the organization hired media professionals with
previous training in journalism and audiovisual technical skills offered by main university centers and
technical institutes. Additionally, the co-operative hired experienced journalists of the province to train
the young new journalists for the channel so as to improve their performance. Furthermore, the needed
technical knowledge to handle their advanced hardware was transferred by suppliers and acquired also
in the practice and use of the equipment by CPEtv’s technicians. Given that these knowledge sources
do not depart much from the training of typical commercial channels, it is not a surprise that their
format looks so similar to mass media. At the same time, this case has the least to say with respect to
strategies to acquire knowledge opposing the ones of commercial media channels.
Similarly to CPEtv, formal training was part of Barricada TV’s process of knowledge acquisition,
because part of its members completed university studies in communications. Conversely, the mem-
bers of the organization highlighted the signiﬁcance of a workshop with a group of documentarian
activists, which allowed them to acquire speciﬁc knowledge more tuned to their interest of covering
social conﬂicts (Cardillo 2011). Furthermore, due to the scarcity of formal training in alternative me-
dia at universities, much of the knowledge was acquired through ‘learning by doing’, in other words,
through the practice of ﬁlming with the tools they had, without fearing the ‘quality schemes’ that they
might have crossed in the process. In conclusion, in this case money was not the main intermediary
to acquire the needed technical knowledge, but rather ties with groups close to their imaginary who
shared their practical knowledge, together with the learning by doing processes that the practice of
ﬁlming unleashed.
In contrast with the previous two cases, after the public denouncement Wall Kintun TV faced the
toughest conditions, because no one from the new team had neither professional nor amateur audio-
visual and technical training. Therefore, they lacked the essential knowledge for elaborating content,
which would have been quite hard for them to acquire without governmental support. During ﬁeld-
work the case was going through a training program organized by INCAA, the national institute of
audiovisual arts of Argentina, to transfer the needed audiovisual skills, which was unleashed by the
state political need to correct the initial ‘error’ in managing Wall Kintun TV’s channel. This shows
that the acquisition of skills in this case is not a product of the Mapuches’ ﬁnancial wealth, but on the
political balance of exchanges between the channel and the government. In more general terms, such
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hurdle that this and other indigenous organizations face connects with the historical social deprivation
conditions that they have been suffering, which in this case is expressed in the lack of access to the
needed knowledge sources. Accordingly, the indigenous communities might have a right to their own
media channel, but they lack the means to put it into practice.
In the case of Mídia NINJA the previous types of knowledge sources are also present: formal trained
members and learning by doing. Indeed, members of the initiative have ﬁnished or studied commu-
nication and careers related to audiovisual production. However, the most relevant in this case has
been learning by doing. One example is the case of one of the founders of the experience, the reporter
Bruno Torturra, who was a columnist and editor of the Brazilian magazine Trip that transferred part
of his skills to the younger members of Mídia NINJA during the coverages of the 2013 riots. Further-
more, the media collective is continuously experimenting and learning from new ICT to disseminate
their content; for example, streaming platforms and different types of social networks. As the use of
these tools is not as stabilized as the aesthetic patterns of traditional TV channels, their experiments
in mixing technologies and aesthetics play a central role, which the members of Mídia NINJA adopt or
reject depending on the reply from viewers. For this reason, the media initiative, and FDE in general,
describe their collective as the “empire of the empirical” (Mídia NINJA member I, 11/08/2013, interview
with & translated by the author in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
Apart from the previous points, it is worth underscoring an important aspect of Mídia NINJA’s
imaginary that I remarked in chapter 5: “everyone can become a NINJA” (Caperuto 2013, translated
by the author), which is in sharp contrast with the professional training of journalists employed by
commercially oriented ﬁrms. In part, this is related to the approach of the FDE University that makes
knowledge open to everyone with an interdisciplinary training. As one member of Mídia NINJA re-
marks:
“In Fora do Eixo we share the view that everyone needs to learn a bit of everything. Today is
communication, but if someone asks to learn something related to sustainability, I can teach,
and if I cannot, then I will go to learn. Because actually the goal is not to train specialized
staff, on the contrary, it is training for life. For us the least important is the product, what
matters is the process of learning” (Mídia NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with &
translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil).
This statement opposes the creative economy perspective, which only aims to create ‘creative’ and ‘tal-
ented’ specialists to elaborate products for markets. Contrariwise, they have the ideal of opening and
distributing their knowledge so that everyone can contribute to their experience. To achieve such ideal,
the organization has elaborated and disseminated booklets and banners that contain the instructions
to copy their practices; for instance, Figure 8.2 shows one distributed through social networks and web
sites during the riots of 2013 to diffuse how citizens could use their smartphones to make live transmis-
sions of events. Moreover, Mídia NINJA organizes workshops to disseminate their knowledge (Mídia
NINJA member II, 18/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in Brasília, Brazil), which in
some cases are transmitted online. From my point of view, these strategies of knowledge dissemination
resemble those of the open software movement, in the sense that the knowledge is accessible to ev-
eryone who is interested, who can later contribute to the experience. This contrasts with the previous
cases, and is one of the organizational differences that might explain why they were more efﬁcient in
the replication of their practices.
To conclude, this section illustrates two opposite set of strategies for knowledge acquisition. On the
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Figure 8.2: Banner prepared by Mídia NINJA that explains how to stream videos. It was distributed
during 2013 through online social networks to stimulate new collaborators of Mídia NINJA. Source:
Mídia NINJA and translated by the author.
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one hand, those that follow a professional training approach that absorbs knowledge acquired from
universities and other technical centers. This is a feasible strategy for the cases with enough ﬁnancial
resources to attract trained human resources, which is a strategy that might contribute to elaborate
content ‘competitive’ in comparison with the ‘quality schemes’ that commercial media employ. But,
although the content might be alternative, the restrictions of following the accepted ‘quality schemes’
might blur the supposed opposition among them and media for social transformation. On the other
hand, Mídia NINJA best illustrates a second strategy that aims to generate speciﬁc nonprofessional
knowledge of audiovisual production, through its own network of knowledge generation and training.
This approach tries to break with the dependence on the established training institutes that repeat the
‘quality schemes’ most valued by commercial ﬁrms. For this reason, I argue that it is the best strategy
for those cases that actually want to depart from commercial ﬁrms. Otherwise, they might end like
co-operatives, not differing much from whom they criticize.
8.2.7.2 Institutions for Knowledge Replication
In this section, I shall highlight the institutions for knowledge replication that two (CPEtv and Mídia
NINJA) out of the four cases have put into practice. I shall employ concepts from Berger & Luckmann to
understand the institutionalization process. However, I recognize that my analysis is more descriptive
and aimed to identify the resource based on the local perspective of interviewees, rather than on proving
some sort of causal relation as it is common in organization studies6. In particular, I remind the reader
of the concept of institutionalization introduced by Berger & Luckmann (1966), which according to the
authors is composed of three processes: habitualization, objectivation and sedimentation. The ﬁrst
concept refers to how actors establish patterned problem-solving behaviors. The second one alludes
to how the historical repetition of the habitualized action might become as ‘objective’ for observers or
outsiders to the ones who initiated the practice. Finally, the third concept covers the process in which
the objectiﬁed practices become transmitted to new generations or new members. I shall argue that
these concepts are useful to understand how practices are further disseminated beyond their context
of origin, providing an important insight on how media for social transformation can proceed to scale
up their networks to challenge commercial ones by replicating their stock of knowledge.
The most successful case to replicate the experience was Mídia NINJA, which initially began as an
experiment of a journalist in São Paulo with streaming, and after FDE members perceived a good reply
from viewers, they quickly started to copy the original practice of operation in other collectives. How did
Mídia NINJA do this? I shall argue that this original action became habitualized and objectiﬁed thanks
to three factors: the practices of knowledge dissemination and replication across the FDE network, the
simplicity of the model and the particular imaginary of this case.
As regards the dissemination of knowledge within the cultural network, it is coordinated and orga-
nized by the front of FDE called University. It is worth pointing out that the concept of ‘university’ that
they employ is completely different from the usual term, where one or more buildings are spaces for pro-
fessors to transmit their knowledge to students. Contrariwise, FDE shares the critics of Freire (1987)
to such an education model, where the person who ‘knows’ transfers the knowledge in a top-down, hier-
archical way to students, with few spaces for interaction. In counter position to this ‘banking’ model of
education, where students just unreﬂectively ‘save’ information, Freire advocated a dialogical, libertar-
ian approach, where all learned together and where hierarchies would be abolished so that knowledge
6. For example, see (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
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ﬂows would be bi-directional (Freire 1987). Inspired by these insights, all FDE houses are part of the
campus of the university, but also many of the online spaces of interaction, such as chats, groups and
video conferences. These are spaces for what they call life experiences, which cover different topics such
as communication, free software, network politics, among others. They do not have a ﬁxed curricula
either, but a dynamic and personalized one, because people have different interests and want to learn
about speciﬁc topics. Besides, they reject the idea of ‘professor’ as they rejected the one of illuminated
artist. Thus, everyone who is part of the network can teach as a professor of the university, because
they understand that anyone has some knowledge that can be shared and replicated. This includes the
leadership of the movement, outside collaborators and many young members who are no older than
23 who are also considered to be teachers. This clearly departs from the stereotype of an old, gray
haired white skinned professor. Instead, in their university men and women of different ages, sexual
orientations, skin colors, religion, etc., contribute to replication of knowledge and the preservation of
the collective memory of FDE and its projects.
This conceptualization of the university leads to three types of practices for knowledge habitualiza-
tion and objectivation: training through the internet; immersions and columns. As regards the former,
a member of the network explains how it works:
“We learn with other collectives, because we are always in contact with each other with ev-
erything we try to do. For instance, if we ask ‘how do we set up our complementary currency?’,
there are booklets we can download, read and then we might even suggest modiﬁcations. It
works like a free software technology. It is as if we had several free software technologies in
the cloud, we put them there and we use them elsewhere. But of course, we adapt them accord-
ing to each context. The feedback helps to update such software, and all the collectives that
are part of the network have access to that” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview
with & translated by the author in João Pessoa, Brazil).
Therefore, members of FDE externalize and materialize their speciﬁc knowledge through ICT. With
respect to imersões (immersions), they refer to intensive training sessions that take place usually in
one of FDE houses (Fora do Eixo 2013c). In essence, FDE brings trainees, either from the network
or from outside, to live for a speciﬁc period of time (from a few days to months) in one of the houses
to acquire speciﬁc knowledge; thus, replicating it to new members or preexisting ones who did not
have it. The key aspect that differentiates these trainings from a workshop or other more conventional
knowledge diffusion practices in ﬁrms or universities, is that they give space for learning by doing
and living together with the person or group of people who have the knowledge to disseminate, which
according to the members of FDE allows a rapid replication of knowledge. For example, the different
collectives of a region go to one of the main FDE houses to receive training on diverse topics, including
media, as it happened in São Paulo in January 2014 (Fora do Eixo 2014a). This suggests that learning
is considered to be an alive process, collective, with a direct interaction among all members part of the
experience, breaking the hierarchies usually found in teacher-student environments and not limited to
the income that interested students might have. These practices have been used to diffuse knowledge
on how a collective house works, how festivals need to be organized, or what matters for this research,
how to produce material for Mídia NINJA.
The third practice of knowledge dissemination that FDE employs is called colunas (columns), which
are trips that members of the network plan and execute to nearby cities and towns in Brazil or foreign
countries (Fora do Eixo 2013c). The aim is also to externalize the speciﬁc collaborative knowledge
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they have acquired. For example, a member of Mídia NINJA traveled to the FDE collective house in
the city of Amapá, to share his knowledge about collaborative media production. As regards foreign
countries, members of FDE and Mídia NINJA have disseminated their imaginary and practices in an
event of cultural networks that took place in 2013 in the city of Córdoba, Argentina (CBA24n movil
2013). During that event, which I attended, they organized workshops to explain their complementary
currencies and their streaming practices, which were of interest to many of the attendees of the event,
who were mostly part of cultural and media collectives of the country.
In sum, FDE’s creation of their own university tackles the problem that the Argentinean cases had
of not being able to create and reproduce knowledge suitable for their practices. Contrarily, the FDE
University is a source that externalizes and objectiﬁes knowledge produced by different members of the
network, giving space for others to internalize such practices. In this way, they have considerably re-
duced the dependence of knowledge training emanating from mainstream universities that go against
their collaborative logic. It is worth pointing out that this institution can be considered a dispositive
to advance the network’s imaginary, and has played an important role in replicating the practices of
Mídia NINJA.
The second factor that facilitates the replication of Mídia NINJA practices is the simplicity of their
model. After all, Mídia NINJA and citizens just need smartphones and an access to online social
networks to record videos, elements which have become quite accessible for many Brazilians, although
still not for all. Furthermore, the knowledge to use both of them to stream and distribute content has
been externalized and objectiﬁed by Mídia NINJA through infographics as the one showed in Figure
8.2. This set up clearly contrasts with channels that follow the commercial media model, like CPEtv,
which require sophisticated knowledge to manage the high tech equipment, which is more difﬁcult to
replicate easily.
Despite the relevance of these means for the dissemination of practices, their replication by other
people would not be possible without an extra element, the attraction that FDE’s and Mídia NINJA’s
imaginary generates in parts of the Brazilian youth. I shall argue that the subject position that their
imaginary offers is conducive to the internalization of interested people to join the collaborative prac-
tices they offer. Although critics to the network have accused them of taking advantage of precarious
workers in the creative sectors, such interpretations from outsiders contrast with the perceptions that
members of the network have. For example, one member says:
“If you want to work with culture, the available horizon is to become a producer, that is to
say, to start a business. But if you do not have capital to invest, you are just limited! On the
contrary, within Fora do Eixo’s network you have a ﬁeld where you can create what you think
and want. Outside you cannot, you end up just dreaming, and you are castrated all time”
(Universidade Fora do Eixo member, 07/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author
in São Paulo, Brazil).
This sense of broader opportunities within the network was shared by several of the interviewees.
Additionally, another typical statement is:
“What really catches the attention is what we are now calling the state of permanent
utopia. This is the possibility of building other ways of doing things, which are out of the
box of what was thought to be the only way of being and doing things, but that in fact was
not. Instead, we are inventing and experimenting with other ways of living, other ways of
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communicating, other forms of organizing, other ways of working, and this attracts many
people” (Fora do Eixo member III, 28/02/2014, interview with & translated by the author in
João Pessoa, Brazil).
These statements point to the dissatisfaction with the professional pathways offered by a commercial
approach to culture and communication, which generates frustration among parts of the Brazilian
youth. Conversely, FDE and Mídia NINJA in the cultural and media sector claim to be offering spaces
for experimentation and of collaborative organization for cultural production. Therefore, although it is
true that the members of the network do not receive a salary, from their perspective the incentives are
on the different lifestyles they are experimenting with, which suggests it is a stimulus for interested
members to join and internalize their practices.
In short, the importance of the three previous factors, is that once the knowledge to stream through
cell phones was typiﬁed and externalized, its propagation across FDE’s network through its university
and followers of their collaborative imaginary was easy. Consequently, the pioneering practice that
began in São Paulo, was quickly objectiﬁed and replicated in other cities of Brazil, such as Rio de
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, João Pessoa, among others, and even copied by Brazilians abroad, like in
Berlin (NINJA Berlim 2015). It is important to realize that this would not have taken place so fast,
unless the previous network and the practices of knowledge sharing of FDE had been established.
In the case of CPEtv, three factors contributed to their strategy of institutionalizing their audiovi-
sual experience: the co-operative principles, a historical path of extending their practices within the
province of La Pampa, and practices of replication within the co-operative.
First, the co-operative principles of co-operation among co-operatives has been central in the con-
struction of networks between CPEtv and organizations beyond the province, which helps to establish
means for the objectivation of practices. For instance, CPEtv is part of the network TRAMA, which in
2012 was composed by at least 39 organizations of the solidarity economy, such as co-operatives, trade
unions, SMEs, among others (Trama Audiovisual 2012). This type of alliance between organizations
sharing a similar discourse, is not present in the other cases. It is worth pointing out the difference
with respect to FDE and Mídia NINJA, because in that case the houses and collectives are all part
of the same network, whereas the co-operatives still operate independently from one another. For this
reason, I argue that the principles are a sort of mechanism linking co-operatives and paving the way for
knowledge replication and transfer across the country. Although there are hurdles in these processes
of co-ordination, it does offer a pathway to break with the limits of localism that small scale media face
if they just produce content in isolation or small networks.
Second, at the provincial level the central structure for the replication of the experience is a network
among co-operatives, where CPE occupies the central node, which also contributes to the habitualiza-
tion and objectivation of practices. In contrast to the latter, this network has been constructed based
on previous collaboration projects that took place in the last decades, where CPE had a leading role to
diffuse new practices, like energy provision and other services such as internet. For this reason, it has
already been objectiﬁed, and locals internalized its operation, such as the provincial representative of
AFSCA who observes that: “CPE is like the mother entity, it is a mirror which all other co-operatives in
the province of La Pampa look in. When the CPE initiates a successful service, every other co-operative
copies their strategy” (AFSCA Bariloche representative, 25/09/2013, interview with & translated by the
author in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina). This suggests the sedimentation of the institution for
replicating knowledge and practices, where CPE is a role model for other co-operatives in the province,
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which has started to be extended to the cable service and TV channel as well. In effect, in 2012 the
AFSCA organized a workshop about co-operative TV at the headquarters of CPE, where many other
representatives of co-operatives of the province assisted, with the objective to learn from the experience.
Off the record, the aim is to build a network of media co-operatives in the province led by CPE, with
the aim to produce and exchange content among its members. The obvious advantage of this initia-
tive is that their capacity of content production and regional coverage would be signiﬁcantly increased.
However, three years since the workshop, the idea is still not operational.
Third, the co-operative is the organization with the longest history among the four cases I studied.
As I explained in chapter 5, the management of the co-operative and many of its members (re)produce
the narrative of CPE, stimulating an internalization process for the new generations that join in. In-
deed, I have argued that CPEtv is a dispositive to strengthen such a process, diffusing practices and
co-operative values. For example, during my interviews with different members, and also in the docu-
ments of the organization I came across the following motto that illustrates such interest to stimulate
internalization processes in new members: “the co-operative was owned by our grandparents and it
will be owned by our grandchildren” (CPE 2012, p. 38, translated by the author). From my stand-
point, this is an important feature as well, because it contributes to the offering of subject-positions
and identity formation of new members, paving the way for the replication of the experience. FDE and
Mídia NINJA are doing something similar with their offer of a new lifestyle, but the continuation of
CPE during decades makes evident that their generational replacement has been successful, though
not without hurdles. Thus, the sedimentation of the practices to set up new co-operative TV channels
is paved with the histories of past successes.
In sum, in both cases the institution for replicating the practices of the experiences is a resource,
which allows to disseminate knowledge on how their media ought to be organized, with actors receptive
to internalize such practices. Contrarily, neither Barricada TV nor Wall Kintun TV were able to build a
similar institution to expand their experiences to the recovered factories movement and to indigenous
communities respectively. From my standpoint, the difference lies in the frequent practices of coopera-
tion that the former had, based on established networks before the media project. It is worth pointing
out a difference between the two institutionalization processes. Although Mídia NINJA seems to have
been more successful to objectify and replicate their practices (that is why I assigned them 3 points
and 2 to CPEtv), it is not possible to argue that the institutionalization process is complete as Berger &
Luckmann would deﬁne it, because the sedimentation phase is still in the making. Indeed, the experi-
ence is only 2 years old, and FDE just little over ten, which makes it quite premature to say that their
practices have been passed on to new generations, although they have to new members. Contrarily,
in the case of CPE the structure of replicating knowledge within generations in the organization and
expanding service models to other cities has been in operation for decades. Thus, the latter process of
knowledge replication, though not so rapid in the speciﬁc media case that I analyzed, seems to be more
institutionalized than the former under the light of Berger & Luckmann’ s concepts.
8.2.8 Audience Reach
The four cases want to disseminate and expand their respective imaginaries. Therefore, the potential
audience, understood in a bounded way as the number of viewers they reach (J. G. Webster 1998), is a
resource that can be used to multiply their experience, or as previously explained, to mobilize support-
ers. Although it was out of the scope of this research to collect comparable data about the audiences of
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each of the four cases, I shall argue that the material conditions of production favor some of the cases
over others from the start. My argument is that the location where media for social transformation
operate creates certain limits to the type of content to elaborate, and thus, to the number of potential
interested viewers they might attract. Why? Because those near highly populated areas or neural
zones of national news production have more access to produce content of national interest, and thus
reach wider audiences.
On the one hand, the three Argentinean cases show an opposite structure than the Brazilian one
in terms of the geographic location of content production. CPEtv, Barricada TV and Wall Kintun TV
are all bounded by the limits of the new audiovisual media law, which fosters local content production
in speciﬁc towns or cities. Therefore, most of the content from CPEtv comes from Santa Rosa, most of
the content of Barricada TV stems from Buenos Aires and similarly, the scarce content of Wall Kintun
TV emanates from Bariloche and nearby. However, there are differences among these three cases
depending on their geographic location. For instance, given that Barricada TV is in Buenos Aires,
the capital of the country, they have an easy access to issues related to political, economic and social
events that tend to be concentrated there. Therefore, it has an advantage in terms of covering topics
that might be of interest for large audiences. Nonetheless, it is also true that during ﬁeldwork the
Cablevisión cable operator, part of Clarín, was disobeying the new law, and did not include the channel
in its grid. Accordingly, Barricada TV has the potential to reach larger audiences through the cable
service in the capital city that has approximately 3 million inhabitants, but in practice, it is still limited
due to the national struggle between the state and the Clarín media group. Contrarily, CPEtv operates
in a provincial capital city of only 125.000 inhabitants. Accordingly, their audiovisual content might be
of interest to local inhabitants of the city and the province, but much less to a wider national audience,
except for co-operative content that could match experiences in other provinces. Similarly, Wall Kintun
TV’s content distribution through cable and air broadcasting is bounded to the city of Bariloche and its
113.000 inhabitants. The online content can theoretically reach everyone with internet access, but as
most of the population of the country is concentrated in the capital, it is safe to say that the contact
with indigenous communities’ perspectives and practices is reduced, which might explain the scarce
interest for it on the web. In sum, the new audiovisual communication services law might democratize
the legal access to media channels, but it cannot address the uneven distribution of inhabitants in
the country that sustains the geopolitics of knowledge production. This still gives advantages to those
channels situated and producing content about the larger urban areas. For these reasons, I assigned
Barricada TV and CPEtv 2 points and just 1 to Wall Kintun TV.
On the other hand, Mídia NINJA operates with a network structure that offers another way to over-
come the previous problem of ‘localism’, because the distribution of members in different FDE houses
allows NINJA to record videos easily beyond the boundary of just one city. As a result of this, Mídia
NINJA members operating in different houses across the country cover varied topics; for instance, in
the house in Brasília they focus on issues of national politics, while those NINJAs in the house in Belém
in the Amazon focus on topics related to indigenous communities and the environment. In the same
way, NINJAs in Belo Horizonte focus on mining themes, which is understandable given that this state
specializes in this industry. In like manner, the rest of the houses where NINJAs operate have speciﬁc
news. For these reasons, the network structure of Mídia NINJA gives them an advantage with respect
to the Argentinean cases, because they can cover a larger variety of topics, trying to compensate for the
geopolitics of audiovisual knowledge production, which in Brazil is concentrated in Rio de Janeiro and
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City # videos %
Rio de Janeiro 632 61%
São Paulo 213 20%
Brasília 116 11%
Belo Horizonte 53 5%
São Luís 28 3%
Seven other cities 38 4%
Table 8.3: Number of Mídia NINJA’s streamings classiﬁed by the author based on the city of ﬁlming.
Out of 1.248 videos, 1.080 offered geographic information to compile the table. Source: Twitcasting.
São Paulo (Ibispina 2010). Therefore, I assigned them 3 points.
Despite this dispersed geographic structure of production, the results of Table 8.3 show that 61% of
the streamed videos were recorded in Rio de Janeiro, and 91% were streamed from large urban cities
of the richest region in Brazil, the southeast comprising Belo Horizonte, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.
For this reason, even though Mídia NINJA might be fulﬁlling the objective to cover social struggles
in the country, it has not been done in a balanced manner. There are at least three reasons for this.
First, 82 million Brazilians live in the southeast of the country, which represents 42% of the total
population (IBGE 2013a), although just a tenth of the national territory. Second, the technological
infrastructure does not allow streaming in all Brazilian states; for example, in the Amazon region
where internet access is limited or nonexistent beyond capital cities. Last but not least, the selection of
Rio de Janeiro as the main base for Mídia NINJA seems to have been a strategic decision, because it is
the most known city abroad and where most of the mobilizations have been taking place. This network
structure allowed Mídia NINJA to reach audiences beyond those of just small cities. However, it has
been pulled by the centrifugal forces of the largest urban centers, overlooking the coverage of news of
those cities and towns far from main national urban centers.
To conclude, these results show the tension between localism and broader national reporting. The
points I discussed suggest that the best strategy for media for social transformation is to build a net-
work for content production and dissemination. In the case of Argentina, the existing cases are far from
putting into practice such organizational scheme, perhaps except for the co-operatives that are trying
to build one. Contrariwise, Mídia NINJA built a structure based on the preexisting network of FDE.
Nonetheless, their use of online technologies leads to a focus on large urban centers, overlooking small
towns with lack of access to such ICT. In the end, this shows a contradiction between their imaginary
and their practice. Thus, the growth of the audience as a resource seems to face a tradeoff with respect
to the aims that media for social transformation might establish for themselves.
8.3 Concluding Discussion
This chapter covered two aspects that media for social transformation experiences have to tackle: re-
silience to violence from incumbents and the capacity to acquire and mobilize resources for their con-
tinuous operation.
The ﬁrst section described four types of violence that each case had to withstand to varying degrees
to put forward their projects, either initiated by state or private actors. I have interpreted these types
of violence as dispositives that limit the emergence of media for social transformation departing from
state and commercial media practices. This typology covered direct physical violence to journalists,
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structural types of violence such as legal and economic, and discursive violence, where I included the
opposition between different discourses, including the use of defamatory stereotypes and libel. Accord-
ingly, media ﬁrms in synchrony with the creative economy policy discourses do not just prevail because
they are ‘better’, whereas media for social transformation are naturally ‘unﬁt’, but rather this has been
shaped by the existence of different types of violence to hamper the projects of the latter. In the case of
Argentina, the private sector incumbents tried to delay and stop the application of the new law, which
shows that a blind adherence to market principles and competition, as implied in the creative economy
policy discourses, dodges the unfair practices that ﬁrms might easily implement. This indicates the
need of regulations to reduce the unfair advantages that some actors obtained in previous and non-
democratic periods of the country. Nonetheless, the Argentinean cases also show that to advance such
changes in practice is far from simple or lineal. In effect, the most resourceful media conglomerate
has been able to ignore and oppose new laws that have the support of the democratic process. Like-
wise, in that context the role of the state was not without problems, because it has not hesitated to
use the historical struggles of indigenous communities to its advantage or to delay the legalization of
alternative media that were not in synchrony with the project of the national administration. In these
politically charged contexts, the only road seems to be the increasing mobilization of civil society media
organizations to organize and oppose the different types of violence, hoping to raise awareness and
employ emerging windows of opportunity to introduce and perfect appropriate regulatory frameworks.
Although the media democratization law in Argentina is not without hurdles, it is true that it has made
a considerable advance to challenge media concentration that is absent in Brazil. Indeed, in the lat-
ter the types of violence against journalists are more harmful; for example, the physical violence that
journalists frequently suffer from the military police. Accordingly, the country needs some sort of new
regulation to address the existing inequalities and violence. Furthermore, in both cases there is still
a blind spot to deal with discursive violence. As the data shows, the media for social transformation
have far too few resources to respond or to legally defend themselves against libel and stereotypes dis-
seminated through mass media. Therefore, there is a need to discuss some sort of national regulation
instrument, within the boundaries of freedom of speech, unethical journalism practices, which damage
media organizations in both countries.
A ﬁnal point to stress is that this typology of violence against media for social transformation is a
useful ﬁrst step to break with the bias in Western media research that overlooks these processes. This
neglect is understandable for media research that focuses on experiences in USA and Europe, but it
is deﬁnitely not appropriate for other contexts. In effect, physical violence by state and other forces
against media is still present in many countries of the world, and undoubtedly worse than the cases
researched in this thesis. Therefore, the theories that speak of ‘network power’ (Castells 2007, 2009) or
‘media power’ in relation to the inﬂuence that the latter can have in society (Curran 2002; Couldry and
Curran 2003), are undeniably important to shed light on some aspects of media and power, but they
are not enough to grasp the different types of violence that journalists and media have to deal with
in non-Western contexts. Furthermore, I showed that the typology is better suited to explain these
different types of violence, rather than just saying they are ‘dispositives’ as in the meta-language of
SKAD (Keller 2013) or ‘structural violence’ as proposed by Galtung (Galtung 1969). Thus, I followed
the advice in the literature to specify the different sources of violence (Farmer et al. 2004), which gives
not only more analytical insights but could also pave the way for further actions by civil society to
denounce and stop those types of attacks.
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The second part of the chapter connects with the ﬁrst one, but also with previous ones, because
it examines the types of resources that each case has been able to acquire and mobilize. I achieved
this by adopting a perspective for interdisciplinary projects that deﬁnes power as the ability to ac-
quire and mobilize resources (Avelino and Rotmans 2009). This perspective is useful, because it avoids
the shortcomings of mainstream discussions on power in media research, which focus on how media
affect ‘society’, such as politics and audiences (Couldry and Curran 2003; Curran 2002). Contrarily,
a resource-view on power allows to systematize the different types of resources that media for social
transformation have acquired to resist the violence that they are subject to. Nonetheless, it is worth
pointing out that the scheme I employed by Avelino & Rotmans is not without its empirical shortcom-
ings. In effect, their deﬁnition of resources is quite broad: “[...] persons, assets, materials or capital,
including human, mental, monetary, artefactual and natural resources” (Avelino and Rotmans 2009, p.
551). This implies that the type of resources that one can detect in any given case is varied, which is
useful to have a qualitative good overview of the ‘power’ of a given case, as I showed in Table 8.2. How-
ever, in practice the same approach creates difﬁculties when the types of resources are not known in
advance and further challenges to measure them. In effect, I could not quantitatively compare the re-
sources, but only make a qualitative assessment based on my perceptions and partial information. This
is not an insurmountable hindrance for future projects, but deﬁnitely one that might require groups of
researchers and more than one round of data collection to assure the quantitative comparison among
cases.
The key conclusion from this sections is that the more diverse the types of resources that media for
social transformation acquire and mobilize, the greater their possibilities of challenging the incumbents
following the creative economy policy discourses. This is important, because I have stressed more
resources beyond the ﬁnancial that are assumed to be the most relevant one in a capitalist economy
(Saeed 2009); for instance, relational ones that link to broader discussions about social capital in social
sciences (Portes 1998). Although these two are deﬁnitely important, based on the empirical data I
have claimed that other resources cannot be overlooked to have a better picture of the power of media
for social transformation to sustain their projects. As regards ﬁnancial resources, their acquisition
comes from different strategies, among which advertising is just one. In effect, the case of Mídia
NINJA illustrates that new organizations can also employ complementary currencies to break with
the scarcity of national ones, which points to the need to advance research on these different economic
exchange systems. As regards relational resources, the analysis of the structures of the networks of
relations that each case has, suggests that the more diverse the networks, the more types of exchanges
the cases can establish without necessarily depending on the intermediation of ﬁnancial resources.
Besides these two resources, the systematization covered the importance of human resources, which in
some cases were attracted by ﬁnancial incentives, but in others, by the desire to be part of a project
that they believed in. This stresses the importance of imaginaries in offering subject-positions for
humans to follow, and to the diversity of them not necessarily restricted to the proﬁt maximizing actor
assumed in the creative economy policy discourses. Furthermore, the acquisition of knowledge followed
different strategies, from the more formal ones through personnel trained at universities, to more
informal ones where knowledge was acquired through ‘amateur’ practices of reporting. Moreover, I
stressed the importance of the set up of knowledge institutions by CPE and FDE to expand their
imaginary and the scaling up of their experiences, which was not present in the other two cases. What
is interesting to remark is that FDE and Mídia NINJA were the most successful to replicate their
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practices, and not necessarily with the highest amount of ﬁnancial resources. In fact, co-operatives in
Argentina are by far richer than them, yet have not been fast enough to adopt the use of ICT tools
to achieve a similarly quick replication. Another important resource in the cases was the acquisition
of technologies and the needed infrastructure to operate them. The cases can be divided according
to whether they just passively adopted technologies, or whether they tried to reappropriate them for
their respective imaginary, which I considered as a sort of mental resource that helps to reduce the
dependence on foreign technologies. In a similar vein, the same interpretation scheme can be useful
to acquire infrastructures appropriate for the context of operation of each case. In general terms, this
last ‘attitude’ toward technologies is a particularly important strategy for resource-scarce organizations
that in my opinion need to grab what they have and start emitting content, implementing the adequate
adaptations, but without blocking themselves for not having enough money to acquire the latest and
fanciest technologies. Another important resource for each case has been their audience reach, which
was in part conditioned by their content dissemination technologies and their location. In addition, I
underscored the importance of political resources; for instance, the mobilization of supporters to strive
for their positions, or the reference of historical debts to demand government action. To conclude,
despite the different types of violence that media organizations might face, the lesson from the second
part of the chapter is that there is a variety of strategies to acquire and mobilize resources beyond
just ﬁnancial ones, which need to be accounted in research, and could be considered by other media
for social transformation in practice. This empirical part of my contribution could beneﬁt other media
experiences by having a more diverse (though possibly not complete) matrix of the different resources
to acquire and mobilize in their struggles for a perspective that does not view information just as a
mere commodity.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Policy Advice
In the midst of discussions on how to surpass the impasse in ‘development’ research, this work con-
tributes to stress the essential role that communication plays in social change processes. In particular,
it has focused on those visions of the future from nongovernmental and nonproﬁt organizations in Ar-
gentina and Brazil, media for social transformation, which deﬁnitely illustrate alternative practices. In
this last chapter, I conclude with the main contributions made, both academic and empirical, together
with a list of possible policy suggestions and plausible future lines of research.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, many Latin American countries have entered into a ‘post-
neoliberal’ period after the election of left-wing administrations, challenging – to varying degrees - the
previous predominance of Western policies. Thus, the state once again occupied a central role in policy
making, contrary to the tenets of neoliberalism that defended the idea of the private sector managing
as many activities as possible. Another essential difference has been the priority assigned to inclusion
policies in order to address the consequences of the policies and politics of previous decades. Nonethe-
less, these discursive changes have faced different types of contradictions in practice. In general, Ar-
gentina and Brazil are good examples of these political changes, and in particular, they illustrate the
tensions in the area of culture and communication between neoliberal and post-neoliberal policies.
As synthesized in chapter 3, Argentina has been advancing further with a new audiovisual media
law passed in 2009 that stimulated the emergence of new NGO media once restricted by a previous law
sanctioned during the dictatorship. In contrast, Brazil failed to take legal action to further democratize
its media system, but the cultural policies introduced after Lula’s arrival to power, together with an
expansion of ICT, have spurred the growth of a diversity of media collectives challenging mainstream
narratives. In both countries, these processes paved the way for various media for social transformation
that speak of different social change processes, mostly challenging privately owned mass media ﬁrms.
In this context, this research contributes with the analysis of four nonproﬁt and nongovernmental
media organizations, which were purposefully selected to illustrate the potentials and challenges of
these change processes. In effect, I selected case studies that communicate discourses of overlooked
groups in mass media, which had conﬂicts either with the state or with privately owned mainstream
ﬁrms, and employed different techniques of content production and distribution. On the one hand, I
studied three cases in Argentina that give insights on projects representing different discourses: CPEtv,
a co-operative media channel as an example of the co-operative movement; Barricada TV, a channel op-
erating in the leading case of the national movement of recovered factories; Wall Kintun TV, the ﬁrst
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Mapuche indigenous channel representing the struggles of these communities. These cases help to
understand the ongoing process of media democratization unleashed by the new law, paying attention
to the hurdles the projects face in implementing their imaginaries. These results can inspire new ex-
periences in the country and in others that have introduced similar laws, such as Ecuador or Bolivia.
On the other hand, I studied Mídia NINJA in Brazil, which is part of the cultural collective FDE that
in contrast to the Argentinean cases has been operating completely with technologies by distributing
content through the internet. It massively attracted viewers’ attention thanks to the innovative cover-
age of the 2013 riots in the country. This case study does not only offer insights into the ways in which
the organization operates with online tools, but also into the very speciﬁc practices of a collaborative
economy they have been able to put forward. Despite their different imaginaries, these four cases
share a common denominator: their opposition to a commercial view of communications, predominant
in the mass media ﬁrms of both countries, and a different noncommercial scheme on how to put for-
ward cultural and communicational activities. The focus on media for social transformation is relevant,
because in the process of media democratization most of the discussions in Argentina and Brazil are
still centered on the role of private versus public media, overlooking other types of organizations that
disseminate discourses different from those defended either by corporations or the state. Accordingly,
these cases are an important empirical research contribution to the scarce literature about media that
are neither governmental nor for-proﬁt, which can potentially contribute to the strengthening of civil
society. At the same time, this particular vision of the future could inspire further ‘critical development
research’, which unfortunately is a resource as scarce as water in the academic ‘ecosystem’.
The main academic contribution of this research is a conceptual framework that stresses different
dimensions to analyze media for social transformation in the context of Latin America. This is a contri-
bution to the emerging literature on communication for social change, which begs for a more integral
way to analyze such media. In synchrony with authors that advance the need of de-Westernizing me-
dia research, I have elaborated and applied a conceptual framework that addresses what I understand
as some of the biases of the preexisting literature. For example, the excessive focus on critical theory
inspired by authors in the Marxist tradition that develop universal models for these media, or the ne-
glect of dimensions such as violence or quality schemes. I have shown that the conceptual framework
has offered many insights to answer the main research question of this thesis: How do new nonproﬁt
and nongovernmental audiovisual media projects striving for social transformation in Argentina and
Brazil challenge a commercial approach to culture and communication? I have argued that to under-
stand this, at least three levels must be taken into account: the media system, the competition among
policy discourses, and the imaginaries and constraints on media for social transformation in their daily
practice. Therefore, I assumed that the cases cannot be understood without insights from the structure
in which they operate. First of all, this included a political economy approach to the media system in
order to reveal the main actors and policy changes in time. Second, I analyzed the competition among
mainstream and counter policy discourses that change the media structure. Third, I claimed that the
policy discourses connect with media for social transformation through dispositives, in other words,
networks of human and material structures that enhance some types of practices and reduce the op-
portunities of others. Through chapters 6-8 I have claimed, in particular, that dispositives bound in
certain dimensions the ideal projects that media for social transformation would like to put forward;
however, I also claimed that the studied cases have employed different strategies to challenge these
constraints that stimulate commercial practices. I have particularly stressed the following: the role of
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technology, the type of content produced, quality schemes, audiences, the role of violence, and last but
not least, the different strategies these experiences employ to acquire and mobilize resources.
With respect to SKAD, the application of the tools emanating from this German research program
on discourse analysis has offered some good insights into the media for social transformation under
study. This originates from an interpretationalist perspective in social science, where knowledge is not
‘natural’ but ‘socially constructed’; thus, privileging meanings of how humans interpret the world and
act in it. As I shown in chapter 5, this is the case in each of the studied media for social transformation,
that have their own ways of interpreting culture and communication coming from the context they live
in, and sketching speciﬁc plans of action to change the fact that they diverge from the ones advocated
by the creative economy policy discourses. This would not have been possible to detect if I had applied a
naturalistic approach - predominant in causal analysis and economics. It would have understood such
strategies as ‘irrational’ for disregarding or opposing the accepted predominant market forces of supply
and demand. However, this overlooks the process of ‘construction’ of these markets and reduces every
feasible experience to the ones that can be measured with the tools of economics, contributing to the
utopia – in the pejorative sense - of inﬁnite growth. Nonetheless, it misses the point of the different
interpretation schemes that human actors might create, leading to new practices and structures for
culture and media. Similarly, my analysis would have been incomplete if I had only followed research
strands of critical theory to research ‘alternative’ or ‘radical’ media. These would have been enough
in the case of Barricada TV, but not so much for the rest. Accordingly, SKAD was essential to break
with mainstream perspectives and also with the idea that media for social transformation can only be
understood within the Marxist tradition. Although it is true that concepts from that research strand
have a lot to say in order to understand the opposition to commercial media, they fall short of grasping a
broader set of interpretation schemes, such as those of indigenous communities that were neither part
of the Western Marxist tradition nor of new media social movements. Contrarily, it is true that SKAD
also is a Western approach to study discourses and the production and dissemination of knowledge;
however, I showed that its broad deﬁnition of knowledge and the methods it suggests are adaptable to
reveal the meaning patterns that media cases employ in other contexts.
Besides contributing with this broad understanding of what knowledge is, SKAD includes other con-
cepts from Foucauldian discourse analysis, such as dispositives, which were good metaphors to trace
how the commercial approach to culture and communication bounds the possible spaces of operation
of the initiatives of media for social transformation. Despite these strengths, I highlighted the lim-
its of a broad scheme for the ‘sociology of knowledge’ in this research. In effect, many things can be
a ‘discourse’, ‘practices’ emanating from them, and ‘dispositives’ reinforcing those practices. During
the analysis I experienced that these concepts can cover very disparate phenomena, but provide few
insights into how they speciﬁcally operate in particular sectors. Thus, they become a sort of meta-
language, metaphors, but do not further illuminate the situation under research. That is the main
reason why I addressed the shortcomings of the ‘dispositive’ by referring to overlapping, but more pre-
cise, concepts that shed light on them. This seems to be the path to follow in order to avoid banal
analyses that get lost in abstractions and do not add much to transformative social science research.
Furthermore, in the thesis I also introduced a change to the employment of SKAD, by dividing the anal-
ysis of discourses into levels, according to the institutional area under analysis. Therefore, I employed
the term ‘policy discourses’ to those appearing in policy areas and ‘imaginaries’ to refer to the speciﬁc
discourses of media for social transformation. Although I argued that they are linked through dispos-
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itives, I claim that this new tag - though it might not be the perfect one given that ‘imaginaries’ has
other meanings in the literature - is still useful to differentiate what type of constellation of statements
one is referring to. Finally, throughout chapter 5 I tried to remark the future dimension of many of the
imaginaries. This is a feature that has lost importance with respect to the previous conceptualizations
of ‘ideology’ in the literature. Notwithstanding, many of the cases made statements about a future way
of organizing society and it is safe to say that this is central to processes of social transformation. Thus,
I reincorporated the term utopian into the analysis in the sense of offering guidelines for transform-
ing the contexts in which the groups under analysis operate, and without the negative connotation of
unattainable.
In the next paragraphs, I shall synthesize the main results of the different levels and dimensions
considered in the conceptual framework, remarking the limits to the practices of media for social trans-
formation, and highlighting the ways the cases managed to overcome them.
In chapter 3, I employed a political economy perspective to synthesize the history and main features
of the audiovisual media system in Argentina and Brazil, by describing the main actors and regula-
tions and by stressing their variation in time with regard to national politics. In contrast to other
regions of the world, in both countries few private media conglomerates have acquired excessive in-
ﬂuence in terms of audience share; a situation that has not improved, but rather deteriorated, after
the return to democratically elected governments. Particularly, I put the focus on the neglect of civil
society organizations and the advance of their different struggles to alter the system in both countries.
One of the conclusions of this chapter is to highlight the shortcomings of a predominant emphasis on
private media, a tendency emanating from Western researchers and the institutions they are used to.
Although this perspective is correct when it comes to criticizing excessive state control in relation to the
experience of European countries with authoritarian regimes, such an approach neglects the negative
consequences of marked concentration of ownership patterns in a few commercial ﬁrms. This situa-
tion is particularly evident in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, raising new sorts of questions that
cast doubt on the claims of commercial approaches to media, such as the creative economy policy dis-
courses, because they neglect the need of appropriate regulations to stop media concentration patterns
that endanger the democratic process.
In chapter 4, I introduced what I called the mainstream policy discourses and counter discourses in
the area of culture and media in Argentina and Brazil, which compete to reinforce or change the exist-
ing media system. I called them discourses as an analytical device to represent different constellations
of statements that represent sets of schemes for action that delineate and understand how culture and
media ought to be and by whom and for what purposes they are produced. It is true that this tends to be
studied in separate manners in Western literature; however, this did not seem appropriate to me in the
countries under study, due to the interconnections between both sectors, such as the increasing impor-
tance of media to disseminate cultural expressions. Indeed, the cultural policies in Brazil inspired the
collective media case I examined in the thesis. Furthermore, even the President of Argentina, Cristina
Kirchner, termed the media democratization change as a ‘cultural battle’. Therefore, the decision to
cover both areas seems appropriate to map the discourses in competition that inﬂuence the existing
media system in both countries.
As I shown in chapter 4, these policy discourses are materialized by different dispositives, and are
neither ‘objective’ nor ‘natural’ ways of organizing these sectors, but rather the result of constructions
by different types of actors. Indeed, I advanced a division between two groups of policy discourses, one
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in favor of a commercial approach to culture and media, and the other questioning the primacy of eco-
nomics by ﬁrst adding other dimensions, but without disregarding the economic one. These discourses
evidently enter into tension concerning the ways they structure the problem of how media and culture
ought to be organized; and thus, the dynamic results of the competition might pave the way for an
alteration of the media system, and might open windows of opportunity for the emergence of media for
social transformation.
I named the ﬁrst group ‘creative economy’ policy discourses, because despite their nuances, they
share a set of similarities that reinforce the preexisting commercially driven culture and media systems
in Argentina and Brazil. First, the addressees of these discourses are industries and entrepreneurs
within them, whose aim is to generate wealth and employment through the commercialization of cul-
tural products and services that are oriented to exports. Second, they focus on creative and cultural
entrepreneurs as the subject position that people can follow, which assumes that every cultural ex-
pression is a potential product or service to be sold in markets. This not only implies a vision of ‘en-
trepreneurship’ limited to the commercial sphere, but also a bounded deﬁnition of ‘sustainability’ that
can only be achieved through proﬁts, and in extreme cases by a strict control of IPRs. Third, the policy
discourses make the extra assumption that the ‘creatives’ are individuals and talented professionals,
part of a ‘creative class’, linking a peculiar Western notion of individuality with creativity. Last but not
least, the policy discourses overlook the particular challenges that media face in the region, such as
the high concentration of media ownership. As analyzed in chapter 4, this group of policy discourses
might be suitable for middle or high-income sectors of the population with enough resources, but it
deﬁnitely overlooks – and in the worst cases discriminates - the vast popular cultural expressions of
marginalized groups. The latter do not have enough resources to set up such for-proﬁt projects or do
not want to. From the start, the market oriented logic of these public policies thus excludes large part
of the population from potential beneﬁts, who would not classify as ‘creative’. This reinforces a divide
among the population that is particularly harmful for the aim of ‘access’ cultural policies are supposed
to have. It is clearly against the discursive claims of the left-wing parties in power in Argentina and
Brazil since 2003, which - at least rhetorically - make inclusion a priority in their political agendas.
Despite such contradictions, governments have not stopped supporting this perspective, because of
the importance of the cultural/creative industries for economic growth. Instead, they tried to counter-
balance the consequences of what many would classify as ‘neoliberal’ policies by introducing others
aiming to address existing inclusion problems. In effect, the two counter policy discourses that I ex-
amined in chapter 4 offer an important contrast to the creative economy policy discourses. First, their
main objective is not to generate proﬁts, but to give rights to civil society actors (specially marginal-
ized groups) so that they can access, consume and produce culture and communication. Second, they
offer subject positions that go beyond that of the entrepreneur and beyond that of proﬁts only - with
other ways of entrepreneurship and sustainability being relevant. Thus, social entrepreneurship and
collective ways of organization, like the points of culture, play a prominent role. Third, the support for
cultural expressions of minority and resource-scarce groups challenges the idea of the ‘gifted’, ‘god-like’
and ‘genius’ artists and stresses that everyone can be creative - thus challenging existing hierarchies
of what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Fourth, they try to address the problems in the media system in both
countries through different methods. For instance, by promoting the sharing of information in online
networks of cultural and media collectives in Brazil, and through a law aimed at regulating ownership
concentration patterns and stimulating the emergence of new media projects in Argentina.
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In order to avoid any simplistic interpretations of this thesis, I shall insist that I am not against the
commercialization of culture and communication. This is an untenable position, given the importance
of the economy in an increasingly globalized, interconnected capitalist economic system. Nonetheless,
what I have severely criticized is the perspective presuming that a commercial approach is the only one
that matters as a ‘feasible development option’, neglecting everything else. Apart from that, the exis-
tence of cultural industries in both countries is a fact, and no policy maker can leave them outside of
their consideration for support. However, in the international development discussions, the latter have
had predominance over any other type of alternative to organize cultural and media policies. From my
perspective, this shows the Western bias in international organizations, which still takes the experi-
ences of some Western nations as universal and as the only ones that could work and help the rest of
the world. I could not disagree more with this perspective, which is so blind to the variations in context
around the world. For instance, the expansion of the creative industries and creative economy as it
emanated from the UK experience and US theoreticians clearly overlooks the dimension of inclusion
and social justice, which is not a priority in those two countries, but which is far more relevant in the
political agenda – at least rhetorically - in many Latin American countries. This bias is not only present
in international organizations, but also in the research that emanates from ‘leading’ Western research
institutes. Indeed, there are almost no articles written in English about the Cultura Viva program,
even though it has existed for more than 10 years, nor about the media democratization processes in
Argentina, but there are thousands of articles about the creative industries in almost every region of
the world. From my perspective, this suggests the standardization of what policies work, overlooking
those that depart and contradict the claim of mainstream authors and institutions. I oppose this lack
of diversity, and from my humble point of view, the two policy discourses are the tip of the iceberg of a
whole set of other policies that could be inspirational for other parts of the world to create their own
autochthonous interventions based on other models and not just inﬂuenced by the propaganda of those
employed in Western countries.
In chapter 5, I thoroughly analyzed the imaginaries of four media for social transformation, under-
scoring their speciﬁcities and the inﬂuence they received from counter policy discourses. One of the
main results of the chapter is that the claim that the creative economy policy discourses are all com-
prehensive must be rejected. Although their inner structure might be broad enough to cover diverse
industries, it is not sufﬁcient to include networks and projects that oppose a for-proﬁt orientation in
the area of culture and communication. SKAD helped to elucidate this weakness, because as I shown
in chapter 5, each of the imaginaries emanates from a particular context, where history, politics and
practices link in speciﬁc ways. Therefore, the members of each of the media for social transformation
employ different interpretative schemes to conceptualize how culture and media ought to be organized
in the struggles to transform the contexts in which they operate. Taking this observation into account, I
have argued that the existence of such imaginaries is a necessary condition for cases to challenge a com-
mercial approach to communications. In effect, the four media for social transformation are examples
of nonproﬁt non state, which make evident the practices stimulated by the counter policy discourses op-
posing the mainstream policy discourses of chapter 4. Here are the examples of the channels operating
as part of the following networks of actors: the co-operative movement struggling for a human-faced
economy, the network of recovered enterprises by workers striving for a democratization of ﬁrms in the
economy, the Mapuches and other indigenous communities battling for ancestral ways of organization,
FDE and Mídia NINJA’s project of expanding a ‘collaborative economy’ beyond their network. In all
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cases, there is a challenge to the contemporary economic order and - to varying degrees - to the ways
in which society at large is organized. The imaginaries of these constellations of actors have a utopian
dimension, offering a different vision on alternative paths to follow. They are partially testing these
paths by putting them it into practice by means of diverse projects, in particular related to culture and
media. Although it is true that the commercialization of culture and media is an important strategy for
many entrepreneurs, ﬁrms and industries, the cases I studied show that it is not the only one. Contrar-
ily, there is far more variety when it comes to practices to organize cultural and media activities than
for-proﬁt ones, and in particular I refer to those of civil society organizations. Accordingly, I argued
that the mainstream discourses need to be seriously criticized and rejected as the only way to promote
culture and media ‘development’, because of their serious side effects of tools to prune the diversity
of practices that exist at the grassroots level. Instead, this begs for the elaboration of more inclusive
policy suggestions that take the diversity of experiences of cultural and media networks into account
that could be more appropriate for addressing issues in non-Western countries.
The previous conclusion is important for all cultural sectors and I want to emphasize that it is par-
ticularly relevant for media for development. As mentioned in the introduction, the increasing process
of mediatization suggests that humans are and will be more and more able to access media channels
more frequently. This raises the question of the diversity of content that those media are opposed to
bring. The position I took in this thesis was to highlight the neglected role of non private and non state
media in the context of Latin America, which tends to be overlooked in media research in general. The
reasons for this bias are possibly connected to the larger audiences of the mass media, which could be
understood as a proxy for their inﬂuence and relevance. However, it is also true that the expansion of
ICT and new media has initiated a process of concentration in terms of the production of technological
platforms, but also of fragmentation in terms of content production, which considerably increases the
possibilities of new media projects to emerge and distribute content, albeit with new hurdles. Thus,
the political economy model that I described in Figure 2.2, focusing on private and public media, nec-
essarily needs to be updated to include the role of different types of media (alternative, community,
co-operative, indigenous, radical, and others), and in particular those that I labeled media for social
transformation, because of their contributions to address development challenges. This is important,
since the existence of these media projects can be understood as dispositives of the imaginaries of the
organizations that are part of broader networks aiming to change and improve the economy and so-
ciety, helping to disseminate overlooked ideas and practices, challenging those emanating from public
(usually associated with the political administration) and private media (guided by for-proﬁt ends), and
strengthening civil society and the democratic governance process. In effect, in chapter 7 I illustrated
how the practices of content production of the four studied cases go, to different degrees, in that direc-
tion. For example, CPEtv has been systematically producing content about the co-operative movement
that despite its economic importance in the province had little content elaborated in the province. Like-
wise, Barricada TV has produced a variety of audiovisual content about enterprises recovered by its
workers and left-wing perspectives on society, which have had scarce coverage in other mass media. In
a similar vein, Wall Kintun TV has started to disseminate and slowly produce content illustrating the
perspectives of the Mapuche indigenous community. Last but not least, Mídia NINJA has been offering
a diverse coverage of various collective actors as a way to unleash social change. Beyond the particular
objectives of these imaginaries, I stressed the importance of these media to locally cover topics that are
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relevant for the international development agenda. For instance, environmental issues, the struggle
for gender equality, and the improvement of livelihoods of marginalized groups. Therefore, this data
suggests that international development projects should not only consider public and private media for
the diffusion of the results of their projects and issues of concern, but also the networks of media for
social transformation that exist in each country.
Despite the contribution that media for social transformation are making in terms of disseminating
different types of discourses, the empirical data I analyzed contradicts part of the most romantic claims
about these types of organizations. In effect, one of the usual dimensions that appears as central in
research about communication for social change is the role of participation. However, the discussion
in chapter 7 showed that the concept of participation in media research - just as in the general devel-
opment literature - is not without problems, because it aims toward an ideal hard to fulﬁll in practice.
Indeed, I employed concepts suggested by Carpentier to elaborate a continuum between two poles of
minimalist and maximalist participation. However, the criteria to classify the last and broadest notion
of participation (audience heterogeneity, audiences participating in media management and content
production, inclusion of content elaborated by citizens and amateurs, without overlooking the polit-
ical) was not achieved in practice by any of the media for social transformation. This is surprising,
given that the discussions in communication for social change claim that these media are going to be
more participatory, and likewise, that they can contribute to the democratization of the public sphere.
Nonetheless, in practice I detected at least two limits that bound such statements. First, the same
imaginaries of the cases under study create boundaries that contradict the notion of ‘full’ participation
with regard to audience diversity. In effect, many of these media emerge as a critique of overlooked ac-
tors in mass media coverage. Accordingly, these media for social transformation focus on those ignored
actors and do not cover others that oppose them, which are well represented by mass media. Thus,
they have a limited audience. The second factor is that these media are interested in news production
which puts them under the pressure of respecting the news cycle and of continuously covering topics in
synchrony with the aims of their imaginary. Therefore, they have the pressure to report as efﬁciently
as possible, which requires a bureaucratization of their news production process. This in turn leads
to speciﬁc editorial lines that prioritize some topics over the diversity that could be covered. In sum,
these two factors conspire against the ideal of maximal participation. Indeed, three out of four media
for social transformation failed in this dimension. The only one that covered more opposing audiences
was CPEtv, which paradoxically is the one that follows a more commercial TV model, siding with a
minimalist model of participation. Although participation seems to be an ideal that cannot be reached
in practice, for me it is still worth pursuing, because it is true that now more marginalized groups are
creating their own media to express, record and disseminate their perspectives in ways they had not
done before. In sum, this analysis of participation points to the need of carefully opening up the con-
cept in order to distinguish between the different types existing in practice, which could then inspire
practitioners to make adequate changes in order to come closer to this ideal.
The results of chapter 7 about content reception revealed the challenges that media for social trans-
formation face when it comes to reaching their audiences, which partly coincide with what mass media
journalists criticize about these organizations. It is safe to say that all these media aim to increase the
number of viewers in order to expand their imaginaries and to replicate their practices. Indeed, many
of the cases explicitly strive to become ‘massive’, despite their lack of resources in comparison to mass
media. However, I have shown that there are several limits that media for social transformation have
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to face to attract audiences. Although it was not within the scope of this research to thoroughly conduct
audience research, social network statistics served as a proxy to compare the importance of these new
media to mainstream mass media in both countries. In chapter 7, I showed that the latter still retain
a large number of followers and viewers, and I hypothesized that this might be related to their infras-
tructure for content production that is superior to that of organizations only operating through online
media. This seems to be a tendency; media that have far more resources in terms of TV channels,
radios and newspapers, also have larger online audiences. Therefore, resource-scarce media for social
transformation indeed have fewer opportunities to reach larger audiences, even though many of them
strive toward such an objective. Online media platforms do offer exceptions, such as the case of Mídia
NINJA: With some of its online videos on YouTube it attracted more attention than Globo. However, it
is also true that these media conglomerates employ their own websites and systems of content dissem-
ination. Therefore, the ‘success’ I measured online is only relative to those platforms of use, and it is
deﬁnitely insigniﬁcant with respect to the millions of viewers that estimates assign to both main mass
media groups on other media platforms such as TV. Additionally, I could not detect much continuous
ﬂow of content from these media for social transformation towards mass media, except the critical, vio-
lent and few exceptions I mentioned in chapter 8. Unfortunately, this suggests that the counter-public
spheres these media are generating have so far not really translated into content toward the structures
of the public sphere heavily inﬂuenced by these mass media. Although it might be true that new tech-
nologies are offering new spaces for media for social transformation to transmit content and to connect
with viewers, their project of becoming massive by means of such channels alone is more bounded than
cyber-utopian statements want to make us believe. Therefore, I claim that the struggle for regulating
the radio spectrum and for implementing such laws is an indispensable path to follow, which might
level the resource asymmetries between NGO media and others in Argentina and Brazil.
The existence of imaginaries is a necessary condition for the emergence of projects of media for
social transformation. This is linked with the function of communication and media to disseminate
imaginaries by circulating role models that stimulate their practices. When employing the language
of cognitive psychology, this could be understood as a set of schemes for action from the space of all
possible ones. Thus, media become channels for the dissemination of diversity of discourses, hoping
to reach and unleash new actions through the reinterpretations recipients make of these schemes.
Nonetheless, I have also argued that the existence of these imaginaries is not a sufﬁcient condition
for the operationalization of the projects as aspired by their members, because in practice producers
of content are subject to material constraints from previous historical trajectories of other discourses,
in particular of the commercial ones in the countries I studied. Therefore, I claimed that there are
diverse types of networks of material and human elements (‘dispositives’) that limit the diversity of
potential new discourses. In effect, I have shown the boundaries these dispositives set in the four
analyzed cases, but I also described how in some cases they were challenged - to different extents and
by means of varied strategies. This is an important point to stress, because it adds empirical and
theoretical insight to understand how media for social transformation challenge the creative economy
policy discourses. Although the discussion of dispositives is useful to refer to networks of material and
human actors constraining the media for social transformation and their imaginaries, I identiﬁed this
broad concept as a shortcoming of SKAD, because it becomes a sort of meta-language to describe very
dissimilar types of processes that lose the speciﬁcities each dispositive might have. Therefore, I have
argued that a way to address this weakness of the approach advanced by Keller is to complement it
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with other concepts from varied research ﬁelds that refer to the same process, but that go deeper to
open up the speciﬁcities they refer to. Speciﬁcally, in this research I examined the role of the following
four aspects I shall summarize in the next paragraphs: technology, quality schemes, violence, and the
distribution of resources, as a proxy to reveal unequal power relations.
In chapter 6, I introduced a ﬁrst contribution by specifying the idea of ‘dispositive’ in the analysis of
media technologies. Indeed, I employed insights from science and technology studies that understand
technologies as having ‘scripts’. That is to say, they are not ‘objective’ artifacts, but rather carry the
morals and values introduced by their designers. For instance, the high tech cameras, equipment
and editing software CPEtv acquired from foreign ﬁrms have all been designed to operate within a
commercial model of media and communication, prevailing in the context they were produced. In
effect, their high costs inevitably lead to such a type of sustainability practices, otherwise it is very
hard to cover their operational costs. Therefore, the co-operative movement and other NGOs that could
neither obtain nor produce those tools in other ways, became dependent on foreign commercial ﬁrms
providing the equipment for them. This forced the co-operative case to adopt commercial models of
sustainability, although it was originally discursively trying to oppose them! In my opinion this is a
paradox the co-operatives are facing, and I interpret it as the result of the ‘script’ of the only available
media technologies that they had at the time they started the channel. Beyond this case, audiovisual
producers I interviewed agreed that the lack of appropriate technologies for these new channels is a
broader and a particularly hard barrier to overcome, but not an impossible one. Indeed, the speciﬁcities
of ICT are tough to copy and improve for countries lacking national electronics industries. Just like
industrializing countries, however, Argentina and Brazil could promote the local production of such
equipment, because they do have technical capacities, but the state initiative is still not given. The
opportunities to surpass such shortcomings seem even more promising in the area of software, because
of the large number of specialized ﬁrms in both countries. In effect, at the time I did my ﬁeldwork
software co-operatives were already trying to break the dependence on foreign programs by developing
a local TV management software to avoid paying for expensive licenses.
The second strategy that some of the media for social transformation have been using is to reinter-
pret the commercial ICT they had access to, in order to use them in different ways rather than the ones
they had originally been designed for. This is an important insight from the philosophy of technology
and authors like Ihde, who argue that technologies have ‘multistability’, which describes how the ac-
tions they put forward are not as conclusive as the idea of ‘script’ might suggest. Conversely, the users
of technologies can vary their application by changing the context and the ends for which they employ
them. Indeed, in the past no one in Brazil thought that free streaming platforms and smartphones
designed for individual consumers could be used to set up a network of independent media elaborating
collaborative coverage as in the case of Mídia NINJA. The key difference lies in the collective and col-
laborative practices of the network FDE, which paved the way for members of Mídia NINJA to copy a
similar approach to journalism. Thus, although it might be true that smartphone designers included
cameras in their design, and that programmers of streaming platforms wanted people to disseminate
live coverage; they expected individual users or consumers to reveal their interests and personal infor-
mation, but did not foresee the creation of a collective network employing these tools in a collaborative
and noncommercial way.
I argued that this reinterpretation of technologies was stimulated by the ‘hacking’ feature present
in the imaginary of FDE and Mídia NINJA, which tries to question and adapt - whenever possible
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- existing institutions and technologies. This result also suggests that the expansion of commercial
practices and ICT is giving some space, though limited, to experiences opposing them. Ihde points
out correctly that technology can be reinterpreted in inﬁnite ways; for instance, I can use my smart-
phone just as a decorative device on my shelf, but if I want to employ it for communication using the
existing commercial platforms, then the reinterpretations are bounded. Therefore, I also argued that
the reinterpretation of technologies does have limits if the new use does not entirely differ from the
original one. This explains why the interviewees of Barricada TV complained about the existence of
‘invasive advertising’ on online commercial platforms, such as Ustream, Facebook or YouTube, which
in a certain way distorts the noncommercial message they are trying to spread. Therefore, these new
online platforms have an ambivalent effect on the imaginaries of media for social transformation. On
the one hand, they do give room for interpretation and dissemination of their content in ways that were
impossible with previous media technologies. On the other hand, there is no way for the cases to get
rid of the advertising the platforms distribute in exchange for their ‘free’ service and of the commercial
logic that they oppose. In the end, the effects of these clashing messages will depend on the viewers
on the reception side, that is to say, how they will react to the reception of both critical content and
publicity or propaganda. Do they ignore the latter? Or are they somehow affected? These are questions
for further inquiries in the ﬁeld of audience research. Despite these limits, from my point of view the
strategy of reinterpretation seems to be the most viable one for media for social transformation lacking
resources to acquire media hardware and software more compatible with their imaginaries. Why? Be-
cause this approach at least allows them to start disseminating their content, though not in the most
perfect conditions they would desire, but keeping a more purist position against commercial practices
would just imply that they would not operate at all.
From a theoretical point of view, although I have employed the concept of script emanating from
STS, in particular actor-network theory, it is important to remark that the idea of reinterpretation
opposes and challenges the former. Indeed, one of the key insights of ANT is that artifacts can be
actors, which has provoked broad criticism of the approach, because of what some understand as an
unacceptable symmetry between humans and non-humans. In effect, by employing the concept of
reinterpretation of technologies I broke the symmetry I consider to be a ﬁctitious one. Although it
might be true that technologies have scripts, they are not able to reinterpret other artifacts or humans
at their own ‘will’ (well, they might in a future with artiﬁcial intelligence, but that was not the case
in the situations I analyzed). Therefore, I have argued that the concepts I employed in this chapter
better capture, on the one hand, the role of technologies that are overlooked in media research; on the
other hand, they avoid the excessive importance STS gives to technologies by putting more weight on
the side of human agency and the reinterpretations it can elaborate.
Another important contribution I made in this research is stressing the inﬂuence quality schemes
have on media for social transformation. This is an overlooked dimension, and sometimes contempo-
rary articles striving for more research on communication for social change in international develop-
ment do not mention it at all. However, my data suggests it is a relevant dimension that most media
producers consider and struggle with. The key insight is that in each country there are mainstream
‘quality schemes’, which refer to the practices of audiovisual production of leading audiovisual ﬁrms
(private, in the case of Argentina and Brazil) and training institutes. In this research I did not analyze
the whole details of these ‘schemes’ that interviewees were referring to, but I did highlight some in
the area of news production, such as the requisite of high quality image, the employment of advanced
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technologies and the goal of keeping the ideal of objectivity and professionalism. I argued that the aim
of this dispositive is to produce a classiﬁcation of the sort of content that is ‘good’ and worth watching
(mainstream commercial schemes), and the sort that is not.
Interviewees pointed out that these quality schemes are a product of the concentration of audiovi-
sual production ﬁrms and training institutes in the largest urban areas of Argentina and Brazil (mostly
Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro). Accordingly, the ways of covering, speaking and selecting the ‘good’
themes to report about are heavily inﬂuenced by the practices emanating from those cities, undermin-
ing the rest from other parts of both countries. This points to the link between knowledge and power,
because the type of knowledge more widely produced and transmitted is in synchrony with the inter-
ests of the most resourceful actors of the media system, disregarding others. For this reason, media for
social transformation face the paradox of whether to follow mainstream quality schemes or to innovate
in style. The former would allow them to elaborate content the audiences are used to, but that does not
necessarily reﬂect the speciﬁcities of their imaginary. The latter would lead them to new ways of report-
ing more in tune with the type of imaginary they defend, but it would involve the risk of not matching
the taste of existing audiences. In chapter 7, I described that both extremes have been employed by the
analyzed cases. For instance, the co-operative emulates the aesthetics of private mass media ﬁrms, but
disseminates co-operative content. Thus, they have been able to locally compete against private ﬁrms,
quite successfully from their point of view. But from the perspective of outsiders, they are not reaching
the goal of creating a real regional TV channel with its own features. This is even more challenging
for the indigenous communities, who want to respect their ancestral ways of communication, but this
was not yet contemplated in the audiovisual production training they have received. I would also add
that they cannot compete against mainstream news ﬁrms who have far more resources to cultivate
such style. In contrast, Mídia NINJA broke with all the supposed mainstream standards, and still was
able to attract the attention of mass audiences, at least for a short period of time. Although the data I
gathered does not conclusively reveal which factor had the largest effect, the content or the way it was
produced, I suggested it is a combination of both, because in much of the coverage the case received in
national, regional and international media part of the news was the innovativeness of the network that
had used cellphones and live streamings to subjectively cover what was happening in a collaborative
way, far from the professional and ‘good quality schemes’ of mainstream private media. However, it
is also possible to think of cases that used innovative aesthetics, but did not attract much attention of
mass audiences due to their content.
Nonetheless, Mídia NINJA’s case casts doubt on the argument that media for social transformation
can only be successful by following mainstream ‘quality schemes’. There seems to be spaces for chal-
lenge, but the data about NINJA suggests two important conditions: specialized own training and the
use of new media technologies. As regards the former, Mídia NINJA is the only case that has been
able to create its own ‘university’, which can be understood abstractly as a system for replicating their
speciﬁc knowledge. Thus, they are one step ahead of the three Argentinean cases that - to a different
extent - still depend on the standardized knowledge emanating from universities, which keeps them
from acquiring professional training, though designed for private commercial media. As I explained
in chapter 8, these training practices allowed the case to institutionalize its knowledge, as opposed to
‘professional’ knowledge imparted in universities. This was possible thanks to the network structure
of FDE, their collaborative practices and ICT, which stimulated the storage and dissemination of their
knowledge.
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One of the main differences between Mídia NINJA and the other three cases is that the former has
been an active adopter of new media technologies to produce and disseminate content. From my point of
view, they seem to have beneﬁted from the pioneering use, of streamings, before the quality standards
became more standardized. This points to a short term advantage of these ﬁnancially resource-scarce
media to experiment faster, before mass media ﬁrms adopt similar technologies. In effect, interviewees
in Brazil commented that mass media journalists were trying to copy their strategies of live coverage,
emulating their style. Although the latter might be slower to experiment with new formats due to the
bureaucratic process of news production that have, once they do so, they might impose their quality
schemes on the new technologies, leaving aside the initial experiments of media for social transforma-
tion. Once again, this derives from their major access to resources and opportunities to distribute their
content nationally.
In sum, these observations show how knowledge is connected to power-effects. Indeed, the cen-
tralized audiovisual knowledge production and training centers reinforce the quality schemes of com-
mercial ﬁrms, at the expense of others. Accepting these schemes, as in the case of the co-operatives,
seriously reduces the spaces of operation to create regional, autochtonous TV channels. However, the
opposition to these schemes is not easy either, because it requires the experimentation with new tech-
nologies and patterns of production, together with the establishment of structures to preserve and
replicate such knowledge. This is not impossible, however, as the case of Mídia NINJA suggests.
In the ﬁrst section of chapter 8, I examined four types of violence that media for social transfor-
mation have to confront and that are dispositives at the same time. I argued that considering this
dimension helps to correct a bias in Western media research that focuses on the power of media in
society, but not so much on the needed power struggles between different types of media. Indeed,
this perspective is also missing in communication for social change, which focuses more on the power
tensions that new media projects can unleash in a ‘community’. Contrarily, the typology I elaborated
stresses the varied types of violence that media for social transformation face in non-Western contexts.
In part, this is a consequence of my assumption that media might inﬂuence the potential lifestyles
humans lead; therefore, it is not a surprise that certain types of media are attacked by mass media
(both commercial and public), due to the challenge that newcomers present to their discourses. In some
countries these attacks are direct and physical, threatening the life of journalists, in others, violence
is more indirect (like legal or self-censorship due to the fear of economic retaliation). I am not saying
that such attacks do not exist in Western nations, but it is safe to say that their institutional stability
seems to make them more the exception than the rule, which might explain why they are overlooked
in by Western researchers. Contrarily, ongoing media change processes in other regions, such as Latin
American countries, are a living laboratory for such dispositives. Therefore, in chapter 8 I made evident
that the emergence and scale up of these alternative experiences might be hampered by incumbents
(both private and state actors). In the worst case, this can lead to physical violence against journalists,
including death threat and killings, to stop them from disseminating challenging content. However,
there are also other mechanisms that have been useful to block media for social transformation, such
as attacks toward their economic sustainability and legal constraints. The essential point is that in-
cumbents tend to have more resources than media for social transformation; therefore, they can employ
them to their advantage against the projects of the latter. The same is true with respect to what I called
discursive violence, which refers to how mass media tend to damage the reputation of challengers, with
the intention of reducing their support. Although I did not aim to prove the damage caused by libel and
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the dissemination of stereotypes, I hypothesized that the asymmetries in terms of resources among the
two types of media tend to make the positions of the former prevail over the latter. Though once again,
testing this hypothesis would require further audience research, which was beyond the scope of this
research.
A ﬁnal important aspect to point out is that the types of violence were not only used by the state,
which is what authors striving for media commercialization tend to focus on, fearing a state media
monopoly, but also by large private media groups, which in the case of Argentina and Brazil have clear
monopolistic tendencies by means of reaching large audiences through diverse types of media - to an
extent not seen in most Western nations. Therefore, it is not only state control over media that should
be feared, but also the excessive ownership concentration patterns that might develop in the hands
of private organizations. In any case, whenever these two different logics of operation grow exces-
sively, disrespecting fair competition and regulations, the space for media for social transformation to
challenge their practices might become compromised and subject to diverse types of violence. The Ar-
gentinean cases show that new laws might help to reduce such dispositives, but fail to get rid of them
entirely, unless the historical unequal distribution of resources that has favored state and private mass
media ﬁrms is somehow rebalanced.
The last contribution of the conceptual framework is to stress the importance of a resource-view
of power to understand the potential and weaknesses of media for social transformation in advanc-
ing their projects. The perspective I employed departs from the focus that contemporary literature on
communication for social change puts on the power relations these media alter within a community, to
redirect it to the types of resources needed to operate these organizations in the ﬁrst place. Thus, my
assumption is that the difﬁculties to access resources are a dispositive, because they indirectly ham-
per the projects of organizations willing to set up their channels. Therefore, I employed a conceptual
framework proposed for interdisciplinary projects, which inspired the construction of a typology of re-
sources that the four cases I analyzed have acquired and mobilized. Although I found the approach
useful to unveil the different types of resources, I have also experienced challenges in implementing
it. First, it was not easy to gather quantitative information about many of the dimensions. This would
have allowed to set up another type of comparison table. Second, I had no access to similar information
about mass media, which would have shown in more detail the asymmetries among them and media
for social transformation by comparing the imbalances between them. Nonetheless, the typology I built
prompted me to complexify the thesis that only ﬁnancial resources matter for the operation of these
organizations. Indeed, the empirical results of the chapter show that those cases that acquired a larger
diversity of resources seem to be in a better condition to put into practice and scale up their projects,
such as CPEtv and Mídia NINJA. This last perspective clearly surpasses a commercial approach to me-
dia and culture that argues that the cases only need money, which of course is partly true. For example,
the availability of ﬁnancial resources was central for CPEtv to acquire everything else. However, the
strong statement that only those organizations with enough funds can operate would mean that it
was impossible for resource-scarce media for social transformation to exist. Nonetheless, the empiri-
cal data clearly disconﬁrms this, suggesting instead a more varied number of resources that projects
could employ to maintain their sustainability, whenever there is not enough state support for their
projects. This is an important insight for other media for social transformation that are facing simi-
lar challenges, because it can inspire strategies beyond commercial ones, such as advertising, which
was not even enough in any of the cases to safeguard ﬁnancial sustainability. In effect, in chapter 8 I
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stressed the importance of relational resources of the cases, which allowed them to acquire others, not
necessarily depending on ﬁnancial intermediation. At the same time, I highlighted the importance of
the imaginaries of each case to attract supporters (both audiences and members of the project) without
the intermediation of a wage relationship. I agree that this might not be the most suitable strategy to
survive in a capitalist economy where most of the activities are intermediated by national currencies;
however, it has to be acknowledged that many of these cases are operating - and sustainably - with-
out wages and without employer-employee relations. My data suggests that the imaginary is the only
way to explain these practices that diverge from mainstream ones, because they offer local meaning
patterns and images of another future that encourages the members of the experiences to experiment
and continue their struggle, despite the apparent utopian nature of their projects for outsiders. Among
the remaining resources, I claimed that the structures for institutionalizing practices that CPEtv and
Mídia NINJA built were essential to replicate their practices, and were missing in the rest of the cases.
Particularly in the case of Mídia NINJA, which found a way to copy and disseminate its speciﬁc knowl-
edge of audiovisual production. I claim that this is an important observation and strategy for media for
social transformation to challenge a commercial perspective. In effect, one of the greatest challenges
of these experiences is to scale-up and build networks beyond their initial projects; and precisely the
institutionalization of their pioneering practices by subsequent members seems to be a key strategy to
challenge commercial practices.
In sum, in a world where the economic dimension of human life has been gaining more and more
importance, the spaces for organizations to depart from commercial principles are reduced. Thus, none
of the studied cases is clearly separated from for-proﬁt experiences, because through dispositives and
exchanges they have to interact with them, and also with the state. Nonetheless, media for social
transformation aim toward and experiment with different ways to elaborate information, and do not
consider it a mere commodity. The studied cases show two opposite poles with gradients in the middle
indicating possible paths to follow. One strategy is to accept many of these commercial practices, but
still disseminate alternative content, challenging that of mass media. As I showed with the co-operative
case, this is a feasible option. However, it also has the limits of not being radical enough to depart from
some practices that create excessive boundaries regarding what these organizations can cover. Having
said that, some media for social transformation are deeply questioning broader institutions to advance
their projects. Although this might seem utopian, given their scarce resources and size, I have argued
that these are valuable experiences, because of their contribution to diversify the space of potential
practices that inspires solutions for the problems contemporary economic systems are causing around
the world.
9.1 Policy Advice
The ﬁndings of this work lead to a number of policy suggestions for the development community and
national policies in Argentina and Brazil, which are synthesized in Table 9.1 and detailed below.
9.1.1 Development
What do these cases teach us about international ‘development’? First, it is worth pointing out that
the term ‘development’ was scarcely mentioned in the interviews I conducted, except the ones related
to the expansion of ideas emanating from international organizations based in Western countries. In
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Table 9.1: Synthesis of policy advice for the development community, Argentina and Brazil.
my opinion, this stresses the central problem of the discipline ‘development research’ and practice, be-
cause industrialized Western countries still speak of and try to disseminate their models as the best
ones, though during the last decades in less violent ways than before. At the same time, the imaginar-
ies of the four media for social transformation illustrate models on how culture, media, and in some
cases, society at large ought to be, different from the ones mainstream ‘development’ models propa-
gate. In effect, the co-operatives and workers’ self-managed factories want to reform the economy, the
indigenous communities aim to preserve and at best expand their own worldview and institutions be-
yond Western ones, and FDE and Mídia NINJA illustrate the emergence of networks that similarly are
experimenting with different ways of living and exchanging goods and services beyond established pat-
terns. These experiences might be classiﬁed by many observers as ‘utopian’ in a pejorative sense, given
the obvious supremacy of a capitalist economic model still heavily inﬂuenced by Western institutions.
Contrarily, from my point of view there are clear examples of alternatives experimenting with varied
patterns of living that address - in their own ways - their local quality of life problems, constituting
niches that remain mostly off the radar in Western and even national research on development. There-
fore, these observations once again point to the historically debated manifold meanings of the concept
of ‘development’. As I mentioned in the introduction, it is worth keeping in mind that despite its appar-
ent uniformity, indeed, it spans projects with different objectives and actors, that might get concealed
when people just speak of ‘development’, plus any other fancy extra adjective that might be added to
it, such as ‘feasible’, ‘green’, ‘inclusive’, ‘sustainable’, among others. Therefore, although ‘development’
might still be useful to tag professionals, practitioners, and others who claim to be working in this
ﬁeld, it needs to be continuously opened up in each context to grasp the diversity of perspectives, many
times in conﬂict with each other; or perhaps just be dropped for other concepts that better delineate the
differences. I advocate for this second perspective, particularly because of the diversity of alternatives
I detected at the grassroots level.
But if there really are many alternative grassroots experiences advocating and practicing with dif-
ferent institutions for living, why are they off the radar in national and international ‘development
research’? As regards the former, I hypothesize that one reason might be that they challenge - to
varying degrees - the authority of nation states. The clearest case would be a fulﬁllment of the most
extreme demands of indigenous communities, that, ultimately, want the political autonomy back they
had before the Spanish and later Argentinean conquest. Similarly, the case of the FDE network is
building parallel networks of exchange that aim to create a semi-autonomous exchange system inde-
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pendent of national currency and other institutions. Therefore, this suggests a latent conﬂict of visions
between these groups that created media for social transformation and the state as the unique agent
monopolizing the power to govern the national territory and diverse types of networks that sustain the
speciﬁc capitalist economic system. Given the history of Argentina and Brazil during the cold war, in
which the state opposed guerrillas and other revolutionary movements that radically challenged ex-
isting institutions, it is not a surprise that imaginaries striving for societal change, and co-operative
and collective lifestyles, might awake fear in the population originating from previous conﬂictive and
violent periods of national history. Nonetheless, this statement has to be rejected in the four cases
I studied, because they are proposing democratic and physically non-violent changes in the existing
structures. It is also worth to point out that many of the demands from these networks have a long his-
tory (like co-operatives and indigenous communities), but they have intensiﬁed their demands thanks
to the advancements of communications. Likewise, new networks emerged, such as FDE and Mídia
NINJA, which are unthinkable without these new technologies. Thus, I understand the four imaginar-
ies I analyzed and their respective media as examples of the increasing role that communications have
in paving the way for new groups and lifestyles to emerge, challenging state and private structures
from within. In other words, despite the hurdles that media for social transformation still encounter,
today they undoubtedly have more means to (re)produce their imaginaries than 100 years ago.
As regards the lack of international research of these alternatives, a similar argument can be made
in connection with the ongoing changes in international geopolitics. The emergence of the BRICS
countries and the growth of the Asian Tigers during the last decades, together with the slow decay of
inﬂuence of the USA and Europe, suggest that the world is in transition – albeit a sluggish one - toward
a multipolar world, where inﬂuence will be more diversiﬁed than in the last century. Therefore, it is safe
to hypothesize that the mainstream ideas disseminated from USA and relevant European countries,
such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, will become more challenged and rejected in the
future. Indeed, this is already taking place with what analysts call ‘neoliberal’ policies, predominant
in Western countries, where austerity, ‘markets’ and private initiative take the lead over anything
else. These concepts are being challenged, at least rhetorically, by left-wing political parties in South
America and even in the European ‘periphery’. Within this dispute of models of what sort of institutions
to follow, it is understandable that international organizations – which are not so international, but
rather Western biased – and mainstream research centers, mostly located in the USA and Europe,
will defend the ‘institutions’ and neoliberal policies they have been living with during the last decades.
Thus, I understand that the neglect of alternatives in mainstream development research is not based
on their inexistence or unreality, as orthodox analysts like to point out, but it rather is a reﬂection
of the existing, though decaying, power relations. However, it is becoming more difﬁcult for the main
centers to stop the ﬂow of these alternative models thanks to the expansion of global communications.
Take the extreme case of the Islamic State, which aims to create a new system of living, quite opposite
to many Western institutions, where different types of media (particularly social networks) have played
a central role in attracting followers. Even though this is a radical and morally reprehensible case, it
still is a good example of how culture and communication shall play a central role in the dissemination
and growth of non-Western models. But it is also true that new ways of control are emerging to avoid
the expansion of ‘alternatives’. For example, left-wing governments all around the world that tend to
receive little or biased coverage in mainstream Western media and research.
The global promotion of the creative economy policy discourses under the umbrella of broader strate-
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gies toward a knowledge economy cannot be separated from the previous global scheme. Indeed, the
mainstream policy discourse disseminated by UNCTAD, inspired by the UK experience and by the work
of Western academics and consultants, clearly takes side with the institutions in Western nations, indi-
rectly claiming their global validity. In particular, they implicitly defend the position that information
is just another commodity. Although it is hard to deny that such strategy might contribute to economic
growth, it is quite doubtful it will advance broader social and environmental objectives. Contrarily,
the original British version seems tailor-made for commercial transnational corporations, and for dis-
seminating the individualistic perspective predominant in Anglo-Saxon countries. Additionally, it is
worth to point out that the cultural imperialism thesis might have lost its prominence in academia,
but that does not mean that the phenomena it describes have disappeared into thin air. At least for
the Americas and many Western European countries, it is safe to say that the inﬂuence of US and UK
cultural industries is far superior to those of other countries. Indeed, it is more common to listen to
music, watch movies and access other products and services from those countries than from others.
Therefore, the argument that the cultural imperialism thesis is no longer valid due to ‘globalization’
and the increasing ﬂows of global communications misses the point, because international structures
still favor current and former global powers over others. Accordingly, it is not by chance that English
is a sort of lingua franca, and thus, it is understandable that the most powerful media and culture
organizations from those countries want to defend their access to and privileges in foreign markets, at
the expense of other perspectives. Similarly, national ﬁrms sharing similar commercial interests side
with this kind of approach, such as Globo in Brazil. In effect, these are the types of actors that would
beneﬁt more from the creative economy policy discourses, and even more from the version in which
strict intellectual property rights are enforced, particularly given the challenge the internet poses to
their preexisting media models.
On the one hand, the commercial approach to culture is particularly problematic in the case of
communications, where it would imply that information production ought to depend on its capacity
to generate proﬁts, limiting, overlooking and undermining alternatives. This notion of information
as a mere commodity favors the existing transnational ﬂow of information, still concentrated in few
Western countries. Thus, it does not only leave aside media for social transformation, but also non-
Western public media channels. In effect, the recent Ukraine crisis in Europe has been a good example
of such imbalances. The reporting of Western nations claimed to have the ‘objective’ facts of what was
going on, while the Russian media were accused of producing ‘propaganda’. This is another example
that reveals how media are quickly linked to political, and in this case, geopolitical issues. For this
reason, it would be unrealistic for leading Western nations to give up a commercial model where they
have an advantage to disseminate their perspectives over others, thus the change of the contemporary
structure will depend more on global transformations, difﬁcult – if not impossible – to predict. On
the other hand, and leaving aside such thorny political issues, if communication is as relevant for the
introduction of new practices as I have argued, it is in the interest of Western nations to employ media
to raise awareness of the global crisis threatening the survival of humanity on earth. Accordingly,
the role of media in ‘development’ needs to be seriously reconsidered. However, it seems that the
fear of a new dispute over the commercial model prevails; otherwise, communication and media would
have appeared in the Millenium Development Goals somewhere or would have been discussed in the
Sustainable Development Goals - an opportunity that unluckily seems to have been missed once again.
This is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed to disseminate content raising awareness of such
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global sustainable goals, in particular by grassroots projects that could deﬁnitely contribute to tackle
environmental and social concerns. Therefore, there is a need for international organizations to put
the role of media for social transformation back on the agenda.
9.1.2 National Policies
During the last twelve years, the geopolitical situation has changed signiﬁcantly both in Argentina
and Brazil with respect to the previous excessive inﬂuence of the USA, which has also gone hand in
hand with a questioning of European and other ‘international’ models. In contrast, more appropri-
ate projects of social transformation and change have started to emerge, and I think that states need
to pursue these speciﬁc directions, without cutting off a dialog with the other models, but by always
putting local and speciﬁc geopolitical constraints ﬁrst in both countries. In other words, to ‘tropicalize’
1 foreign inﬂuences in mixture with local practices. This also requires to further question the role of
international organizations and ‘deterritorialized experts’ who transfer ideas and practices in a top-
down way from speciﬁc contexts in industrialized countries to the rest, repeating a well-known pattern
in the development industry. However, these translations abuse the ‘status’ that consultants and aca-
demics in think tanks, international organizations or universities of industrialized countries have in
comparison with those in industrializing ones. Nonetheless, in many cases these ‘experts’ have little or
no knowledge whatsoever of the country in which they are diffusing their idea, with the possible neg-
ative consequence of misguiding policies, undermining local expertise, and producing collateral effects
that resource-scarce sectors of the population generally suffer from. Therefore, there is a need to as-
sess translation processes, and to open more space to a diversity of local specialists, and not just those
agreeing without questioning foreign ‘international’ ideas, just in exchange for temporary ﬁnancial
beneﬁts. Otherwise, the imposition of one vision on what sort of communication matters for develop-
ment will prevail, at the expense of a diversity of models that grassroots and other organizations are
experimenting with.
Although the introduction of new local models has not been without hurdles, I think that the con-
sideration of policies to reduce inequalities must remain a priority in Argentina and Brazil, and also
in other Latin American countries, because it is still one of the most unequal regions in the world. In
particular, this thesis partly examined how both countries have experimented with pioneering cultural
and media policies; for instance, Brazil with the Cultura Viva program as a way to address inequalities
in the cultural area, and Argentina with its new audiovisual communication services law. Both cases
show the central importance of cultural and media policies to reinforce the speciﬁc national political
projects that emerged in 2003. These initiatives are paving the way for further policies to revalue the
diversity of expressions of the multiple communities that make up the two countries: indigenous com-
munities, peripheral communities; different immigrant communities; Afro-descendant communities;
among others. Despite these promising policies to reduce inequalities, it is also true that commercial
policies for culture and media are still prevalent in both countries, disregarding the efforts of the latter.
I have argued that both need to be present at the policy level, but in a more balanced way. Therefore, I
think that a possible road to strengthen cultural and media policies so that they can tackle inequality
issues is to open up the policy planning process and advance with more participatory techniques of
1. The term ‘tropicalization’, or to make something appropriate for the tropics, tends to be used in Brazil to describe a process
of adoption and adaption of foreign models and practices. The adaptation part is particularly stressed, since it has historically
been omitted in many Latin American countries during the expansion of Western models.
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policy design and implementation. This would allow civil society organizations to speak with a clearer
voice on what they want, reducing authoritarian top-down models, where only the economically more
powerful interest groups and technocrats are heard.
Even though during the last ten years there have been changes to address the bias against resource-
scarce groups, there is still a lot of room for improvement. For example, broadening the deﬁnitions used
in tenders that in many cases just allude to commercial practices; training public ofﬁcials to understand
the discourses of minority communities; comprehending different economic systems of exchange, etc. In
short, both countries, which are still relatively young democracies, need to cultivate and institutionalize
tolerance to alternative views that challenge both the state and private corporations. Additionally, in
chapter 5 I examined four cases that point to the existence of broader and diverse networks of projects
striving for different models of societal organization. For example, the social and solidarity economy
and the emerging experiences through ICT that can be classiﬁed as part of a ‘collaborative economy’.
These offer different ways of organizing production, distribution and consumption to address the in-
equalities generated by the contemporary capitalist economic system. I think these different economic
exchange practices deserve further research to understand their contributions to tackle social and en-
vironmental challenges, and if positive, further support from the state to stimulate their activities.
After 30 years, both countries have returned to democratic systems; however, I have argued that
there are still many steps to take in order to further advance the democratization of other institutions,
such as culture and communications. If information is considered as a commons, one way to address the
ﬁnancial hurdles of NGO media would be for states to establish transparent and egalitarian systems
of distributing public propaganda, taking into account compensation mechanisms for the historically
unequal access to resources some groups suffered. The distribution of such funds could be reviewed
by representatives of diverse parties. In this way, the political administration in charge would be
prevented from taking control, and such distribution of funds would also pave the way for dissident
voices to appear across the country, enriching the diversity of opinions on issues of local and national
discussion.
Additionally, given the role that foreign technologies play as a dispositive to further advance com-
mercial principles, states could put into practice policies to produce appropriate local technologies for
these media to operate. In this way, the ‘script’ of these technologies would at least match the context
of operation of these media, and not translate those of commercial media in the ‘Global North’. I am
not naive to think this is something that can be easily done, given the high concentration patterns of
technological ﬁrms that exist in the world, like in Silicon Valley in the USA and similar regions in other
industrialized countries. Yet, this shows that, unless organizations unite against such concentration,
the creation of NGO media is highly threatened due to the pervasiveness of technologies oriented to-
ward for-proﬁt principles. At the same time, this local generation of technologies would help to address
the problems that contemporary practices of reinterpretation still have. One possibility to explore is the
association of civil society actors across Latin American countries facing similar challenges in order to
develop appropriate hardware and software for their media initiatives, among other nonproﬁt projects.
In effect, software co-operatives are already advancing in that direction. Deﬁnitely, this points to the
need of also broadening innovation projects to include not only projects of for-proﬁt ﬁrms, but also the
ones of co-operatives and other NGOs.
Apart from the stimulation of appropriate media technologies, in chapter 7 I revealed the role that
quality patterns have in limiting the spaces of operation of media for social transformation. These exist,
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in part, due to the social structure in both countries, but also due to the concentration of audiovisual
production ﬁrms and training institutes in the largest urban areas, aiming to provide human resources
for the private sector. Therefore, one way for the states to start ‘democratizing’ audiovisual production
knowledge is funding audiovisual training institutes in different parts of the countries. In such projects,
it will not only be important to transfer the practices from the capital to the rest of the territory, but
also to support a diversity of regional groups so that they can experiment with appropriate technologies
and new aesthetic schemes of audiovisual content production. This would reduce the inﬂuence of the
quality dispositive of audiovisual production knowledge aimed toward for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
The results on violence from chapter 8 point to four ways to reduce such limits to media organiza-
tions striving for social transformation. First, the unacceptable physical violence against journalists
must stop. Second, competition laws need to be closely enforced and in some cases updated to avoid
unfair competition practices. Third, the need to introduce and enforce appropriate media regulation
laws to avoid concentration patterns in few ﬁrms and to stimulate new media experiences, particu-
larly nonproﬁt and public ones. Last but not least, the continuous discursive violence that mass media
organizations exercise through libel and stereotyping against smaller organizations, individuals and
resource-scarce groups, also needs to be addressed somehow. This begs for the discussion of an instru-
ment to assure certain ethics in media reporting, which of course is a subtle issue given the thin line
separating freedom of speech, offense and repression. However, the current frameworks seem to favor
only the most economically endowed actors to cross such boundaries, while the less resourceful ones
remain defenseless against such attacks. Therefore, new measures need to be devised to address such
problems, to stop the reputations of the affected from being unfairly damaged in the ever more increas-
ing and connected societies we live in. A potential solution to explore might be to create a national
organization, with federal representation, which could receive complaints and decide based on the
gathered evidence, whether or not to initiate lawsuits against offenders. I think that an organization
of this type could at least try to balance the existing asymmetries.
In addition to these suggestions, I would like to detail speciﬁc ones addressing the situation in
Argentina and Brazil, below.
9.1.2.1 Argentina
The new audiovisual communication services law has unleashed substantial changes in Argentinean
media. However, it still faces several challenges in its implementation; for example, the legal battles
with the most concentrated and powerful ﬁrm that opposes its application, Clarín, which, so far, has
neither met the requirements regarding its downsizing nor regarding the inclusion of NGO and other
public media TV channels in their cable services. This puts the whole project of media democratization
under threat, and thus requires the continuous pressure of civil society actors to fully implement the
new law; a situation that will depend on the context of the national elections in 2015. At the same
time, the state has to fulﬁll the promises it adhered to, by treating all types of media equally, without
distinguishing between those closer to their political projects and those opposed to them. Another point
is to carefully open up the category ‘non-governmental organizations’ in the law, which in fact is a broad
tag that hides the asymmetries of the organizations that match such a deﬁnition. Moreover, the law
has not taken into account online media, an issue that might require further legislation in the nearby
future. Last but not least, the emergence of new media channels is still invisible, perhaps this could be
addressed by keeping and distributing a directory of all the new legalized media that are operating in
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the country. This would make their existence visible and might raise the interest of potential audiences.
9.1.2.2 Brazil
Brazil urgently needs a new media law, and of course I am not being creative at all in this recom-
mendation, because since 1991 it has been the demand of the FNDC. However, the comparaison of the
collected empirical data shows the imbalances between both countries: Whereas in Argentina there
has been a challenge to concentrated private media ﬁrms and an advancement to democratize media
production, Brazil still did not touch on this policy area much, apart from the stimulation from cultural
policies. This absence of state regulation has been detrimental to new media collectives, which despite
their circumstantial attraction of audiences, have been suffering higher and in some cases even deadly
levels of violence than similar experiences in Argentina. These situations damage the democratic sys-
tem in Brazil, because the voices of different minority sectors are ignored, or in the worst of the cases,
attacked and ridiculed. This once again is a political question that has reappeared on Dilma’s agenda
during her reelection campaign in 2014. The success and hurdles of the Argentinean experience might
be useful in the discussion of such a new law in Brazil, because it not only shows that it is essential
to change the legal framework to address unequal resource distribution in the media sector, but also
that this is not always enough. In a national political scenario where such change is still not possible,
the most promising space to challenge concentration of media is to continue promoting digital practices
and collectives, which was an essential part of the ﬁrst years of Lula’s government, but lost importance
during Dilma’s governments. Although it is a second best solution, it would still contribute to media
democratization by taking into account ongoing technological changes. However, it would still not touch
the remaining resource advantages that mass media ﬁrms, such as Globo, retain.
9.2 Further Lines of Research
The conceptual framework employed in this thesis can stimulate further lines of research about com-
munications for social change. First, I employed participant observation, which brought attention to
the material contexts of production that are often ignored in Latin America’s media research, mostly
focusing on content. Although it is true that the former requires far more resources and better access to
the cases than the latter, I claim that the efforts are valuable, because the combination of both types of
approaches offers deeper insights. In future research projects, these could be extended to other media
relevant for social transformation projects, such as the radio. Second, the research showed the fruitful
interconnections between media research concepts and those of science and technology and the phi-
losophy of technology, stressing the materiality and mediation of non-human objects in shaping these
media experiences, but also the existing spaces for reinterpretation. Additionally, I remarked the role
of ‘quality patterns’, which point to the relativity of ‘taste’ and the limits media for social transforma-
tion might encounter when trying to produce content in an innovative way. These dimensions could
be further studied by comparing different experiences operating with a variety of media technologies
and aesthetic patterns of production. Third, another possible future line of research is to compare the
role of different media (public, private, NGO) and their role in governance in varied Latin American
countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, etc. This is a central political issue in the region, due to
the ongoing media change processes. Fourth, the empirical data made evident the existence of a variety
of alternative and complementary currency systems, which offer promising ways to address national
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currency scarcity. These systems could be further studied with empirical methods from economics to
inquire about their pros and cons, and to offer insights for the design and implementation of media
systems less constrained by for-proﬁt principles. Fifth, the research stressed the role of discursive vi-
olence, in particular the dissemination of defamatory communications and stereotypes against media
for social transformation by mass media. The effects of these communications on audiences could be
further inquired by designing speciﬁc social psychology and media psychology experiments, which de-
pending on their results, might either inspire regulations against such types of violence or not. Last
but not least, with the examination of the case studies I stressed the existence and the importance of
varied discourses, which I called imaginaries, and the role of communication to advance these differ-
ent, inter-subjective perceptions of the world. I have argued that these played a very important role
in offering ‘subject-positions’ to attract viewers and also members, counter-balancing their lack of re-
sources. This begs the question of how and why some of these imaginaries have been more successful
than others, which requires the use of audience research strategies possibly in tandem with psycho-
logical research methods to understand what types of viewers access this media and why. On the one
hand, this could help to unveil consumption patterns, because it is without doubt that most of the pop-
ulation in Argentina and Brazil would immediately identify the names of the two mainstream media
groups; but, very few might have heard of the rest. This raises the question of what sort of factors
inﬂuence media consumption patterns, particularly with new media technologies that seem to offer a
major variety of sources. Is it a habit that persists throughout different media? How does it change
over time? What differentiates people who actively search media for social transformation from others?
These are not new discussions in communication research in Western countries, but they have not been
empirically researched in Latin America thoroughly, and in my opinion offer the potential to go deeper
into understanding the role of media for social transformation. On the other hand, such audience re-
search methods could include media experiments to inquire about the social-psychological processes in
operation during the interaction between viewers and the media content offered by media for social
transformation. These media mediated processes deserve further attention from researchers, because
the creation and change of practices through communication could contribute to advance and expand
more environmentally friendly lifestyles, which might look utopian from a mainstream perspective, but
which could still offer pathways for innovations to address the pressing global problems that human-
ity is facing in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the analysis of these psychological processes could
also shed light on other communication experiences of public concern; for example, far right extrem-
ist groups or radical religious organizations, such as the Islamic State or neo-Nazi organizations, who
appropriate widely available ICT and use media as a central tool to disseminate and reinforce violent
‘imaginaries’, despite the efforts of states to eradicate such radical and racist behaviors, even in the
most ‘developed’ nations.
To conclude, I want to stress that with this thesis I aimed to highlight the role of interpretations
and meanings to achieve intelligibility of the diverse types of human and technical organizations one
can ﬁnd in practice. I employed the analytical strategy of studying discourses, which suggests how
these constellations of statements lead to different types of strategies of organizing contemporary soci-
eties, inﬂuencing spaces for action and having power-effects. Accepting this perspective, it is inevitable
to revalue the importance of communication and culture for social transformations, because of their
theoretical role in disseminating a diversity of such discourses. However, the contemporary excessive
tendency of commercializing everything seems to limit diversity just to the space of commercial prac-
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tices, damaging democratic processes because of the exclusion of those actors not following such an
approach. From my point of view, the four studied examples offer inspiration to surpass such exces-
sive tendencies, because they try to experiment with different ways of producing information beyond
the guidance of for-proﬁt principles, albeit with obstacles. At the same time, I think this and similar
innovative niche networks can help overcome the impasse of ‘development research’, because these
networks of experiences are already proposing innovative new organizational methods and practices
to solve pressing social issues. For this reason, I believe they deserve to be studied in more detail,
and should not disappear from the radar, obfuscated by false analogies with dangerous and failed past
experiences (I mean the usual critique of collective experiences with communist dictatorships) or by
the comfortable pessimism of ‘elite’ armchair philosophers and social scientists from the West. Unfor-
tunately, these perspectives still have too much inﬂuence on ‘international’ organizations, but do not
have a positive affect on the lives of those who suffer the most in the world. This collective pain is
caused by the undeniable consequences of ongoing wars, inequalities, and systems bringing out the
worst of human biological impulses, where mainstream for proﬁt media do play an important role in
reinforcing many of these ominous tendencies. However, this research also suggests the existence of
projects of communication for social change contributing to alter these perceived inequalities, which to
me seems to be an essential contribution to ongoing processes of human emancipation, departing from
business as usual. It is my hope that this work will inspire further research in an age in which critical
voices have few spaces for expression and the stimulation of action.
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Appendices:
Appendix A: Interview Partners in Argentina
Figure 9.1 shows that I conducted a total of 33 interviews in Argentina with four types of actors. I had
thirteen interviews with policy makers, including those occupying a position at the time of ﬁeldwork
and others related to previous administrations. Moreover, I interviewed eleven different actors related
to the cases, but the graphic does not show the quantity of times, which in some cases was more than
once. Furthermore, I had interviews with media personnel and others related to mainstream and al-
ternative cultural practices in Argentina not strictly related to the three cases under analysis, which
helped to understand the different policy discourses in the country. Finally, the category academics
considers the interviews I had with professors that study policies related to culture and communica-
tion in the country.
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Figure 9.1: Interview partners in Argentina.
Appendix B: Interviews Partners in Brazil
Figure 9.2 shows that I conducted a total of 27 interviews in Brazil, divided into four categories. Ten
interviews were with members of Fora do Eixo and Mídia NINJA distributed in different cities of
Brazil. Seven interviews covered policy makers related to creative economy policy discourses in the
country, which includes those that were at that time in ofﬁce and others from previous administrations.
Additionally, I interviewed ﬁve practitioners in the ﬁeld of media and culture, who were not working
for Mídia NINJA in order to obtain more ﬁrsthand information on the delineated policy discourses of
chapter 4. Finally, the last two categories in the graphic cover interviews I conducted with academics
and consultants, who have knowledge about the policy discourses and in some cases about the case
under consideration as well.
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Figure 9.2: Interview partners in Brazil.
Appendix C: Interview Questions
The in-depth interviews were guided by open questions that inquired about several dimensions of
interest. The interview guides varied depending on whether the interviewee was a former or current
policy-maker/academic from the countries under analysis or practitioners related to the studied cases.
Below I include typical questions asked to policy makers, academics and practitioners. It is worth
to point out that for each interviewee the guide was adapted to research about speciﬁc information
about his or her experience and trajectory, which would shed light on the main research question of the
project.
Policy Makers and Academics
Policies and Politics
These set of questions aimed to gather information about the different perceptions on the changes in
politics at the national or regional level, with respect to the changes in policies in the area of culture
and media. It also included comparisons between Argentina and Brazil and within other policy areas.
• What is your opinion about the changes in the promotion of cultural or creative industries/ cre-
ative economy in country A/B in relation to the national political changes prior and posterior to
2003?
• What do you think about the effects that the use (or not) of the terms cultural or creative indus-
tries/ creative economy imply?
• What sort of conﬂicts do you highlight in this policy arena? Which actors are involved?
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• Which academics or experiences inspired the design of policies for the area of cultural or creative
industries/creative economy?
• What is your opinion about policy/program Y in the country?
• What do you think of the policy Y in country A/B with respect to the policies in country B/A?
• What is the role of actor X in the policy?
• What are the connections of cultural policies with those of the Ministry of ... (Communications,
Science and Technology, Economic Development, etc.)?
Intellectual Property
• What is the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) in cultural and media policies?
• What do you think about the inequalities in access to cultural and media expressions?
• What do you think about the promotion of alternatives IPRs schemes that have emerged? For
example, Creative Commons.
Cases
These set of questions aimed to capture outsiders’ perspectives on the cases under analysis.
• What is your opinion about case X?
• What challenges are they facing?
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Practitioners
About the Experience
These questions aimed to inquire about the historical process of creation of the cases
• How and when did the organization begin?
• How has the organization evolved in time?
• How is the experience organized?
Policies and Politics
These questions were similar to the ones asked to policy makers and academics in order to grasp
the perceptions of policies on their everyday activities.
• What is your opinion on the changes in the promotion of cultural or creative industries/economy
in country A/B in relation to the national political changes prior and posterior to 2003?
• What do you think about the effects that the use (or not) of the terms cultural or creative indus-
tries/ creative economy imply?
• What sort of conﬂicts do you highlight in this policy arena? Which actors are involved?
• What is your opinion about policy/program Y in the country?
• What do you think of the policy Y in country A/B with respect to the policies in country B/A?
Resources
• How many people work in the organization?
• What is their training?
• How do you sustain the operation of the organization?
• Which are the main partners of the organization?
Content
• Could you describe the process of content production of the organization?
• Has the organization innovated in the production process?
• What are the themes that the organization considers more important to cover?
Intellectual property
• Which is the strategy of the organization with respect to IPRs? Why?
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• What is the perspective within the organization about the promotion of alternatives IPRs schemes?
For example, Creative Commons.
Technology
• What sort of media technologies does the organization employ?
• How has the organization acquired them?
• Has the organization introduced further innovations in them?
• How does the organization experiment and learn from the application of new technologies?
Aesthetics
• What sort of aesthetic production schemes does the organization follow?
• How does the organization deal with mainstream schemes?
Violence
• What sort of conﬂicts has the organization endured since its creation?
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Appendix D: Elaboration of Statistics from Videos List
This annex describes the method employed to collect metadata about online videos generated by the
studied media organizations.
Step 1 - Selection of Sources
The ﬁrst step was to select the source or channel from where to obtain statistics and other infor-
mation about videos. In this research, I collected data from two types of sources: YouTube channel
videos and Twitcasting live transmissions. For example, from YouTube I gathered information about
the videos from Barricada TV, whereas from Twitcasting I collected information about the content from
Mídia NINJA.
Step 2 - Construction of the List of Web Pages with Videos to Study
The second step involved obtaining a complete list of web pages of all videos in each channel from
the case studies, which were useful to automatize the data extraction process in the following step. The
solution to this selection depended on the type of source under analysis. For the case of YouTube, the
best way was to consult the API that the site offers, because it easily allows to obtain the total list of
videos associated with a channel. In the case of Twitcasting, the technique was easier given that the
site names each video of the channels sequentially, thus it was simple to build the list of web pages by
taking the ﬁrst and last video.
Step 3 - Metadata Collection
The next step consisted in extracting useful data from the list of web pages with the videos from the
case studies. I accomplished this by employing the free service offered by Kimono Labs, an organization
whose software allows the user to collect structured information from web pages. The procedure was
quite simple to extract data from the webpages that appear in the same structure. For example, in the
case of YouTube I extracted the title of the video, its longer description, its duration, the number of
viewers, the number of likes and dislikes it received, and its publication date. Likewise, from Twitcast-
ing I gathered information about the title of the video, the number of viewers, its length and when it
was streamed.
Step 4 - Save Information into a Database
I exported the collected data from Kimono to a local database and modiﬁed the format of some vari-
ables to access them; for example, those that represent time, like the duration of the videos and the
date in which they were published.
Step 5 - Elaborate Statistics
Finally, I analyzed the data to build the statistics included in the thesis.
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Appendix E: Video from CPEtv, Argentina
To analyze and compare the different styles of news production in each of the four cases, I employed
the videohermeneutics method introduced by Raab & Tanzler (2012). In particular, I borrowed and
adapted the idea of score that captures different dimensions about the visual and audio data of a video.
Speciﬁcally, in this research I opened up the former in three dimensions: setting, camera movements
and captions, whereas the latter is extended in two dimensions: speech and music. This simple device
unveils the patterns of video production of each media organization, and most importantly, allows a
comparison among them. The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the video-
hermeneutics method to a video elaborated by CPEtv, where I include a description of each dimension
plus my comments. I highlight I employed “-” to indicate that there was nothing of interest to remark
in a given cell about the dimension under analysis. Similarly, I used the latin word “Idem” to indicate
that the content of a given cell is equal to the content of the previous one in time for a given dimension.
The video covers the ﬁrst block of the program CPE Notícias, broadcasted on August 7th, 2013.
Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
1 a 20 Symbols of the town are
shown, such as the central
plaza, the main street, the
lagoon, satellites of the
channel, the statue of an
indigenous community leader,
and the symbol of CPE
notícias.
- - - Background
music
21 Two journalists appear on the
studio. The man wears a suit
and the woman a formal dress,
both trying to give a
professional impression.
Both have laptops and sit in
front of a broad table. The
studio has a futuristic
background, and a big LED
TV.
The camera
zooms in to focus
on the
journalists.
- The male journalist starts
speaking and introduces the
programme, He asks the female
journalist how is she doing. The
woman replies, continues the
informal presentation and then
gives some comments on the
weekend in the city.
Change of
background
music -
lower
intensity
22-36 Idem
The camera
focuses on each
journalist
separately and
then both
together.
- Idem
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Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
37 Idem Idem Announces that
CPE received the
license from the
AFSCA and gives
the channel’s
address.
Idem
0:0:59 Idem Idem - The journalists exchange
superﬁcial comments on climate
and other local issues that they
will cover in the news.
Idem
1:53 - Idem - The male journalist mentions the
city’s mayor was present in a local
event and announced a better
transport system. The female
journalist reclaimed an “adequate”
bus system in Santa Rosa, making
evident the local issue with
transport.
Idem
2:19 - Idem - Both journalists comment about a
strike that was not endorsed by
the workers union. They seem to
be happy that the ﬁrm that used to
offer the service has been replaced.
Idem
3:30 - Idem - They speak about the accident that
took place in the province of
Córdoba (a gas explosion inside a
building).
Idem
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Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
4 Shows a number of images
that were collected during the
day in order to introduce the
news. They presented three
local news and a national one.
Fixed on the
images.
Shows a short
description of
each news.
The journalists brieﬂy introduce
the news of the day:
* San Cayetano’s day
* Five years since the agreement
between the nation and the
provinces of La Pampa and
Mendoza with respect to access to
water resources. The news show
the position of a local NGO,
Chadileyvú Foundation, which
produced a “hard document”
calling it a dead agreement,
because it had not advanced at all.
* Two days of national mourning
due to the accident that took place
in the province of Córdoba.
* A local female boxer defended the
title in the city against a Puerto
Rican opponent.
Change of
music -
louder than
before.
5:37 Returns to studio.
Focused on the
female reporter.
- She explains in detail the news
about San Cayetano’s.
No music.
6:07 Shows the footage where they
interviewed a priest.
Close up showing
the priest, the
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Explains the day
August 7th is the
day of San
Cayetano.
A priest from a parish in Santa
Rosa explains how they are
celebrating the day of San
Cayetano, and also gives details on
why they celebrate such day.
No music,
just
background
noise of
people
assisting to
the
celebration.
6:20 Shows a parish. - - Idem
6:27 Shows people touching a
statue of San Cayetano.
- - Idem
6:41 Returns to show the priest.
Close up showing
the priest, the
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Explains the day
August 7th is the
day of San
Cayetano.
Idem
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Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
6:49 Show more images of the
preachers, candles, many old
people touching the saint and
things that they sell.
- - Idem
7:31 Exhibits the priest blessing a
woman.
- - The priest explains San Cayetano
is one of the most revered saints in
Argentina, even more than in Italy.
Idem
7:34 Returns to show the priest.
Close up showing
the priest, the
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Explains August
7th is the day of
San Cayetano.
The priest explains the context
where San Cayetano worked and
that he was a count who donated
his wealth.
Idem
7:51 Shows people from the parish
selling diverse objects related
to the celebration.
- - Idem
8:12 Returns to focus on the priest.
Close up showing
the priest, the
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Cites “His motto
was always
providence”.
Idem
8:20 The images focus on
preachers.
- - Idem
8:48 Returns to focus on the priest.
Close up showing
the priest, the
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Reappears
mentioning the
priest belongs to
the local San
Cayetano parish.
The interviewer asks what
believers usually request to San
Cayetano, not surprisingly, he
answered “work”.
Idem
8:55 The symbol of the channel
reappears to make a
transition.
- - - Transition
music.
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9:00 Shows an image of young men
running, which illustrates a
brief news about an athletism
event in the city.
Focuses on the
image.
Brief description
of the news.
A journalist announces an
athletism event that would take
place in the Don Tomás Park,
destined to athletes with
intellectual disabilities.
Uses the
same
background
music than
during the
previous
news
summary.
9:30 Returns to studio.
Focuses on the
male journalist.
- The male journalist introduces
news about neighbors of the city
that decided to get together to
show different artistic expressions
in order to complain against a
decision of the city’s mayor, who
wants to modify the Oliver Park.
No
9:56 Interview with one of the
neighbors gathered at the
park Oliver.
Centered on the
face of the
interviewee. The
microphone of
CPEtv is seen,
but not the
reporter.
Mentions the
name of the
interviewee,
Guillermo Tondo.
Explains what they are planning
to do and what do they expect from
the municipality.
Idem
10:21 Shows images of what the
citizens are doing in the park
to protest against the mayor’s
decision.
- - The citizens reclaim the
reconstruction of the oval that was
previously located in the Oliver
Park, which , as the images show,
has been destroyed by the
municipality.
Idem
10:43 Returns to show the male
interviewee.
Centered on the
face of the
interviewee.
Introduces the
news and adds
“We demand
answers from the
municipality”.
Idem
11:00 Returns to show the destroyed
oval in the park.
- - Idem
11:14 - - - A female voice starts to comment,
once again no question was heard.
She expressed that they received
support of neighbors who are
happy that there is someone caring
to recover that public space.
Idem
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11:18 Shows a close-up of a female
interviewee.
Shows a close-up
of a female
interviewee.
Introduces the
female citizen
Elina Alonzo
Porcel.
Idem
11:36 Once again images of people
working trying to rearm the
oval.
- - Idem
11:43 Shows that citizens are
building a message with the
bricks of the remaining oval.
- - Idem
11:55 Returns to the interviewer
Shows a close-up
of a female
interviewee.
Introduces the
female citizen
Elina Alonzo
Porcel.
Idem
12:01 Transition signal of CPE
noticias
- - - Background
music.
12:07 Returns to the studio.
The camera
focuses on both
journalists.
- The female journalist anticipates
the ﬁrst break and the next news
to show.
The
background
music level
increases as
they get
closer to the
cut.
12:35 The male journalist writes on
a page, while the female
journalist uses her notebook
The camera
makes a slow
zoom out.
- -
12:44 The video closes with the
transition signal of CPE
noticias.
- - - Transition
music.
340
Appendix F: Video from Barricada TV, Argentina
The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method explained
in Appendix E to a video elaborated by Barricada TV. The video is part of the program Noticiero Pop-
ular that discusses the decriminalization of marijuana for personal use. It was broadcasted on June
22th, 2011.
Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
1 to
10
Shows a photo of IMPA’s
building, which has an
antenna at its top,
emitting TV radio waves.
- Barricada TV’s
symbol appears
during all the
transmission at
the top right part
of the image.
- Rock
music.
0:11 The interviewers are two
female journalists from
Barricada TV. The
interviewee is Sebastián
Basalo, director of THC
magazine. They sit
around a circular table.
The background wall has
red and black colors and
the symbol of Barricada
TV.
Films at a
distance to cover
the three on the
studio.
- The journalists ask questions about the
political situation and the project that the
interviewee defends. He replies with
details; for example, he says that 400.000
people had their human rights violated due
to the drugs law and that they are precisely
trying to change such situation by
discussing a new law in congress.
NO
0:16 - Makes a close up. Introduces the
theme and the
interviewee.
1:20 Shows images of a
mobilization in front of
the national congress.
Protesters carried several
banners, for example
saying “Decriminalization
NOW!”.
- - The interviewee goes on explaining the new
project to replace the current drugs law.
NO
1:27 Returns to the studio. - - NO
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1:34 - Shows two
panels: on the
right, the
coverage of
protestors in
favor of the new
law; on the left,
the studio.
- The interviewer remarks that 20 years had
to pass to make evident that the consumers
are not a problem, but the drug dealers,
who are not persecuted, because the focus is
mostly on consumers. In his opinion, these
trafﬁckers have only expanded in the
country thanks to the current law, which
also led Argentina to become the leading
country in consumption of marijhuana and
cocaine in Latin America. Therefore, he
advocates for the decriminalization of drug
consumption and for a new law to persecute
trafﬁckers.
NO
3:45 - The image now
only focuses on
the face of those
at the studio.
It synthesizes
the theme and
the name of the
interviewee.
The central point of the new project is that
consumers detected with small amounts of
drugs will not be penalized; instead, the
focus will be on trafﬁckers. Thus, the police
will need to gather evidence on those that
commercialize drugs and not on consumers.
NO
5:55 - Focuses on the
second female
journalist.
- A journalist asks about the role of the THC
magazine on the debate about the new law.
NO
6:44 - Focuses on the
interviewee.
- Although they did participate in the
creation of the new law project, the
interviewee replies that the main function
of the magazine is to inform. He is also very
clear that they are not vindicating drug
consumption, but giving information on the
pro and cons.
NO
8:06 - Focuses on
journalists.
- A journalist refers to an article in another
online Argentinian journal, which says that
Monsanto is planning to produce different
types of transgenic seeds. She plays with
the idea that the ﬁrm might produce
transgenic drugs.
NO
8:22 Shows both panels: on the
left, the mobilization; on
the right, the studio.
Focuses on the
interviewee.
- The interviewee replies that Monsanto is
not a ﬁrm that thinks in the social good.
NO
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8:55 - - - A journalist asks about the studies of the
marijuana route that the interviewee
elaborated.
NO
9:28 Returns to the studio. - The name of the
interviewee
reappears below
the screen.
The interviewee answers back, making an
historical connection that stresses that the
ﬁrst drug law was sanctioned during the
dictatorship of the 1970s. From his point of
view, the intention of the law was not to
stop its commercialization, but to
implement a sort of social control of young
and poor sectors of the population, by
imprisoning them if detected with drugs.
NO
10:44 Shows only images of the
mobilization.
The image says
“to cultivate is a
right!” The
mobilization was
massive and took
place in the
Plaza de Mayo in
Buenos Aires.
-
11:17 Shows just the studio. - - The interviewee explains another problem
of the current law, which rewards policemen
for the number of cases of drug consumers
that they collect. The interviewee
highlights that the government uses these
indicators to show how well they are
ﬁghting against drug trafﬁcking; but
according to him, these statistics hide that
more than 70% of those detentions were of
small consumers, 20% are doubtful cases,
and just 3% were related to
commercialization.
NO
11:53 Shows both panels: on the
left, the mobilization; on
the right, the studio.
- - The interviewee explains that the new
project also received the opposition from
those few organizations that offer help to
addicts. From his perspective, this can be
explained by the business behind such
service, because the new law wants to
diffuse enough capabilities in hospitals to
deal with addicts, which would damage the
business interests of those organizations.
NO
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12:31 Studio. Returns to show
just the studio,
and changes
focus from
interviewee to
interviewers.
It appeared
again showing
the theme and
who is being
interviewed.
A journalist asks how the new law is
proposing to support addicts and not just
casual consumers.
NO
13:20
Idem Idem -
The interviewee explains his position
against the commercialization of health for
addicts, and illustrates the dangers of such
perspective with the law for insane people
in Argentina. According to the interviewee,
internees do not have a date to leave
asylums and believes that situation is even
worst than being in prison.
NO
14:30 The interviewee accentuates that the new
drug law should punish those that
commercialize drugs and not consumers.
NO
14:50 A journalist makes a last question on what
sort of effect the proposal might have in the
context of the elections that were about to
take place. The interviewee replies it is a
good moment, because it would push
candidates who usually avoid the topic, to
make a public statement about it.
NO
15:37 One of the journalists thanks the
interviewee and ends the interview.
NO
15:38 The same image of the
beginning is used: a photo
of IMPA’s building, which
has an antenna at its top
emitting TV radio waves.
- - - Rock
music.
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Appendix G: Video from Wall Kintun TV, Argentina
The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method to a video
elaborated by Wall Kintun TV, uploaded to their Facebook account on April 16th, 2014.
Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Caption Speech Music
0:13 Shows Wall
Kintún TV’s
symbol, and a
subtitle that says
“Voices from the
Wall Mapu”.
- - - Yes
0:14 The interview
takes place in
front of a room
that belongs to
the coordinating
ofﬁce of the
parliament of the
Mapuche people
in the province of
Río Negro,
Argentina.
The camera
focuses on the
interviewee.
Shows the name
of the
interviewee,
Domingo
Collueque,
explaining he is a
Mapuche leader
of the region.
The video starts with interviewer and
interviewee greeting each other with “mari
mari lamngen” that in Mapuzungun is like
saying “hello brother/sister”. The
interviewer is part of the team of Wall
Kintún TV, though she does not appear on
screen, just her hand with the microphone.
No
0:20 - - - The interviewer asks in Spanish why the
interviewee had a meeting at the Mapuche
parliament.
Idem
0:28 - - Shows the
Spanish
transcription.
The interviewee answers back in
Mapuzungun. From the Spanish subtitle it
is clear that they gathered to share
information and experiences among them.
Idem
1:05 - - - The interviewee switches to Spanish and
explains that their aim is to denounce what
local politicians are doing, disobeying the
“land”, which according to the Mapuche
belongs to them.
Idem
1:10 Shows the rest of
the Mapuche
present at the
meeting, who are
mostly elderly.
- - - Idem
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1:35 - Shows a close-up
of the
interviewee.
- The interviewee is direct in his statements,
arguing that politicians want to eliminate
indigenous people in order to appropriate
the land.
Idem
2:04 Shows an image
of a sewage (it is
not explained
from where it
was taken), but
the point was to
illustrate the
statement about
water pollution.
- - The interviewee denounces that politicians
and businessmen want to pollute the
environment, such as water resources.
Idem
2:07 - Close-up of
Domingo
Collueque.
- The interviewee understands that
politicians, powerful lawyers and
technicians lie to them, because they say
their actions will not damage the
environment, but the Mapuche distrust
such statements. The interviewee further
claims that future problems will be related
to: a) scarcity of food; b) scarcity of animals
which are disappearing because of “them”,
“capitalists” that bring millions to deceive
the communities by saying they will be well
fed. But the interviewee expressed his
mistrutst by saying “Only those who are
working for the state will be well fed, but
not the indigenous communities”.
Idem
3:40 - - Shows the name
of the
interviewee,
Domingo
Collueque,
explaining he is a
Mapuche leader
of the region.
The interviewee argues that indigenous
communities have the right to defend
themselves and to raise awareness of what
is happening in the territories.
Idem
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4:17 Shows an image
portraying the
typical steppe
landscape of the
province of Río
Negro, with
several guanacos
moving in group.
- - - Idem
4:20 - Close-up of
Domingo
Collueque.
- According to the interviewee, the damage
caused to the environment will be both a
problem to indigenous communities and to
white men. So he reinsists with the need to
make politicians and businessmen
understand that they need to stop
destroying the land, in particular those
inhabited by indigenous communities.
Idem
4:39 Shows an image
of a tractor
pulling down a
tree.
- - - Idem
4:43 - Close-up of
Domingo
Collueque.
- The interviewee continues saying that he
cannot believe what white men are doing
with land and water. Expresses that many
animals and plants are being lost, because
they are being poisoned.
Idem
4:55 Shows an image
of a couple of
goats, and after
three seconds
switches to
another image of
a bird in an
empty and dry
landscape.
- -
5:00 - Close-up of
Domingo
Collueque.
-
The interviewee gives more details; for
instance, says white men have invaded and
changed the landscape in hills where the
Mapuche have the graveyard of their
ancestors. Moreover, thinks that some lakes
are drying in an irreversible way, affecting
agriculture.
Idem
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5:42 They show an
image of a dry
ﬁeld, followed
after few second
by another one of
a small drying
lake.
-
5:52 - Close-up of
Domingo
Collueque.
6:02 - - Shows the name
of the
interviewee,
Domingo
Collueque,
explaining he is a
Mapuche leader
of the region.
6:04 - - Idem The interviewer thanks the interviewee for
the interview, and the video ends with both
greeting each other saying “peukallal”,
which in Mapuzungun means bye.
Idem
6:09 Shows once
again the initial
Wall Kintún TV’s
symbol, and the
subtitle that says
“Voices from the
Wall Mapu”.
Idem
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Appendix H: Video from Mídia NINJA, Brazil
The following table shows a fragment of the result of applying the videohermeneutics method to a video
elaborated by Mídia NINJA. In contrast to other videos, in this case there are no captions, because the
video was transmitted live without further edition from Rio de Janeiro on March 8th, 2014 .
Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Speech Music
0-4:00 The video starts with the
camera pointing to a
group of garbage
collectors, who have
drums and are dancing
and singing in front of the
public building of the
labor court in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. Most
participants in the protest
are Afro-descendants,
which suggests the racial
division existing in this
work.
Moves around
the place, with
bumps and low
image quality
deﬁnition.
- Just songs
from the
protestors,
who sang
against the
world cup.
4:00 Idem - The Mídia NINJA journalist gives some comments
on what is going on, repeating what a garbage
collector with a loudspeaker is communicating.
Idem
4:52 Image and sound frozen. - - Nothing
4:53 The image remained
frozen.
- The audio returned, highlighting the voice of a
protestor with a loudspeaker.
Idem
7:07 The image returns and
moves in the same setting
in front of the public
building.
The camera
moves around,
showing the
people in the
protest.
The Mídia NINJA journalist describes how the
negotiation is evolving, explaining that a group is
entering the building to discuss with public ofﬁcials.
He also keeps on summarizing messages that the
speaker of the garbage collectors is communicating.
Idem
349
Time
h:m:s
Visual data Audio data
Setting Camera Speech Music
10:28 Idem Makes a close-up
to the
interviewee.
The Mídia NINJA journalist starts speaking with
garbage collectors. First, the journalist asks a man
about his opinion on the meetings and the evolution
of the negotiation. The interviewee is happy that at
least they have started a dialogue after eight
continuous days of strike. The interviewee explains
how many of them received threats to stop from
striking, but he and many others still decided to
mobilize. He also tells he works since 18 years as a
garbage collector and explains how little they get
paid.
Idem
14:44 A second protestor comes
close to the Mídia NINJA
Journalist to express his
point of view.
Makes a close-up
on the second
interviewee.
The second interviewee explains his point of view
about the injustices they are suffering. In particular,
how they received threatening letters of dismissal.
He also elaborates his point of view of the situation
and about the problems of the garbage collecting
system.
Idem
21:48 Idem Passes from the
interviewee n° 1
to n° 2.
The Mídia NINJA journalist gives a summary of
what they are covering, mentions how many viewers
are following the live transmission.
The music
stops, but
protestors’s
voices
remain on
the
background.
22:49 Idem. Focuses on the
news article.
Interviewee n° 2 brings a newspaper article of the
day and explains what it says to the Mídia NINJA
journalist. This improvised act by the interviewee is
evidence of the open characteristic of the
transmissions and of the unplanned participation of
citizens.
Idem
25:00 Idem The camera
moves around
the place, but
with bumps and
low image
quality
deﬁnition.
Another protestor asks the Mídia NINJA journalist
how they are ﬁlming and transmitting. The
journalist replies with a brief explanation of their
working process and technology.
Idem
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27:00 The journalist moves to
the top of the stairs of the
labour court’s building.
This gives another
perspective of the protest.
The camera
makes a closeup
to a new
interviewee.
The interviewee n° 3 explains who where the ones
that entered into the negotiation and how.
Idem
27:32 - - The sound was lost. Nothing
27:42
Idem
The camera
makes a closeup
to a new
interviewee.
The sound returns and the Mídia NINJA journalist
asks a fourth interviewee the reasons why they are
mobilizing.
Protestors’s
voices
remain on
the
background.
30:50 It captures
different points
of view, while the
journalist moves
with the camera.
The Mídia NINJA journalist starts to move and
makes once again a summary of the situation.
Idem
32:49 Focuses on
another
journalist that is
streaming with a
cellphone.
Both journalists belong to “independent media”, and
brieﬂy exchange some points of view of what is going
on. The Mídia NINJA journalist remarks the
importance of such media to offer a counter
narrative to the one diffused by mass media.
Idem
34:10 Focuses on a
sixth
interviewee.
A protestor comes close to the Mídia NINJA
journalist, shows him a banner that says “Brazil!
Help to clean Rio de Janeiro”, and he then gives
some comments illustrating his point of view.
Idem
35:00 The Mídia NINJA
journalist moves away
from the stairs, and takes
a distance of around 30m
from the front door of the
labour court building.
Moves around
the place.
- Idem
37:00 Idem Focuses on a
protestor with a
loudspeaker.
The protestor with the loudspeaker explains the
situation and how the garbage collectors are
suffering. He also motivated the protestors to keep
on stuggling.
Idem
37:43 The image froze. - The voice of the speaker continues, while the image
is frozen.
Nothing
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44:40 The image is intermittent. Focuses on a
seventh
interviewee.
Interviewee n° 7 brieﬂy gives his perspective and
hopes they will triumph with the mobilization.
Another Mídia NINJA journalist took the camera
and summarizesd what was going on.
Protestors’s
voices
remain on
the
background.
45:38 Same place, moving
across the street in front
of the labour court.
Focuses on a
banner
The Mídia NINJA journalist reads a banner against
the Globo network that garbage collectors prepared.
Idem
46:03 The image is intermittent. Moves around
the place, and
goes once again
near the main
door to the
building.
- -
47:30 Same place, moving
around.
Moves around
the place.
The Mídia NINJA once again makes a summary of
the conﬂict and on what is going on, while he moves
around the place.
-
50:34 Idem Idem The sound is silenced, though this time on purpose
by the Mídia NINJA journalist.
Nothing
52:02 Idem Idem Another Mídia NINJA journalist carries the camera,
explains he replaced his colleague and that Mídia
NINJAs operate in this collective way, distributed
across Brazil. He then diffuses the web pages of
garbage collectors in internet and explains these
media helped them to get organized, because they
did not have a trade union nor were they connected
with political parties. Thus, social networks allowed
protestors to exchange experiences and mobilize
against a situation they consider unfair.
Protestors’s
voices
remain on
the
background.
54:30 Idem Focuses on more
interviewees
(three females
and two males),
the camera
passes from one
to the other
when they speak.
One of the male interviewee explains how they are
being exploited, and the other interviewees complain
about the large quantity of hours they have to
withstand. He also comments that the Globo
network is ignoring the issue. The journalist asks
the women how do they experience their work,
trying to learn about gender differences, but the
women just reply that collecting garbage is the same
work for both.
Idem
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1:00:02 Idem Moves around
the place.
The Mídia NINJA journalist explains once again
that garbage collectors’ salaries are ridiculously low,
which pushes them to get other jobs or to ask for
money from friends and to employ diverse strategies
of survival. But this should not be taking place,
given that they are offering a public service for the
city.
Idem
1:00:04 - - Sound is lost. Nothing
1:00:05 Idem Moves close to a
new female
interviewee.
The sound returns and the Mídia NINJA journalist
moves next to a female garbage collector, who
explains his part in the conﬂict, but it is not clear
given that on the background someone is using a
loudspeaker that distorts the audio.
Very loud
background
noise.
1:10 Idem Idem The interviewee n° 13 details the conﬂict and gives
information about herself, what she studied and her
life. She explains the diffult situation they are
facing with the low salaries they have, which is
contrary to the type of beneﬁts that those in higher
positions of the ﬁrm or public ofﬁcials have.
Idem
1:14:20 Idem Idem The Mídia NINJA journalist makes a summary of
what the woman says and expresses the sound
quality is not good. The woman highlights she
started to work with only 5 years old, in order to
satisfy basic needs. She then starts to compare and
contrast the negative stereotypes against garbage
collectors versus her reality of daily effort and
struggle.
Protestors’s
voices
remain on
the
background.
1:17:44 Idem A male
interviewee joins
the conversation.
The interviewee n° 14 gives more details on the
conﬂict. After this, he announces new information
from the meeting that has been taking place,
arguing that the authorities are trying to delay a
solution for a month, and of course expresses his
anger against such suspected intentions. The female
complains how the authorities complain about
protestors, but she remarks that they do not have
any idea of the sort of work garbage collectors daily
do nor the time and effort it takes to ﬁnish them.
Idem
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1:22:51 The image is intermittent. Idem The woman keeps on detailing her point of view.
Later the man expresses his opinion that the
situation has not improved much during the last 25
years, also that the trade union has not been of
much help, and that is why they distrust them.
Idem
1:30:54 After hearing a bit more the perspective from the
interviewee n° 14, the transmission ends abruptly.
Idem
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Appendix I: Local Terms
The following list summarizes a group of terms that are used in the text, indicating the language in
which they were originally expressed and its connotation in the context of use.
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Term Language Meaning
Arrastrão Brazilian Portuguese Refers to a group of criminals that act together to steal
objects in a public space, which is frequent in the beaches of
Rio de Janeiro.
Bariloche Mapuche language People from behind the mountain.
Caixa coletivo Brazilian Portuguese Organizational technology of FDE to manage ﬁnancial
resources collectively.
Colunas Brazilian Portuguese The translation of the term is “columns”, but in the context of
this research it refers to trips that members of FDE plan and
execute to nearby cities and towns in Brazil or foreign
countries.
Griôs Brazilian Portuguese This neologism is a Brazilian word inspired by the term griot,
which refers to West African storytellers who keep the
tradition through oral stories. In contrast, in the Brazil the
concept was broadened to include any person (not only
Afro-descendants) who shares stories and traditions of
particular Brazilian communities.
Quilombo Brazilian Portuguese Hinterland settlements founded by Afro-Brazilians, most of
them who escaped slavery.
Kultrún Mapuche language A traditional Mapuche musical instrument.
Imersões Brazilian Portuguese The translation of the term is “immersion”, but in the context
of this research it refers to intensive training sessions that
take place usually in one of FDE houses.
Lonko Mapuche language Chief of a Mapuche community.
Mapunzugun Mapuche language The name of the language of the Mapuche indigenous
community.
Piqueteros Spanish This word is an Argentinean neologism that refers to street
mobilizations that emerged in Argentina during the 1990s
and reached their peak after the economic crisis of 2001. The
demonstrators, who blocked streets and occupied
governmental buildings, faced different conﬂictive situations
with the police and citizens not sharing their views.
Povos de terreiro Brazilian Portuguese This refers to Afro-descendant communities in Brazil and
their spaces to preserve African worldviews and religious
practices. They are also are important for strengthening the
social ties in their location.
Ruka Mapuche language Houses of the Mapuche built following their worldview.
Wall Kintun Mapuche language To look or search around.
Wall Mapu Mapuche language The territory where the Mapuche lived before the Spanish
conquest.
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